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## **Abstract (English)**

The Civil war in Syria has caused half of its population to flee, creating more than 6 million refugees. European Union countries with their huge social support programmes are undoubtedly the places refugees are most willing to reside in. With Angela Merkel's declaring 'Wir schaffen das', Germany opened its doors to refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq and many others. Admittedly, the countries refugees are arriving from such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq are the countries where Jews are commonly perceived as enemies. What is more, Anti-Semitic stereotypes and propaganda from the Arabic world and North Africa are also widespread across European countries. These kinds of prejudices come not only from Muslim migrants coming to Europe, but also from the average European and are a stubborn predisposition among them. The aim of this thesis is to analyse contemporary anti-Semitic rhetoric in Germany and its influence on the political climate in the country. The research question asks; has the rapid growth of the Muslim population in Germany contributed to the growth of animosity directed toward Jews in the country? For the purpose of analysis, the constructivist approach was used, which considers international relations as well as everything in the world to be 'socially constructed', thus, to be an interaction between agents. The Master's thesis is divided into four chapters. The first section of this paper will establish the context of what problems European and especially German societies faced in 2015. The second part of the thesis will present a description and analysis of the German identity explaining the reasons why Germans are easily influenced by social and political changes in society, if they are influenced at all. The third part will deal with the characteristics of the refugees coming to Germany. The fourth chapter will describe the overall political climate and assess the possible dangers of the situation. The outcome of the thesis will show that the refugee crisis brought a sudden demographic change to German cities and has fuelled far-right populism. The AfD party, which strongly focuses on identity, is distinguished from the more traditional parties and is promising to satisfy a desire for patriotism among the Germans at the time when Germany is ashamed to be proud of its culture. Questions remain as to whether the AfD's presence in the German Parliament will contribute to growing division and how the German political system will be able handle these challenges.

## **Abstract (German)**

Der Bürgerkrieg in Syrien hat die Hälfte der Landesbevölkerung in die Flucht gezwungen und mehr als 6 Millionen Flüchtlinge geschaffen. Mit der Erklärung der deutschen Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel "Wir schaffen das" hat Deutschland seine Türen für Flüchtlinge aus Syrien, Afghanistan, dem Irak und vielen anderen Ländern geöffnet. In den genannten Ländern herrscht oftmals eine feindliche Einstellung gegenüber Anhängern des jüdischen Glaubens. In den europäischen Ländern sind antisemitische Stereotype und Propaganda aus der arabischen Welt und Nordafrika ebenfalls weit verbreitet. Solche Vorurteile stammen nicht nur von muslimischen Einwanderern, die nach Europa kommen, sondern auch von durchschnittlichen Europäern. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die antisemitische Rhetorik in Deutschland und deren Einfluss auf das politische Klima im Land zu analysieren. Die Forschungsfrage lautet: Hat das schnelle Wachstum der muslimischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland zur Zunahme der Feindlichkeit gegenüber Anhängern des jüdischen Glaubens im Land beigetragen? Das Ergebnis dieser Arbeit zeigt, dass die sogenannte Flüchtlingskrise einen plötzlichen demografischen Wandel vor allem in die deutschen Großstädte gebracht und den rechtsextremen Populismus angeheizt hat. In einer Zeit, in der sich die Wahrnehmung vieler Deutschen in Bezug auf die eigene Kultur immer noch in Scham äußert, setzt die Partei Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) stark auf nationale Identität als Mittel der Politik. Es bleibt die Frage, ob, unter Betrachtung der Fragestellung, die Präsenz der AfD im Deutschen Bundestag zur Veränderungen in dem deutschen politischen System beitragen wird.

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## **Abbreviations**

<b>AfD</b>	Alternative for Germany (party)
<b>ALLBUS</b>	German general survey
<b>BMI</b>	The German Federal Ministry of Internal affairs
<b>CDU</b>	The Christian Democratic Union of Germany
<b>CETA</b>	The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
<b>CSU</b>	The Christian Social Union in Bavaria
<b>DW</b>	Deutsche Welle (News)
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDP</b>	The Free Democratic Party (Germany)
<b>FRA</b>	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
<b>FRG</b>	The Federal Republic of Germany
<b>GDR</b>	The German Democratic Republic
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organizations
<b>NPD</b>	The National Democratic Party of Germany
<b>NSDAP</b>	The National Socialist German Workers' Party
<b>SPD</b>	The Social Democratic Party of Germany
<b>SS</b>	The Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)
<b>TiSA</b>	The Trade in Services Agreement
<b>TTIP</b>	The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## Introduction

Germany is a developed democratic state which, at first glance, has succeeded in its policy of regret for the Holocaust, and has gained respect all over the world, yet deeper research shows that anti-Semitism is still widespread, and the high volumes of Muslim immigrants coming to Germany over the last couple of years has deteriorated the situation. Anti-Semitism is one form of national intolerance, based on prejudice, expressed as a hostile attitude towards Jews as an ethnic or religious group, and is one variety of xenophobia. The term refers only to hostility towards Jews, and not to all the peoples of the Semitic language group. In the present study, anti-Semitism is defined as hatred toward Jews, expressed in rhetorical and physical manifestations. This includes, but is not limited to harming Jews in the name of ideology, making stereotypical allegations about Jews, a denial of genocide of the Jewish people etc.<sup>1</sup>

Due to the Civil war in Syria, half of its population has been displaced, creating more than 6 million refugees. Half of these refugees have moved to Turkey, others to Lebanon and Jordan, considerably stretching resources in these countries, resulting in humanitarian, political and economic problems in an already unstable region. With their huge social support programmes, EU countries are undoubtedly the places refugees are most willing to reside. Angela Merkel's *Willkommenskultur* has resulted in more than a million Muslim immigrants arriving in Germany since summer of 2015. Admittedly, the countries they are arriving from such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq are the countries where Jews are commonly perceived as enemies (Lehming 2017). Anti-Semitic stereotypes and propaganda from the Arabic world and North Africa are also widespread across European countries. These kinds of prejudices come not only from Muslim migrants coming to Europe, but also from the average European and are a stubborn predisposition among them.

Anti-Semitic attitudes and the rejection of the state of Israel are widespread among refugees. In 2016, Germany recorded as many as 1, 468 anti-Semitic incidents and there are only the ones that have been reported (FRA 2016). Bielefeld University has surveyed Jews about their daily life and 62% of respondents indicated that they often experience anti-Semitism, about 28% noted that they were victims of harassment or even verbal attacks. These incidents are causing some Jews to leave the country, that is to say, against

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<sup>1</sup> International definition of anti-Semitism adopted by the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in 2005.

all the values Europeans fought so hard for. After the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even advised European Jews to leave European countries and move to their 'home', but European politicians insisted they stay in Europe.

The effects of anti-Semitism have attracted considerable attention, mainly after the horrors of the Holocaust when German authorities participated in the murder of more than six million Jews. Ghettos, forced-labour camps and transit camps were established by the Nazi regime in order to monitor and concentrate Jews, leading to mass-murder operations being committed across Europe. Nazi crimes were recognized and by the 1980s, the German duty to remember was accepted. By now students are commonly taught this horrific history lesson.

The statistical data shows that 49% of those surveyed believe large numbers of Muslim refugees pose a major threat to their country. 59% of those who were interviewed consider that refugees are likely to trigger terrorism in their country (Poushter 2016). Such broad negative sentiments seem to deepen political divisions in Europe, making people more supportive of right-wing parties. The belief that Muslims do not want to integrate into the society they are now living in reflects antipathy in European countries toward diversity. Thus, integration remains a crucial challenge for European society.

After all, the danger of anti-Semitism is widely known, the lessons of the past should have taught something to the German society, however, what is seen now in German domestic policy right-wing views is becoming more popular among the mainstream population. More precisely, the politics of regret that helped Germany come to terms with its past is now failing (Olick 2007). Therefore, there is a need to enforce the law in order to prevent the bloody consequences that could follow.

The results of the last Bundestag elections on September 2017 show how important this issue is. According to the official results the right-wing populist party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) received 12,6% of votes, becoming the third-largest party in the federal Parliament just four years after being founded.

A considerable amount of research has been written about xenophobia in Germany, but little research exists on the most recent developments. The immigration crisis happening in Europe since 2015 has re-energized anti-Semitism in Germany and has elevated the problem to a new political level. Hence, additional studies of the current situation in Germany are needed.

## A. Research question

The **aim** of this thesis is to analyse current anti-Semitic rhetoric in Germany and its influence on the political climate in the country. This research provides an important opportunity to advance an understanding of how until today; the Holocaust is making an impact on Germany's policy. There is a growing body of literature that vividly describes the nature of the Nazis' anti-Semitism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as 'racial'. Many subjective theories were invented in order to prove that Jews were the 'bottom of the society' and Germans – were the top. However, recent investigation shows that contemporary Germans are not concerned about racial or ethnic differences, the only thing that they are disturbed about is that they are different – 'foreigners'. After all, only four elements of classical anti-Semitism exist: stereotyping, denigration, demonization and obsession (Joffe 2005). Elimination is no longer a goal or a method. Research on the subject has mostly been restricted to limited comparisons of the Nazi party's anti-Semitism and contemporary expressions. That is why the research question will be: **has the rapid growth of the Muslim population in Germany contributed to the growth of animosity directed toward the Jews in the country?** An objective of this study is to explain the cause-effect relationships of the inflow of Muslim immigrants to Germany and the increased support for the right-wing populist party among Germans.

The problem is analysed using **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY and History**, these subjects allow us to logically develop the topic, and make it more evidence-based. The study of history helps base the research on the recent developments in German policy, to make a comparison between the Hitler's anti-Semitism and that of today. At the same time, the theory of international relations makes the research empirical and more structured.

## B. Theory

For the purpose of analysis, the **constructivist approach** was used, which considers international relations as well as everything in the world to be 'socially constructed', thus, to be an interaction between agents. Social relations make people what they are and *vice versa* – people make the world what it really is (Wendt 1999). Constructivists assume that the people are products of their culture, where 'idea' plays an enormous role in forming actors and their actions (Dunn, Kurki, Smith 2016). Human behaviour cannot be studied separately from the social structures within which it occurs,



and that give it meaning. Thus, constructivists assume that reality is a product of constructions and conceptualisations. Every single person in society is involved in the creation of these constructions and conceptualizations. Applying constructivist theory to this thesis will give a base to the arguments used in the work, will emphasize which aspects are more or less important and will help draw a conclusion.

From the constructivist standpoint, anti-Semitism alone does not have any substantial implications for the nation in general unless the social context is understood. The theory further demonstrates that the effect of ideas and beliefs on world politics goes beyond material reality. It also presupposes that reality is constantly under construction, which opens a space for change. Put differently, the meaning of a societal tendency is not fixed but can modify over time depending on the ideas that actors hold. Therefore, the meaning of the immigration crisis in Germany can also change over the time, from raising xenophobia to finally accepting a multicultural society.

Another issue raised by constructivists is the issue of identities and interests. The actions of a state should be associated with its identity. Evidently, a state cannot act contrary to its own identity since it will question the validity of the identity. This point could explain why Germany, being a great power and having a leading economy, is not changing its rhetoric to being more nationalist and quite the opposite is seen – Germany claims to be multicultural. As stated before, social norms are central to constructivism.

Furthermore, norms go through a ‘lifecycle of norms’ before they get accepted (Wendt 1999). To become an expected behaviour a norm must go through an acceptance of many state actors in their own practice. In order to fully accept newcomers, many political actors should understand that it is the right way to do for the survival of human being, of their culture and beliefs, otherwise, norms will stay the same. In the framework of this research; this norm will be rising xenophobia.

All the social/structural conditions should be brought into the rhetoric in order to estimate their meaning. The main conditions that brought the increase of anti-Semitism in Germany should be put in one place and made public in order to trigger people’s attention and provoke an adequate response. Every country is different, and has different triggers of anti-Semitism. In this case, the main social and economic conditions in Germany for the xenophobic behaviour should be analysed in order to understand the change. It is not just enough to state that the anti-Semitism increase because so many young Muslims came into Europe. It is essential to explain the conditions that caused this trend. Germans

have always had an identity different from other states, even European ones. Constructivism is well prepared to detect and recognise these changes.

### C. Methodology

In the process of writing the work, the method of **content analysis** for the study and subsequent use of various research sources was used, such as history books, documents, agreements and research papers. Examples include the analysis of the electoral programme of the Alternative for Germany to estimate its rhetoric against the Jewish issue. A **deductive approach** was employed because it was assumed that there was a link between an influx of Muslims and the resurgence of anti-Semitism in German society. This approach aimed at providing empirical evidence to substantiate the cause-effect relationships between concepts and variables. It is much easier by providing the research question to establish the structure of the thesis.

The study of anti-Semitism lacks a measurement methodology, as it is difficult to measure the feelings of the population towards a specific group. **External secondary data research** was used to study existing data on anti-Semitism from government statistics, and international agencies. Additionally, **primary data research** such as speeches of the leaders and relevant documents was studied. An interview with an expert in the field was conducted to bring new insight into the research and prove the points made. The thesis will present a detailed analysis of the spread of various anti-Semitic ideas and attitudes in Germany, with the help of the data provided by the ALLBUS general survey. A **quantitative approach** was adopted to evaluate the views of a population. Based on questions from the different resources, an analysis of current anti-Semitic views in Germany will be conducted.

This research follows a **case-study design**; the impact of the immigration crisis would be studied with Germany as an example. It must be mentioned that Germany is not the only country influenced by the immigration crisis, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and all of Europe are faced with the same challenges, however, the consequences are more observable in Germany. Since the end of World War II, Germany has taken many attempts to take responsibility for Holocaust and to prevent anti-Semitism from rising again. Many reparations were paid to Jewish victims of the Nazis, many memorials were built for those murdered and anti-Semitic expression became a crime. However, when Angela Merkel opened the borders to millions of Muslims in 2015, the

arrival of so many migrants was among the biggest factors that triggered the support to right-wing nationalist movements. That makes Germany the perfect case to study the nationalist element among the people, aiming at discovering how nationalism is fed and on what it is based. This is why Germany was chosen as a case study, it certainly has a promise to shed the light on the research question. All of these methods help determine the factors influencing the changing dynamics of anti-Semitic rhetoric in Germany.

**The chronological approach** of the study focuses on the period between 2015-2018. Starting from the current immigration crisis and moving to the most recent developments on the anti-Semitic issue in the German society. Choosing this limited period make the research more original and precise for the study of contemporary anti-Semitism.

**The Master thesis is divided into four chapters. The first section** of this paper will establish the context of what problems the European society and especially German society have faced in 2015. The necessity of this chapter is a given as there is certainly a need to write in detail about how many migrants, why and how they arrived into the country, what policies the European policy-makers followed and whether European states were unanimous about the response or not. One needs to assess political, economic and social situations in order to conclude whether ‘point 1’ (the immigration crisis) caused ‘point 2’ - the increase of xenophobia, in general, and anti-Semitism, in particular. Additionally, chapter one will provide information on the legal basis for the prosecution for the hate crimes. **The second part** of the thesis will go on with the description and analysis of the German identity and reasons why Germans are easily influenced by social and political changes in society, if they are at all influenced. Additionally, a chapter will cover the topic of the consequences of the reunification of Germany, new structural changes in the society and how it influenced Eastern and Western Germans’ perceptions of migrants. **The third part** will deal with the characteristics of the refugees coming to Germany, describing who are they and their special characteristics. Moreover, it will provide details about the criminality and the anti-Semitic incidents that have been claimed to be triggered by the immigration crisis, including the recent protests in German cities against the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the probable scenario of this discontent. **The fourth part** will go on to look at the rise of right-wing populism after the beginning of the immigration crisis, which resulted in complications forming a governing coalition in the German Bundestag. The chapter will describe the overall current political climate and assess the possible dangers of the situation. The possible

outcome of this thesis is to discern why anti-Semitic rhetoric increased after the beginning of the immigration crisis, how these events are interconnected, and finally, to describe the cultural background behind it by applying the constructivist theory.

Sources of the current research can be divided into the following groups. The first group of sources used is German demographic and economic indicators, compiled by the *German Social Survey (ALLBUS)*, *Eurostat* and *Das Statistic Portal (Statista)*. The second group of sources includes excerpts of speeches by Germans political and economic figures as well as relevant non-Germans. In particular, the speeches of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, AfD politician Björn Höcke and the Prime Minister of Israel Binyamin Netanyahu. The third group - includes various treaties and documents concluded by Germany and other European states, as well as by further international actors, such as '*The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany*', the '*Treaty of Amsterdam*' and the '*Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union*' which were issued by national or supranational bodies (see appendix for more detail).

The literature used in this paper can also be divided into two groups. First of all, it includes various monographs and collections of articles. In particular, the work of M. Cohn's "*Jews in Germany, 1945-1993: The building of a minority*" and the recently published book by D. Ranan "*Muslimischer Antisemitismus (Muslim anti-Semitism)*". The second group includes analytical and expert works published in the following periodicals: "*Time*", "*OZP*", the works of '*the Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs*', etc. Both groups contain the contributions of international experts from all over the world.

The variety of sources presented in this thesis offers different perspectives because they all represent existing points of view. By looking at popular publicity '*Time*' *Journal*, '*The Guardian*' and '*Deutsche Welle*' the research question proves to be relevant and vital for the global society. Sources such as the '*Times of Israel*' and the '*Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs*' offer a Jewish perspective on the issue. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and *Der Spiegel* show a slightly left-of-center view of the German people. *Die Welt* daily newspaper proves to be more or less socially conservative and economically liberal. Historical sources like '*The politics of regret*' and '*The fall of Rome and the Retreat of European Multiculturalism: A historical Trope as a Discourse of Authority in Public Debate*' give legacy to the thesis.

Detailed sources and literature are listed in the appendix.

## **Chapter I – Setting the context**

### **1.1 European migration crisis as an impetus for an increased anti-Semitism**

For Germany and for the whole of Europe, a large influx of the migrants constitutes a huge challenge. 2015 was marked for the European Union by multiple increases in the flow of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa onto EU territory. This migration crisis was called the European migration crisis by many researchers. The quantity of people coming to the country since the summer of 2015 has been rising very rapidly. The European Commission has already recognized this crisis to be the largest since Second World War. In fact, more people in need of asylum have come to Germany than ever before. There were 441,899 initial applications, and 476,649 asylum requests submitted in 2015. According to the German Federal government, in 2015, 1.1 million asylum seekers were listed in the so-called EASY system<sup>2</sup>. This is an enormous burden for the state in economic, political, social and cultural terms.

This crisis has caused a very mixed reaction around the whole world. Some people, referred to the experience of the Roman Empire, and perceived this crisis to be the beginning of the end of European civilization (Peden 2017). To be more precise, historians see parallels between modern events and events in ancient times: a clash of civilizations between the West and East, mass migration of Muslims as ‘barbarian invasions’, Islam as ‘seventh century religion’, the rising China as a ‘Thucydides Trap’. These parallels are made to give authority to reasons underlying the current problems and many do believe in this theory. For others, the current crisis situation is proving that European institutions and organizational structures are inefficient, as they have failed in their task to manage migrant flows. The European Union was unable to consolidate its Members on one common policy, instead states acted independently and most of the burden was taken by several states such as Italy and Germany. However, for scientists, this migration crisis was not something unexpected, but rather a combination of a number of factors, such as the global economic crisis, effects of the military conflicts and civil wars, the destabilization of the European countries, rising social inequality in numerous countries, among many other factors. Thus, the European migration crisis is a complex issue triggered by many factors some of which will be covered below.

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<sup>2</sup> The EASY system is a computer program used by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees of Germany (BAMF) for the initial distribution of asylum seekers to the German federal states.

One of the distinguishing features of the today's crisis is the unification of the several migration flows – refugees, legal and illegal economic migration - into one powerful flow. As a result, ethnic composition of the migrants is really diverse, consisting of Syrians, Egyptians, Libyans, Nigerians, Afghans, Pakistanis and more. Another distinguishing feature is that most of the migrants initially targeted the most developed countries of Western Europe such as Germany, France, Scandinavia, and Austria because of the information they received about the advantages of living in these countries (Baker 2017). This indicates how migrants were well-informed by the media and informal networks (internet, phone) about the benefits living in these countries provides, and about the generosity of their socio-economic support, compared to other EU countries. Therefore, modern migrants do not just flee to other countries in cases of danger, war and the behaviour of their government officials, but act on the basis of information they receive on a daily basis. The features mentioned above demonstrate how the modern influx of migrants is different from the ones seen before and why it has triggered such a reaction from the Europeans. Europeans have not had any experience facing this challenge, they did not know how to respond and what to expect from the 'new population' that is why they were not consistent in their behaviour and experienced fear.

It must be emphasized that there are several reasons for the enormous influx of migrants in the last couple of years. First, of course, a war in Syria triggered by massive protests in March 2011 in Syrian cities transformed into the large-scale armed conflict with thousands of deaths. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the number of victims of the Syria conflict in 2015 exceeded 330,000 people. People feared for their lives and started to flee *en masse* to safe places in order to survive. As a result, Syrian people constituted a half of the migration flow in 2015 becoming the first country of origin of asylum seekers. German *Foreign Minister* *Franz-Walter Steinmeier* on the meeting of Council of the EU in 2015 in Luxemburg stated that '*The main topic of the today's meeting was Syria, with a focus on the migration crisis; we must combat the reasons for the flight of people, and the main reason is without doubt the conflict in Syria*'. At that time, and until now war in Syria is seen as a main reason for the increased migration.

At the beginning of the conflict, refugees from Syria fled to the neighbouring countries, for example, to Jordan and especially to Turkey. However, after a while, Turkey was no longer able to accept so many refugees. Apart from Syria, other source countries included Afghanistan and North African countries, in particular Libya and south

of the Sahara<sup>3</sup> where civil wars are still going on. According to the data from the UNHCR, over the last 5 years, at least 15 conflicts have erupted or renewed, including countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Pakistan, Central African Republic and etc (UNHCR 2016). Thus, civil wars and unstable political systems remain the biggest catalysts for migration. The situation has also been intensified by the emergence and empowerment of the terrorist organization "Islamic State" which has been successful in recruiting new supporters using their idea of 'jihad'.

Secondly, an important reason for the current migration crisis is a widely used way to reach European countries. Until recently, sea transport from Libya to Italy was the most preferable route for all migrants and refugees, moving to Europe. In 2015 at least 150, 000 people arrived by sea to Italy (European Commission 2016). However, this method is highly dangerous, they are risking their lives facing many dangerous situations in order to find protection in EU. Fatalities and missing persons in 2016 in Italy reached at least 5,079, additionally, Spain, Morocco and Tunisia added another 300 to this number. The dreadful death rate is 1 in 40 facing refugees that are crossing from Libya to Italy in overloaded rubber dinghies. It is certainly the shameful product of the European response to the growing refugee crisis that will be later discussed in this paper.

As for the third reason for the migration crisis, the 10<sup>th</sup> High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres<sup>4</sup> stated that the third factor for the growth of refugee's influx is the reduction of the humanitarian help in the region. In particular, a 30% reduction of the activities of the World Food program because of a lack of funding had created a truly critical situation. It is not only food, but also vital shelter material, supplies for sanitation and water, and clothing. This is devastating for aid-dependent people who have nothing to lose and chose to risk their lives to emigrate. *"My appeal to the international community: increase humanitarian aid to the refugees, increase solidarity to countries like Jordan or Lebanon or others receiving Syrian refugees, and make sure that more opportunities are given to these refugees,"* A. Guterres stated during the visit to Jordan in March 2017 *"This is not the moment to reduce solidarity, this is the moment to increase solidarity."*

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<sup>3</sup> The Western Sahara conflict is a continuation of the past conflict in 70th XX century and is going between the [Polisario Front](#) and the [Kingdom of Morocco](#).

<sup>4</sup> Antonio Guterres served for a decade in the position of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. On 13 October 2016 he was appointed by the General Assembly as the 9<sup>th</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, for five years from 1 January 2017.

The critical situation in the countries of Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan is intensifying, more money is needed to support people in need, but there is another crisis inside European countries caused by the asylum seekers who need support according to all the fundamental rules of the EU. So the European decision-makers choose to cut the funds outside their borders to have sufficient funds inside the borders for tackling the challenges. The logic is simple – when there is a choice between discontent of your voters and the discontent from the migrants, adequate politicians would choose to tackle the issue inside the country too.

The fourth important factor is the accumulation in Europe of a "critical mass" of people from the North and Equatorial Africa. Very many migrants tend to get into specific countries where their relatives have already settled as they have the opportunity to join members of their family, who are more or less settled in Europe. It makes it much easier from the psychological side of such a move, as well as the economic side. Family reasons proved to be a stronger reason for migration rather than economic ones (Kok 2006). As a matter of fact, rural families have showed tendency to maintain stronger family ties than urban families. Moreover, experts state that most of people flee not from war, but from the ruined regions, where there are no economic prospects, no educational opportunities, poor accommodation and a poor healthcare system. People move to other countries to explore better opportunities and better conditions of life

All in all, there are many reasons for an increased number of migrants coming to Europe; however, modern researchers tend to focus on one – a war. Let's now move on to the European response to this crisis in order to objectively estimate the social situation in European countries as a whole and Germany in particular.

In 2015, the quantity of migrants crossing European external borders doubled in comparison to previous years. To tackle this unique challenge the EU is acting on several fronts: from improving the asylum system to strengthening border security, making the return policy more effective and encouraging the integration of refugees.

Germany opened its doors to refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq and many others for almost six months in 2015, with *Angela Merkel's* declaring '*Wir schaffen das*' ('we can do this'). However, she failed to achieve positive German opinion on this policy and consequently, quickly lost all the support among the German people (Trauner 2017). Other European states, including Britain, have chosen to accept Germany's generosity, but have not followed its example. European leaders were initially open to giving grants to refugees and provided them with minimal conditions and benefits for staying in the



EU. However, the rhetoric quickly changed in the European Union. For example, the previous French President Francois Hollande stated that it was impossible to further receive refugees and migrants due to the lack of free accommodation for them. Another opinion popular at that time presented by British Prime Minister Theresa May, who despite the calls of the *German Chancellor A. Merkel* and *Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä*, stated that the problem of migration should not be resolved through harming the interests and needs of the local population of the European countries (Guardian 2016). Europe's approach has changed significantly from optimism in handling the crisis 'we can do this' to a disgraceful 'out of sight, out of mind'.

The EU has failed to unify member states' responses to the migration crisis, and to harmonize and coordinate their asylum policies. European states decided to resolve the issue as soon as possible separately. With the help of temporary measures, the EU restored control over external borders and put an end to the rapid actions of individual member countries. The practical measures included the agreement with Turkey, which helped to defuse the situation and establish procedures for granting asylum to migrants and their return, even though the cooperation between these two sides was heavily criticized by the population.

At the same time, the idea of equitable resettlement quotas for European states was rejected by national leaders. At the heart of the European approach to the *Common European Asylum System (CEAS)* remains the *Dublin regulation*, which directs the country responsible for the processing of an asylum claim. Generally speaking, the country responsible for the asylum seeker is the first country in EU that the applicant has entered and this country also has a right to send them back to their country of nationality.

There are two key routes that migrants take to get to Europe: the Aegean route going via Turkey, Greece and the Balkans, and the second one is the central Mediterranean starting from Libya via the Mediterranean Sea and finishing in Italy. The Dublin regulation resulted in poor countries like Italy and Greece bearing all the responsibility for the large numbers of arrivals. Now the Aegean route is almost closed as a result of stricter Balkan border controls and the EU-Turkey deal by which Turkey accepts the return of all irregular migrants from Greece in exchange for enormous financial aid and the liberalization of the visa regime for Turkish nationals.

The situation in the Mediterranean route is even worse. The European countries tried to put effort to reduce deaths at sea by launching *the European Border and Coast Guard Agency* in 2016 and as well by working with the Libyan coastguard to stop the

illegal migration at that point. Under these deals, EU promised Libya more than \$225 million to impose stricter border controls and migrant assistance in respect of international humanitarian standards (Tugnoli 2017). However, instead of receiving better treatment, migrants are sent back to Libya to again face violence. It only made migrants to attempt even more unsafe crossings on rubber dinghies and the Italian government accuses NGOs that operate their own search-and-rescue boats near Libyan waters of boosting people-smuggling. UN agencies claim that Libyan coastguards are co-operating with smugglers by re-selling smugglers' boats and returning migrants back. This is the response that European countries have made: no unity, no solution, striking deals with quasi-dictatorial regimes like Turkey and Libya, with no respect for human rights.

All in all, the main issues related to migration remain unresolved: chaos in the Middle East, and enormous migration flows. Disagreement between European countries has increased because of growing domestic political tensions and concerns of the population, who believe that migration threatens their security and social cohesion. Instead of discussing how to overcome differences, European leaders have stopped any attempts to find a common solution to the problems in connection to the European migration policy, and the measures countries apply are normally limited to short-term solutions.

For the reasons mentioned above, the EU's migration policy has not yet been fully formed. In order to give a more powerful collective response to the migration challenge, Europe needs to overcome two contradictions: firstly, to convince all EU member states on the necessity to act together on the common solution; secondly, to increase trust between the EU countries.

To overcome these contradictions, European countries should act more coherently, and for this, flexible solidarity is needed. Former European Parliament President *Martin Schulz* stated that the main problem caused by migrants is not the influx of migrants, but the lack of solidarity for the adoption of joint rules for solving problems with their resettlement, which leads to a huge overload on migration services in certain countries. As a consequence, the massive influx of migrants threatens the existence of the Schengen agreement, and the contradictions between the EU countries in resettling migrants deepen the split in the EU. Flexibility could allow the harmonization of pan-European political steps with the opinion, with the vital interests and with the characteristics of each country (Vimont 2017). And this, to be more specific, is the best way to support the idea of a common destiny and reduce the risks of the division of Europe. Flexible solidarity is the

most realistic path to much needed unification of many areas of European migration policy.

Therefore, the unprecedented influx of the migrants, which the European community has been experiencing from 2015, demonstrated a threat to the values of a single, harmonious European policy. The uncontrolled flow of people has reached such proportions that it is equivalent to a humanitarian catastrophe. This showed the weak sides of the migration policy of the European Union. This is, firstly, the inability to host such a large number of migrants on their territory, and to provide them with a social assistance. Secondly, the migration crisis highlighted the weakness of the national legislation of the participating countries in comparison with the generally accepted directives of the Union. Finally, European citizen did not support an idea to help the refugees and are seeing this crisis as a direct threat to national values and sovereignty in general. The lack of solidarity of European states regarding the migration crisis, which is perhaps the largest since the Second World War, could lead to a serious split of the European Union as a supranational entity.

In order to prove the intensity of this crisis, it is essential to investigate from which countries these

asylum seekers are coming from and in what numbers via **external secondary data research**.

During the last three years, the main inflow of migrants to Europe originates from




Figure 1. Refugees in Germany by country of origin.

Source: Migration Policy Institute

the countries in the Middle East - Syria, Iran and Iraq, Asian countries -Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Balkans- Kosovo and Albania. As seen in *Figure 1*, in 2014 only 31.5% were Syrian, Afghan, Iranian and Iraqi refugees coming to Europe, and only 11% were citizens of African countries. Thus, in total 57% were arriving to Europe from uncommon

countries of origin. In 2015, the percentage of people arriving from the Middle East countries drastically increased by 17% to more than 250, 000 people. In 2016 this number increased even further, to nearly 70% of all refugees coming from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. This demonstrates a huge change in composition of a new population of Germany (*Neue Deutsche*), which nowadays consists of a mostly Muslim population. This assumption will be further examined in the next part of the thesis.

Another graph (*Figure 2*), demonstrates how many migrants Germany hosts, in comparison to other European countries from the period between 2014 and 2016 and from what countries these migrants are coming from. The first point that is clearly illustrated on this graph is that Germany hosts almost a half of all migrants. Thus, the main destination of the European Union is its "main economy" - Germany. Moreover, the role of Germany as the recipient of migrants is growing (The Guardian; 2016). The reason for this is the objectively higher standard of living and the system of social benefits, as well as its policy of admission of forced migrants<sup>5</sup>, implemented by Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The main migration flow is directed towards Germany also because the rest of the




Figure 2. Refugees by country of origin in EU and Germany.


Source: Migration Policy Institute

<sup>5</sup> Forced migrants - the refugees and internally displaced by conflicts people as well as displaced by natural or environmental disasters, famine, nuclear or chemical disasters, or development projects.

European countries took protective measures. Therefore, Germany, being the strongest economy of the European Union, is sufficiently resistant to such shocks, because it has the necessary grain of strength and the stock of socio-economic sustainability for the whole EU countries.

Additionally, *Figure 2* shows a composition of people coming to Germany compared to other European states. In 2014 and 2015 this difference was minimal; however, in 2016 almost half of all refugees coming to the EU from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran chose Germany as their destination. To be more precise, 520,610 people out of 1 226 385 came to Germany, which means that **the German state has more Muslim nationals than almost any other state in Europe**. This is important to emphasize because **it may influence anti-Semitic sentiments inside the country**.

Moving to the question to the process of relocation of the high number of asylum seekers in the territory of Germany, it is essential to start with a presentation of the quota system. Refugees are allocated through the *Königstein quota system* to 16 federal states. This quota system distributes refugees according to fixed percentages on a constant basis. The example can be seen in *Figure 3*, which shows the data from January to September 2015. The distribution quota is based on the formula  $\frac{1}{3}$  multiplied by the percentage of the population in Germany plus  $\frac{2}{3}$  multiplied by the percentage of state tax revenue. This is an attempt to equally redistribute newcomers on the territory of the country during the early accommodation phase. What is interesting that this quota system only works in the early phase of the application procedure, later on asylum seekers can try to relocate if they are willing to.



*Figure 3. Share of the selected number of registrations in Germany from January to September 2015*  
Source: Bundesregierung's data was used

By its nature, this system imposes burdens on large cities because it does not take into consideration factors such as higher population densities, secondary migration patterns or special housing conditions (Katz 2016). The *Königstein* quota system only

considers total population so **large cities receive more migrants**, and bear a larger burden. As can be seen in Figure 2, the differences are huge: the small territory of Berlin receives more than the whole of Rheinland-Pfalz, 5,06% against 4,75%, at the same time Northrhine-Westfalen has as much as 21,43% amounting to 123,714 people. This matters because projects in less-populated areas can be provided quicker and at lower cost, and this is, to say, an issue of budget and policy. **Big cities do have enormous responsibilities with regards to the asylum seekers and lack opportunities for such a large group of people.** If there were an equal distribution by the number of people per square meter, they could be more easily integrated into the system without an additional burden to the local population.

Despite the above mentioned challenges big cities such as Berlin and Hamburg have demonstrated an ability to innovate in emergency response. These cities were prosperous in using technology to trigger the participation of civil society, community, and even succeeded in building non-traditional housing. Although the federal government proved to be prepared for the crisis, new policy reforms are still needed to empower cities, speed up best-practice replication to other cities, and give a seat to city leaders at the policymaking table.

## **1.2 Multiculturalism as a failed policy**

The 2015 European migration crisis was not the first time when that the assimilation of migrants via the '*melting pot*' model was questioned because a new culture do not always comes to co-exist with another. At the same time, the policy of multiculturalism was seen as an answer to the social problems Europe faced. However, today multiculturalism has been publicly denounced by many leaders such as former British Prime Minister David Cameron (Malik 2015). This policy assumes too much influence of the ethnic communities of the asylum seekers on the culture of the receiving country. **Multiculturalism** is not a mixture of cultures, but **a free space for Diaspora cultures**. Europe has too quickly allowed massive migration without demanding sufficient integration.

Therefore, the practice of '*civic integration*' has gradually been introduced since the 1990s, whereby migrants are granted a certain level of social and economic rights, meaning that the balance between their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the host

community is maintained. Three elements included in this policy are: openness of European societies to regular migration, meaning integration rather than one-shot migration; integration into major institutions, especially into the labour market; the reduction of unwanted family migration as a 'side effect' (Joppke 2017). Without economic integration through a workplace, social integration proves to be impossible. Adults make contacts and friends mostly in their workplace or during their work, jobs helps to integrate people into society, gain respect and show others that you are in the same position as they are.

One of the most significant aspects of the integration of migrants seems to be the cultural one, because socio-cultural differences are the root causes of the problems that European society faces at a time of increasing migration flows. The Muslim culture common to newcomers is very different from Christian or Jewish ones. The successful socio-cultural integration of a huge number of people that belong to a substantially different community than the European one is becoming a priority challenge for Europe. For migrants themselves, this problem is also a challenge as they are trying to understand a new culture, to create social ties, to achieve a certain economic status.

The religious factor is a key one, it causes huge conceptual differences. For a Muslim, to understand a Christian is a really big task and *vice versa*. A person from a non-western background is really hard to integrate into Western society. Additionally, it must be emphasized that the consequences of the terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 showed that Islamic extremism negatively affects the integration of Muslims (Malik 2015). The local population is experiencing growing difficulties in distinguishing between such concepts as '*Islamic terrorism*', and the '*Muslim community*'.

An integrated approach is needed to solve the emerging problems between the two cultural communities. More importantly, the **integration of migrants is a multilateral process, combining political, economic, social and cultural aspects**. It is about expanding the socialization of migrants in various fields - educational, medical, and economic. Of particular importance is the cultural and psychological vector of socialization, allowing representatives of non-European society to adapt more quickly to an unusual cultural environment. The gradual inclusion of migrants into the life of the host society should lead to a reduction in the rejection of values, including face-to-face interaction. As a rule, **a key factor of socialization is an ability to fluently speak the**

**language of the host country**, and cultural integration need not mean the rejection of the host nation's cultural identity, a balance must be found here.

Currently, it is Berlin that sets the tone for the entire EU migration policy. Moreover, Germany's government has reiterated that it is willing to continue its leading role within the European Union in tackling this issue (DW 2016). Angela Merkel's position is clear - she assumes that all of the European countries are obliged to undertake part of the responsibility for the distribution of the migrants, encouraging other states to follow its lead and not to abandon fundamental principles of the EU like free movement (Eddy 2015). Unfortunately, Merkel's attempts at leading the EU to a common European solution to the migration crisis have failed and even led to increasing opposition in both Germany and the European states. Moreover, for a long time, much attention has been paid to the issue of migration at the state level, and main aspects such as cultural and social integration.

On 1 January 2005 a new immigration law went into force that encouraged foreigners to integrate by learning the German language, the political system, and history and values of the country. The language part includes part-time or full-time learning of the German language up to B1 level, and course attendance is checked. In other courses, participants learn everything about German values (tolerance, family values) and history and then pass exams on these issues. The inclusion of migrants in public life should be the result of the network interaction of various actors - from the federal government and the migration commissioner in the Chancellery to municipalities, associations of migrants and non-profit organizations.

At the local level, Germany has a wide network of institutions and organizations dealing with integration issues: councils for foreigners, integration councils, and municipal and land commissioners for integration. The development of decision councils is carried out through consultations with local migrant organizations. The councils, elected by the migrants themselves, participate in the discussion of all the key aspects of the local integration policy. Recently, integration projects at the local level aimed at integrating migrants into political and social life have been widely disseminated. The sources of the financing of such projects include the EU budget and the national budget, to diverse funds and organizations, and the addressee of funds is primarily the migrant organizations. The key factors of sociocultural integration in the Federal Republic of Germany are the interaction of a wide range of participants at different levels and the huge role the migrants themselves play in this process.



According to the data from 2015 within the framework of intercultural communication, a number of problems arise between migrants and the hosting community. Moreover, their spectrum is quite extensive: from indignation about religious or other intolerance (often unreasonable) to criminal actions and violent clashes involving various spheres of life. Currently, the main problem of intercultural communication in Germany is the escalation of crime in the migrant environment and public response to this issue.

### **1.3 Legal basis regulating current anti-Semitism**

Hate crimes have attracted substantial attention over the last decades, especially after the events of the Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda. Civil society and media in Germany try to cover all the possible violations of the people's fundamental rights, for example freedom of religious belief. The protection of all people against racial discrimination is the aim of modern German law and German policy-makers. Among the concerns of international organizations is that hate crimes can lead to the large-scale migration of the people from insecure places to safer places, but can also be a reason for terrorism. Following shootings in Copenhagen and the Paris attacks on Charlie Hebdo and other violent anti-Semitic events in 2015, the Prime Minister of Israel *Binyamin Netanyahu* appealed to Jews living in Europe: *"This wave of terror attacks can be expected to continue, including anti-Semitic and murderous attacks. We say to the Jews, to our brothers and sisters, Israel is your home and that of every Jew. Israel is waiting for you with open arms."* (The Guardian 2015). It was only an appeal that could lead to real actions, already, some experts claim that Jews are leaving Europe to more safe places. Therefore, one must combat these changes in the society from the beginning by applying the common law on non-discrimination.

The principals of equality and the prohibition of all forms of discrimination play an essential role in both international and domestic law. *The Universal Declaration of Human rights* adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 acknowledges the same rights of all the individuals on the planet. All parties to the United Nations should follow these rules. Additionally, in 1969 Germany ratified *the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* issued on 7 March 1966 among other 26 states (OHCHR 2018). Most of the parties even

accepted the individual complaints mechanism of the Convention demonstrating a strong desire to be bound by the provisions. The ratifying states should eliminate racial discrimination and promote understanding among the races, moreover, hate speech should be forbidden and membership in racist organizations criminalized. In fact, the parties to this Convention face persistent problems with the reporting of the development on the issue of non-discrimination, examples include Sierra Leone who failed to report since the year of 1976 and the Liberia that never reported. Since 1966 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has submitted the reports to *the Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)* on a regular basis.

Since the middle 1980s there have been special amendments to the German Constitution prohibiting any activity of extremist organizations. The German government tried to include both preventative and repressive measures to counter xenophobia, extremism and anti-Semitism. Among the goals of these measures are to counteract the spread of xenophobic and especially anti-Semitic attitudes and organizations. The **Articles 3, 4, 9 and 33** of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany emphasizes that no one may be harmed or favoured on the grounds of religious or political views; freedom of religion is inviolable and the state should guarantee this freedom. Associations whose goals and activities are contrary to criminal laws or directed against the constitutional order or against the ideas of mutual understanding between peoples are prohibited and no one can limit access to public office on the basis of belonging to a particular religion. These Articles are accorded with the highest priority, and the state of Germany ensures that they are given full effect.

*The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany* provides for the punishment for non-compliance with the Articles (**Articles 130, 166, 167**). The violators can be imprisoned for up to three years or can be obliged to pay a fine for insulting the religion of citizens and religious societies, as well as for obstructing the practice of religious rites and cults, if such actions cause disturbance of public order. **Articles 84 and 85** of the Penal Code of Germany have provided for responsibility for illegal activities of the party declared unconstitutional. Since 1949, 77 neo-Nazi and right-wing extremist organizations have been banned in the country. The decision to ban 15 of these organizations was taken by the federal authorities, 62 – by regional authorities. Furthermore, **Article 86** of the Penal Code of Germany strictly (up to 3 years of imprisonment) punishes the dissemination of symbols, including swastikas, the use of the greetings, slogans of NSDAP, SS and other attributes of Hitlerism, as well as banned neo-

Nazi parties and groups (exceptions - cinema, theatre, scientific and museum turnover, etc.). A number of other articles and separate laws aimed at preventing a significant increase in the number of offenses of anti-Semitic. Finally, **Article 130** of the Penal Code of Germany provides responsibility for fomenting ethnic and other discord, including by approving, glorifying or justifying the crimes of National Socialism.

In the European Union the **Treaty of Amsterdam** (1999) empowered the Council of the EU to undertake unanimous legislative actions in order to combat discrimination based on race, sex, ethnic origin, religion/belief, age, disability or sexual orientation. As a consequence, the European Union passed four pieces of legislation on the grounds of Articles 13 and 141 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, what now are **Articles 19 and 157** of *the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*. These legislation pieces include:

- Racial Equality Directive (*Council Directive 2000/43/EC*) that implements the principle of uniform treatment regardless of race or ethnic origin;
- The Framework Directive on Employment (*Council Directive 2000/78/EC*) that establishes general rules for equal treatment in occupation and employment;
- Equal Treatment in Goods and Services Directive (*Council Directive 2004/113/EC*) that implements the equal treatment of men and women in the supply and access of goods and services;
- Equal Treatment Directive (*Council Directive 2002/73/EC*) that establishes equal treatment of women and men in employment, promotion, vocational training and working conditions.

The EU directives establish equal rights and opportunities for all people aiming at preventing discrimination. It took the Federal Republic of Germany almost six years to create its own laws consistent with *the Racial Equality Directive* and *the Framework Directive on Employment*. The reasons are diverse, but the most vital one was the scepticism of the powerful political groups in Germany towards the comprehensive anti-discrimination provisions. These lobby groups, organizations and politicians lacked consensus on the problem of discrimination and even questioned the necessity of having legal means to combat them. Incorporation of these directives into German law finally took place in 2006 through so-called *Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz*, in other words *the General Equal Treatment Act*.

After using **primary data research** on the existing laws a conclusion can be drawn that all of these laws are still in use in achieving efforts to foster equality in social policy. Meaning that the state does pay for the housing of low-income households and finances council housing, and migrants with a strong residence status do benefit from this policy. At the same time, the migrants without permanent residence permit do not profit from this opportunity, so that they are not equally treated, which reflects weakness of Germany's social welfare. Additionally, asylum seekers, in their first year after the legal submission of their asylum application, are not allowed to work in the German labour market. Moreover, the third-countries nationals have limited access to the market according to the legal provision that guarantees a favoured access for nationals and all EU-citizens. Therefore, only third-country nationals who have better skills than Germans who applied for the same job can get a job. The equalities and inequalities are incorporated into the social welfare system, favouring people of German or EU citizenship. As a result, discrimination still exists in the German society, triggering mixed feelings among the migrants.

The topic of equal treatment of people of different origins is fixed in the school curriculum of the Federal Republic of Germany. It aims at shaping tolerance and respect for people of different cultures, religions and beliefs and as well eliminating discrimination. There is even the *Guidelines of the Approval of Schoolbooks* issued by the Conference of Ministers of Culture and education of Germany stating the obligatory consistency of the books with general constitutional principles. Stereotypes should be also avoided, for example, Islam as totalitarian power or the superiority of Europe, which are still widespread among the people.

The media also plays a significant role in combating discrimination through for example the *Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons* that lists media dangerous to youth. This includes media that is immoral, incites violence, crime and racial hatred or even violent acts. All in all, over 1,600 media glorifying National Socialism or racial hatred are listed and mostly restricted to young people.

People affected by discrimination can contact the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, so-called *Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes*, to be informed about proper provisions, possible claims and time limits. This agency is also involved in research on the topic of discrimination in German society and responsible for reporting to the German Government and Parliament. Many Non-Governmental organizations and civil society actors are actively engaged in the struggle against discrimination while at the same time,

some laws of the German government should over go by hearing the voices of the activists and systematic evaluation of all the initiatives and projects implemented in this sphere. The current lack of awareness of ethnic discrimination among German people is very dangerous, causing new political powers to rise.

## Chapter II – German side

### 2.1 How to define a German?

The concept of '*national identity*' becomes a key element of the country's profile. National identity is not only the core of the state's image, but it also allows the country to have a more consolidated population with the same values, culture, and religion. At the same time, with the strong national identity people could feel that they belong to the country and be proud to have a certain nationality. It is important also to note that identity depends not only on the fact, how the people see themselves, but also on the way other nations see it, or, more precisely, how they would like to look in the eyes of other nations. In regards to this study, the characteristics of German identity can show the reasons for German's behaviours and actions. **Understanding the German identity can provide an answer to the research question by explaining why anti-Semitic sentiments among the Germans can increase with high numbers of newcomers. Additionally, by considering the specific features of German identity in comparison to other European identities and Muslims especially, the constructivist theory can be proven to work in this context.**

The issue of the formation of German national identity is an acute domestic political problem for modern German society. This phenomenon can be considered a natural consequence of *the policy of denazification*, carried out after the Second World War (Olick 2007). Much has been written on the *collective memory* and its consequences. Because of this policy, Germany is believed to be in an identity crisis. Going back to the past, Germans were proud to belong to this nation, which was defined by its language, political structure and the ethnicity. However, since the War the term of national identity has been used with more or less negative connotation, Germans are now not allowed to be proud of being German. They cannot be patriots; they cannot sing their national songs or cannot have their flags carried with them without people making comments or jokes about their past. That is why many Germans describe themselves as being Europeans or preferring not to use any words of belonging to certain groups.

**Who is a German?** This question is asked by many researchers, and there is no perfect answer that will satisfy nearly all the people living in this state. To begin with, the German national state was formed in the end of the 19th century, namely by 1871, when the '*iron*' Chancellor Otto von Bismarck succeeded in creating *the Second Reich* after

three victorious and bloody wars. Bismarck triumphed in finally uniting all the territories divided for years under one rule and consolidating power in order to achieve dominance in the region. However, this Second Reich brought the First World War to Europe, the fall of the Empire and a weak 'democratic' Weimar into existence. The German nation had such a strong national identity at that time that it could not be lost after a failed war, but instead was strengthened by revanchist ideas. People felt dissatisfied with the outcomes of the war and the lessons of this war had not taught nothing but the idea of rebuilding everything and starting again. Although Germans failed in the war, they succeeded in the consolidation of their people with a help of a new leader - *Hitler*, who concentrated all the power in his hands. Germans wanted revenge, a new chance to become a dominant nation in the world and they found the basis in the new ideas of '*Mein Kampf*'. These ideas led to millions of deaths in Second World War including 6 million European Jews, later referred as the **Holocaust**.

In the years following the Second World War until 1961, the German question was determined by a sense of *collective guilt* (Olick 2007). For the first post-war years, the only important issue was a survival of the country as such: "hour zero" came for Germany - the very starting point that marked the beginning of the history of the formation of **a capitalist democracy** in the heart of Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), not the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was a prototype of the modern Germany that led to an establishment of a new united country.

The following characteristics and sentiments of German post-war society can be emphasized:

- Leaving behind an idea of a special German way;
- The loss of a positive self-image;
- Scepticism in all spheres of life;
- The restoration of German culture, which suffered during the reign of **Nationalist Socialist German' Workers Party** (NSDAP);
- Popularization of American mass culture;
- A sense of collective guilt, a sense of shame in relation to individual episodes of German history.

The next stage, which caused the transformation of the German question, is the period between 1961 and 1989. The German question is the question of the existence of two Germanys. A search for national identity begins with a new force in the 1970's. The FRG is a completely westernized country in which capitalism flourished, and residents

enjoyed the benefits of an economic miracle. They considered themselves to be true Germans, and the GDR was seen as an opposition camp - a country with a conflicting political regime – **communism**.

At the same time, two contradictory tendencies of the post-war period could be noted: on the one hand, the need for integration was growing in society. The idea of national unity was increasingly becoming a subject of a debate. On the other hand, the ‘Germans’ who experienced **denazification** in the post-war years often spoke of themselves as **Europeans**, as **cosmopolitans** and only afterwards as Germans.

The next milestone is the period from 1989 to the beginning of the 21st century. The unification of Germany gave impetus to a new wave of searching for national identity: **who are we, the Germans?** The issue of the unification of two nations divided for years, who had each taken their own paths of post-war rebuilding was really challenging. A complete transformation of the statehood of the GDR, the unification of the people into the one single nation - have brought a radical breakdown of the post-war paradigm of German political, social and economic realities. At the end of millennium, united Germany became **an independent political player** with its own foreign policy, based on democratic values (dialogue between states, protecting human rights, respecting international institutions).

The reunification of Germany was certainly not an easy process accompanied by attempts to unify a nation that during the time of the separate existence formed **a different mentality**. These mentalities are specific to the diverse economic and political systems. In regards to the economic backwardness of the eastern regions, it became necessary to take special measures in order to develop old and new lands. Consequently, Western Germans were forced to pay taxes at a rate of 50%, and most of these taxes were transferred to the East. Western Germans were unhappy about the fact that it was necessary to transfer part of their hard earned income to the new regions.

In addition, different ideologies influenced the formation of other traditions and customs, east and west Germans took different cultural tracks. Until now, many German citizens believe that these differences in the developments after the Second World War outweighed all that is in common that united the German nation before the war. In other words, although the Berlin Wall fell, it continues to exist in the minds of the nation. While the West Germans are already used *to self-payments for living, medicine, training, and etc.*, which is normal for capitalist system, in the minds of the east Germans, there are such concepts as support from *the state, free medicine, education, social insurance*, etc. It



means that even now, East Germans are not used to a new system and do not consider it perfect. Besides, when the economy of the Western states was being restructured, East Germans had not experienced much of the modernization. The same applies for the time after reunification, when Eastern states should have accepted the ways the Western Germans lived and rejected more than 40 years of communist existence. It was not easy for them to refuse their identity in favour of western freedoms. At the same time, only after the government moved to Berlin in 1998, could people speak of themselves as one nation (Voth 2012).

Despite of the fact that a lot of time has past since unification, most western Germans still feel themselves primarily as Germans, and the majority of eastern Germans still consider themselves to be east Germans. "*Sie sind arrogant, immer auf das Geld aus, bürokratisch und oberflächlich*" (They are arrogant, always thinking about the money, bureaucratic and shallow)"- this is how east Germans think about their western brothers (DW 2013). They still do not feel like one nation and see themselves as **‘second class’** because of the economic differences. Although East Germany was modernized, and infrastructure improved, East German **salaries are still 20% lower than Western ones**. As a result, *‘Ossis’*<sup>6</sup> feel themselves discriminated against by the state. At the same time, *‘Wessis’* consider east Germans to be angry, distrustful, scared and dependent on help from outside. However, the young generation from 16 to 29 are more optimistic about each other. The survey from *Forsa-Institut* shows that 57% of the young Germans identify Germany as a one nation state (Spiegel 2014). Among the elements that make East and West Germans different 23% recognize salary and pension, 19% - mentality and character, 12% - language and dialect, only 4% identify quality of life as being different in East or West Germany.

After the reunification of Germany, there was a shift in the national identity. Among the most popular forms of identification today in the German society is belonging to a certain region or a local ethnicity. On the question of who you are by nationality, many Germans, answer "*I am a Bavarian*" or "*I am a Saxon*", only then "*I am a German*". This was a way of identification in 1800s, before the unification of German small territories (Zick 2015), and today Germans are using this form of identification again. Nowadays federal states are the most important actors in German domestic politics so that national identity is often limited to regional identity. At the same time, another common

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<sup>6</sup> Ossis and Wessis – this is how eastern and western Germans call each other inside the country.

way of identification is by calling themselves '*Europeans*' and claiming that all Europeans are one big nation. In the context of European integration, this statement is becoming truer.

Overall, modern German society is still facing the problem of strengthening national identity. The Germans love their fatherland, respect traditions, honour their culture and history, but **many Germans do not consider themselves German, but rather Europeans or, depending on the region where they live, Bavarians or Franconians**. Such a crisis of national unity can be explained on the basis of historical factors: the later unification of German principalities into a single state, post-war denazification, the existence of one nation for two states, etc. Modern Germany needs to "restore" its lost national identity in order to confront challenges, in this case the influx of migrants.

## **2.2 Xenophobia of east Germans**

**Nationalistic sentiments are higher in the East Germany than in the West as studies show.** However, anti-Semitic incidents are more marked in the West. The reason is quite simple: East Germans feel humiliation after the unification. A so-called "*brain drain*" followed after reunification – the migration of young people from the new federal states to the old ones who wanted to obtain decent education and work. Two-thirds of the entire industry of the East Germany disappeared, bringing high unemployment rates. A majority of East Germans dreamt of swift accession and fast exchange of the mark at a rate of "*one-to-one*", however, this did not happen. In nearly one night they lost all means of existence, new relations should have been built. They missed the times of 'easy' existence whereas west Germans could not understand this feeling. In the West, there was an established structure, a high quality of life, decent work, and predictability. In this case, the 'wall' existed in their heads.

In fact, German unity was associated with a great sacrifice of utopia. Many east Germans had illusions about the better Western society. Many who thought about the synthesis of the best of the two societies into one, very soon forgot about it, collecting what was left by broken East German identity. Ecstasy about *Helmut Kohl* changed to bitter disappointment. Some of them even felt nostalgia about the past. For example, in 1991-1992, one could observe an outbreak of violence that occurred in the "new" federal states. *"The number of xenophobic and radical right-wing attacks in eastern Germany is*

*distressing," specified Iris Gleicke, the government's commissioner for Eastern Germany - "Without question there are also such attacks on foreigners in the west. But they are particularly frequent in the east".*

For people who grew up in the conditions of the command and administrative system of a socialist country, the feeling of "*collective deprivation*" is very common. This means that **they feel initially disadvantaged in relation to fellow citizens from the western lands**, as well as to migrants, whom East Germans often consider to be "*social parasites*", as they are according to east Germans are getting everything easier than local people.

Another widespread phenomenon in the region is that of "*selective memory*". In the memoirs of many residents of the eastern lands, the GDR seemed to be a positive, romantic place. In the years of socialism, the "*friendship of peoples*" was propagated, as in the Soviet Union where many nationalities were trying to live together, but this relation to migrants in the GDR was only as to "*guests*", and their stay was temporary, said one of the authors of the report, *Michael Lühmann* (DW 2017). This idea has been preserved by many residents of the eastern regions to this day.

With the disappearance of the GDR, the old social structures disintegrated, and new ones could not be created. **People in the east do not see good economic prospects, they are distrustful of state structures, which certainly increases the propensity for xenophobia.** The situation is so complex that it represents a "great danger" for the development of the entire region.

Raised in the Marxist way of living, youth who did not see any real prospects began to attack the foreign workers, to destroy their homes. An example of an extremely radical attitude of the youth in the eastern lands is a series of murders of Turkish immigrants from the late 1990s and until 2011, committed by the "National Socialist Underground" group in Zwickau. And although the population of many cities opposed this kind of attitude towards foreigners, and many cities staged powerful demonstrations in solidarity with foreign citizens, "Right" radicalism still exists to this day in Germany and shows itself from time to time.

In 2015, a wave of protests swept the Saxon cities of Meissen, Freital, Heidenau and Hoyerswerda. East Germans, who remember negative memories of the communist past, and are not coming to terms with their Nazi past, blame foreigners for social and economic problems they face. In their opinion, migrants are responsible for all of the failures of eastern Germany.

Xenophobic sentiments in Eastern Germany sparked the anti-Islamic movement **Pegida**<sup>7</sup>. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that in the west of the Federal Republic of Germany, buildings in which refugees are housed are being burned, the examples include, but are not limited to the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.




Figure 4. The percentage of the east and west Germans having anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist views.

Therefore, in Saxony, hostility towards illegal migrants acquired a special form of expression: young nationalists, adults and young families shouting slogans at the demonstrations.

### The Quantitative

**approach** used for

studying the views of the east and west Germans. It has shown that 29% of those surveyed in East Germany have anti-Semitic views, and 7% of those surveyed have prejudices about the state of Israel (Figure 4). At the same time, 22% of sampled Germans of Western origin, possess anti-Semitic views, and another 5% have anti-Israel visions. The data varies slightly from source to source and the difference can be seen.

Author of the book "Gefühlsstau" ("Not found out emotions") *Hans-Joachim Maaz* states that *'The problem that flares up around the refugee situation cannot be reduced to a small number of radicals'* (DW 2016). He believes that the problem should not be underestimated and the number of supporters of radical views will increase. In his book, he tells about the disappointment of the people of the former GDR about the fact that many of their expectations did not materialize after the reunification of Germany, and this problem should be discussed openly. *'In the east of Germany there are a large number of people who, after the reunification of the country in 1989, failed to integrate*

<sup>7</sup> PEGIDA- European patriots against the Islamization of the West- is a German political movement with the nationalistic, anti-Islamic and right-wing views. This movement was established in 2014 in Dresden with an aim of opposing Islamic extremism.

*successfully,*’ Maats noted that this problem passes from generation to generation. *‘Such grievances and spiritual wounds become a breeding ground for anger and hatred, and asylum seekers become the object to which these feelings are projected’*, declares Maats. He points out that East German cities cannot cope with the influx of refugees, and the insufficient societal discussion of the issue of illegal migration only aggravates the problem. As has been stated before, many Germans associate themselves with the federal states and this is the case with the Saxony. Local residents are afraid that the refugees will interfere and make things worse, locals are not ready for new changes. Consequently, many are particularly frightened by the migrants of the Muslim faith. Protests against the reception of refugees clearly showed that the boundaries between civil protests and right-wing extremist forms of agitation are disappearing.

*‘[East Germans] are disappointed and in this disappointment comes all of the sudden immigrants. None of these frustrated people from Dresden or Leipzig or whatever, they are ready to do the dirty work of the immigrants. But the rhetoric is that they are taking our work, our girls...’* as Professor Avram Burg states. East Germans blame newcomers for their decline, because who else can they blame.

Moreover, almost 28 years after German reunification, economically the east-west division is over 25 per cent (Gehalt.de). In the old federal states, the average annual salary for all skilled workers is EUR 42,968, in the new federal states it is EUR 34,308. This means that workers in the West earn 25% more than their colleagues in the east, the pay gap can be even greater depending on occupation and industry. A specialist in commerce in the West for example, receives almost 20 per cent less salary than the same specialist in the East. In absolute terms, this means a salary difference of around EUR 4,000 per year.

## Chapter III – The Muslim side

### 3.1 Characteristics of the Muslims coming to Germany

To understand the whole opposition raised about the influx of the migrants, one should assess what differentiates them from common Europeans and Germans. **Because it is the differences that trigger the social discontent among the Germans towards newcomers, that it is why this chapter is necessary to understand these differences and the feelings that they trigger.**

On figure 2 on the page 17 above, it can be seen that Germany was the destination for 748,265 refugees in 2016 coming from all over the world. 520,610 people came from Syria, Iran, Iraq or Afghanistan. The percentage of people holding certain religion can be estimated, **and the number of people having Muslim views is about 86% of refugees accepted by Germany from 2014 until now**, in comparison to 40% of regular migrants (Pew Research Center 2017). Additionally, with the help of the **quantitative method of research** one can assess that 91% of the Syrian migrants are Muslims due to the religious composition of the country, the same applies to Afghanistan and Iraq. Data from other countries can be seen on the table number 1: in Libya 87%are Muslims, in Algeria – 87%, Tunis – 86% and etc.

*Table 1. The percentage of Muslims inside the country.*

Country	Percentage of Muslims in the country
Iraq	92%
Libya	87%
Algeria	87%
Tunis	86%
Iran	56%
Morocco	80%
Egypt	75%

*Source: Anti-Defamation League.*

It is vital to point out that Muslim immigration is not new to German society; after the Second World War many Muslim migrants came into the country to find work - ‘*Gastarbeiters*’. The economy of Germany, like other Western European countries, in the

1940s and 50s, faced serious demographic problems. In this regard, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced a contractual system for recruiting immigrant workers, mainly from Turkey, to ensure the country's economic growth and prosperity. Local society expected them to come, improve the economy of the country and leave. However, it did not work how the government planned.

Because of the controversial contradictions, many temporary workers became, in fact, permanent residents. They gradually moved from the hostels to the city workers' quarters, creating ghettos. Since there was an influx of guest workers, the native German population left these areas. In the ethno-cultural enclaves, a new infrastructure was created, aimed at the Muslim consumer. Compact living contributed to the self-isolation of new ethnic minorities. For example, Turkish national symbols are often found in the Turkish quarters of major German cities, accordingly, Turkish the mode of life is ostensibly pronounced. According to estimates of German law enforcement agencies, in the Turkish ethnic enclaves, patriarchal and clan customs play a huge role, as these were typical to Turkish migrant workers' social composition, and their families originally belonged to the least educated strata of the Turkish population. Initially, they came from underdeveloped rural areas where religious traditions were particularly strong.

The 2014/2015 wave of asylum seekers was not a new phenomenon, however, as mentioned before, this wave of migration is very different from the previous one, even though most of the arrivals are Muslim. To start with, firstly, this migration **flow is characterized by the size of migration**, meaning that **whole families are coming to the EU**. It is not separate individuals anymore but a whole family migrating and that makes the process of integration much more difficult. Secondly, they have **very strong Arabic or African identity** in comparison to a doubtful European one. Thirdly, similar to previous migratory waves, these migrants are coming with a strong '*Geltung fur den Islam in Europa*' (Tibi 2017). They want to hold the same values as they had before and even spread them, to be more precise, **build the Islamic community in the EU**. Fourthly, this migration flow is characterized by **a high level of criminality**. It is not anymore a country which decides who will have the possibility to migrate to Europe, but criminal smugglers ('*Schleuserbanden*') who are collecting sizeable amounts money in this migratory process.

After defining how the modern migration flow is different from the one between 1945-1960, it is essential to describe how the asylum seekers are different from the other population. Two main features must be emphasized. First of all, **Muslims coming to**

**Europe tend to be younger, in comparison to the ageing population of Europe.** The average age of a Muslim refugee in Europe is 30, this is 13 years younger than the average European – 43. Second of all, they **have higher fertility rate than other religions.** Muslims do have more kids than an average European and this is an essential determinant of demographic growth. The average woman originating from a Muslim country is likely to have 2.6 children, one child more than a non-Muslim European woman. The Pew Research Centre has estimated that in 2050 in Germany there would be at least 5.99 Million Muslims with a zero migration scenario and 17.49 Million with a high migration scenario. These two differences are really positive for the European society as Professor Burg states in his interview: *‘not having the influx of younger people coming to the system, nobody will be there to support the welfare policy of the society. This is why the Turks were invited as Gastarbeiters and it’s immigrants who will save the social welfare of the west. Immigrants work, pay taxes, they are in good health etc.’*

Additionally, **Muslims and Christians differ in their attitude to the roles of men and women in society:** the equality of men and women, girls’ participation in sport events, the issue of wearing a headscarf for Muslim women. It is necessary to note the differences in the varying understandings of society between Muslims and Christians. Unlike the traditions of modern Christian Europe and, in particular, Germany, in Islam, the state and religion are inseparable. This also prevents the rapprochement of the German state and Islam.

Resulting from the higher birth rates among Muslims, the proportion of young people is very high. This is important to emphasize because the young population is not resistant to the propaganda of radical Islamism and traditional Islamic values. **Radical Islam is rapidly spreading among the Muslim youth in Europe - both among newcomers and second and third generation Muslims.** Thousands of young Muslims from France, Germany and Britain have already left their homes to fight for the Islamic State<sup>8</sup> group in Syria and Iraq.

More importantly, new studies show that anti-Semitic attitudes and rejection of the state of Israel are prevalent among the newcomers (JTA 2017). As mentioned before, refugees are coming from the countries where religion plays a huge role and hatred towards Jews is propagated in all spheres of life. Sociologist and historian *Günther Jikeli*

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<sup>8</sup> The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – a Salafi jihadist terrorist organization and as well former not recognized proto-state that supports Sunni Islam. It is responsible for numerous terroristic attacks worldwide and is forbidden in many countries.



of Indiana University and the University of Potsdam (Germany) stated: *‘Anti-Semitic thinking and stereotyping are very common ... even among those who emphasize that they ‘respect’ Judaism or that there is no problem living together between Muslims, Christians and Jews in their countries of origin and in Germany, ’.*

### 3.2 Anti-Semitic incidents: the problem of reporting

The issue of reporting of anti-Semitic incidents has long been raised and criticized by international organizations, non-governing organizations, and other interested parties. **In 2017, 1,453 anti-Semitic incidents** were officially reported by the German Federal Ministry of Internal affairs (BMI), including 32 incidents of physical violence, 160 incidents of vandalism and almost 900 incidents of incitement to violence or hate speech towards Jews (BMI 2017). The numbers are not highly different from to the previous year, in which **1,381 anti-Semitic crimes were reported**, but still the numbers are not declining, instead they are growing. According to the report of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in 2016 – 1,468 incidents were recorded, the numbers were comparable and both high. The numbers provided by the FRA and BMI

*Table 2 and 3. The number of recorded crimes in years from 2010 until 2016.*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Recorded crimes</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Recorded crimes</b>
2010	3.305	2010	1.268
2011	3.554	2011	1.239
2012	4.112	2012	1.374
2013	4.305	2013	1.275
2014	4.983	2014	1.596
2015	1.246	2015	1.366
2016	1.381	2016	1.468

*Sources: BMI (left table) vs FRA (right).*

indicate the crimes recorded to be with right-wing motives, so-called hate-crimes, as well official data differs in interpretations in the registration of criminal acts.

According to the table 2 and 3, between 2001 and 2016, an average of 1,522 crimes related to anti-Semitism were committed in Germany, many of them violence-

related - an average of 44 crimes. **The apparent increase in the number of crimes compared to the previous year was observed primarily during the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2014.** In Germany, anti-Semitic aggression is closely linked to the Middle East conflict, 49% of German Jews interviewed said they have recently faced a statement: *'The Israelis treat the Palestinians in the same way that the Nazis treated Jews'*. Numerous studies suggest that in Germany Jews are perceived as representatives of the Jewish state and its policies (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung).

One may take into account that **most anti-Semitic crimes are not officially reported**, according to the survey made by FRA, only 23% of incidents with anti-Semitic motives are documented. Surveys claimed that the reason for this underreporting is that they do not see any prospects of change by going to the police (FRA 2016). Jews claim that they experience discrimination every day in all spheres of life. These deficiencies can be partly documented by unofficial media for example, victim support centers, or by specialized human rights NGOs. New methods of national registration of xenophobic incidents have not yet been established. One journalist even conducted an experiment and did not remove a kippah after his visit to synagogue in Germany and all the way home he experienced negative views and comments from the people.

Germany has extensive experience in countering discrimination and hate crimes using the capabilities of NGOs. It is **the NGOs, in cooperation with the municipalities and the government, that conduct active explanatory work among citizens, initiate boycotts of neo-Nazis and right-wing radicals, especially those working in their businesses.**

Moreover, anti-Zionist demonstrations are also not included in the police statistics as having an anti-Semitic purpose. For example, in Berlin in December 2017 numerous demonstrations were held against President Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The flag of Israel was burned on December 8, next to the building of the US Embassy in the German capital. These events caused disturbance among German politicians: German *Foreign Minister Thomas de Maizière* commented that *'It is unacceptable for us when Jews or the State of Israel are insulted in such a shameful way'* (DW 2017). A similar statement was made by the head of European diplomacy *Federica Mogherini* who had an urgent meeting with the *Prime-Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu* on this matter. After these demonstrations, 10 people were arrested, since a criminal case on them was opened on suspicion of desecrating the symbols of the sovereignty of a foreign state. A German government spokesman, *Stefan Seibert*, stated

that the government strongly condemns the protests in those cities where hatred for Israel and Jews was expressed.

The same is true for the incidents happening in the German schools. Numerous surveys held in schools tell that the influx of migrants has clearly radicalized Muslim diasporas in European countries. The young people who have just migrated to Germany, faced a lack of prospects and social elevators, projecting their irritation on other minorities. German teachers told reporters that in schools where the overwhelming majority of students are Muslim children, Jewish students are persecuted and often forced to transfer to other educational institutions. A lot of public attention in Germany was recently attracted by the case of a 14-year-old Jewish teenager from Berlin. For several months, his Muslim classmates harassed and insulted him. One of them allegedly stated: "*All Jews are murderers.*" After the students began to use physical violence against their child, the parents took him out of this school. Jews regularly face insults, aggression, and bullying by Muslims that make their lives unbearable. As a matter of fact, children are more influenced by the media than by what their parents say. By saving the traditions of their society, meaning anti-Semitic attitudes, they can consolidate with others of the same background in the new community.

It is essential to correctly report the number of anti-Jewish attacks in schools, so that the reason for hatred can be understood. Parents need to be aware of the problem in order to teach their children how to act, as hatred starts in the early ages and then evolves into political behaviour. Nevertheless, the latest publication over the past few years demonstrates that **about one in five German citizens experience ‘*latent anti-Semitism*’** (The Jerusalem Post 2015). Experts do not claim that all Muslim communities and mosques are sources of anti-Semitic propaganda. Within the framework of the survey, 18 imams were interviewed. Open anti-Semitism among them was not revealed, although the researcher found a very critical attitude towards Israel in the light of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meaning that the problem again cannot only be blamed on newcomers, it is deep inside the German society, inside the Europeans. Multiculturalism should be taught in all spheres of life from the early ages, not only non-hatred of Jews.

Another controversial point raised by the *Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University* is that the expression of political disagreement with the State of Israel state cannot be deemed to be anti-Semitic because anyone in the society can hate the policy of another country. This argument has its own grounds for existence and in fact many people really do not support the policy of their

country, especially when it holds a bloody war. Additionally, no one can really prove that violence was used against them because they were Jews. There cannot be 100% certainty since the various reasons for certain behaviour can be found.

## Chapter IV - Political implications: Political climate in Germany going far too right?

### 4.1 The overall political climate in Germany

An increase in illegal immigration and the influx of refugees has had a significant impact on the growth of radical sentiments in German society that can fundamentally change the political map of Germany towards a more right-wing composition. Recent polls show that almost half of voters favour the resignation of the government because of the effects of the "*open door*" policy that they perceive as a failed strategy. As a result, the number of citizens voting for opposition nationalist parties has sharply increased, which means that people are **unhappy about the government's migration policy and are willing to change the whole direction of the policy**. In particular, the Eurosceptic right-wing party "**Alternative for Germany**" (AfD) strongly criticizes the government's policy on migration and integration issues. It is against an annual quota on asylum seekers and advocates for a 'zero immigration' policy. AfD leaders are willing to close the borders, end so-called 'unregulated mass migration' and increase the number of deportations of illegal migrants (DW 2017). Although it supports the involvement of skilled migrants in the country, provided that illegal immigration is terminated, and also advocates for granting refugee status to those who come from the regions most affected by the war. Moreover, they stand against all types of family reunification, irrespective of protection status. Therefore, this party is certainly against the illegal immigration to Germany and stands for regulated migration in limited numbers for skilled workers and nations affected by war. This means that according to them, migration in such large numbers should stop, especially family reunification.

A more extreme position is taken by the ultra-right wing **National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)**, which believes that the problems associated with mass immigration are accompanied by exceedingly high costs and threaten the welfare of the country as well as the finances of taxpayers. In the rhetoric of the party, qualified migrants appear to be the force that leaves a large part of the indigenous population without work, and the influx of refugees is linked to the failures of EU policy. At the same time, the solution to migration problems is linked to the need to withdraw the country from the European Union. The position of the NDP is more radical than that of

AfD or any other legal German party, supporters of this party oppose migration fully and stand for the leaving the EU.

Oppositional left and ecological movements of Germany adhere to opposing views, seeing in the migration flows the prospects of positive shifts in the economy. The **'Links' (Left)** party calls to refuse any restrictions on granting refugee status, to consolidate the right to family reunification and choice of host country, to create a new European reception system. According to the Links party, migrants are supposed to be given equal rights with German citizens. Moreover, in the program, increased attention is paid to combating discrimination against women and representatives of other cultures. Hence, the German "*Links*" are in favour of recognizing the responsibility of the federal government in resolving issues of assistance to refugees, for the rapid integration of migrants into society already at the initial stage of their stay in the country, and also consider it necessary to resist racism more actively, **"fighting the causes of immigration, and not with refugees"**. This is a largely different view on the migration than the other parties.

The positions of the party **"Union 90 / Greens"** largely coincides with the rhetoric of the "*Links*". The party pays special attention to human rights, combating discrimination and supporting refugees. The Greens promise to provide migrants with voting rights at the communal level and the possibility of maintaining dual citizenship. The Greens and the Left represent more open and friendly views to the migration flows to Germany than other common parties, with these views they do trigger more positive behaviour to newcomers and instead of fearing and opposing them to accept and help to assimilate them in German multicultural society.

The left-wing radicals of Germany (the communist: **Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist parties, the Red Aid**, etc.) also promote the idea of combating racism, and advocate for equality in all spheres of life since multicultural community is a part of communist's coexistence, criticizing state policy on the migration from these positions. The German centrist **Free Democratic Party** advocates for the creation of a simplified administrative system for the protection of and assistance to refugees, and *"for accelerating naturalization through economic, social and cultural factors"*. The FDP demands that the municipalities should be dismissed and the federal government pay more for social welfare. In addition, they stand for the introduction of *a European quota system*, which distributes asylum seekers to the member states of the European Union, and the construction of large reception warehouses, so-called hotspots, in Greece and Italy.

Refugees running from the civil war should be provided with the temporary humanitarian protection. According to them, a common, pan-European asylum law should be a long-term goal. Refugees from the Middle East should be helped by being provided with local assistance in the affected countries. The Western Balkan states should be declared safe countries of origin in order to limit the pressure from these states. Regarding the immigration of skilled workers, the FDP is committed to a great simplification of the rules on skilled labour immigration, for example, by massively lowering the minimum income limit, and justification of the right to permanent residence after two years with proof of sufficient language skills.

A relatively new moment in the political life of Germany is the increased criticism of *Angela Merkel's* policy not only from the opposition, but also from the representatives of her own party - the Christian Democratic Union (**CDU**). It should be noted that Christian-democrats have always advocated a more rigorous approach to migration than the Social Democratic Party (**SPD**) and the **Green Party**, which have traditionally favoured a more open migration policy. The **CDU/ Christian Social Union (CSU)** requests to increase the number of deportations of rejected asylum seekers. They introduced a reduction in the number of countries recognized as unfavourable, which has reduced the number of refugees, but, the issue of deporting people back to Afghanistan is a subject of active debate. Turkey, Algeria and Morocco are considered safe places. According to CDU/CSU, immigration should be really low and the events of 2015 should not be repeated again. With increased political efforts, aimed at African states, the Union parties want to struggle with hunger, illnesses and other critical problems common in these states. A certain shift to the right was also indicated by the inclusion in the program of provisions on the "**leading culture**" of Germany. Parties advocate for the deepening of European integration: the creation of the European Defence Union and the European Defence Fund, the formation of a unified policy on border protection, migration, and combating unemployment. Accordingly, the CDU/CSU parties stand strongly for the European Union and the introduction of the common response to the immigration crisis.

At the same time, SPD stands against limiting the number of asylum claims granted and against deportations to Afghanistan. Under the influence of unresolved problems with refugees, the spectrum of opinions is gradually shifting towards a toughening of the migration policy, which is reflected in the official discourse. The SPD guarantees the right of refugees for asylum, but in the migration issue, like the CDU/CSU, prefers the Canadian model of attracting skilled labour. The Social Democrats

favour the integration of migrants, but they reject the concept of "leading culture" offered by the CDU / CSU and the prohibition of dual citizenship.

Hence, the aggravation of public protest in early 2016 prompted the government of Angela Merkel to take new measures aimed at facilitating the deportation of migrants who were convicted of committing crimes. It should also be noted that, despite the measures taken to normalize the situation, the situation with migrants in Germany is far from being resolved, which somewhat distinguishes it from another large EU country - Great Britain, which currently ranks third in Europe in terms of the number of Muslims (after France and Germany).

## 4.2 Rise of the Alternative fur Deutschland.

Populism of the AfD is promising to satisfy a desire for patriotism among the Germans. It strongly focuses on identity; which distinguishes this party from the more traditional ones that try to keep the theme of patriotism as far as possible. Although it is unlikely to be a part of a governing coalition in the Bundestag, it largely succeeded in shaping the domestic conversation to its advantage triggering a huge debate inside the country as well as fear from the international community about the party's possible demands. The AfD capitalized on growing anxiety of the Germans that mostly Muslim immigrants would deeply change German society (VOX 2017). The party leaders are using this fear for their advantage, stealing voters from SPD and CDU/CSU.




Figure 5. The percentage of votes received by the German parties in 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections.

Source: Deutscher Bundestag.

The far-right party not only entered the Bundestag, but became the third-largest party with an increase of almost 9% according to exit polls conducted in Germany. The results of the elections in the German parliament were astonishing since **AfD has achieved a support of 12,6%, while traditional parties such as CDU/CSU and SPD scores**



**their weakest electoral results since the 1950s.** The centre-right CDU/CSU garnered 32.9% of public support, whereas the SPD - 20,5%. The political tendencies in German society are astonishing both for national experts, and for international ones.

As for the history of this party, the AfD was created in 2013 as a response to the Eurozone crisis and attempts made by Chancellor Angela Merkel and her FRG government to save bankrupt South European countries like Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Merkel and other leaders of EU member states decided to help them by providing the loans to these countries, as well as by the use of other stabilization tools so-called "Rescue parachutes" (*'Rettungsschirme'*), which, in addition to loans, also necessarily include the repayment of government loans. The problem was primarily related to Greece's impending credit default. At that time, the AfD stood for enabling countries such as Greece to leave the Eurozone, which would have ensured the stabilization of the Eurozone. This statement very quickly put on the party the stigma of **'the opponent of Greece's membership in the Eurozone'**.

At the beginning, the young party was condemned for the absence of a party program. However, now the representatives of Christian-democrats who are believed to possess Conservative views, and other parties in the federal parliament, criticize AfD for its **conservative-traditionalist** rhetoric and claim that it has even Nazi positions. Another popular claim in regard to AfD is that they accuse this party of being **populist**, and support this by pointing to the rapid increase in the number of supporters in such a short time, consequently, the redistribution of a significant number of electorates'' votes in favour of this party. There is also a negative rhetoric on the party's composition where many members are believed to hold racist and anti-Semitic views.

**Primary data research** of the party's programme has shown that AfD opposes the deepening of European integration, supports the return to the "Europe of Nations" and promises to hold a referendum on withdrawal from the euro. In other words, all core competencies must be passed from the EU back into the hands of national states, which is shown by the desire of the neo-conservators to the traditional national state. In the program, the euro area is portrayed as a mistake that must be rectified step-by-step, seeking to dissolve this area.

Much attention is paid to the issue of refugees and migrants in the program. The party demands to limit reception of refugees, by creating reception points in regions of their origin and toughening the policy of deportation. AfD calls for measures to increase the birth rate and supports "traditional German values." At the same time, in economic

issues, the party demonstrates neoliberal views - it opposes state intervention in the economy, supports the abolition of property taxes and inheritance, the introduction of a tax gap, but opposes the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)<sup>9</sup>, the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)<sup>10</sup> and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)<sup>11</sup>. AfD believes that NATO must become an exclusively defensive alliance. Also Eurosceptics are principally against the united European army and the presence of any type of Allied troops in the North Atlantic Alliance on the German territory, in other words, the party demands full military sovereignty, including from American nuclear bases. Interestingly, it appeals to stop sanctions against Russia and make it one of the main Germany's partners. And here the party aspires to achieve more sovereignty for Germany. Unlike other parties that pay great attention to climate protection, AfD asserts that the relationship between CO2 emissions and global warming has not been proven and criticizes the abandonment of nuclear power plants and the ill-considered transition to renewable energy.

In addition to the family, a very important part of society is considered to be cultural identity. Therefore, AfD calls for the protection of mainstream German culture from multiculturalism, which, in their opinion, are obliged to deal with both civil society and the state. One of the main parts of this culture is a language, which this party wants to make the third working language of the EU along with English and French. At the same time, they believe that it is necessary to save the German language from the increasing presence of 'Anglicism' in it and 'genderization'. ***"We have the right to reclaim not just our country, but also our past"*** Alexander Gauland, a leader of AfD, claims.

Alternative for Germany stands for the Canadian system of migration when before migrating to the country migrants should prove that they are professionally qualified, that they know language and possess an invitation from an employer. Additionally, to obtain asylum, the seekers should actually prove that they need it and those that are declined should leave the country immediately.

They are critical about Merkel's immigration policy, given the desire of preserving their traditions and values, because neither people originating in Africa nor

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<sup>9</sup> TTIP – a trade agreement proposed by the European Union and the United States, whose goal is to promote trade and multilateral economic growth.

<sup>10</sup> TiSA - a possible international trade treaty between 23 Parties, which include the European Union and the United States. The goal of this agreement is to liberalize the worldwide trade of services such as healthcare, banking, and transport.

<sup>11</sup> CETA – a provisionally applied free-trade agreement between Canada and the European Union. The Treaty has eliminated 98% of the tariffs between the EU and Canada.

people from the Middle East carry these "German" values and the majority are Muslims. Their traditions and values differ from German ones. Over time, according to such marginal politicians as *Thilo Sarrazin*<sup>12</sup> such a strong presence of these people in the country can lead to a situation whereby traditions and values will begin to compete with German ones inside the country. A special argument here is the fact that the number of children born in Muslim families in this country is several times greater than the average number of children in German families. In the long term, such a development of the country's demography will lead to religious and cultural alienation, which the neoconservatives are so afraid of. The arguments do not assume the possible changes in the families from a generation to generation because of the integration and western education, therefore, and only assumes the development of a diaspora culture.

Since AfD has repeatedly been criticized for its "*Islamophobic*" position, it is essential to consider the position of a party on the theme of Islam. The German Eurosceptics' position is liberal enough, recognizing freedom of religion. However, the program immediately clarifies that the party is against the practices of some Islam traditions which are directed against the Judeo-Christian and humanistic foundations of the German culture, as well as the free-democratic order and the laws of Germany. One of their popular campaign slogan for 2017 elections was '**Stop Islamization**'. According to them, Muslims who have integrated should live respecting German traditions, but Islam is not a part of these traditions they believe. Therefore, they require a prohibition on the construction and operation of mosques to societies and unions that are unconstitutional. Financing must also be stopped for the construction and operation of mosques by Muslim states and other foreign creditors from abroad. Moreover, the AfD states that Imams preaching in Germany must receive state permission. Therefore, the AfD is willing to control everything connected with Islam in the country.

The analysis of the program of the party demonstrate that this party is more a **new right** party than a 'Nazi' one as many politicians and people label it. They openly discriminate against Muslim culture since they, as many Germans do, are fearing the invasion of the Muslim culture. As stated before, the Muslim identity is really strong and different in comparison to the weak German identity that is now in crisis.

Therefore, in the course of a public survey of the population, only 16% of all AfD supporters surveyed named the content of the party program the reason for their choice,

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<sup>12</sup> Thilo Sarrazin – a German politician, author of controversial books 'Germany abolishes itself' and 'Europe does not need the euro', former senator of finance for the State of Berlin.

and 68% admitted that they support the Eurosceptics because of their dissatisfaction with the other parties. This **quantitative approach** shows the discontent of the people with the decisions of current politicians. People seem to be in favour of a far tougher response to the immigration crisis than the government provides. Therefore, as the **primary data research** of the party's programme has shown, the Alternative for Deutschland party offers an alternative in an era when Germany is obliged to do something, obliged to accept refugees when other countries remain not so open.




Figure 6. The percentage of votes by states received by AfD in the Federal elections in Germany in 2017.

Source: Based on data from the Federal Returning Officer.

Another issue that must be raised is the percentage of votes received by the AfD in the various Federal states. As seen in Figure 6, in the East of Germany more people voted for the AfD than in the West. In the East, Thüringen had the highest number of the votes with 22.7%, in the old states the highest number of votes was registered in Bayern – 12.4%. What is more, in the **new states the average of the votes received by AfD was 21.62%, in the old states it was only 10.15%.** An enormous difference that can be clarified by the factors explained in the previous chapters - East and West economic, historical and social differences. Mostly, ‘A serious disappointment in what used to be the GDR (communist Germany) east and disappointment in the process of unity and equalizing the size’ (Appendix 1).

**Who is the average AfD voter?** First of all, more men vote for this party than women, only 39% of voters are women. Second of all, the voters are older than 30 years, which means that they were born before unification. Then, they have medium education, in other words, 55% of voters only finished *Realschule*<sup>13</sup> in Germany. Highly educated people chose other parties. Later on, these people earn more than average salary in Germany (>€2200) and they are not small people, not low-qualified workers. Finally, AfD voters are highly concerned about the issue of migration, and 82% of those surveyed

<sup>13</sup> Realschule – a secondary school in Germany.

were against it – (Machowecz 2017). All in all, they are people who are dissatisfied with how Germany developed after reunification, what policies it held and most of them fear of high numbers of newcomers belonging to a foreign culture.

## Conclusion

The aim of this investigation was to assess present anti-Semitic rhetoric in German society and its possible influence on the political climate in the country. As claimed, classical anti-Semitism with its stereotyping, denigration, demonization and obsession is not relevant anymore in the modern society; contemporary anti-Semitism is believed to be a part of overall xenophobia, fear of others, of foreigners. The research question of the present study is: **has the rapid increase of the Muslim population in Germany contributed to the growth of animosity directed toward the Jews in the country?** In other words, the goal was to clarify the cause-effect relations of the inflow of Muslim immigrants to FRG and the increased support to right-wing populist parties among the Germans.

This study has shown that the EU has failed in orchestrating a unified response towards the immigration crisis; it has neither harmonized nor coordinated its asylum policy. Instead, European authorities decided to resolve the issue on their own. The temporary measures helped restore control over the external borders of the EU and stopped further rapid actions of individual member states. Data showed that the composition of the immigrants coming to Germany has changed over the time to more people coming from the Middle East. More particularly, in 2016 already 70% of all refugees originated from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. The change in composition of the newcomers meant that newcomers were mostly Muslim which is a relevant factor for assessing anti-Semitism inside the country as they were raised in a culture where having anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist views is a norm.

The quantitative method of analysis has shown that almost half of all migrants are directed to the Germany since they believe that this country has a higher standard of living, a better system of social benefits and finally, rest of the countries took protective measures to close the boarders for the newcomers in such a big numbers. 520, 610 people out of 1 226 385 (total number of refugees) came to Germany in 2016 only, meaning that the German state now has more Muslim newcomers than almost any other state in Europe. This factor again influences xenophobic positions.

Allocation through the *Königstein quota system* to 16 federal states as an attempt to equally redistribute newcomers on the territory of the country during the early accommodation phase was not as successful as one could expect. First of all, because the quota system was only in work during the early phase of application procedure, later

asylum seekers could move to other places if they had the will to do so. Second of all, this system of allocation imposes huge burdens on large cities as it only considers total population. Consequently, large cities receive more migrants. This means that big cities do have enormous responsibilities towards the asylum seekers and lack opportunities for such a big group of people, in the case of more equal redistribution, they should have been easily integrated into the system without being an additional burden to the local population. The current situation offers no chance for integration in big cities; accordingly, newcomers do not easily accept the values of the German society. People of a Muslim culture, especially traumatized after the events in their countries, direct their hatred towards Jewish population in big cities.

The socio-cultural differences are the root causes of the problems that European society faces at this time. That is why there is a constant need for successful socio-cultural integration of a huge number of people that belong to a considerably different community than the European one. For migrants as well it is a challenge since they want to have a decent standard of living in the new society and do not want to experience alienation. The integration of migrants is a multilateral process that combines political, economic, social and cultural aspects. Subsequently, the gradual inclusion of migrants into the life of the host society should lead to acceptance of the values of the European society or at least its understanding, and the key factor for this socialization is an ability to speak fluently the language of the hosting country. Moreover, cultural integration does not mean the rejection of the host state's own cultural identity, a balance must be found.

The primary data research of the existing legislation on non-discrimination in Germany has shown that the principals of equality and the prohibition of all forms of discrimination play an essential role within the country. Documents such as *the Universal Declaration of Human rights*, *the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, *the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* and *EU directives* are being employed to foster equality and non-discrimination in the country. The same way the topic of equal treatment of people of different origin is fixed in the German school curriculum in order to shape tolerance and respect to the people of distinct culture, religion and beliefs from the early ages. The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency was formed to help people affected by discrimination and it is also involved in the research on the topic and provides the German Government and Parliament with a report on discrimination within the country. Numerous NGOs and civil society are actively engaged in the struggle against discrimination. However, people still lack

awareness about discrimination issues and are supporting stereotypes that are insulting to other nations.

The second chapter showed the difficulties in identifying as a German. Germany is no more the powerful and Empire of Bismarck or Hitler, it is an open democratic state that possesses liberal values. The Second World War brought divided the country into communist and capitalist ways of living. Different ideologies influenced the formation of other traditions and customs, differently speaking, east and west Germans took opposite cultural directions that still divide them today, as the study shows. Until now, many German citizens believe that these differences in the developments after the Second World War outweighed all that was common that united the German nation before the war. The economic backwardness of East Germany after reunification is really challenging and it is certainly causing a discontent among the east Germans about their lower standard of living. Additionally, it was not easy for eastern Germans to give up their identity in favour of western freedoms.

A study shows that Germans still do not perceive themselves as one united nation, moreover, east Germans believe that they are 'second class' Germans because of the economic differences. Although modernization took place after reunification, salaries are still 20% smaller than the Western ones. They rarely identify themselves as Germans, and more often identify with regional identities, political beliefs or as Europeans. It is a crisis of national identity after all the difficulties the history brought to this nation: the post-war denazification, the existence of one nation for two states, later unification of German principalities into a single state, etc. Lost national identity must be restored; otherwise, it is too easy to destabilize the country with events such as an influx of migrants.

Quantitative analysis has shown nationalistic sentiments are higher in Eastern Germany than in the Western. The reason for this is the economic difference between Eastern and Western Germany. East Germans felt humiliation after the unification, German unity was associated with a great sacrifice-loss utopia. All the illusion about the better Western society and the synthesis of the best of the two societies in one were forgotten, collecting what was left of broken East German identity. They felt initially disadvantaged in relation to fellow citizens from western lands, and migrants are considered to be "social parasites" as they are getting what east Germans are entitled to. As a result, east Germans do not see good economic prospects for themselves, they are distrustful of state structures, which certainly increases the propensity for xenophobia. Various protests in German cities against the reception of refugees clearly showed that



the boundaries between civil protests and right-wing extremist forms of agitation are disappearing. East Germans blame all the economic and social problems they face on newcomers.

The third chapter outlined the differences between modern migration flows from the huge migration flow in 1950-60s. Among the differences are family migration, strong Arabic or African identity, a strong desire to spread Islamic views, and the high number of criminal smugglers that are gaining a lot of money on the process of migration. Additionally, the features that differentiate them from the German population were outlined: young age, compared to the ageing population of Europe and a higher fertility rate compared to other religions. These demographics are positive because when the native German population ages, they will need someone to support their welfare system by paying taxes. However, the other side of these demographics must be mentioned, the younger population is less resistant to the propaganda of radical Islam and traditional Islamic values. Radical Islam is rapidly spreading among Muslim youth in Europe - both among the newcomers and representatives of the second and third generations of Muslims. Anti-Semitic attitudes and a rejection of the state of Israel are prevalent among the newcomers since they are coming from the countries that have strong anti-Israel positions and they are trying to find belonging in a new community by becoming more religious, in order to create bonds with Muslims of different ethnicities and nationality.

The study has proven that anti-Semitism is growing in comparison to previous years, moreover, most anti-Semitic crimes are not officially reported, and according to the survey made by FRA only 23% of incidents with anti-Semitic motives are documented. Discrimination is a part of a Jewish person's life, and new ways of national registration of xenophobic incidents should be established. The work of NGOs and civil society should be more active in order to counter the dangers of holding such views. What happens in German schools with young migrants being increasingly intolerant towards Jews should be countered with better coverage of the incidents and integration of students and their families into German society. The same way, a lack of prospects and social elevators for newcomers, project their irritation onto other minorities.

However, the increase of anti-Semitism cannot only be blamed on newcomers. The problem is more complex, it is deeply rooted in German society. Society is divided and cannot understand why so much money should be spent on migrants who, in their opinion, want to live on their taxes. The policy of multiculturalism has failed as one can

see, and the lessons should be learned from this policy to choose the new policy of the German state correctly.

The fourth chapter has attempted to assess the overall political climate in the country. A rapid increase in immigration to Germany has a substantial impact on the growth of radical sentiments in German society that can deeply change the political map of Germany to a more right-wing composition. "Open door" policy is perceived as a failed strategy by many citizen and researches as well. The themes of European integration and center-right economic reforms are also a dividing point between the political elite. Elites lost consensus over the main topics and as a result, people are searching for new ways of political thinking and are finding it in the support of right-wing parties. The Eurosceptic right-wing party "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) is becoming extremely popular among the Germans especially on the East.

Primary data research of the party's program has shown that the AfD is strongly focused on identity, which distinguishes this party from the more traditional ones who try to keep the theme of patriotism as far away as possible. It is promising to satisfy a desire for patriotism among the Germans at the time when Germany is ashamed to be proud of its culture. The AfD presents itself as a leader of ordinary Germans that punishes the elite for their denial of a national identity. Mostly, people are discontent with the current decision of politicians, people seem to be for a tougher response to the immigration crisis than the government provides.

The refugee crisis that brought a sudden demographic change in German cities has fuelled far-right populism. One cannot underestimate the implication of this change on the political composition because far-right parties' have greater influence on the entire political situation than parties promoting different political agendas. As studies show, the success of the far-right parties push more traditional parties to adopt similar elements in their voting platform. What is more, the sense of threat and chaos can drive to polarization. Left and liberal parties can become more opposed to those not sharing their values, in this case, far-right supporters. The questions remain whether the AfD presence in the German Parliament will lead to the growing division and whether the German political system will handle these challenges.

The topic of research is important and current since it applies to the modern political situation inside the country and only started to make an impact on the political composition. Germany's Nazi past and the Holocaust caused the deaths of millions of Jews and make the topic very sensitive. The same way the issue is unfolding since

xenophobia in Germany has political consequences, more precisely, 2017 Bundestag elections and the rise of Alternative for Germany party.

Moreover, this Master's thesis is original mostly because of the theory applied. The constructivist theory allows the shedding of light on aspects hitherto unseen. It tells what is relevant and less relevant allowing us to put an emphasis on the more important issues. Several questions still remain. The present study lays the groundwork for future research on the reasons for increased anti-Semitism in Germany after the influx of immigrants. It must be emphasized that the current political and social situation in Germany is just in its beginning.

The use of primary data research such as surveys, interviews, polls helped to address the problem at hand and to control the quality of research. At the same time, secondary data research was more time saving, less time was spent on observations. By mixing both qualitative and quantitative research methods, depth understanding of the issue was achieved. The use of several means to examine similar phenomena helped to identify the aspects of anti-Semitism in Germany more accurately from the different sides. Deductive research approach explored a known phenomenon and tested in given circumstances – high number of migrants, German's discontent with the politicians and etc. This approach followed the path of logic closely. The proposition - *cause-effect relations of the inflow of Muslim immigrants to FRG and the increased support to right-wing populist parties among the Germans* - was put to the test by confronting it with observations that lead to a confirmation of the hypothesis.

This study was limited by the absence of the accurate data on anti-Semitic incidents that cover all kinds of discrimination directed toward Jews. Notwithstanding the relatively limited sample, this work offers valuable insights into the study of anti-Semitism in Germany and its dependence on social and economic changes in society. The various data from primary sources of information, research articles and media have helped to partly cover the gaps in the process of reporting the incidents.

Further research should be undertaken to explore how xenophobia can be combated bearing all the features of the German case. The German society is a complex and unique one and a special approach should be developed to counter the root causes of the hatred towards Jews. International and national laws are not enough, the efforts of all parties should be put together in the common struggle of combating discrimination. Policy-makers and IOs are not the only actors who can make a change, but the simple person, a schoolteacher can teach young people how to behave. As stated before, anti-

Semitic behaviour is not the only characteristic of the Muslim people living in Germany, but of all the people living in Germany who support prejudices and stereotypes. Constructivism in this case is really relevant; it is assumed that every single person in the society is involved in creating these constructions and conceptualizations.

Greater efforts are needed to ensure that anti-Semitism will not gradually increase further if immigration continues at such a pace. An improved policy of integration should be developed since the existing policy has failed and gives a rise to xenophobic positions. In the the language of constructivists, in order to fully accept newcomers and to help them to integrate many political actors should understand that it is the right way to do for the survival of human being, of their culture and beliefs. Otherwise, xenophobia will become the norm.

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## **Appendix 1.**

Interview of 16.04.2018

With Avraham Burg, Professorial lecturer in the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

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**-To start with this, do you see any clear relation between the influx of immigrants to Europe and the increase of anti-Semitism in Germany?**

There is no clear answer. It is a thing that you need to look into generation, that 20 years ago we were in the middle of the watershed. We do not know without accurate factual argument that if you move from point 'A' to point 'B' you get 'C'. I cannot say that the European crisis had led to the increase of anti-Semitism in Germany. I see an almost quantum physics here, it jumps in various directions. I will try to show couple of parallel directions which I don't sure where are they.

**-Therefore, can you tell what are these directions?**

I will begin with the first one. In the past anti-Semitism was the most explicit manifestation of the hatred in the western societies. Because of the heritage, the education of dogma, new born of a nation state - all of the sudden you have elements as the Jews who are cosmopolitan, living everywhere in the world, who were always suspected of the loyalty. And the combination of the modern nation patriotism plus the old Christian anti-Semitism created the old number one target of hatred— the Jews.

**-And, is it a problem nowadays?**

I think it is no more a case in our post-modern society when everything is equal. Everybody have five identities, no hierarchy exist. There is a lot of hatred in the world: Homophobia, Judo phobia, islamophobia, immigrants phobia... And I am not sure whether Judo phobia is a prior. I see wider expression of hate and anti-hate coalition, where Jews are a part.

I must say that when the immigration came into Europe, it raised the sensitivity to the other. Some became sensitive and could not stand any other. For example, a white supremacy in the US or any kind of ethnical nationalist populist position that do not wanted to see that anyone was unlike them. But many others say that Jews and

immigrants and women and us people are all together. On the one hand, it increased sensitivity to the others and on the other hand, it increased cooperation on the belonging to the others.

**-I see, what is the second point you wanted to make?**

Secondly, I see a strange coalitions of right-wing racist philosophies/ideologies who all of the sudden became Jews lovers in order to get a permission to hate Muslims which I don't understand. I do not understand the Jews that supported this right-wing racism. If you hate him today it can eventually come to me. Did it increase anti-Semitism? No, all of the right-wings that were 70 years ago Nazis all of the sudden became Jews lovers but it increased hate in the world. It is a popcorn still jumping.

**-What do you think about the popular rhetoric in media that the far-right parties are rising?**

It more that right versus left, it is the second coming of certain ideologies which are a combination of national supremacy, racial/ethnic discrimination and the motivation of having the closure dogma society rather than having an open, tolerant and pluralistic society. They want to be monophonic, mono identical. Germany is a fantastic example, pluralistic state. Chancellor is amazing, she is saving the West. In political life I usually prefer any party even though it stands for ideology. I want them to get lost, I want them to run for the parliament. I prefer most disgusting ideologies to run for the parliament, to be presented out open rather to be excommunicated and all of the sudden be underground damaging the society. I want to be them part of the system even if it is difficult, even if I say about Israel-Jews party, I would say about any party wherever it is. If you have in society significant political force that feels this way, let it run for the parliament. Let's deal with it. If you veto it, it would not help you. It will continue with this.

**-What is your opinion on AfD party?**

They got a lot of support and I think that this support is a lot to do with two elements that emerged together, important to pay attention to. A serious disappointment in what used to be the GDR – communist Germany-east and disappointment in process of unity and

equalizing the size. Their expectations that overnight there will be Munchen, Berlin, Hamburg. It takes time. They are disappointed and in this disappointment come all of the sudden immigrants. None of this frustrated people from Dresden or Leipzig or whatever they are ready to do the dirty work of the immigrants. But the rhetoric that they are taking our work, jobs, our girls. It is like violent music. I don't want to be a low income waiter in the Turkish restaurant, they do it, but I am upset they take my job. The rhetoric is very in sighting one, at the same time, people ignore the fact that in the European society you have disappointment of what the unification process have did with them and now you see it is the western people that take new people inside. What about us that are taking our jobs? And at the same time this people fail to realize that the German society there are less people, high life expectancy, therefore, people live longer, therefore, the welfare is becoming very expensive. Therefore, not having the influx of younger people coming to the system, nobody will be there to support the welfare policy of the society. This is why the Turks were invited as Gastarbeiters and tis immigrants who will save the social welfare of the west. Immigrants work, pay taxes, their health is good and etc.

### **-What about Islamophobia?**

Things you don't see things you do not know, things are dark. The European Union has 25 mln Muslims out of half a billion, 90 per cent are wonderful people and what we have let say 100 000 people this is the threat?! You have more prostitutions in the world, criminality, more drug-dealers on the streets. And this is a threat? Since it is a demon, you do not see individuals, all of them are dangerous for me. The majority came to work, to prosper, they are happy with their traditions. Happy with the democracy, no problems with this. Media just blows everything, it is not a business for politicians, but a business for psychologists...

“On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.”

A handwritten signature in brown ink, appearing to be 'Mf-' or similar, enclosed in a light yellow rectangular box.