MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Decision making process: Zimbabwe exits the Commonwealth"

verfasst von / submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S)

Wien 2019 / Vienna 2019

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt Postgraduate programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	A 992 940
Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt Postgraduate programme as it appears on the student record sheet:	Internationale Studien / International Studies
Betreut von / Supervisor:	Prof. Markus Kornprobst

diplomatische
akademie wien
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

Abstract

As the new Zimbabwean government proclaims new dispensation and seeks re-engagement with the Western Countries after more than a decade of strained relations, this study will engage in a foreign policy analysis of Zimbabwe's foreign policy with particular focus to decision making process. The study will seek to explain why the Robert Mugabe government took the decision to exit the Commonwealth. Various logics of action such as logic of consequences, logic of appropriateness and logic of practise among others will be tested in order to determine which logic of action best explains the decision making process. Process tracing method will be used to provide a chronological account of the events as they unfolded and an analysis of the decision making process. The study suggests / concludes that Mugabe government was influenced by the logic of consequences ie cost benefit analysis in its decision making process The study is intended to provide an insight to other States on foreign policy decision making process in Zimbabwe

Zusammenfassung

Nachdem die Regierung Zimbabwes neuerdings beschlossen hat, nach mehr als einem Jahrzehnt von Spannungen, endgültig die Befreiung zu proklamieren und eine Wiederaufnahme der Beziehungen mit den westlichen Staaten anzustreben, wird in dieser Arbeit die Außenpolitik Zimbabwes mit besonderen Fokus auf den dortigen politischen Entscheidungsprozess näher analysiert.

In dieser Arbeit wird ferner thematisiert werden, warum die Regierung unter Robert Mugabe die Entscheidung traf, das Commonwealth zu verlassen. Die Arbeit hat die Absicht auch anderen Staaten einen Einblick in den Entscheidungsprozess im Rahmen der Außenpolitik von Zimbabwe zu bieten.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

UK   The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

USA   United States of America

EU   European Union

AU   African Union

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

CHOGM   Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

Acknowledgement

I would like to show my appreciation to all the people who have contributed to the production of this work.

Firstly, I would like to say a big to thank you to my thesis Supervisor, Professor Kornprobst (Diplomatic Academy) for his guidance and direction throughout the thesis writing process.

Also, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting and encouraging me throughout the writing process. Special thanks to Ms Genny Chiarandon, Mr Henry Ngo-Sytchev, Ms Annemarie Hengl, Ms Eva Bauer, Ms Rosemarie Winkler, Mr Hubert Nettig, Ms Roswitha Strampfer and finally Sabrina who during our interactions at the Academy made my study process as smooth as possible

Lastly, I would like to thank the Austrian Development Agency, without their support none of this would have been possible

Dedicated to

My mother Ellis Shirichena and Alrae K Ramsey.

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

The question of how individual actors make decisions is a question often asked in international relations theory and Kornprobst notes that this is an inevitable question for studying politics.'[1]It is also the main question this study will seek to answer. Upon Mugabe's return from the Commonwealth Heads of States and Government (CHOGM) summit held in Abuja, Nigeria where the question about Zimbabwe had dominated the summit, Mugabe while at the airport announced that Zimbabwe was withdrawing from the Commonwealth. To some it was a decision shocking, considering the fact that no one anticipated/imagine that the diplomatic fallout had deteriorated. For those in the corridors of power, the move was not surprising as Mugabe government seemed convinced that the Commonwealth had now been hijacked and was now being used as a vehicle to recolonise Zimbabwe and that a bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and UK had been escalated to a multilateral dispute. This study will seek understand why Zimbabwe left the commonwealth and which Logics of action best explains this decision. The study will analyse the events that led to the ultimate decision to withdraw and a hypothesis will be developed and tested against the logics to conclude which logic best explains the decision. Thus the study will seek to answer the question on how and why this decision was made.

This study is relevant because, since November 2017, government of Zimbabwe has indicated its interest to re-engage with the world particularly the western countries. In July 2018, it submitted an application to rejoin the Commonwealth. The study comes at crucial time as the Commonwealth is evaluating the decision whether to allow Zimbabwe to rejoin the organisation again. It is important for all foreign policy stakeholders to understand how foreign policy decisions are made in Zimbabwe.

This study is not only relevant for Commonwealth only but also for the rest of the Western Countries and allies with whom Zimbabwe would be seeking to re-engage to ensure that they understand the decision making process in Zimbabwe in order for them to engage Zimbabwe constructively. The main objective of the study is to understand how foreign policy decisions are made in Zimbabwe.

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[1] Markus Kornprobst, 'The agent's logics of action: defining and mapping political judgement' International Theory, *Cambridge University Press,* (2011), 3:1, 75.

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1.2 Literature Review

1.2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis

The study on foreign policy analysis is important because it focuses on foreign policy decision making process and in particular the actors. Since this study will also focus on the actors of the foreign policy decisions it is important to engage on the foreign policy analysis as the point of departure for the study. Valerie Hudson defines a 'ground as the conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena in the field of study occur.'[2] She argues 'all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.'[3] 'Understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them, is central to the inquiry of social scientists, including those in IR.'[4]

Valerie Hudson notes that the 'field of foreign policy analysis grounded in decision makers acting singly or as individuals and thus reaffirms the point made by scholars on why the domain of foreign policy decision making is centralised in presidents'.[5] 'Reasoning and their deliberation with others and therefore it is not the individual on his or her own who is the judge of what is a convincing argument but a group of actors, debating arguments with each other'.[6] This is a common trend in African politics and by extension decision making process where all decision all while the president takes credit for them, they often a result of deliberations with his inner circle usually in his own party or security cluster. Kornprobst [7]and Latour argue that researchers should follow actors themselves.[8] They further postulate that 'the task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up by the analyst', a view shared by other scholars on foreign policy decision making in Africa.[9] Kornprobst further adds on to the argument by not that how leaders reach these decisions is based on their imagination.[10]

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[2] Valerie M. Hudson, '*Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations',* Foreign Policy Analysis (2005) 1, 1–30 https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/1/1/1/1808190.
[3] Hudson ,1.
[4] Hudson ,1.
[5] Valerie, 1.
[6] Kornprobst, 75.
[7] Kornprobst ,72.
[8] Latour, P, 'Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory', *Oxford: Oxford University*. (2005), Press, 12.
[9] Latour ,23.
[10] Kornprobst ,84.

Stuart argues that 'it is generally assumed that the relative potency of various factors involved in a foreign policy decision and the process by which the decision is arrived at will differ according to the type of decisional situations' [11] This would suggest that there is no fixed set of rules on how to make foreign policy decisions but each decision is made based on the existing circumstances and facts as they develop. Stuart argues that the decision making process is dynamic and requires researcher to view it as a series of stages as it is subject to change based on the situation on the ground.[12] Kornprobst then notes that 'the reasoning of political actors rarely ever follows a certain logic of action in a pure form. Judgements usually move back and forth between even intertwine.'[13]

In analyzing decisions one has to take into account that any decisions one must begin by analysing what were the decision makers trying to accomplish.[14] This is essential in because it helping the scholar understand whether they achieved their aim or not but also how they took the decision, was it guided towards an aim or simply navigating through the crisis. George notes that we must take into account the constraints imposed on decision makers.[15] Such issues could include the debates between the people in the circle of control and to what extent the leader had influenced or power to assert his wishes.

George argues that 'the significant contribution of foreign policy analysis to International relations theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of State behaviour material and ideational factors, the point of intersection is not the State, it is human decision makers.[16] Other scholars argue that 'by emphasizing decision making as a central focus, we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society and decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers.'[17] 'Agent-oriented theories state that, States are not agents because States are abstractions and thus have no agency and only human

[11] Douglas T Stuart, Foreign Policy Decision Making, *Oxford Handbook of International Relations* , (2008), edited by Christina Reus Smit and Duncan Snidal ,582.
[12] Stuart, 587.
[13] Kornprobst, 79.
[14] Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment; How good is it? How can we know? *Princeton , NJ:Princeton University press*, (2005), 230.
[15] George A, Presidential Decision making in foreign policy: The effective use of information and advise , *Boulder, Colo , West view*, (1980), 2-3.
[16] George,3.
[17] Snyder, R. C, H. W. Bruck, And B. Sapin, 'Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics', *Glencoe, IL: Free Press.* (1962), 15.

beings can be true agents, since it is their agency that is the source of all international politics and all change therein.'[18]

Graham Allison provides a context in which to understand foreign policy analysis and he uses the Cuban missile crisis to explain it. He provides three angles to explain one episode of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and in investigating both the U.S. and the Soviet sides of this case; Allison's study shows that the unitary rational actor model of foreign policymaking does not adequately explain the crisis. He suggests two models as to adequately explain the crisis namely the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model allows Allison to explain more fully what transpired.'[19] The Organisational process model argues that research shows how 'rational' foreign policymaking can be upended by the attempt to work with and through large organized governmental groups. [20] 'Organizations and bureaucracies put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities, and this survival is measured by relative influence in comparison with other organizations by the organization's budget, and by the confidence of its staff.'[21]

Models such as 'the bureaucratic politics model includes personal interests such as status, prestige, re-election and has no consistent set of strategic objectives and the mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa since it contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions.'[22] In other words the factors influencing decision making are diverse and cover a wide range of factors. Hudson further argues that 'each decision-makers mind is a microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates.'[23] Thus decisions cannot be analysed in isolation but one must also look at the surrounding environment to determine the role it has played in all this. 'Foreign policy is influenced by internal as well as external factors and devoid of general theory.'[24]

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[18] Snyder 16.
[19] Snyder 16.
[20] Hudson, 8.
[21] Hudson 8.
[22] Hudson 8.
[23] Hudson, 10.
[24] Rosenau, J. N, ''Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy.'' In Approaches in Comparative and International Politics, Evanston: *North-western University Press*. (1966), 115-169.

1.2.2 Foreign policy Analysis in Africa

The study of foreign policies and decision making process of many African States continues to gather momentum. As a result Qiunn notes that 'where the foreign policies of Africa are examined, the focus tends to be more on the outcomes and the limits constraining it, rather than on the decision making process itself.'[25] Thus most of the scholarship during that time was focused more on the decisions made by the leaders and now how or why they made them.

For IR Scholars 'African countries were tackling the common problems of nation building, stability, poverty, decolonization, the problems of the Cold War, and international dominancy of the great powers.'[26] As a result, this cohesion also helped create the conditions that led African countries to turn to efforts to foster regional cooperation and integration.[27] The common foreign policy concerns facing the continent include Pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism and African nationalism, and could be seen in the unity against apartheid era South Africa, struggles with autonomy from the former colonial power, regional cooperation for economic development and political autonomy, nonalignment during the Cold War, regional security, and securing national sovereignty.[28] National sovereignty has become an important tool for most African States in their attempt to pursue their own policies without interference.

As the wave of decolonisation swept across Africa, charismatic and powerful figures emerged who later became leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julis Nyerere, etc. As a result foreign policy formation or decisions was normally left to the presidents, and also noting how power was personalized by the leaders across the region it was expected that they would want to preserve autonomy over this field in order to advance their personal ambitions and also make themselves an important link between their country and the rest of the world.[29] Clapham argues that foreign policy was shaped by the personalization of the African state as "African leaders characteristically conducted much of their foreign relations themselves"[30] Schraeder

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[25] John James Quinn, '*African Foreign Policies*' ,Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, (2017), Oxford Research Encyclopedia, International Studies, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.117.

[26] Shaw, T.M, and Aluko, O, '*The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy*'. New York: St. Martin's, Shaw, T.M, and Okolo, J.E. (eds.) (1994) *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS*. New York: St. Martin's.

[27] Shaw, T.M, and Aluko, 54.

[28] Shaw, T.M, and Aluko, 54.

[29] John James Quinn, 1.

[30] Clapham, '*Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1996), 44.

concurs also that African foreign policy is highly personalized in the office of the president.[31] Quinn then concludes that probing the bureaucracies or legislatures would not shed much light on the foreign policies of most African governments as these institutions unlike in the United States of America or Western Europe where parliaments have great influence on foreign policy.[32]

It has often been argued by many analysts that foreign policy could be one of the several ways in which the leaders to engage in the politics of "state survival."[33] In such instances the leaders the leaders and his/her inner circle get resources for ruling and leading from both domestic and international sources in order to remain in power by seeking to balance out several competing interests while making themselves a great asset to both their State and the rest of the world. Clapman notes that 'the existence of juridical sovereignty created opportunities for leaders to obtain resources with which to remain in power and to play one patron against the other.'[34]

During the cold war era where many African States sought to ensure their benefit or do not get caught up in the cold war battles. Clark postulates that, the domestic needs of leaders dominate the foreign policy arena and he suggests that rational actor models are important for understanding the foreign policy choices of governments where the interests of the governments substitute for the interests of the nation.[35] A common act that was carried out by most African leaders who would secure deals with the former colonial powers perhaps on continued economic independence and in return they would get continuous support financially and politically from the former colonial master.

Jackson notes that nationalism and sovereignty have been quite strong norms in African relations between themselves and the rest of the world.[36] Thus the study of foreign policy decision in Africa is important for this study because it sheds light on the concept of presidential diplomacy conducted in some parts of the world including Africa and to understand what factors influence the decision making process. As already indicated, the

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[31] Schraeder, P.J. '*African International Relations'.* In A.A. Gordon and D.L. Gordon (eds.) *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 2nd edn. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, (1996), 129.
[32] John James Quinn,117.
[33] Clapman , 45.
[34] Clapman 47.
[35] Clark, J.F. 'Foreign Policy Making in Central Africa: The Imperative of Regime Security in a New Context'. In G. Khadiagala and T. Lyons (eds.) *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. (2001) Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 67.
[36] Jackson, R.H. The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations. In J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane (eds.) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (1993), 111.

study is being conducted at a time when Zimbabwe and other African countries like Sudan have had a change in governments and it is important to understand the foreign policy decision making process in order to be able to understand the decisions they make and for the rest of the world to be able to anticipate and understand how to conduct relations with them.

1.2.3 Logics of Consequences

Kornprobst defines the logics of consequences as a result of individual actors trying to determine a response or what to do by doing a cost benefit analysis in weighing up various options in which to respond to a crisis.[37] This definition is also echoed by Martin Shulz who states that action follows the logic of consequence when it is motivated by subjective assessments of outcomes of different courses of action. March and Simon argue that logic of consequences guides 'analysis-based' actions and normally comprises calculated thought of alternatives, judgment of the outcomes and preference-driven choices.[38] Shulz postulates that the main characteristic is the presence of calculated choice between alternatives.[39] Leaders driven by the logic of consequence engage in some form of analysis to assess future consequences of their decisions and thus any decision involves a great degree of information processing and great deliberation.[40]

Based on the above definitions two comments can be made namely that on one angle, there are the firm advocates of the rational choice such as Keohane, etal who 'presuppose that individuals calculate based on constant, steady and externally given preferences and what makes for the most favourable course of action for them to acquire what they desire.'[41] This assumes that leaders are always rationale in their actions and does not take into account physiological factors and individual needs at stake. Most situations are not always presented in consistent and stable set up. While on the other hand, 'psychological approaches criticize that actors do not calculate incessantly until they have found the optimal course of action rather, these approaches hold that actors hope for means that tell them when to stop searching for other options.'[42] This assessment holds water when viewed from the perspective of how history is always a reference point to decisions, meaning since it has happened in the past it is likely to happen again and in a similar way. As such decisions on how to respond to these

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[37] Kornprobst, 71.
[38] March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. 1993.' Organizations' (2nd edn). *Oxford: Blackwell*,(1958), 7.
[39] Shulz, 2.
[40] Shulz ,2.
[41] Keohane, R.O.'*International institutions: two approaches'*, International Studies, Quarterly 44(1) (1988), 379.
[42] Kornprobst ,73.

situations usually mirror those from the past. Leaders sometimes do not stop searching for alternatives until such time they reach a decision they feel best reflects their interests.

For March and Olsen, one of the main characteristic of the logics of consequences is that it is individualistic in nature and they tie together the logics to the in rational choice theory.[43] 'Leaders are self interested based on rationale anticipation and calculation of the consequences of action.'[44] By tying it together to the rationale theory, this shows the strong link between the need for survival and pursuit of self interests that a state does vis a vis the same pursuits that are done by leaders in who use cost benefit analysis by trying to maximise their benefits out of a crisis. This sentiment of its individualistic nature is also shared by Ole Jacob Sending, who argues that 'the logic of consequences seems overly individualistic in its omission of the social and institutional elements that are relevant in explaining and understanding action'[45] For Sending, this does not take into account the social norms and rules that the logics of actions would include.'[46]

Stuart argues that 'it is generally assumed that the relative potency of various factors involved in a foreign policy decision and the process by which the decision is arrived at will differ according to the type of decisional situations'[47] This would suggest that there is no fixed set of rules on how to make foreign policy decisions but each decision is made based on the existing circumstances and facts as they develop. Thus the logic of appropriateness will not be suitable to explain some of the decisions made in foreign policy such as the United States of America's decision to drop nuclear bombs on Japan or the decision by Nixon to visit China in 1972. As such Mugabe' s decision to leave the Commonwealth can only be best explained as a decision that was made on a cost benefit analysis and that rules and norms would have dictated otherwise. Moreover, Stuart argues that the decision making process is dynamic and requires researcher to view it as a series of stages as it is subject to change based on the situation on the ground.[48] This again emphasizes the point that in an action based on logic of consequences decisions are not fixed and do not follow laid out rules and procedures thus they

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[43] March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen *'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', International Organization'* (1998) 52(4), 951.
[44] James L Perry and Wouter Vandernabelle ,'Behavioral Dynamics ;institutions, identities and self regulation in Motivation in Public Management , The call of public service', *Oxford University press,* (2008) , 59
[45] Ole Jacob Sending, '*Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the 'Logic of Appropriateness' and its Use in Constructivist Theory,'* European Journal of International Relations, SAGE Publications and ECPR, (2002), Vol. 8(4): 450
[46] Sending ,452.
[47] Stuart, 582.
[48] Stuart, 587.

are subject to change as more information becomes available and the situation on the ground changes.

In addition to the above, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides another suitable example, where Kennedy and Khrushchev's decisions on how to deal with the crisis kept changing as more and more information began to trickle in/become available. One can also argue that the leaders in this instance understood that the normal rules and norms of dealing with such a crisis could not apply because the situation was different as two nuclear armed States were involved. For Kennedy that usually available option of using the nuclear weapons was immediately removed and this he had to respond to the situation best on what in the best interests of the United States of America at that time.

Hermann and Milburn notes three situations that are likely to enhance a leaders influence over policy are when the situation is ambiguous, when situation requires an authoritative action (crisis) and when political leader assume office through dramatic means.[49] Rules and norms normally provide answers to clear situations. In law where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the courts are usually approached to provide clarity while the legislature provides a remedy to the situation. In politics and international relations, however politicians do not have the option of approaching a third party to provide clarity they instead have to make decision on their own and trust that this decision is in the best interests of them of the country.

 Similarly, the Cuban Missile crisis and the US 9/11 attacks were crisis's which required an authoritative response. An authoritative response is ordinarily not given in a democracy and in a democracy rules and norms are given, thus when a crisis arises leaders are required to apply their mind, do a cost benefit analysis and decide the best course of action. When a leader assumes power through a coup (military / parliamentary coup) that in itself is a dramatic move done base on cost benefit analysis it is only logical to expect that the leaders will continue this trend of taking decisions based on a cost benefit analysis in making their decisions. In such instances the leader as to act on a cost benefit analysis in order to preserve his power as there are not set of rules governing such scenarios a situation which we find Mugabe to have been under during this period.

The logic of consequences allows us to explain the dynamics between individuals. The interpretation of situations allows for individual differences in action as situations can be interpreted differently. March and Olsen depict the course of interpretation as one that entails

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[49] Hermann , M and Milburn T , 'A physiological Examination of Political leaders' *Free Press*, New York , (1997) 20, 1.

multifaceted analysis, uses of knowledge and experience.[50] Further Sending notes that 'this is an important point as it directs attention to the ways in which individual actors with similar identities or roles may act differently by applying different rules, because they interpret and understand the situation differently.[51] If one actor defines a situation as a crisis, he or she will apply and follow other rules when acting than an actor who defines the same situation as uncritical and normal.[52] Thus because of the dynamics and differences in people one cannot expect a uniform approach to be taken by individuals when taking into account what Hermann and Millburn have to say situations that may enhance a leader's influence over policy. Thus the logic of consequences allows us to explain the different decisions taken by different leaders to similar or same crises.

'In the rationalist conception, actors comply with rules and norms if they perceive the costs (material and non-material) of non-compliance as higher than those of compliance and absent the compliance produced by self-interests, there needs to be some kind of external sanctions. The underlying logic of action is rational choice.'[53] Leaders in their quest for power and to strengthen their positions will almost always find themselves going against the norm and standard practises. As already indicated when norms and rules are costly to maintain to which perhaps Mugabe may have calculated that staying in the Commonwealth would cost him his position as president, the country would lose its independence among other problems, he decided to depart from the norms. Despite the fact that the sanction of doing so was expected or know, on a cost benefit analysis it seemed like the best course of action to undertake in order to preserve his power and sovereignty.

Finnemore and Sikkink note that in order for new norms to emerge and become accepted by others, norm entrepreneurs or advocates have to act explicitly inappropriately.[54] One could argue that Mugabe's actions were not part of the norm and the only way in which new norms emerge is if one departs from the norms and acts inappropriately. Thus one can argue that Mugabe acted in appropriately by exiting the Commonwealth because he did a cost benefit calculation of what would have been in the best interests of Zimbabwe and himself. Thus the logics of consequences can best explain this action.

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[50] March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, 'Rediscovering Institutions'. *New York: Free Press*, (1989) 30, 1.
[51] Sending 448.
[52] Sending 448.
[53] Elster, Jon' Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences'. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*. (1989),65.
[54] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink 'International Norms Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization (1998) 52(4), 887.

Kjell Goldmann provides a critical account to the arguments by March and Olsen in which "logic of expected consequences" is set against logic of appropriateness."[55] Kjell argues that it is difficult to determine what kind of constructs the so-called logics are whether they are to be seen as perspectives, theories, or ideal types secondly, that the logics, far from being mutually excluding, overlap very considerably, thirdly that analytical utility can be discussed not only in the case of the "logic of expected consequences" this is well-known but also when it is a matter of the "logic of appropriateness" and finally that the normative virtue of substituting a "logic of appropriateness" for a "logic of expected consequences" is less obvious than March and Olsen's readers may be led to think.[56] Jervis however argues 'logic of expected consequences" is based on a simplified account of human thinking. Another standard criticism of such an approach is that it sees preferences as exogenous and does not address the main issue, namely, how preferences are formed and changed.'[57]

1.2.4 Logic of Appropriateness

March and Olsen have been great proponents of the logic of appropriateness. They argue that the 'logic of appropriateness is meant to capture something fundamental about public and civic action, i.e. actions within institutions that have bearing upon the organization and direction of a polity.'[58] March views the logic of appropriateness as a perspective on human action and to act appropriately is to ensue according to the institutionalized practices of a collectively and mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good.[59] This suggests that leaders in an organisation or State make decisions based on what is good for the State and there are no self interests involved but even if they do exist, they play a minimal role to the overall interests of the State.

In their 1998 book, March and Olsen concede to the role of individual interests by noting that Like the logic of consequences, 'the logic of appropriateness is explicitly a logic of individual action. It is specified as a mode of action or justification for an individual actor. Thus it is as individualistic in structure as is the logic of consequences.'[60] Thus they concede that both logics of action have an element of individualism and by extension self interests, they argue

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[55] Kjell Goldmann, '*Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism, Governance*' An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, (2005) 18, 1 35–52.
[56] Kjell Goldmann, 38.
[57] Jervis, Robert, 'Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation'.)*World Politics, (*1988)4, 322.
[58] March and Olsen, 1995: 251.
[59] James G. March: Understanding Organizations. *Stanford: Stanford University Press*, (2008). 3.
[60] March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', International Organization',(1998) 52 ,4, 943.

unlike on the logic of consequences, logics of action prioritise what is good and good for the State or organisation.

'Actors seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity.'[61] Kornprobst notes that many constructivists started to maintain that actors do not weigh costs and benefits but abide by identity-constituting norms.[62] In international relations all States and by extension the leaders all want to be part of the international community and to do that they often try their best to follow the rules and norms of the community in order to continue to benefit from it. However as always the case, the domestic interests or personal interests clash with international norms or rules, leaders have always been willing to forgo the rules in order to satisfy those domestic or personal interests.

Similarly Mugabe despite coming under severe criticism from the Commonwealth, USA and EU, he still decided to go against their opinions because they were no longer adequate for the task at hand and did not serve the best interests of being a member of the political community. Thus despite Mugabe insisting that he preferred membership to the UN and other African bodies, and would act appropriately to that extent, his personal and group interests over the norms and values of the international community. This present a major flow in the logics of appropriateness as it does not explain why leaders sometimes make decisions that are inappropriate hence the central claim in constructivist theory is that it is able to account for change in international politics that extends beyond the change in behaviour that rationalism can account for.[63]

The logic of appropriateness accepts permitted actions as default condition and logic of appropriateness is the primary mechanism for individual choice and once rules are determined there is little room for individual initiative left[64] States are often willing to abide by international law and rules to the extent that they are in line with their interests. To that end many States have always invoked the principle of sovereignty in order to justify the need to violate the rules.

[61] James G. March, 'Understanding Organizations', *Stanford: Stanford University Press,* (2008),3.
[62] March, I73.
[63] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink , 887.
[64] Elinor Ostrom, '*Rationale Choice theory and Institutional Analysis; Towards complementarity'*, American Political Science Review , Proquest , (1991), 85, 1, 239.

Most leaders do not want to be put in positions where they are left with no alternative as this may cost their positions as such, the logic of appropriateness makes a simplistic argument to suggest States and by extension their leaders are willing to be boxed into rules and norms they cannot opt out of easily. Similarly Mugabe was unwilling to remain boxed into a situation where he would be bound to an unpopular decision that could cost him his job and this explains why during the peak of the dispute/crisis he invoked sovereignty in order to allow himself more autonomy on how to respond to the crisis.[65]

In addition to the above, Sending notes that 'a theory of individual action seems to require an explanation of how and why actors may refrain from following or violate certain rules and this motivates an analysis of the theoretical constructs that make the Logic of appropriates explain action by reference to rules.'[66] Thus the important issue then becomes an analysis of what is it about these duties and obligations that make actors follow or act in accordance with them.[67] Does this explain why they follow rules of appropriateness even in the absence of external sanctions or a conception of interests defined in terms of outcomes of actions? And what, in other words, is the source of the 'conception of necessity' that underwrites and defines the logic of appropriateness as 'obligatory action.'[68]

Since March and Olsen rely exclusively on these duties and obligations to do the job of explaining why rules of appropriateness are followed: no reasons are provided in the logic of appropriateness for why actors follow rules of appropriateness beyond the claim that the duties and obligations defining an identity demand it.[69] Thus the logic of appropriateness does not cater for self interests and as noted before the decision was made based on self interest and where self interests are involved the actors / leaders have no incentive to abide by norms especially where no punishment/sanction exists. Even if a sanction exists, the cost benefit analysis allows them to determine whether the sanction is worth it or not.

Moreover, if the logic of appropriateness is to be individualistic in structure, the individual actor must be left with a reasonable degree of choice (or agency) concerning how to act in different situations not specified by the institutionally defined identity, or the institutionally defined (and defining) rules for appropriate behaviour. One such 'escape route' for the

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[65] During the UN General Assembly debate in 2002, Mugabe declared, 'so Blair keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe'. This speech was meant to highlight the need for autonomy and sovereignty and did not want to be reminded about international norms and rules.
[66] Sending 452.
[67] Sending 452.
[68] Sending, 452.
[69] Sending, 453.

individual actor in the logic of appropriateness is the process of interpreting rules and situations[70] 'The elements of openness in interpretation of rules mean that while institutions structure politics, they ordinarily do not determine political behaviour precisely.'[71] By admitting that institutions do not determine the political behaviour, they accept that where politics is involved the leaders has a wide range of options on how to interpret a situation and to that extent they are free to do so out of the cost benefit analysis and do have to follow rules and norms because rules and norms rarely govern politics.

March and Olsen postulate that the actions of actors are based on necessity rather than preference and they sum it as stated;

> 'In logic of appropriateness . . . behaviours (beliefs as well as actions) are intentional but not wilful. They involve fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation, and so of trying to determine the imperatives of holding a position. Actions stem from a conception of necessity, rather than preference. Within a logic of appropriateness, a sane person is one who is 'in touch with identity' in the sense of maintaining consistency between behaviour and a conception of self in a social role.'[72]

If an action is taken out of necessity this suggest that this was perhaps a last resort and therefore may be departing from the traditional norms. The decision by Truman to drop nuclear bombs on Japan was taken out of necessity and as such it departed from the norms and rules of warfare (international humanitarian law). To that end this decision was based on a cost benefit analysis and less of appropriateness because it was inappropriate.

Sending notes that 'the appropriateness of an action cannot be established apart from or prior to the constitutive rules that define the normative space (understood as what is appropriate) of the particular political community.'[73] Sending concludes that , March and Olsen appear to fail in trying to establish a firm footing from which individual actors can interpret rules and situations differently, a key requirement for a theory of individual action. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that concerning the understanding dimension of action, the logic of appropriateness bears a closer similarity to a holist course than an individual one.[74]

Bourdieu, postulates that 'political leaders are unlikely to reflect much about their role as political leaders every time they have to make judgements, even if this is as important and divisive, these kinds of judgements become rather habitual and may best be understood as a

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[70] Sending ,451.
[71] March and Olsen, 1995,33.
[72] March and Olsen, 1989,161.
[73] Sending, 452.
[74] Sending ,452.

'feel for the game.'[75] Puoliot who argues 'logic of practise agent stake their reasons for action too much for granted as that they could reflect upon these reasons by themselves, not even to speak of debating them among themselves and instead, they act upon common sense, which is generated out of the interplay of habitus and field.'[76] Despite referring to the logic of practise, the logic of practise itself borrows from the logic of appropriateness in suggesting that leaders act in a certain way not based on their thinking or calculation but accepted practises or norms. However in a crisis leaders do not have the luxury to act based on habit or practise because each crisis and Hermann et al put it, presents various challenges that may pose a threat to their legitimacy or power.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

Slaughter argues that Constructivism is not a theory, but rather ontology which is a set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and agency. Its counterpart is not realism, institutionalism, or liberalism, but rather rationalism.[77] She notes that 'by testing the rationalist framework that underpins many theories of international relations.[78] For Slaughter the perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and out groups, fairness and justice all become key determinant of a State's actions. While some constructivist's scholars would accept that States are self-interested, rational actors, they would stress that varying identities and beliefs and simplistic notions of rationality under which States pursue simply survival, power, or wealth thus constructivism are considerate of the function of social norms in international politics.'[79]

March and Olsen, distinguish between a logic of consequences where actions are rationally chosen to maximize the interests of a State and 'logic of appropriateness', where rationality is heavily mediated by social norms, constructivists would argue that the norm of State sovereignty has profoundly influenced international relations, creating a predisposition for non-interference that precedes any cost-benefit analysis States may undertake.'[80] 'These

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[75] Bourdieu, P, '*Outline of a Theory of Practice*', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,(1977),83.
[76] Pouliot V,*), 'The logic of practicality: a theory of practice of security communities'*, International, Organization, (2008),62(2), 257.
[77] Anne-Marie Slaughter, '*International Relations, Principal Theories',* Published in: Wolfrum, R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law *Oxford University Press*, (2011) 19.
[78] Slaughter 19.
[79] Slaughter 20.
[80] Slaughter, 20.

arguments fit under the institutionalist rubric of explaining international co-operation, but based on constructed attitudes rather than the rational pursuit of objective interests.'[81]

Rational choice theory is an approach that could be used by social scientists to understand human behaviour.[82] The 'rationality' defined by the rational choice theory adopts a more specific and narrower definition, which simply means that "an individual acts as if balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximizes personal advantage."[83] 'Realism argues that States are sovereign and thus autonomous of each other and no inherent structure or society can emerge or even exist to order relations between them and they are bound only by forcible coercion or their own consent.'[84] Furthermore realists claim that survival is the principal goal of every State and foreign invasion and occupation are thus the most pressing threats that any State faces.'[85] Becker says the rational choice model as "a unified framework for understanding all human behaviour.'[86] Rogowski describes the model as the 'most rigorous and the most general theory of social action that has been advanced in this century'[87] while Hirshleifer says the theory is "universal grammar of social science."[88]

Slaughter extend the discussion further by arguing that 'even if domestic interests, strategic culture, or commitment to a set of national ideals would dictate more benevolent or cooperative international goals, the anarchy of the international system requires that States constantly ensure that they have sufficient power to defend themselves and advance their material interests necessary for survival. Second, Realists hold States to be rational actors.'[89] This means that, given the goal of survival, States will act as best they can in order to maximize their likelihood of continuing to exist.'[90] Moreover, 'Realists assume that all States possess some military capacity, and no State knows what its neighbours intend precisely.'[91] However the main weakness with the rationale theory is that 'human beings are not machines

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[81] Slaughter, 21.
[82] Michael I. Ogu, '*Rational Choice Theory: Assumptions, Strengths, And Greatest Weaknesses In Application Outside The Western Milieu Context*,' Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (Nigerian Chapter*) (*2013)1,3, 91.
[83] Friedman, M, 'Essays in Positive Economics', *Chicago: University of Chicago Press*, (195315, 22- 31.
[84] Slaughter, 1.
[85] Slaughter,1 .
[86] Becker, G. 'The Economic Approach to Human Behavior,' *Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,* (1976); 3.
[87] Hirshleifer J. '*The Expanding Domain of Economics.*' The American Economic, Review, (1985), 53.
[88] Rogowski G, Router Joinery *Taunton Press,* (1997)**,** *16.*
[89] Slaughter, 4.
[90] Slaughter 4.
[91] Slaughter 4.

that do everything in perfectly predictable manner as it is postulated by the core assumptions of rational choice.[92]

In addition to the above, realism while it may explain the personal interests involved it does not explain some of the action by the government during this process and since there was no use of hard power it does not fully explain the moment as best as the constructivist approach does. Constructivists argue that everything is socially constructed and thus they look at the society and politics from social norms in internationals relations. Realism on the other hand provides a closer link to foreign policy decision making process if analysed closely with its links to rationale actor model and the rationale actor model.

Thus the logic of consequence is closely linked to the rationale actor model and thus will be very relevant to use it compared to the constructivist approach. However there are problems associated with the rationale actor model namely, Problems associated with inadequate information and uncertainty. This may make it difficult for individuals to make rational decisions. As a result, they may rely on other ways of making decisions.[93] Norms and habits may guide much action, and once these take root people may not question them but use them to pursue meaningful social action.[94] This argument is made mostly by proponents of the constructivist approach who argue that most decisions are based on social norms they for logics of appropriateness will apply. The rationale theory is relevant to this study as it most scholars have sought to interpret the action of the Zimbabwean government as being influenced by realism. One can argue that the Zimbabwean government simply saw the crisis as a threat to its existence and that its actions or response was simply meant to fend off the threat against the survival of its independence.

The study will mainly focus on the two logics of appropriateness and consequence because they best provide a solid foundation on which to analyse these actions. It will provide a historical analysis of the events as they unfold and seek to explain how each event was decided on. The logic of argumentation argues that leaders make some decisions in order to generate a convincing argument. However in light of the circumstances surrounding the decision by Zimbabwe one could argue it was not possible for Zimbabwe to make such a far

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[92] Wendt, A, *'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory'*, International Organization, Jstor .(1987). 41, 335 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706749?origin=JSTOR-pdf .
[93] Ogu, 96.
[94] Ibid, 97.

reaching decision all in the interest of generating a convincing argument. The logic of practise suggest that Harare was simply following commonsense is not convincing enough as scholars are in agreement that this decision to was not a standard practise to constitute common sense. Thus for the above mentioned reasons the study will focus mainly on the logics of appropriateness and consequence.

The study is premised from a poliheuristic explanation that political leaders such as Mugabe take into cognisance the domestic political and consequences while making decisions.[95] The explanations suggest that politicians will not make decisions that are likely going to affect them negatively politically.[96] This suggests that Mugabe's decision to, leave the Commonwealth was perhaps directed for his domestic audience namely the War Veterans who constituted his power base and while the results of this policy may have costed him support from the local population , he was able to maintain his grip on power due to the continued support of the his power base

Thus, the study will make sense of the decision making process by Mugabe. Noting that political leaders have a given set of preferences. The study will seek to contextualise the preferences for Mugabe and how these influenced his foreign policy decisions. By providing a historical narrative and analysis the study will seek to demonstrate that for Mugabe, he perhaps did not like to be told what to do and that state sovereignty was a key pillar of his foreign policy decisions. The study will show that despite seeking to preserve his power, Mugabe's foreign policy decisions were all premised from the desire to preserve state sovereignty and to in his understanding stop all attempts of interference in the internal politics of Zimbabwe especially by the UK.

1.4 Methodology

The Master's thesis will be divided in two parts, a theoretical and an empirical part with a case study. On an empirical level it will use the process tracing method to analyse the circumstances and events that led to the decision to withdraw. Bennet and Checkel define process tracing as 'the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences

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[95] Alex Mintz and Karl De Rouen Jr, 'Understanding foreign policy decision making process' *Cambridge University Press* , (2010), 79.
[96] Alex Mintz and Karl De Rouen Jr ,80.

about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest.'[97]

Process tracing is relevant for this study because the explaining process outcome tracing method is relevant for this study as it seeks to explain the outcome of the decision making process of the individuals of Zimbabwe. On the empirical part it will test the hypothesis to the relevant logics.

1.5 Thesis Structure

This study will be organised into four chapters. The first chapter will provide a general overview of the study. Chapter two will provide a historical account on why Zimbabwe left the commonwealth. Chapter three will test the logic of consequence and appropriateness .The chapter will seek to evaluate which logics can best explain the decision making process of the Zimbabwe government. Chapter four will be the conclusion.

1.6 Sources

Data for this study will include primary and secondary data, Official statements and declarations from the Zimbabwean government and the Commonwealth Organisation. Secondary sources will include journal articles, opinion pieces and other sources of information. These sources are relevant because they provide a detailed account to the events as they unfolded and the reaction from Zimbabwe. This will enable the study to determine the final logics that was in being pursued. The study will encounter challenges in obtaining primary such as diplomatic cables that may help shade more light, nevertheless it is hoped that the other sources will provide the much detail information The study will focus on the period from 1997-2003, when Zimbabwe left the Commonwealth. The study will focus on the government of Zimbabwe as it is the main actor in this case.

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[97] Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Process Tracing From Metaphor to Analytic Tool', *Cambridge University Press* (2015) ,5.

Chapter 2-Historical Background

2.1 Background to How Zimbabwe left the Commonwealth.

"A few days later he told reporters at Harare International Airport: 'That's the end. There is no return,' after the committee report from Abuja had been released. In future, said Mugabe, Zimbabwe would look to the East.'[98] With this statement Mugabe officially ended Zimbabwe's relationship with the Commonwealth. The Look East Policy became the centre stage and it was to China that Zimbabwe would now focus its relations on to balance the east and west. According to Garth Abraham a senior official in the ruling party of Zimbabwe immediately announced that, "for us this is like an escape from hell because Britain and its white allies have turned the Commonwealth into a Zimbabwe lynching dub'. Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe stated that the Commonwealth is a mere club, but it has become like an Animal Farm where some members are more equal than others." [99] These comments sum up how the Zimbabwe government viewed its relationship with the Commonwealth. Whether these were long standing views or were mere statements made out of anger and frustration about the Abuja summit, relations deteriorated from then onwards.

At the heart of the dispute between Zimbabwe and The Commonwealth was the Harare declaration of 1991 which called upon member States to uphold principles of democracy and now the Commonwealth accused Zimbabwe of failing to live up to its obligations. Article 1 of the declaration states that, "the Heads of Government of the countries of the Commonwealth, meeting in Harare, reaffirm their confidence in the Commonwealth as a voluntary association of sovereign independent states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and co-operating in the interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace."[100] Here the organization sought to reaffirm sovereignty of member states but also shared values.

Article 3 of the declaration states that, "the special strength of the Commonwealth lies in the combination of the diversity of its members with their shared inheritance in language, culture and the rule of law. The Commonwealth way is to seek consensus through consultation and the sharing of experience. It is uniquely placed to serve as a model and as catalyst for new forms of friendship and co-operation to all in the spirit of the Charter of the United

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[98] Garth Abraham '*The commonwealth, human rights and Zimbabwe: Trouble in the family?,* South African Journal of International Affairs, (2004) 11:1, 160.
[99] Abraham, 148.
[100] Article 1 Harare Declaration of the Commonwealth .

Nations."[101] The declaration noted that the organization shall seek consensus through consultations as a way of ensuring there was support for every decision made. However as will be revealed later this consensus and consultations was not implemented when the dispute arose.

In order to understand why Zimbabwe responded in this manner, it is important to understand the roots of the foreign policy of Zimbabwe. "In, May1980, the then President Canaan Banana, emphasized non-alignment, African issues, peaceful co-existence, reordering of the international economic order, and exchange of ideas, culture and trade Thereafter, in a major speech at the United Nations in August 1980, Mugabe, then prime minister, expounded on the five key principles of Zimbabwe's foreign policy:1) 'national sovereignty and equality among nations'; 2) 'attainment of a socialist, egalitarian and democratic society'; 3) 'right of all peoples to self-determination and independence'; 4) 'non-racialism at home and abroad'; and 5) 'positive nonalignment and peaceful co-existence among nations."[102] Stephen Chan and Hasu Patel note that the "lessons from the period of the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe are factored in, and play an important role in the foreign policy making process."[103] The secretary for Foreign Affairs once hinted "our belief in ourselves as a people in charge of our destiny controlled by no power."[104] It appears the desire to be independent and controlled by no power was to cause tensions between Zimbabwe and United Kingdom. A dispute, which was soon internationalized through the Commonwealth.

The dispute between Zimbabwe and United Kingdom began in 1979 with the Lancaster house conference. Yorke describes the conference as 'the great 'indaba' held at Lancaster House, London, which successfully achieved the final constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian problem, represented the political culmination of nearly 15 years of bitter and protracted military conflict which had virtually ruined one of the strongest economies in Africa and cost the lives of over 10 000 black and white Rhodesians.'[105] During the conference 'American intervention in the negotiations produced a formula which allowed the Patriotic Front to return to the conference and responding to appeals from Mr Ramphal and Dr Nyerere, the Americans informed PF leaders that they were prepared to help finance a multinational fund

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[101] Article 3 of Harare Declaration.
[102] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel '*Zimbabwe's foreign policy: A conversation'*,The Round Table, (2006) 95:384, 176.
[103] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel , 176.
[104] Percyslage Chigora, 'On Crossroads: Reflections on Zimbabwe's Relations with Britain at the New Millennium'(2006) ,vol 5, 3, 62
[105] Edmund Yorke, 'A Family Affair': the Lancaster House Agreement', D. H. Dunn (ed.), Diplomacy at the Highest Level *Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited* (1996),200.

to assist in the agricultural and economic development of an independent Zimbabwe - effectively a fund to compensate expropriated white farmers.'[106] The land question had become such a divisive issue that threatened to progress of the conference.

Nevertheless an agreement was reached and in 1980 Zimbabwe gained its independence. The issue of land however would come to be a source of dispute again 17 years later. In 1997, events in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) would have a domestic impact on the situation in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe intervened militarily to the conflict in DRC. It did so because 'SADC members are linked by a defence agreement in case of aggression. Officially, Zimbabwe, like Namibia and Angola, intervened at the request of a new member, the Democratic Republic of Congo, to protect it against external aggression. However, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, the Seychelles and Mauritius, also SADC members, have adopted a much more neutral stance.[107]

Secondly, 'Mugabe's interests are economic. A large number of sources in both Congo and Southern Africa have referred to lucrative joint enterprises undertaken by Mugabe and Kabila along with their sons and this originally covered the supply of foodstuffs by Harare, but since 1998 it covers the supply of military uniforms to Congo.'[108]

Thirdly, 'Zimbabwe had a vested interest in keeping open the main road to Congo and its commercial corridors if it is to have any claim to leadership in the region, or at least to contest that of South Africa and Uganda.' [109] The power play between Zimbabwe and South Africa was continuing and dating back to the apartheid era when South African government supported the Smith government in Rhodesia to fight the liberation war fighters. Within the region Zimbabwe was engaging in a power play with South Africa and other States to assert influence. Finally, the war in Congo came as an opportunity to create a diversion from the internal difficulties and challenges faced by Mugabe.[110] While the situation was unfolding, Mugabe was 'under pressure after street protests by former guerrillas who were demanding payment for their role in the 1970s liberation struggle, President Robert Mugabe ordered unbudgeted payouts for ZW$50 000 of the war veterans. The Zimbabwe dollar fell by 71, 5%

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[106] Martyn Gregory, '*Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster House'*, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 36, 1 (1980)11 available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395397 Accessed: 02-06-2019.
[107] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict* , 17 November 1998, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6ce20.html (accessed 2 June 2019).
[108] International Crisis Group,1.
[109] International Crisis Group,1.
[110] International Crisis Group,1.

against the greenback, while the stock market crashed by 46% as investors rushed for the United States dollar'[111]

Miriam Prys notes that Zimbabwe became a cause of unease to the European Union, particularly the UK, and the United States following its decision to intervene in the conflict in the DRC with 10,000 troop's in1998/99.[112] This was the first time Zimbabwe had put its troops in foreign land. After this military deployment in 1997, disagreements between the UK and Zimbabwe about the funding of land reforms became an issue, despite being agreed upon at the Lancaster House agreement in 1979.[113] When Labour party under Tony Blair took over in 1997 in United Kingdom, Clare Short, the minister for international development, argued that 'since neither she nor her colleagues came from the landed class in Britain stating that "my own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonized not colonizers."[114] She then wrote to the Zimbabwean minister of agriculture and land that United Kingdom could no longer be held responsible for what Britain had done in colonial Rhodesia.[115]

Moreover, the decision by the UK government was a cause of concern to the Zimbabwe Government.[116] Domestic issues in Zimbabwe were slowly presented as a violation of NEPAD further worsened the division between Western governments and Zimbabwe.[117] Miram Prys notes that "this was decisive, as NEPAD was considered to be a major achievement in bringing about positive change in the relationship between Africa and the developed world. In the West, Zimbabwe was associated with human rights violations, infringements of the rule of law through the toleration of illegal occupations of land, and election rigging."[118]

During this period, Robert Cooper who was Tony Blair's foreign affairs advisor wrote an essay, in which he argued,

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[111] Godfrey Marawanyika , '*Zim marks 10 years since 'Black Friday'* Mail and Guardian, 11Nov 2007, https://mg.co.za/article/2007-11-11-zim-marks-10-years-since-black-friday.

[112] Miriam Prys,23.

[113] Miriam Prys,23.

[114] Mahmood Mamdani 'Lessons *of Zimbabwe: Mugabe in Context'*, Columbia University) Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin N°82 – (2009), 5.

[115] Mahmood Mamdani ,5.

[116] Mahmood Mamdani ,5.

[117] Miriam Prys, 23.

[118]Miriam Prys,' *Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Quiet Diplomacy*", 23.

> "The challenge of the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards," wrote Cooper. "Among ourselves," by which he meant the West, "we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era -- force, pre-emptive attack, and deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle."[119]

Whether this essay represented the views of the labour government of it was simply an opinion by an individual. Mugabe interpreted and framed it as attempts by UK to recolonise Zimbabwe.

Despite, the ensuring crisis between Zimbabwe and UK , the Abuja Agreement of September 2001,made by the Commonwealth noted that "land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from other issues of concern to the Commonwealth, such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and the economy.''[120] Chan et also note that even though Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in December 2003, both Zimbabwe and the UK agreed to the statement and it appears that the UK–Zimbabwe standoff was a result of Zimbabwe demanding that prior resolution of the 'land and compensation issue' be dealt with first while, the UK argued that the prior resolution of the 'rights and governance issues.'[121]

With such a stalemate at hand, the UK stepped up its diplomatic pressure on Zimbabwe through the Commonwealth. At the CMAG meeting in London (30 January 2002) Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Jack Straw of Britain, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer of Australia and Deputy Prime Minister Billie Miller of Barbados, they argued for immediate suspension of Zimbabwe. However the motion was not adopted and Zimbabwe remained on the formal agenda, despite objections from Harare, and critics attacked the Commonwealth for weakness.[122]

Chigora argues that "while the Zimbabwe issue has been internationalized, and has affected Zimbabwe's relations with especially the West and also the Commonwealth, land is at

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[119] Gregory Elich, *Zimbabwe Under Siege*, Swans , (2002) ,11.
http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004.html .
[120] Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001.
[121] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel (2006), 187.
[122] Derek Ingram, *Commonwealth update, *, *The Round Table* (2002), 91:364,135.

epicentre the conflict has been between Zimbabwe and the UK."[123] On 11 May 2002 the then foreign minister of Zimbabwe Stan Mudenge told the EU that 'we must tackle the question of the colonial albatross that has poisoned ties between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom'. Britain had used the EU 'to gain sympathy for the white farmers'.[124] This was a clear sign that a bilateral dispute between two States had been internationalised and both countries now sought to win the support of international community to support their positions.The blame game was in full swing between Harare and London.

Gregory Elich sums up the situation by noting that, "as Zimbabwe moved away from the neoliberal path dictated by Western financial institutions, Western hostility grew."[125] For Gregory "In the period leading up to the March 2002 elections, Western leaders attempted to tighten the screws on Zimbabwe, hoping to affect the outcome. Already a sort of de facto sanctions regime was in place, in that Western officials were actively discouraging trade with Zimbabwe, while overheated news reports painted a picture of instability and unreliability, which also tended to deter trade. In November 2001, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw revealed that during the past few months he had been "building coalitions" against Zimbabwe."[126]

The UK also stepped up its pressure on Zimbabwe by pressuring fellow neighbouring countries to put pressure on Zimbabwe. On January 14, 2002, as the Extraordinary Summit of the South African Development Community (SADC) opened in Blantyre, Malawi, Great Britain threatened to withhold $18 million in budgetary support from Malawi, the chair of the SADC, unless it agreed to direct the SADC towards the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe. Some sources also indicate that Great Britain held the threat of withholding aid for Malawi's food crisis. Related threats to withdraw budgetary support were wielded against Mozambique. At the summit, President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania announced that British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Baroness Amos telephoned him directly and urged him not to support Zimbabwe at the SADC and at the upcoming meeting of the Commonwealth and when that call failed; British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw then telephoned and attempted to bully him."[127] It appears United Kingdom was strengthening its resolve to build a coalition

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[123] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel (2006) 187.
[124] Derek Ingram, 134.
[125] Gregory Elich, 7.
[126] Gregory Elich, 8.
[127] Gregory Elich, 9.

against Zimbabwe to even include other African countries by force. However it appears at this stage the attempts were unsuccessful.

In October 2001, European Union sent a delegation of three led by Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten and Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana left Harare on 23 November 2001 shocked after Mugabe had told them he would not consider their insistence on minimum international norms for the presidential election and a UN report had accused Zimbabwe of prolonging the war in the Congo.[128] Perhaps Mugabe was convinced the elections were to be used to remove him from office.

In May 2003, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee issued a report where it stated that

> 'We conclude that Mugabe's regime may indeed be in its last throes, although we do not underestimate its determination to cling to power. We recommend that the Government ensure that it is in a position swiftly to restore good working relations with any incoming administration which demonstrates a real commitment to restoring the rights, welfare and dignity of the people of Zimbabwe."[129]

Mugabe may have interpreted this as an attempt to topple him from power and had nothing to do with democracy. He soon viewed the opposition parties as part of the means and methods by which UK sought to replace him and thus the government adopted a hostile attitude for the opposition parties. Thus Mugabe and his government responded in a calculated manner which sought to preserve their hold of power perhaps influenced by cost benefit analysis logic.

However while the diplomatic niceties were going on behind the scenes, "emotions were running high in Zimbabwe itself, as the fate of the nation rested on the outcome of the election. Gregory states that 'Complaints from both Zimbabwe and the SADC concerning hostile Western intervention in the political process in Zimbabwe were sent to the European Union. Under Article 98 of the Cotonou Agreement, disputes between the European Union and African Pacific Caribbean (ACP) countries must be taken to the joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers for resolution or arbitration proceedings. Zimbabwe's invocation of Article 98 was not responded to by the European Union, prompting President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi to

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[128] Derek Ingram, 133.
[129] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Zimbabwe, Eighth Report of Session 2002–03,* https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/339/339.pdf

write to the EU on behalf of the SADC. Muluzi complained that Zimbabwe's "legitimate concerns had received neither a response nor an acknowledgment from the EU," and that the EU had instead threatened to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe."[130] One could argue that it was clear Britain had successfully lobbied the EU to join its coalition against Zimbabwe as Jack Straw had suggested.

Despite all the intense pressure from UK and its allies Mugabe remained unwavering. Elich argues that Mugabe's firm determination disenchanted British officials, who had hoped to make him plead and back down, and on February 18, 2002, the European Union's foreign ministers voted unanimously to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe.[131] The European Union suspended budgetary support to Zimbabwe and terminated "financial support for all projects" except "those in direct support of the population, all financial aid would be "reoriented in support of the population, in particular in the social sectors, democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law," by which the EU meant that financial support would be funnelled to groups seeking to overthrow the government of Zimbabwe.[132]

Furthermore, a visa ban was also imposed on 20 Zimbabwean government officials and their spouses, forbidding travel within the European Union, and overseas assets held by the targeted officials were frozen. Zimbabwe Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, among those listed in the EU's sanctions, sharply criticized the EU. "It is very clear that what we are now, dealing with is organized economic terrorism whose aim is clear and is to unseat a legitimately elected government which has decided to defend its national independence and national sovereignty."[133] The die was cast and it soon became clear that resolving this dispute was to be harder than anyone had expected.

Four days after the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe the United States followed suit, expanding the list of targeted individuals to include not only Zimbabwean government officials, but prominent businessmen as well. The Bush Administration even included church leaders to the sanctions list, including Anglican Bishop Nolbert Kunonga, who had praised President Mugabe.[134] In diplomatic circles, the major issue of suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth and the imposition of targeted sanctions by the European Union and

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[130] Gregory Elich 10.
[131] Gregory Elich, 10.
[132] Gregory Elich, 10.
[133] Gregory Elich, 9.
[134] Gregory Elich, 10.

USA, Britain had led the campaign on both multilateral institutions to have Zimbabwe isolated. These acts by Britain were meant to transform an otherwise bilateral issue to a multilateral one so as to gain support of those countries that might also be affected by the same situation for example Australia, New Zealand and other former colonial powers."[135] At this stage it is safe to argue that the bilateral dispute had been internationalized and it was clear that it was in Commonwealth where the battle will be fought as both countries had allies there.

In the run-up to the presidential election the Commonwealth assembled at Coolum in Australia for the annual Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). The leaders of Australia, Britain and New Zealand, argued that Zimbabwe should be suspended from the Commonwealth before the elections based on widespread violence against opposition supporters as well the fact that European Union observers were treated in such a fashion that they were obliged to withdraw from Zimbabwe.[136] 'Other countries, notably Canada but also African members, argued that the Commonwealth should desist from taking any action until the elections were completed and the manner as to how they were conducted was evaluated and a compromise ensued, inspired by Canada, whereby a 'troika' of the previous, current and next Chairpersons-in-Office (Australia, Nigeria and South Africa) would settle on any suitable action upon accepting a report of the Commonwealth Observer Group about the elections'[137]

'The Troika concluded that if the report was not good, possible action ranged from collective displeasure to actual suspension and in the final declaration, the leaders assembled at Coolum restated the Harare Declaration's commitment to democracy as an indispensable condition for Commonwealth membership Prime Minster Blair of the UK was quoted as saying, ''the fudging will have to stop. The credibility of the Commonwealth itself is at stake. The procedure laid down in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration and the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme is clear, and action must follow, up to and including suspension."[138] In addition, 'Prince Charles was quoted as saying that the Commonwealth deserved ''contempt'' if it did not stand up for democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe and that the organization was 'drinking in the last chance saloon, for the Prince, how Zimbabwe

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[135] Percyslage Chigora, 69.
[136] Gregory, Elich 10.
[137] Gregory Elich, 10.
[138] Gregory Elich, 10.

was treated by the Commonwealth was ''the biggest test since it had been created'', but the organization was ''failing the test and this was causing long-term damage to its credibility''[139]

At Abuja in 2003, 'arguments over Zimbabwe continued through a two-day closed-door retreat. In order to break the stalemate, Kenya (acting on a suggestion by Canada's Jean Chre´tien) suggested that an ad hoc committee made up of six countries (South Africa, Mozambique, India, Jamaica, Australia and Canada, later joined by Nigeria), be established to resolve the matter. The result was that all the countries, except South Africa, voted to continue Zimbabwe's suspension. In response, Mugabe announced that Zimbabwe was leaving the Commonwealth. With Mbeki's diplomacy in tatters, a statement ''on behalf of the SADC'' was released accusing Commonwealth members who had voted for Zimbabwe's continued suspension as being ''dismissive, intolerant and rigid'[140]

 'The appeal for accommodation appeared to have been provoked by Mugabe's threat to leave the association should his country's suspension not be lifted, Mugabe had said, 'if our sovereignty is what we have to lose to be readmitted into the Commonwealth, well, we will say goodbye to the Commonwealth, and perhaps the time has no come to say so. Mugabe said he valued membership of other organizations, such as the African Union, SADC and the United Nations, because they treated Zimbabwe as an equal. In a rare disenchantment with multilateralism, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in December 2003 because it concluded that it was being unfairly treated by Nigeria, the 'white' Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Secretary-General.''[141]

Hasu Patel provides the following reasons for why ultimately Zimbabwe left. He states that "the white members of the Commonwealth have been the leading, and most vocal and persistent 'bloc' in their 'anti-Zimbabwe' stance."[142] Secondly "there has been a seeming 'flip-flop' by Nigeria, whose President Olusegun Obasanjo, with the concurrence of President Thabo Mbeki, wrote a letter in February 2003 to Prime Minister John Howard of Australia (as Chair of the Commonwealth Troika on Zimbabwe) recommending the lifting of the previous 12-month suspension of Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth. The suspension issue was within the mandate of the Commonwealth Troika, nevertheless, two votes out of

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[139]Ian Taylor 'The Devilish Thing': The Commonwealth and Zimbabwe's Denouement, The Round Table, (2005), 94:380, 374.
[140] Ian Taylor (2005) 374.
[141] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel (2006) 177.
[142] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel (2006) 185.

three could not lift the suspension yet, contrary to Zimbabwean expectations, Mugabe was not invited to the December 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja, Nigeria, to present his case, as per the Report of the High Level Review Group's recommendations (concerning procedures to be adopted relating to perceived breaches of Commonwealth Harare Principles in circumstances other than an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratic government) adopted at the March 2002 CHOGM in Coolum, Australia.[143]

Further, SADC leaders claimed they were not allowed to give a press conference/s in Abuja to voice their displeasure about the treatment of the 'Zimbabwe issue' at the Abuja CHOGM,[144] Thirdly, 'Zimbabwe's disaffection with Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon related to the perceived inadequate use of his 'good offices' role and, especially, his March 2003 'Commonwealth Statement on Zimbabwe', in which he declared that the Troika had agreed to continue Zimbabwe's suspension until the Abuja CHOGM in December 2003. Zimbabwe questioned his authority to make the statement and the public absence of the contents and results of his consultations with Commonwealth Zimbabwe Foreign Policy 183 governments. Similar concerns were publicly raised by the SADC diplomats based in London." Blair supported Pakistan's readmission to the Commonwealth because of 'progress towards democracy', Swaziland, the last remaining absolute monarchy in Africa, and Uganda, a 'non-party democracy', continued as members of the Commonwealth.'[145] This Zimbabwe left the Commonwealth because Mugabe argued it was now being used as a method to delegitimize his rule and by extension oust him from power. Whether UK sought to recolonise Zimbabwe or not, Mugabe seized the opportunity to sell the crisis to his domestic supporters as an attack on independence of the country and that he was the man who was going to save the country from the imperial UK.

Mugabe had other external factors to consider as well, would he have allies in the international community who would be willing to help him/ turn to in the event that relations with the West do not improve. Thus as relations deteriorated with west, he turned east to China. 'Zimbabwe and China have relations dating back to the southern African country's 1970s liberation struggle when Beijing provided arms and training to the Black Nationalist

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[143] Stephen Chan ,185.
[144] Stephen Chan& Hasu Patel (2006) ,185.
[145] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel (2006) 185.

movement fighting the white minority government of Ian Smith.[146] For Mugabe it seems China had been a reliable ally in the past and they could be counted on for the future. 'The friendship was rekindled when President Robert Mugabe, shunned by former friends in the West over the political crisis in his country, adopted a "Look East" policy forging stronger ties with countries like China, Malaysia, Indonesia and India.'[147] Alao notes that Zimbabwe–China relations were developed and intensified during the colonial era when Beijing assisted ZANU (PF) during the liberation war with arms, military strategies and training of former freedom fighters,, China supported ZANLA forces with military hardware and received intense training in China while Russia backed Zimbabwe's People Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).[148] Hence,Mugabe commented soon after the independence that 'we will continue to maintain and deepen our alliances with those who have been our truest friends'[149]

Furthermore, the 'Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army3 (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU (PF), adopted Mao Zedong theories which motivated them in their quest to free the country from the colonial rule under Ian Smith. Thus, the foundation for modern-day bilateral relations was established during the cold war era when China in the 1960s and early 1970s not only willingly trained most African countries' freedom fighters in the revolutionary ideals but also provided scholarships to most children of African freedom fighters and ruling elites'.[150] Thus a long historical bond had already been created and in existence between these two countries.

Matahwa argues that as Mugabe was battling international isolation by the West and a creaking economy, Zimbabwe, like other countries in Africa, has warmed up to China as a possible way out of its present economic crisis. A number of African countries including Zimbabwe have gone through structural economic reforms which have left them with large debts to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[151] Thus perhaps there was no alternative of where to turn to. One could argue that perhaps based on his previous working

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[146] Obert Matahwa, *China And Zimbabwe: Is There A Future?,*
http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/econ/matahwa_china_zimbabwe_future_071101om.pdf
[147] Obert Matahwa 1.
[148] Zindiye, S. *Understanding China's activities in Zimbabwe: A review of Literature. South Africa*: Rhodes University(2015). Retrieved from https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodes university/content/.../Stanislous%20Zindiye.ppt.
[149] Alao, A. '*China and Zimbabwe: The context and contents of a relationship'* (Global powers and African programmes, SAIIA Occasional Paper)' (2014) Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs
[150] Victor Ojakorotu Rumbidzai Kamidza, '*Look East Policy: The Case of Zimbabwe–China Political and Economic Relations Since 2000'*, SAGE publications. Indian Quarterly 74(1) 17.
[151] Victor Ojakorotu Rumbidzai Kamidza , 17.

relationship with the Chinese government, Mugabe found the Chinese to be a reliable partner and was thus willing to let relations with the West sour knowing very well, he could count on China.

Thus view is also shared by Ramani who argues that 'China's close ties with Harare can be explained by historical legacies, normative convergences, and practical economic benefits.' Thus, the adoption of the 'look east policy' (LEP) programme in 2003 by the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government was a direct response to the country's deteriorating political and economic instability, and bilateral conflictual relationship with both the Western governments and international development partners (donors and global financial institutions GFIs)'[152]

Kamidza et-al argue that 'Zimbabwe's Look East Policy (LEP) and specifically the bilateral relationship with China should be viewed through the lens of Zimbabwe's domestic politics and that the political elite in Zimbabwe have a vested interest in a close economic and political relationship with China at the cost of the interests of the people of Zimbabwe Further, Look East Policy (LEP) was introduced to promote Zimbabwe–China bilateral relationship as a sign of commitment by the two countries to support each other against Western governments in global dialogue engagement and platforms. [153]

Chun concludes by asserting that 'western governments such as the USA, the European Union (EU) and the UK, imposed smart sanctions on ZANU (PF) leadership and associated companies in support of the 2001 Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), but Mugabe administration firmly improved bilateral relationship with China thereby cushioning bruised ego. As a result, Mugabe regards China as 'all weather' friends. In return, China's benefits from this bilateral relationship include access to extractive minerals, investments in the across all the sectors of the economy and booming trade since Zimbabwe has increased the importation of cheap commodities from her bilateral partner. In this close bilateral partnership, China has been much stronger politically and economically than Zimbabwe.[154] Thus Mugabe decision to ally with China was influenced by a cost benefit analysis train of thought. Any decision to be made had to ensure that he remained in power

[152] Ramani, S. '*Zimbabwe: China's 'all weather' friend in Africa'*. The Diplomat, (2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/zimbabwechinas-all-weather-friend-in-africa/.
[153] Victor Ojakorotu Rumbidzai Kamidza, 18.
[154] Chun, Z. '*China–Zimbabwe relations*: *A model of China–Africa relations?*' Global powers and Africa programmes, SAIIA Occasional Paper .(2014) 205 Retrieved 17 July 2016, from https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/643.

and that his inner circle was able to retain influence and control of State assets and resources. Thus the cost of losing support from the Western Countries was less compared to the benefit of staying in power.

During this time, SADC had adopted a policy of quiet diplomacy. This strategy involved mediation without sanctions and also a putting a united front to the rest of the international community. Mandela's South Africa would learn of this diplomacy when 'General Abacha of Nigeria who despite various efforts of quiet diplomacy from Mandela to negotiate the crisis bedevilling Nigeria at that time to save the, Ogoni activists, they were executed in November 1995.[155] 'President Mandela's issued strongly worded statements on this issue at the Commonwealth Heads of States meeting in New Zealand and it was met with strong response. 'Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth and president Mandela took the moral high road by recalling the South African High Commissioner from Nigeria, urging the UK and USA to impose oil sanctions, requesting UN action on the issue and calling a special SADC meeting to discuss the issue.'[156] 'Mandela's actions were strongly criticised by other African States including his own party members of the ruling African National Congress. 'Van Aardt described this as a South Africa learning the unwritten continental code that "African states do not turn against each other in international fora."[157] President Mandela it appears was influenced by international norms and standards, norms dictated that appropriate action must be taken to hold a leader accountable in case they are going against the international norms. SADC leaders on the other hand, were more concerned with how such norms and standards may affect their rule and thus chose not to enforce them and instead look aside. This was a classic act of a cost benefit analysis influenced by an analysis of the consequences.

Despite the show of solidarity SADC was also unconvinced that the current violent land reform program would yield positive results. ' At the SADC Windhoek Summit in August 2000 they publicly backed President Mugabe on his land reform process, however, the final communique made it clear that SADC's support is conditional on the peaceful resolution of the land question. This replicated President Mbeki's stand taken during his meeting with President Mugabe before the Windhoek Summit.'[158] 'The SADC Summit delegated President Mbeki and Malawi's President Muluzi to negotiate with Britain to finance land distribution

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[155] Jo-Ansie van Wyk, *'The Saga Continues...The Zimbabwe Issue in South Africa's Foreign Policy'*, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations,(2002) Vol.1,4, 182.

[156] Jo-Ansie van Wyk 182.

[157] Van Aardt M, *A foreign policy to die for. South Africa's response to the Nigeria crisis,'* Africa Insight,(1996) 26, 2, 114.

[158] Jo-Ansie van Wyk,189.

schemes seemed to be unsuccessful by September 2000.[159] 'Muluzi mandate included the qualification that the rule of law has to be restored and invaders removed from farm.[160] It appears in this instance SADC leaders were influenced by both following norms and standards of rule of law and international law hence being the appropriate action. At the same time, political considerations also seemed to be taken into account in the manner in which the leaders sought to balance up all competing interests and choosing a solution which was best suitable for SADC region and stability.

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[159] Southern Africa Report, 29 September 2000 and 11 August 2000.
[160] Jo-Ansie van Wyk, 189.

Chapter 3

3.1. Analysis

It is common cause that in every crisis that any government or leader faces, the government will always try to find the best response that will enable them to come out successful, convince domestic audience that this was the best course of action and it was a success. When faced with both a domestic and international crisis, leaders always want to appeal to the international audience that is to appeal to allies in the international and regional community that this action was the best response they could come up with and it is for the good of the country and the international community as a whole. Mugabe government no doubt was facing a difficult decision on how to respond to his personal needs and domestic supporters, while at home and at the same time winning the international audience that Zimbabwe was being victimised and this was a justified response which is in the best interests of Zimbabwe and other countries facing them same crisis..

According to Garth Abraham a senior official in the ruling party of Zimbabwe immediately announced that, "for us this is like an escape from hell because Britain and its white allies have turned the Commonwealth into a Zimbabwe lynching dub'. Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe was equally dismissive: The Commonwealth is a mere club, but it has become like an Animal Farm where some members are more equal than others."[161] One can reasonably infer and conclude that deliberations had been ongoing within Zanu PF and the government on how best to respond to this crisis that was getting out of hand as they perceived it. It is also important to note that during this time, the war veterans (key allies to Mugabe and Zanu PF who had started the land reform programme) were getting discontent and Mugabe needed their support. Thus his decision was based on a calculation of whose support he needed the most to stay in power.

This can also be seen as the Abuja summing was taking place in December 2003 when 'the appeal for accommodation appeared to have been provoked by Mugabe's threat to leave the association should his country's suspension not be lifted and on the same day as the meeting of the SADC troika , Mugabe had said, 'if our sovereignty is what we have to lose to be readmitted into the Commonwealth, well, we will say goodbye to the Commonwealth, and perhaps the time has no come to say so. Mugabe said he valued membership of other organizations, such as the African Union, SADC and the United Nations, because they treated

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[161] Garth Abraham ,148.

Zimbabwe as an equal. This, apparently, was an attitude that he felt was not forthcoming from the Commonwealth.[162] In a rare disenchantment with multilateralism, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in December 2003 because it concluded that it was being unfairly treated by Nigeria, the 'white' Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Secretary-General. One can also infer that Mugabe had does his calculations and decided that the Commonwealth was less important to Zimbabwe as an international organisation than the United Nations and other regional African organisations. In such an instance no norms existed that when States are in disagreement they should leave the organisation. Most countries that had disagreements with organisations only suspended or boycotted but never left such as the Soviet Union when it suspended United Nations Security Council meetings. Thus Mugabe broke with norms and tradition and acted in his best interests therefore qualifying his actions as influenced by logics of consequences.

In this case one can argue that the British government departed from the international norms and rules that when States enter agreements they must uphold and fulfil their obligations. Thus appropriateness was no longer applicable in this case. UK decision came at a time when the economy in Zimbabwe was not doing well, the War Veterans were getting agitated over the slow progress in land reform, Mugabe was presented with a crisis, that required authoritative action and based on his calculations he took a decision that in the end managed to safeguard his personal interest and a great cost to the nation.

Chan etal note that even though Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in December 2003, both Zimbabwe and the UK agreed to the statement and it appears that the UK– Zimbabwe standoff was a result of Zimbabwe demanding that prior resolution of the 'land and compensation issue' be dealt with first while, the UK argued that the prior resolution of the 'rights and governance issues.'[163] There was a crisis of a stalemate and Mugabe needed to take bold action in order to end the stalemate. His response to the crisis shows well analysed and calculated response which was not in line with the international norms.

In May 2003, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee issued a report discussed earlier on situation in Zimbabwe, it may have concerned Mugabe noting that, Mugabe had come into power by dramatic means. By 1995 he had won his fourth term in office albeit a slowing economy among other challenges. When this report was issued perhaps he interpreted

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[162] Garth Abraham, 157.
[163] Stephen Chan & Hasu Patel (2006), 187.

it as a direct and personal attack on his legitimacy as president. Motivated by the desire to stay in power for as long as he could, he and his supporters decided to do everything they can in order to stay in power.

An analysis of the above facts show that Mugabe was faced with a situation which decided to deal with in his own way, as the rationale theory put it , there were self interest to be protected and the survival of his party and the country's independence were at stake he therefore based on the deliberations, calculations and analysis of his close confidants and supporters decided to leave the Commonwealth because they believed it was in the best interests of Zimbabwe and for him , if he was to retain power for longer. Thus Mugabe's actions/decisions may have influenced by the logics of consequences.

McDougall notes that, through this process, "the following Commonwealth countries have had their membership suspended: Nigeria (1995–99); Pakistan (1999–2004, 2007–8); Fiji (1987–97 (i.e. preceding CMAG), 2000–1, and 2006–14); Zimbabwe (2002–3, after which Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth). Apart from Zimbabwe, the main recent examples of members withdrawing from the Commonwealth have been The Gambia (2013–18) and the Maldives (withdrew October 2016). (In different circumstances there were the earlier examples of South Africa (1961–94) and Pakistan (1972–89)." [164] One could perhaps argue that Mugabe was simply following the tradition within the organisation in which when a member state is in disagreement with the organisation they would exist (either voluntarily or be suspended).thus Mugabe was acting based on standard practise and that may have been the appropriate act at that time in order to allow more time for diplomacy outside of the organisation perhaps preferably a bilateral deal would have been struck with the UK on the matter.

Sending notes that the' logic of appropriateness is untenable as a theory of individual action and secondly it shows that the logic of appropriateness is inconsistent with constructivist theory, as expressed through three of its core claims.'[165] 'The logic of appropriates accounts for and specifies the action-mechanism implied in the key constructivist claim that norms are constitutive for actors identities'.[166] The motivational internalist position of the logic of appropriateness makes it possible to account for the action-mechanism implied in this claim.

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[164] Derek McDougall *The Commonwealth in contemporary international relations, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*(2018), 56,4, 552.
[165] Sending 461.
[166] Sending 461.

However, precisely because of this motivational internalist position, the logic of appropriateness is inconsistent with an equally central claim in constructivist theory namely that agents and structures are mutually constitutive, and it is unable to effectively account for the action-mechanism through which changes in norms occur, which is a central substantive claim in constructivist theory about international politics[167] The logic of appropriateness cannot explain the process by which the changes in ideational structures get off the ground and are advocated. The Logic of appropriateness can explain how and why new rules and norms are being followed once internalized, but not for the process by which certain actors advocate, disseminate and in some way get others to accept and internalize new norms. This logic of appropriateness, thus may not fully explain the decision making process by Mugabe and his government during this crisis.

The rationale Choice theory has a set of key characteristics that define it namely that, Actors have stable and consistent principles and that human preferences are obvious. In this case Mugabe's preferences for power and more wealth were obvious and known. Actors search for a course of action that is optimally suited to pursue their preferences. For Mugabe, challenging the Commonwealth was the best course of action in order to preserve power and his status. Actors are constrained by the means end calculation. This loosely translated refers to the cost benefit analysis that has been discussed earlier on and finally the information available to actors shapes their cost benefit analysis.

While many decisions are reflective and continuously changed as more information becomes available, which is typical feature with realist leaders, for Mugabe however it appears the decision to not cooperate with the Commonwealth had been made and despite new information being available such as offers to mediate from South Africa and Nigeria, they were simply not willing to engage or take up those initiatives. Thus Mugabe's decision making process is consistent with the rational choice/realist theory of decision making process and therefore the logic of consequences based on cost benefit analysis was at play in this situation.

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[167] Sending ,461.

Chapter 4

4.1Conclusion

Shulz discusses the logic of appropriateness and consequences together, to show how they relate.[168] Schulz's work is important because it helps us to show these two logics are the most relevant and important to this study.Shulz argues these two logics enable us to understand the main distinction between the two methods of action in governments and organisations.[169] He argues that these two distinguish between an intentional act and a routine action taken by leaders of organisations.[170] This study has been about analysing these two logics of action to draw a possible conclusion on which logic may perhaps have best explain the Zimbabwean governments' decision to exit to Commonwealth. The study concludes that based on the information discussed above , it appears this was a well calculated decision by Mugabe and his government , to the extent that they concluded that the Commonwealth organisation was no longer serving the best interests of Zimbabwe and that they would rather prioritise membership to the UN and other African organisations.

The purpose of this study was to provide an understanding to the foreign policy analysis particularly decision making process in African countries using Zimbabwe as a case study. The underlying research question was to explain what factors best explain Zimbabwe' decision to leave the commonwealth. To provide an answer to the question that the study raised, the structured focused on an empirical analysis and comparison of the two logics of action namely the logics of appropriateness and consequences. The study was placed in the context of two reigning theoretical underpinnings; namely the rationale theory and the constructivist theory. These two theories present two different approaches to foreign policy analysis and decision making process.

The first part of the centred on explains the process of foreign policy decision making. The hypothesis showed that foreign policy decisions rarely follow norms and rules when certain political interests are at stake. The study showed that when Mugabe perceived his rule and that of his party to be under threat he departed from the rules and norms that govern international relations and made his decisions based on a cost benefit analysis on what he considered to be in the best interests of the country and for his rule. The logic of consequence was able to adequately explain this decision process making by showing that actors/leaders

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[168] Martin Schultz, 1.
[169] Shulz , 1.
[170] Shulz ,1.

normally make decisions on what they normally perceive as in the best interests of themselves and the state. They do this by doing a cost benefit analysis of their decisions.

 The logic of appropriateness was able to show that leaders do make these decisions based on standard practise and what is considered appropriate. However, it failed to explain why some decisions especially in foreign policies do not normally follow the standard rules. It also showed that some rules do not apply to political situations and the study had already demonstrated that most political decisions are about pursuit of self interests. Therefore the study concluded that the logic of consequences best explains the decision making process of the Zimbabwean government during this crisis.

 The second part centred on explaining the various theoretical frameworks that may best explain this decision. The rationale theory was able to explain how leaders respond when they perceive themselves to be under threat and when self interests are involved. The constructivist theory despite its attempt to explain these foreign policy decisions are more about the community of State actors. Thus the study concluded that the rationale theory best explains the decision of the Zimbabwe government.

Overall, the study has shown that these two logics of actions cannot be studied in isolation and are intertwined and thus it is important to view them holistically. One can conclude that the Zimbabwe government foreign policy decision making process is influenced by hard power and state survival as such Mugabe was a realist and the decisions followed to traits of logic of consequences which enabled him to weigh the competing preferences and interests in order to determine an outcome he deemed acceptable. The logics of action are key instruments in which to make sense of foreign policy decision making process.

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Pledge of Honesty

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Arthur Shirichena