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„Transforming contested Sites of Memory (*lieux de mémoire*):  
A Case Study of four iconoclastic measures at the Cihu  
Mausoleum“

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## **NOTE ON ROMANISATION**

In this thesis, I choose to apply the romanization system most commonly used in Taiwan itself and research literature regarding Taiwan. The transliteration is used for Chinese names and terms, both in the text and in the footnotes. Furthermore, I provide the Hanyu Pinyin transliteration and traditional characters in brackets at every first mention of a name or term.

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# 1. Introduction

The hardships of dealing with a country's own past, especially if that past is marked by a violent and authoritarian regime, are familiar to many countries on this planet. Especially in third-wave democracies, meaning countries that only just democratized in the late twentieth century (Huntington 1991), the struggle of coping with the past regime is still an on-going and painful process. Such is also the case in Taiwan, where the assessment of former president Chiang Kai-shek's (*Jiǎngjièshí* 蔣介石) legacy still divides today's society and politics. This division often manifests itself in the vandalism of physical materializations of Taiwan's authoritarian past, which in turn requires the government to take action (Morris 2018). Chiang Kai-shek ruled over the Republic of China from 1928 till his death in 1975. During his leadership opponents were systematically suppressed and human rights violations took place on a regular basis. Chiang is one of the persons mainly responsible for the atrocities committed during the thirty-eight-year long period of martial law that repressed political dissidents, stripped society of their civil rights and erected a state under constant surveillance (Lin 2013:13–14; Lee 2004). Even though today the horrors of his violent regime are well known, certain communities in Taiwan still praise Chiang for his role in the War of Resistance (*Zhōngguó kàngrì zhànzhēng* 中國抗日戰爭) against Japan and his contributions to the Taiwanese economy. These two, seemingly contradictory assessments of the former president are the starting point and motivation behind this master's thesis. The ongoing appreciation of a former authoritarian leader in the context of a flourishing democracy displays a fascinating peculiarity of Taiwanese society. The physical manifestation of this juxtaposition can be seen for example in Taipei itself. Massive buildings commemorating the generalissimo, such as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (*Guólì zhōngzhèng jìniàn táng* 國立中正紀念堂) can be found a few minutes walking distance from the 228 Peace Memorial Park (*Èr'èrbā héping jìniàn gōngyuán* 二二八和平紀念公園), built in remembrance of the victims of the past authoritarian regime.

In recent years the physical remnants of Taiwan's authoritarian past on the island's landscape spark more and more controversy. Frequent vandalism of Chiang's statues or busts, for example at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall or National Chengchi University (*Guólì zhèngzhì dàxué* 國立政治大學) in Taipei evidently show that these relics have a very emotional impact on society. Certain communities and individuals are frustrated with the

government's use of public finances to maintain the generalissimo's commemoration. Protesters often demand a swifter implementation of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice (*Cùjìn zhuǎnxíng zhèngyì tiáolì* 促進轉型正義條例) issued in December 2017, which among others regulates the handling of authoritarian symbols (Morris 2018; 2019). But it is important to note that this is by no means a difficulty that only Taiwan struggles with. Spain's recent decision to move the mortal remains of dictator Francisco Franco out of his pompous Mausoleum to a different, more remote burial site shows evidently that this is a worldwide phenomenon (Burgen & Jones 2019).

This thesis intends to evaluate how the Taiwanese government and society handled one of these contested sites over time and how the employed approaches fit into a broader international discourse of managing sites of memory. The actuality, relevance and many facets of this phenomenon is why Chiang Kai-shek's resting place – the Cihu Mausoleum (*Cíhú língqīn* 慈湖陵寢) – was chosen as the topic for this case study.

The theoretical framework of this thesis consists of two approaches, namely French historian Pierre Nora's lieux de mémoire (sites of memory) along with related theories of the study of memory and iconoclasm. Firstly, the Mausoleum shall be examined with the use of the just mentioned theory of so-called sites of memory. "Sites" in this context has to be interpreted in a broader understanding, meaning that memory can be symbolized not only by physical representations, such as monuments, statues etc., but also through symbols, events or rituals. Thus, the Cihu Mausoleum will be classified according to Nora's definition of the three dimensions of sites of memory – material, symbolic and functional (Nora 1984; 1986; 1992). Afterwards by means of the second theoretical approach, it will be discussed how the chosen site transformed in regard to four iconoclastic measures. Hereby a distinction will be made between iconoclasm from above, whereby a government or state power decides how to handle a site of memory and iconoclasm from below, meaning an individual or group of civilians take the matter into their own hands (Skillingstad 2016:39).

By applying a diachronic comparative research method the chosen site of memory will be studied during four specific points of time, namely the total closure of the Mausoleum under Chen Shui-bian (*Chén Shuǐbiǎn* 陳水扁) in 2007 during his *QuJianghua* (去蔣化 de-Chiang-Kai-shek-ification)<sup>1</sup> programme, the re-opening under Ma Ying-jeou (*Mǎ Yīngjiǔ* 馬英九) in 2008, the "vandalism" by an activist group in 2018 and the temporary closure as a consequence thereof and finally the re-opening under Tsai Ing-wen (*Cài Yīngwén* 蔡英文) in

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<sup>1</sup> Henceforth the Pinyin romanization "QuJianghua" instead of the English translation "De-Chiang-Kai-shek-ification" will be used.

2019 in accordance with the work of the Transitional Justice Commission (*Cùjìn zhuǎnxíng zhèngyì wěiyuánhùi* 促進轉型正義委員會). The focus will be on how these four different caesurae affected all three dimensions of the site of memory. The research questions that this thesis intends to answer, are as follows: How was the Cihu Mausoleum as a site of memory transformed with regard to four specific iconoclastic measures and how do these measures differ from one another? How do transformations of the material dimension of a site of memory change the symbolic and functional meaning of said site? It is assumed that a total iconoclastic approach, such as the closure of the Mausoleum, appears to encounter more resistance from the public and the opposite political camp, than a moderate physical transformation. Due to the split collective memory of the nation, the handling of contested sites of memory occurs more complex than initially expected. As sites of memory are a source of identity, a pluralistic society such as Taiwan exhibits a range of diverse and contesting sites. This is also the reason why it seems that the Taiwanese society requires more subtle and delicate methods than a radical elimination or removal of authoritarian symbols. Furthermore, it is believed that seemingly minor physical changes of these sites of memory can have a grave impact on the symbolic and functional dimension of a site.

The current state of research regarding the Cihu Mausoleum is very limited, one of the reasons most likely being that the role of the perpetrators has long been neglected in the reappraisal of Taiwan's history (Hwang 2016). This is why up till now research mainly focused on the commemorative culture and spaces of the victims. This thesis tries to present new insights in order to fill this distinct literature gap. Neither in English, nor in German or Chinese much scholarly work in relation to the research questions was found. When checking Taiwan's National Central Library Catalogue only two master's theses (Chang 2012; Wang 2016) dealing in some manner with the Chiangs Culture Park (*Liǎng jiǎng wénhuà yuánqū* 兩蔣文化園區), consisting of the Cihu Mausoleum, Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park (*Cíhú jìniàn diāosù gōngyuán* 慈湖紀念雕塑公園) and Touliao Mausoleum (*Dàxī língqǐn* 大溪陵寢), appear, making the minimal research interest of this topic even more obvious. Even though the relatively remote Mausoleum as a research topic may appear irrelevant at first glance, the site with its annexed sculpture park, worldwide the only sculpture park dedicated to one single person and Chiang Ching-kuo's (*Jiǎng Jīngguó* 蔣經國) Mausoleum display the government's struggle to come to terms with a violent past. Therefore, the site and its meaning should not be underestimated and is deserving of a closer investigation.

The thesis will be structured into five main chapters. After the introduction in chapter 1, which will include the current state of research as well as the applied research method, the

background knowledge and specifics needed for this paper will be provided in chapter 2. A short historical introduction will offer insight into the life of Chiang Kai-shek and important historical events, that is the 228 Incident (*Èr'èrbā shìjiàn* 二二八事件), White Terror (*Báisè kǒngbù* 白色恐怖) and the Kaohsiung Incident (*Gāoxióng shìjiàn* 高雄事件). This is followed by the paper's theoretical framework in chapter 3. Nora's sites of memory and related theories, such as collective memory and counter memory will be explained. Subsequently the concept of iconoclasm will be presented and discussed how governments (iconoclasm from above) and individuals (iconoclasm from below) decide to interact with contested sites of memory and what options are available to deal with said sites. In the main chapter 4 the thesis' empirical discussion will be presented. Firstly, the personality cult of Chiang Kai-shek which ultimately lead to countless physical manifestations of the authoritarian leader will be introduced. Subsequently the construction and specifics of the Cihu Mausoleum will be examined. Afterwards it will be discussed what it means for a site to be labelled as Cultural Heritage, as is the case with the Cihu Mausoleum. This will be followed by the classification of the Mausoleum as a site of memory in accordance to Nora's theory. Lastly, the four iconoclastic measures and their impact on the Mausoleum will be discussed in further detail. Finally, in chapter 5 the findings of this thesis will be summarized, and a future outlook will be attempted.

## 1.1. Current State of Research

The following state of research will be presented in various groups of themes following the structure of the thesis. The most important literature in relation to the Mausoleum, iconoclasm and more specifically how to deal with contested sites of memory and respectively cultural heritage, will be presented. It will not be attempted to list every most recent scholarly work for each topic, but the most helpful and essential for this paper.

As mentioned before, the state of research regarding the Cihu Mausoleum is quite limited. There are some works addressing the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park, which contributes to the analysis of the Mausoleum. Therefore, the master's thesis of Torhild Skillingstad titled "Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park: Iconoclasm, memory and the importance of space" is a very helpful reference point, as the same theory, namely sites of memory was applied. Skillingstad analyses the park's importance and whereas the park intends keeping Chiang's memory alive or displacing it (Skillingstad 2016). Still, in this thesis it will be argued, contrary to Skillingstad that the Sculpture Park cannot be analysed without including the Cihu Mausoleum

in the observation. Joseph Allen also mentions the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park in his book “Taipei: City of Displacement” and describes it as an absurd installation that can be perceived as ridicule of the generalissimo (Allen 2012). Crucial beyond that are also works that address physical manifestations of memory and identity in Taiwan. Among these Sinologist Marc Matten has to be named, who focuses in one chapter of his book “Places of Memory in modern China: history, politics and identity” on the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei. In this chapter he discusses the renaming of the Memorial Hall as a contested place of memory and how such a site contributes to the search for identity in a society (Matten 2012). The state of research regarding how to deal with contested sites of memory on an international level is quite abundant, however not a lot of research was found specifically for Taiwan. Imperative research that deals with iconoclasm from in Taiwan is the paper of Jeremy Taylor titled “QuJianghua: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Reign on Taiwan” which describes Chen Shui-bian’s policy to eliminate physical relics of Chiang from the Taiwanese landscape (Taylor 2010). Very helpful for this thesis is also the work of Sabine Marschall, who not only writes about vandalism of contested monuments, but also the government’s duty to address and deal with these sites and as such can be integrated in the thesis’ division of iconoclasm from above and iconoclasm from below. In her book “Landscape of Memory: commemorative monuments, memorials, and public statuary in post-apartheid South Africa” she covers the democratisation and transformation of cultural heritage in South Africa. She also stresses the potential of cultural heritage to further reconciliation and the construction of an inclusive collective memory (Marschall 2010). In respect to iconoclasm from below again Marschall’s work is noteworthy with her article “Targeting statues: Monument *Vandalism* as an Expression of Socio-political Protest in South Africa”. She examines the defacement of contested statues in post-apartheid South Africa and discusses the problematic nature of the term “vandalism” (Marschall 2017). Since the Cihu Mausoleum is labelled as cultural heritage, research literature in relation to tangible cultural heritage and a community’s interaction which such has to be included as well when discussing iconoclasm from below. Dimitrios Chatzigiannis argues in “Vandalism of Cultural Heritage: Thoughts Preceding Conservation Interventions” that vandalism and its perception is not static, on the contrary it has to be evaluated in regard to society, politics, conflict etc. (Chatzigiannis 2015). Cohen offers in his book chapter “Sociological Approaches to Vandalism” an essential classification for vandalism as well as its incentives and prevention methods (Cohen 1984).

Lastly, research about the Transitional Justice Process in Taiwan is quite extensive. This thesis although will only focus on the Transitional Justice Commission's work regarding the handling of authoritarian symbols. Hung-Ling Yeh and Ching-Hsuan Su analyse in their paper "Never Too Late – The Work of the Transitional Justice Commission" the different Departments assigned with the five major tasks prescribed by the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice (Yeh & Su 2019). Jau-Yuan Hwang studies in his paper "Transitional Justice in Post-war Taiwan" what has been done in regard to Transitional Justice, especially legislative initiatives and what still is missing in the process (Jau-Yuan 2016). Ian and Jamie Rowen introduce in their article "Taiwan's Truth and Reconciliation Committee: The Geopolitics of Transitional Justice in a contested State" Tsai Ing-wen's proposal for a Truth and Reconciliation Committee in 2016 and how such a committee does not only serve domestic, but regional and international policy goals (Rowen & Rowen 2017).

At this point the state of research will not be discussed in further detail, as the just mentioned subject areas will be revisited in chapters 2., 3. and 4. Additional information will therefore be provided in the corresponding chapters.

## **1.2. Research Method**

The thesis' elected case will be examined over a specific period of time, to be more precise from 2007 to 2019. The unit of analysis will therefore be the Mausoleum and its transformation as a site of memory generated by four different iconoclastic measures. For that reason, a diachronic comparison will be conducted, whereby the chosen object is examined within the selected periods of time (Nohlen 1994:509–511). The dependent variable in this thesis will be the three dimensions of sites of memory defined by Nora, i.e. material, symbolic and functional. The independent variable on the other hand will be the just mentioned iconoclastic measures.

A well-known disadvantage of case studies is the research's limited theoretical reach. At the same time, the method also grants the opportunity to examine the chosen case far more intensely compared to other research methods (Nohlen 1994:515). The thesis intends to establish hypothesis that can later on be examined and verified with respect to other sites of memory in Taiwan or internationally. It will also be attempted to present some generalizations with respect to the handling of physical remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek personality cult in Taiwan. However, one aspect which has to be noted is that the Cihu Mausoleum has some characteristics that distinguish it from other authoritarian sites of memory, the most

noteworthy being the actual mortal remains of Chiang Kai-shek are preserved at the Mausoleum. This is why far-reaching conclusions have to be drawn very carefully.

Due to the limited state of research, newspaper articles will be used for the description and comparison of the Mausoleum's transformation. The articles will be gathered from different online portals. In addition to a comparative research method, a literature review will be applied to present sufficient knowledge for the analysis of the case.

## 2. Historical Background

This chapter intends to present a short overview of the political and historical set-up of Taiwan leading up to the research topic of this thesis. Firstly chapter 2.1. will present the basic information of Chiang Kai-shek's life and the development of his political career in order for the reader to gain an impression of his training and career path. Subsequently, in chapter 2.2., to understand the democratic progressive party's (henceforth as DPP; *Mínjìndǎng* 民進黨) and the Kuomintang's (henceforth as KMT; *Guómíndǎng* 國民黨) different assessment of Chiang, a short introduction into the island's history will be outlined. In order to understand the two parties' contrasting attitudes, it is important to have a basic understanding of their developing. Moreover, the 228 Incident and period of White Terror in general are crucial episodes of Taiwanese history that still affect today's society and politics. In order to comprehend the highly emotional effect that Chiang's legacy still evokes, one has to be familiar with these events and the generalissimo's involvement and responsibility in it.

### 2.1. Chiang Kai-shek



**Portrait of Chiang Kai-shek.** Image via History.com. Available from: <https://www.history.com/topics/china/chiang-kai-shek>

Chiang Kai-shek was born on October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1887 in Zhejiang province on mainland China. In his youth at the age of about twenty, Chiang trained at a Chinese imperial military academy in Hebei and was later transferred to a related academy in Japan. It is also in Tokyo where Chiang first meets Sun Yat-sen (*Sūnzhōngshān* 孫中山) and is fascinated by Sun's



revolutionary thoughts (Schlomann & Friedlingstein 1976:9–14). In 1910 Chiang's first wife gives birth to his son named Chiang Ching-kuo (Schlomann & Friedlingstein 1976:56).

In 1911 as the Chinese imperial system ceased to exist, several political groups wishing to gain the new leadership in China appeared. Among these also the Nationalist party of Sun Yat-sen is to be found. As the Nationalist party expanded, Chiang's position in the party also rose. Chiang's second son Chiang Wei-kuo (*Jiǎng Wěiguó* 蔣緯國) was born in 1916, his mother not being Chiang's wife, but his Japanese concubine. Chiang's marriage is eventually divorced in 1921. In 1922 he meets his fifteen years younger future wife Soong Mei-ling (*Sòng Měilíng* 宋美齡) for the first time and five years later they are married. Soong Mei-ling's familiarity and affiliation with the United States of America, will later boost the couple's prominence overseas (Schlomann & Friedlingstein 1976:57–58). After Dr Sun's death the Communists gain more and more influence. In 1926 Chiang is at the top leadership of the KMT (Schlomann & Friedlingstein 1976:34–35). In June 1926 Chiang leads as Supreme Commander his troops in the Northern Expedition, a military campaign against warlords with the goal to unify China, which stands as the starting point of a more than twenty years lasting Civil War in China (Schlomann & Friedlingstein 1976:40–42). The tumultuous period of a missing unified system reached its peak during World War II. The chaos eventually leads to an escalation of the Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists in China right after the end of World War II. After the Nationalist's defeat on the mainland, Chiang withdraws his troops as a “temporary solution” from mainland China and retreats to Taiwan. Till his death Chiang Kai-shek was convinced that he would reclaim the mainland. During the Nationalist's reign of Taiwan Chiang was portrayed as father of the nation and an elaborate personality cult was established (Skillingstad 2016:21–22). The regime that Chiang erected in Taiwan was a violent one, subjugating the island and suppressing the native population. Chiang's time ruling China accounts approximately to the same period of time he spent reigning over Taiwan (Skillingstad 2016:24).

After Chiang became sick with pneumonia in July 1972, he secluded himself from the public and retired. On April 5<sup>th</sup>, 1975 Chiang Kai-shek died at the age of eighty-seven. His body was laid out in a bronze casket in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (*Guólì guófù jìniànguǎn* 國立國父紀念館) in Taipei. An unanticipated number of mourners appeared at the scene, waiting for hours in line to pay their respects to the generalissimo. Till April 14<sup>th</sup> two and a half million people bid their farewell to the late president. Even though one cannot fully trust the propaganda accounts of the population's grief, one has to recognize that a lot of people sincerely grieved for Chiang Kai-shek. The government swiftly tried to make use of the

former president's death to strengthen anti-communist sentiments on Taiwan (Wakeman 1985:155–156). Moreover, no succession dilemma emerged after Chiang's death and Yen Chia-kan (*Yán Jiāgàn* 嚴家淦) was appointed president the same day. After a public funeral service at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, the immediate family of Chiang held a more private funeral at Cihu, a former residence of Chiang. This service privatized Chiang's body but the state still reserved the right to retrieve his remains if they ever reclaimed the mainland (Wakeman 1985:164–165).

## 2.2. The 228 Incident and Taiwan's White Terror

With Japan's surrender in 1945 the Nationalist government in Nanjing sent troops to Taiwan to retrocede the island from Japanese colonial rule. Most Taiwanese people initially welcomed this retrocession, but soon came to realize that the island was once again under military occupation. Overall, Mainland Chinese occupied the majority of every important positions and therefore just replaced the Japanese colonialists, leaving the population and especially intellectuals disappointed. The forced unification of two different societies laid the groundwork for later conflicts. The Taiwan Provincial Administrative Office (*Táiwān shěng xíngzhèng zhǎngguān gōngshǔ* 台灣省行政長官公署), which held executive, legislative, judicial and military power monopolized all resources on the island. Above that, the Monopoly Bureau (*Zhuānmàijú* 專賣局) also monopolized all economic resources (Lee 2004; Ross 2016:175). With its focus on war on the mainland, the KMT mismanaged Taiwan from the beginning (Morris 2019).

On February 27<sup>th</sup>, 1947 the widow Lin Jiang-mai (*Lín Jiāngmài* 林江邁) sold cigarettes in front of the Tianma Tea House in Taipei. The woman not only carried legal goods, but also untaxed cigarettes. When the Monopoly Bureau's agents tried to confiscate all her goods, as well as her earnings from both her legal and illegal sales, Lin protested. The woman begged the agents to return the earnings from her legitimate sales, accepting the confiscation of her contraband. However, one of the agents responded by hitting her in the head with his pistol, causing her to pass out. The scene attracted the attention of bystanders, soon leading to the forming of an angry mob. As the agents tried to flee the scene, shots were fired into the crowd and the spectator Chen Wenxi (*Chén Wénxī* 陳文溪) was shot and died the next day of his injuries (Lin 2007:12–13; Lee 2004; Ross 2016:175–176).

On February 28<sup>th</sup>, news of the incident spread throughout Taiwan, leading to a series of protests, riots and armed rebellion. The Taiwanese released the resentment towards their new occupiers by beating Chinese civilians. The incident caused the island to plunge into chaos for several weeks. General Chen Yi (*Chén Yì* 陳儀) declared a state of emergency, allowing military and police to shoot at protesters (Lin 2007:13; Lee 2004). This bloody episode later became known as the 228 Incident (*Èr'èrbā shìjiàn* 二二八事件).

On March 1<sup>st</sup>, officials and provincial council members established a committee to investigate the events of the past week. In addition, a delegate met with Chen Yi, who declared later that day in a radio broadcast, the lifting of the emergency decree, the release of detainees, prohibition for military and police to open fire and the setting-up of a committee to investigate the events. In contradiction with his words he demanded military backup from Nanjing. Chiang Kai-shek thereafter dispatched the 21<sup>st</sup> Division of the Nationalist Army to northern Taiwan (Lee 2004).

As soon as the troops landed at the port in Keelung, they opened fire at civilians, killing or “disappearing” an estimated 20 000 Taiwanese till the end of March. In May 1949 Martial Law was declared to ensure the population’s total submission and stripping them of their civil rights. “Suspicious” civilians thereafter were apprehended by the Garrison Command (*Táiwān jǐngbèi zǒngsīlingbù* 台灣警備總司令部) and tried by military court. In late 1949 the remaining Nationalists fled from the mainland and went into exile on Taiwan (Lin 2007:13).

The following four decades of repressive rulership are known as White Terror (*Báisè kǒngbù* 白色恐怖). Even abroad people were being watched by the government’s spies. This constant presence of surveillance forced the Taiwanese people to practice a high level of self-censorship for decades (Lin 2013:13–14; Lee 2004). Simply talking about the taboo topic of the 228 Incident in public was reason enough to be imprisoned (Ross 2016:176).

In 1972 Chiang Ching-kuo, became premier, democratization however still did not make further progress (Tien & Schiau 1992:59). On December 10<sup>th</sup>, 1979, Human Rights Day, the Formosa Magazine (*Měilì dǎo zázhì* 美麗島雜誌), the voice of the then illegal opposition party (*Dǎngwài* 黨外) organized a pro-democracy rally in Kaohsiung . The government sent troops and police to suppress the protest, which caused the rally to turn violent. With the military closing in on the rally and using tear gas on people, the protesters soon began to retaliate and use physical violence. The following day the people responsible for the organization of the demonstration, the so-called Kaohsiung Eight, were apprehended and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 12 years to life imprisonment. The state media portrayed the protesters as violent rioters, which is why the incident was viewed in a different

light for quite a long time by the public. The event is now known as Kaohsiung or Formosa incident (*Měilìdǎo shìjiàn* 美麗島事件) and stands as a crucial turning point in Taiwan's democratization process. The organizers would later go on to be important members of the DPP<sup>2</sup> (Han 2015; Ross 2016:179).

In 1978 Chiang Ching-kuo was elected president and re-elected for another term in 1984. During his presidency Chiang Ching-kuo was an advocate for political reform. Finally, in 1987 martial law, as well as other public restrictions, such as the ban of right of assembly were lifted. After legalizing opposition parties, the DPP was established. In 1992 the first election for the Legislative Yuan was held (Tien & Schiau 1992:59–61).

Taiwan's history as well as the democratization process demonstrate how the two major parties' different attitudes towards Chiang Kai-shek developed. The DPP had to endure a violent period of suppression and therefore naturally fosters different feelings towards the island's authoritarian past. For the KMT on the other hand, it is difficult to fully denounce Chiang, as he is the founder of the party on Taiwan and as such cannot be easily dismissed from the party's history. Moreover, the four-decade long censorship of the 228 Incident and period of White Terror demonstrate why it is crucial for the Taiwanese society to reappraise their history. As will be discussed later, this reappraisal of the past also implies physical remnants.

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<sup>2</sup> Kaohsiung Eight: Anette Lu Hsiu-lien (*Lǚ Xiùlián* 呂秀蓮) former Vice-president under Chen Shui-bian administration; Chen Chu (*Chén Jú* 陳菊) former Mayor of Kaohsiung; Lin Yi-hsiung (*Lín Yìxióng* 林義雄) former Chairperson of DPP; Shih Ming-teh (*Shī Míngdé* 施明德) former Chairperson of DPP; Chang Chun-hung (*Zhāng Jùnhóng* 張俊宏) former Chairperson of DPP; Yao Chia-wen (*Yáo Jiāwén* 姚嘉文) former Chairperson of DPP; Huang Hsin-chieh (*Huáng Xìnjiè* 黃信介) former Chairperson of DPP (Lin 1999).

### **3. Nora's sites of memory and Iconoclasm**

This thesis' theoretical framework is based on Pierre Nora's concept of sites of memory as well as the idea of iconoclasm which supports Nora's claims. Nora's theory was initially published in a three-volume collection (Nora 1984; 1986; 1992). In his work, Nora applied his theory to the French nation, however later it was also adapted for other nations and societies. It argues that a community's collective memory can be displayed by certain places, symbols or rituals. To fully grasp Nora's conception, it is also crucial to introduce other theories native in the broader study of memory. This is why the chapters 3.2. and 3.3. present a short overview of the related ideas of collective memory and counter-memory. Chapter 3.4 will deal with the second part of the theoretical framework, namely iconoclasm. This conception upholds Nora's belief that sites of memory are subject to constant reinterpretation and transformation. The term iconoclasm will be divided into two sub-categories, namely iconoclasm from above and iconoclasm from below, to illustrate the variety of possibilities in transforming sites of memory.

#### **3.1. Sites of Memory**

The "sites" in sites of memory has to be understood metaphorically, as not only actual physical places can be sites of memory, but also symbols or rituals (Szpocinski 2008:249). As such memory can be represented by geographical locations or physical depictions, like monuments, statues, mausoleums, cemeteries, etc. but also through symbols, events, rituals or concepts. By visualizing the past, it becomes omnipresent and creates a dynamic connection between past, present and future. An important question one can pose, is not only "What is our memory?", but also "Where is our memory?" (Foote/Azaryahu 2007:127).

Memory is not spontaneous, which is why we have to actively create situations, places etc. in order to remember. Without diligent commemoration, history would soon extinguish memory (Schwarz 2010:53). Out of this notion, the French historian Pierre Nora defined three distinctive sites of memory, namely material, symbolic and functional. Material sites of memory are described as physical places of commemoration, statues, memorials, monuments and suchlike. Whereas symbolic ones are not material manifestations, but practices and events such as pilgrimages, mourning rituals or other ceremonies. And finally, functional sites of memory, which are shared codes and concepts such as testaments, classroom manuals or dictionaries. These three aspects always coexist. (Legg 2005:482; Nora 1989:18–19;

Skillingstad 2016:50). Each of these three types can be classified in further subcategories. Material sites of memory can be divided into four further categories. Portable sites, like the Tablets of the Law for the Jewish community. Topographical sites, which are characterized by their relationship to the location and ground they stand on. Monumental sites are defined by their inherent meaning, for example statues or monuments commemorating the dead. These sites do have a certain relationship to their location, but they could also be relocated without altering their intrinsic meaning. Architectural sites are characterized by the relation between their elements and their location, meaning a re-location would alter their meaning. Symbolic sites of memory can be subdivided into dominant and dominated sites. Dominant sites are established top-down. National authorities or established communities found for example official ceremonies, which can be attended by visitors. Dominated sites are created spontaneously, such as places of devotion or pilgrimage. These sites are not established from above and are rather visited than attended. Finally, functional sites of memory which can be split into two additional classifications as well. Preserving sites uphold experiences and memories that would vanish with the community who actually lived them, for example a veterans' association. Pedagogical sites have the purpose to guide future generations, such as testaments, dictionaries or manuals (Nora 1989:22–23).

Sites of memory are an interaction between memory and history. To create a site of memory there has to be a will to remember, otherwise literally everything would be worthy of remembrance. Therefore, a site of memory prevents people from forgetting and as such is prescribed historical significance in a community's collective memory (Nora 1989:19). Sites of memory can therefore strengthen one's identity and protect our remembrances. Remembrance and commemoration serve as a social activity, that binds different groups of people together and strengthens their sense of identity (Hoelscher & Alderman 2004: 348).

The emergence of a site of memory has two stages: first the construction or adaption of a site in order to commemorate a certain memory, secondly a phase of routinization and standardization of the sites' use (Winter 2010:312). There is no need for official certification in the construction of a site of memory, as groups of individuals and communities can act on their own behalf. Still, unofficial sites of memory must be preserved by the efforts and expenses of ordinary people, who want to commemorate a certain memory (Winter 2010:317–318). Public sites of memory invite people to openly remember at a public place or institution.

If sites of memory did not defend something that is threatened, they would be needless. If the memory they constitute would genuinely be present in everyday life, these sites of memory

would be obsolete. Consequently, if history was not a tool to distort or change memory, memories would not transform into sites of memory (Schwarz 2010:53). Thus, sites of memory must also appeal to a broad and diverse community in order to survive after the regime or era in which they were created. However, since sites of memory do not have an absolutely fixed meaning, they can be reinterpreted according to current priorities and feelings of a community or society. Ergo, these sites of memory are often controversial places where the powerless can confront the powerful or where so-called "counter memories" meet the collective memory. Especially when communities feel that certain aspects of the past have been excluded or erroneously included in the construction of a monument, controversy can arise. These sites can have a potential of noncompliance and resistance for the differently minded. This occurs increasingly in times of political discontinuity (Foote/Azaryahu 2007:129-132).

Most commonly regime changes bring about a difference in sites of memory (Cherry 2013:6). Especially in post-totalitarian regimes it is of great importance, that the public is part of the re-construction and re-interpretation of sites of memory (Hoelscher & Alderman 2004: 351). A site of memory does not represent the past, but a certain interpretation of the past, often in accordance with current political and ideological contexts (Foote/Azaryahu 2007:132). Each site of memory has plural meanings and identities, creating a space of claims and counterclaims for every visitor group (Cherry 2013:7). People do not recall the past just for the sake of remembrance, but to support their opinions and aims (Hoelscher & Alderman 2004:349). Respectively and contrary to Nora's claim, sites of memory are not an escape from politics. Exactly the opposite is the case, people visit sites of memory with different predispositions, motives and hopes (Winter 2010: 315). Sites of memory encourage specific memories and recollections, while disregarding others and as a consequence shape the view or discourse of an event, nation, etc. (Legg 2005:482). Nora argues that memory generally tends to lose its connection to the past and therefore is driven by aspects of the present (Schwarz 2010:54). With this in mind, sites of memory can also be used to manipulate memories and thereby legitimize authority (Foote/Azaryahu 2007:130).

Furthermore, Nora stresses that over time sites of memory get stripped of their "real memories". The more time passes, the more the meaning of these sites changes (Schwarz 2010:55). These sites therefore turn into places of 'Second-order memory', as Jay Winter phrases it. They commemorate memories of people from the past. These people are often already dead, which means that memories of people in the past are being commemorated by people in the present (Winter 2010: 313). Sites of memory are constructed for those who were

not there, enabling them to access past memories (Winter 2010:321). In such manner, even if sites of memory remind us of the past, they also stand for the future, as they are built to endure and remind coming generations of their meaning (Cherry 2013:4).

Sites of memory are never really finished, as they can be demolished, reused, changed, appropriated etc. and thereby constantly attract new and different visitors. Through every new generation and visitor group sites of memory accumulate new and diverse meanings. By performing rituals at a site of memory, for example mourning rituals, depositing gifts or donations, commemorative events etc. these sites are being constantly reinvented (Cherry 2013:4).

Whether it's worship, glorification or desecration, vandalism or destruction of public sites of memory, these are still methods of a society to start a dialogue with the state (Legg 2005:484). The analysis of the Cihu Mausoleum will show exactly that. The measures implemented to transform the site started an exchange between state actors and civilians in Taiwan.

### **3.2. Collective Memory**

To grasp Nora's sites of memory it is also crucial to have a basic understanding of the term "memory", as sites of memory are part of a broader study of memory. There are various overlapping aspects in the theory of sites of memory and collective memory. Therefore, it is helpful to present a short understanding of how these concepts interact.

Collective memory is socially constructed and thus shaped by political, ecological, cultural, ideological, and social contexts. Collective memory is a designed tradition that is shared and practiced by individuals and social groups. The compilation of these shared, historical experiences defines as well as unites a community. (Foote/Azaryahu 2007:126-127).

This so-called collective memory is made up of two building blocks, which are the cultural memory and the communicative memory. The communicative memory is based on everyday communications. This oral history is socially mediated and related to a group, which shares a common perception of their past. Every individual is part of different communities and therefore shares numerous communicative memories. This oral history extends for a maximum of one hundred years into the past (Assmann 1995:126–127). Cultural memory is the archaeological and written legacy of humanity. It has a fixed point and is characterized by its distance from everyday communications (Assmann 1995:1269).

Sites of memory can therefore be part of the communicative as well as the cultural memory. On the one hand, communicative memory in the respect, as discussed in chapter 3.1., that



sites of memory and the act of commemoration practiced at these sites are a kind of social activity. As explained, every site of memory can have countless and various meanings prescribed to it, same as individuals share numerous communicative memories. People with the same perception of the past, can consequently share the same communicative memory and site of memory. On the other hand, cultural memory, same as sites of memory, are intergenerational and can exist for longer than a maximum of one hundred years. They can transmit and preserve information and memories over decades. Capturing memories in a cultural form, like statues, monuments or ceremonies, can be seen as a type of externalized memory and makes it possible for communities to draw on these remembrances over generations.

It is also important to stress that collective memory can be manipulated to legitimize power. It can be a source of power for the elites, but on the other hand it also carries potential for non-compliance and resistance. Thus, it does not represent the past, but only a specific interpretation of it and is always associated with current ideological and political interests (Foote/Azaryahu 2007:130-132). Accordingly, collective memory is created by a dominant discourse and promoted by institutions, that stress certain memories while neglecting others (Legg 2005:482). Therefore, the third relevant question to ask in regard to memory is "How was our collective memory constructed? ".

In summary, sites of memory, as well as collective memory, are influenced by external factors. Sites of memory materialize political realities, social tensions and cultural values. They are manifestations of a specific version of the past and thus contribute to the formation of a society's identity. Sites of memory, just like collective memory, create and promote certain memories, while others are neglected and forgotten. They can connect, but also separate a community. Thus, they carry a great potential of power within them, which can be used for resistance. Therefore, a site of memory is an expression of collective memory. Vandalising, protesting or demolishing a site of memory can thereby reveal the split collective memory of a society or community.

### **3.3. Counter-Memory**

It is up to each individual in a community to remember things differently than the rest of the collective. However, adhering to so-called counter-memories requires more effort when a system or society follows an agreed upon discourse (Legg 2005:497). Counter-Memory can be classified as part of the communicative memory. Because as it does not conform to the

official discourse, it is most commonly not recorded in historiography. Consequently, it is rooted in everyday conversations and as such kept alive. Naturally sites of memory for people holding on to counter-memories can exist, but these are not officially funded or subsidized.

As mentioned before memory and sites of memory have multiple and contesting versions. Hence, memory operates under the pressures of altering versions challenging one another (Davis & Starn 1989:2). Counter-memory recalls repressed memories or ones that are contesting to the common discourse. As Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (2012) argues, even if a public discussion about a dramatic event in society, such as for example the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China, exists, it does not coincidentally mean that 'society had a chance to go through a process of reconciliation' (p.69). She goes on to explain that conflicts which go back to such traumatic events are often being suppressed. As people often avoid speaking up about their own experiences, the public discourse cannot offer an assessment that a greater part of society can support and share (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2012:69). Although individuals can encourage a public discourse, their memories are often 'so fragmented that so far they can only contest the officially held view without replacing it by some other frame' (p.69). Such uncertainty and fragmentation can lead to the development of a counter-narrative (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2012:69). Therefore, even if it appears as a public discourse is being endorsed by state actors, it often does not imply that a nation's majority shares this promoted collective memory, instead each individual holds on to their counter-memory.

Moreover, not only fragmented memories classify as a form of counter-memory, but also the so-called Politics of Forgetting (Davis & Starn 1989:2). As professor of political studies Omar Encarnacion describes in his book "Democracy without Justice in Spain: The Politics of Forgetting", a consequence of Politics of Forgetting was, that no one was put on trial for the political crimes committed in the Franco dictatorship. Quite the opposite, people responsible for these horrific crimes were not disqualified from playing a role in Spain's new democratic system (Encarnacion 2014:2). This is also the case in Taiwan, where the former party of Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT, was not excluded from forming a new government. Furthermore, no trials were held to clarify responsibilities regarding the White Terror Period or prosecute the main people in charge. Decades of not being able to talk about these crimes turned the past and therefore people's experiences into a taboo topic, which can lead to a collective will to forget (Encarnacion 2014:2-4). This contradicts a common theory, that the more violent and repressive a previous regime is, the more active the demand for justice will be. If this were the case, citizens would demand justice from a new democratic system. Such a demand

would also pave the way for a new system to hold the misdeeds and crimes of the former regime accountable (Encarnacion 2014:5). But when the people responsible, as well as the party of the former repressive regime, are part of the new democratic system, as is the case in Taiwan, this scenario becomes more complex. One explanation for the Taiwanese society's lack of incentive to demand justice could be the temporal gap between the major crimes committed and the lifting of martial law. By the time martial law was lifted in 1987 the atrocities of the 228 Incident already lay forty years in the past. Forty years in which talking about the Incident was prohibited, leaving people's memories and experiences slowly to fade. Stripping communities of their right to remember freely is a method for repressive regimes to legitimate their power and impose historical revisionism. Organized state forgetting is therefore often directly linked to repressive systems (Bradford 2010:10–11).

However, one also has to remark, that forgetting is not solely destructive. If memories of violence and injustice lead to strong feelings of revenge and therefore hinder the process of reconciliation in a society, collective forgetting can be productive for a community's healing process. To remember and to forget are not clear-cut opposites. To remember can unintentionally cause some form of forgetting and vice versa (Bradford 2010:12).

### **3.4. Iconoclasm**

Iconoclasm implies the destruction of works of art or images in a broader sense. Different reasons and causes can lead to the decision to demolish icons, such as changed political circumstances, a shift in religious beliefs or just a different trend or fashion in general. These altered situations can motivate removal, de-contextualization, alteration and demolition of art (Pusch 1999:284). Today's meaning of "Icon" is more multifaceted and does not only imply works of art, like paintings, statues or monuments. "Icon" can also refer to a cultural figure or a site of memory. Iconoclasm in this thesis therefore refers to a feeling of hostility towards an icon in the just discussed broader meaning (cf. Džalto n.d.). The term iconoclasm dates back to the ancient era and originally was associated mainly with fluctuations in religious beliefs. Today however the term carries a strong political and social meaning. Iconoclasm has become a political act and a mechanism to express social and intellectual liberation. Destroying can reveal new meaning and reveal the real essence of things. Thus, iconoclasm is not synonymous to merely destruction, it can also add value and meaning to the affected object (cf. Mafolino n.d.).

Professor Sabine Marschall from the University of Kwazulu-Natal describes in her book “Landscape of Memory: commemorative monuments, memorials and public statuary in post-apartheid South Africa” the transformation of the heritage sector in South Africa. Even though the history of the two countries, Taiwan and South Africa, are very different quite a lot of similar conclusions can be drawn from the way in which the governments deal with the relics of their past. Even though iconoclastic measures are a practical instrument to get even with a past regime, history suggests that radical iconoclasm does not take place as systematically and frequent as expected (Marschall 2010:24). Especially in negotiated transitions of power or a gradual transformation to democracy, a society might not demand the government to handle the leftovers of the past regime in a total iconoclastic fashion. As discussed in chapter 3.2. and 3.3., the Taiwanese identity and assessment of the past are not as clear-cut as it might be in other democratic systems. Thus, when examining the management of sites of memory one has to keep in mind that there are communities in Taiwan that wish to uphold the memories of Chiang Kai-shek and materializations of such, others that detest those relics and then again groups of people who do not have any opinion on the topic at all. Overall, it should be kept in mind that the Taiwanese authoritarian system was not overturned by a revolution, which probably would have increased the likelihood of a total destruction of the old sites of memory but transitioned into a democracy with the “blessing” of Chiang Ching-kuo. Tolerating contested sites of memory can therefore be a political tactic to emphasise the peacefulness and inclusiveness of a new system (Marschall 2010:30).

There are various methods in handling a contested site, some of them being more inclusive than others. Whereas the demolition or removal of a site of memory is perceived as a contentious act, the creation of new sites of memory is regarded as inclusive, leading to unification and reconciliation. By erecting new sites of memory, new meanings and values can be inscribed into a landscape. Furthermore, the perception of a contested site of memory can be remoulded by adding a new site to the existing one (Marschall 2010:144). By erecting new sites, the experiences, sacrifices and contributions of the previous suppressed group can be materialized. A balance could be acquired by placing these new sites of memory in direct juxtaposition with the old ones. This deliberate act could counter the old discourse (Marschall 2010:275). With this approach, the new site of memory obtains meaning from the presence and meaning of the old site (Marschall 2010:299). This kind of interaction of two sites of memory can have an inclusive effect on a society with a split collective memory. Or as Marschall (2010) puts it ‘establish a historical and conceptual relationship between old and new, and reaching out in reconciliatory gestures and building metaphorical bridges’ (p.300).

The meaning of a site of memory can also be changed spontaneously without much ado by government forces. For example, when tour guides clarify historical facts and present new perspectives when visiting contested sites (Marschall 2010:158). The sheer acknowledgement of “both versions” of the past can make a grave difference in the awareness of visitors and therefore the meaning of the site in general. Of course, not all visitors will interpret a site of memory in the same manner. Much depends on their previous knowledge and political attitudes, but some context provided during a visit of a commemorative site by a tour guide can definitely shape the picture.

However, in certain cases a physical relocation often seems like the easiest option for contested sites of memory. It leaves advocates with the assurance that their beloved site of memory is not demolished and opponents with the relief of having the monument out of their sight and its original ideological space. Still, a relocation is not a viable option for all sites of memory. Some sites are just too complicated to relocate, because of their height, weight, age or other similar factors. A perfect example for such a site is the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in the centre of Taipei. An alternative for such cases would be to re-interpret or re-contextualize these unmovable sites. By conducting specific alterations to a site, for example changing the wording of a plaque or a renaming it in general, the meaning of the whole site can be transformed (Marschall 2010:156). Especially public sites of memory which present a biased history, should be re-interpreted to correct this constrained rendition of the past. Still, one has to keep in mind that these contested sites can also serve as a reminder for the public. They should not simply be perceived as unmovable memoranda of a traumatic past, but as an expression of the obstacles already overcome and the progress made (Marschall 2010:20).

The concept of iconoclasm clearly interacts with Nora’s theory of sites of memory. Sites of memory are subject to changing trends and circumstances, whereby iconoclasm poses the tool for implementing transformation in accordance with new situations. In this sense iconoclasm does not simply entail the demolition or elimination of a site of memory, but also the just discussed reinterpretation, re-inscription or re-contextualization of these sites.

### **3.4.1. Iconoclasm from Above**

As mentioned in earlier chapters, a political change generally brings about a change in the landscape of sites of memory. There are different methods in symbolically and physically changing a site of memory. Iconoclasm from above connotes that a government or state power decides how to proceed with a site of memory (Skillingstad 2016:39). However, the

decision-makers in these instances often lack professional training and expertise to reach a proper and reconciliatory solution. A site of memory also has to be public property in order for iconoclasm from above to occur. Naturally a government cannot decide how to handle a site of memory located on private grounds or in private possession.

The process of altering, demolishing, relocating, re-interpreting etc. a site of memory is without a doubt a highly politicized undertaking. With a government's decision to transform or remove a site of memory, a certain state ideology is promoted. Removing sites of memory from public places can always result in two opposing reactions depending on the political views of the observer. Dismantling statues and busts of Chiang Kai-shek therefore causes outrage in some parts of society and relief in others. The anger caused by such a removal does not necessarily mean that the person identifies with the commemorated memory, value or role model, but that they feel alienation, anxiety over their future or they feel their cultural identity threatened. Under these circumstances the removal of a former widely unnoticed site of memory can lead to heated discussions and protests (Marschall 2010:142). The removal of such a contested site can thus shed light on the event or person it commemorates and refresh the memory in the public's awareness. However, the elimination of a site of memory can never fully eliminate the public's memory of it. Moreover, a removal hinders the public to critically engage with the monument and the past it represents (Marschall 2010:275).

Another option for state actors to re-interpret a site of memory commemorating a certain leadership figure would be to redefine the symbolic identity and significance of said personality (Marschall 2010:160). Naturally for such a redefinition of a contested leader to take place, historical responsibilities have to be clarified, which is a long-lasting process. A collective discourse in society has to be created and beyond that, this discourse needs to be officially reinforced by the education system or museums for example.

In Summary, there are various arguments for and against demolishing or eliminating contested sites of memory. It seems impossible for a government to please all parties involved. But it is important to give the former repressed communities a voice and to not ignore their stance on the subject. Authoritarian relics in a country's landscape are a manifestation of the former dominant discourse, one version of a biased history. It is crucial that the former powerless have a voice in the treatment of the relics of suppression. Still, one way to interpret these sites is them being a symbol for a better common future. They can help to avoid a loss of memory and to preserve the experiences of all persons affected in order to build a sense of identity as a nation. Without recognising the past, closure cannot be achieved (Marschall 2010: 33). Sites of memory will almost always empower one community, while disempowering

others at the same time (Marschall 2010:350). One has to ask, as Marschall (2010) phrases it ‘can such structures really atone for the absences and injustices of the past? Are monuments and memorials perhaps mere trappings, covering up for the lack of truly meaningful symbols of integration and identification?’ (p.354).

What also has to be taken into account is that a state actor is bound to obey the laws and regulations concerning certain sites of memory. The Cihu Mausoleum for example has cultural heritage status, which binds the state actors to a certain set of rules. One could argue that also civilians have to obey these laws, but still normally a government is held to “higher standards” than a single individual.

### **4.3.2. Iconoclasm from Below**

Iconoclasm from below means a private individual or group of civilians decide to destroy or transform a site of memory (Skillingstad 2016:39). As mentioned earlier, sites of memory are always based on selective remembering, which means one or several versions of history are being repressed (Marschall 2017:204). This can lead to discontent and frustration in some beholder’s eye.

A more common way, especially in the public discourse, to describe iconoclasm from below is the term “vandalism”. This term frequently evokes associations, such as violence, unlawfulness, disrespect, disobedience and uncivilised behaviour. But these associations are linked to people who want to maintain a site of memory as well as officers of the law. By calling it “vandalism”, these acts are described as barbaric, criminal and deviant. More positive connotations and synonyms for iconoclasm from below could also be intervention, alteration, modification, addition, re-inscription or re-arrangement (Marschall 2017:205). By inscribing these acts with more positive associations, we can look beyond the simply primitive and crude act of cutting a statue’s head off or besmearing it with paint etc. and focus on the deeper meaning of such actions. iconoclasm from below can express dissatisfaction with societal circumstances and political opposition.

By classifying a site of memory as cultural heritage, such as the Cihu Mausoleum, certain values and judgments are inscribed onto the site. Cultural heritage can therefore strengthen the identity feeling of a community, but also disrupt communities and invigorate social tensions, due to their emotional impact. Thus, the damaging or vandalising of cultural heritage can have a deeply emotional effect on a community. Mostly this cannot be ascribed to the distress caused by the physical damage, but the insult of the values associated with the

heritage site and therefore directly of the interest group behind said site of memory (Marschall 2017:207). Also, the attack on the statue itself is a highly emotionally motivated action expressing deep anger and hatred. Assaulting the statues or monuments of past dictators turns into some version of post-humous punishment for that person (Marschall 2017:212).

One could also describe vandalism as an interaction between people and their material environment, as vandalism not only turns against the law, but also against property. Society holds public and private property as a core value shared by most people and thus is protected by a legal framework. If an act of vandalism violates this framework it does not only insult the value of the property, but parts of society itself and therefore turns antisocial. For others, the exact same act of vandalism can appear as progressive and constructive, if they for example do not agree with the management and decision-making process regarding a certain public property. The same iconoclasm from below can therefore have antisocial as well as social realities (Chatzigiannis 2015:121–123).

The dominant discourse and ideology of a system sets the rules on how vandalism is perceived and interpreted. Vandalism in a certain system can be regarded as an unlawful and barbaric undertaking, but after a regime change the exact same act can be hailed as revolutionary and rightful. As for example the demolition and vandalism of Stalin's statues in post-communist countries which was not viewed as vandalism. Consequently, the manner in which an individual interprets an act of vandalism reflects his or her ideology (Chatzigiannis 2015:125–126). Revolutionary vandalism expresses dissatisfaction and opposition to the dominant political ideology. It targets a constructed and unidimensional "truth" and tries to deconstruct it. The ultimate intention is to eliminate and condemn the attacked idol, as well as the values and ideas behind it, while introducing a new one (Chatzigiannis 2015:131–132).

In summary, the perception of iconoclasm from below depends on the eye of the beholder. Not all acts of vandalism are regarded as criminal or deviant and dealt with as such. Their judgment is not characterized by the act itself, but by the societal conditions under which the act is committed (Cohen 1984:53). Sociologist Stanley Cohen therefore defines four different realities of vandalism. First, non-political acts of vandalism, where the actor did it just for entertainment reasons and the observers also accept it as such. Second, a clear political act, which the observer regards as plausible and acknowledges. Third, a non-political act, but the observer does not regard it as such and prescribes some political meaning to it. Fourth, a standard political act, which is discredited by the observer as a senseless or motiveless behaviour (Cohen 1984:55). These four categories obviously show, that not every act of vandalism has the same motive, nor is each act perceived in the same manner.



Cohen goes on to classify not only the degree in how far an act of vandalism is political but also introduces five classifications of incentives for vandalism. The first category is acquisitive, which means damaging a site to gain money or property. Second, tactical vandalism in order to achieve publicity for a political cause. Third, vindictive methods to gain revenge by damaging sites. Fourth, play which implies damage due to curiosity or competition. And lastly fifth, malicious where also elements of anger, hatred and aggression are dominant but not as specifically directed as with vindictive (Cohen 1984:57). Furthermore, Cohen describes different methods to prevent vandalism, which can be either physical, social or deterrent. Physical measures include building and design improvements, whereas the deterrent approach consists of surveillance and patrol methods. Social prevention mechanisms seem to be more inclusive, such as participatory management, community involvement and education (Cohen 1984:60). Two opposing attitudes can therefore be identified in dealing with vandalism. The damages can either be restored and made invisible without second thoughts, or it can be dealt with in a conscious way by trying to understand the deeper feelings and preoccupations of the vandaliser (Chatzigiannis 2015:133–134). Thus, it is crucial to decipher the vandaliser's meaning which is consciously or unconsciously communicated to the observer. It is advisable to not just disperse the traces of vandalism, but to ascertain whom the act is directed at and why it was committed (Sperandio 1984:106).

## **4. Transforming the Cihu Mausoleum – a contested site of memory**

The wording “contested sites of memory” illustrates the considerable potential of conflict certain sites of memory contain. Said contested sites of memory often remind the public of a traumatic and violent past. Dealing with them can be a problematic venture, that troubles not only the Taiwanese nation, but countless others. Though every government and society deal with past experiences in their own way, similarities can be drawn in regard to the treatment of a repressive past’s relics. When dealing with contested site of memory a subtle and diversified approach has to be employed. On the one hand in regard to reconciliation, some version of continuity has to be signalled. On the other hand, it is important to present a new beginning by signalling rupture (Marschall 2010:137).

In this next chapter we will discuss why it is important for societal progress to transform contested sites of memory and what available approaches either for state actors or individuals exist and have already been implemented in Taiwan. Firstly, in chapter 4.1. the personality cult of Chiang Kai-shek will be discussed to explain the emergence of thousands of physical manifestations of the generalissimo all over Taiwan. It is crucial to understand the course of this cult, as it is the cause why today’s already democratized Taiwan still struggles with these remnants. This will be followed by a recount of the construction and characteristics of the Cihu Mausoleum in chapter 4.2. Chiang Kai-shek’s countless residences, among them Cihu, are another manifestation of his personality cult and a symbol of privilege. Subsequently, chapter 4.3 presents a general introduction to the term “Cultural Heritage”, as which the Cihu Mausoleum is classified. Preserving a site of memory as cultural heritage entails political consequences, which is why the decision to do so contains a great potential for conflict. Chapter 4.4 will discuss why the Mausoleum can be categorized as a contested site of memory. Lastly in chapters 4.5 to 4.8, each caesura of the four iconoclastic measures will be discussed in greater detail. The corresponding political background and course of events of the caesurae will be presented, as well as an analysis of the impact of the measures for the three dimensions of the site of memory.

## 4.1. Chiang Kai-shek's Personality Cult

To understand the relevance and need for a discussion of Chiang statuary and authoritarian symbols in general in the Taiwanese landscape, one first of all has to understand the origin of these objects. The personality cult of Chiang Kai-shek brought forward thousands of statues, symbols, memorials and also residences, such as the later discussed Cihu Mausoleum. This chapter will discuss the emergence of Chiang's personality cult and its progression in Taiwan and will show that this cult lasted beyond Chiang's death.

The Chiang Kai-shek personality cult, similar to Lenin's cult, worked through promoting a form of mass adoration. By distributing images of the generalissimo, renaming streets in his honour, erecting statues or memorials and so forth, Chiang was portrayed as possessing superhuman power and wisdom. Chiang Kai-shek himself did not comment or admit to the existence of a personality cult. Quite the opposite, he criticized the personality cults of Stalin and Mao. Contradictory to Lenin's or Stalin's personality cult, there was no single ministry of propaganda responsible for Chiang's personality cult. The cult was mainly promoted by semi-official organizations<sup>3</sup>, which worked mostly in an independent fashion. However, the Ministry of Education, as well as the Ministry of Military Affairs were two official government divisions, that were involved in the promoting of Chiang's cult. This suggests that Chiang, contrary to his statements, indeed held the desire to be idolized, however also that mostly smaller, semi-official groups facilitated this wish (Taylor 2006:97–100). Although there were people who involuntarily had to celebrate the generalissimo, there were also individuals who took part in the personality cult by choice, hoping for a rise in rank or other pragmatic opportunities (Taylor 2006:108).

In general, personality cults and the idolization of single leaders are a form of legitimation during periods of social and political unrest, as well as wartime (Taylor 2015:691). The construction of memorials, official portraits in public institutions, remembrance of birthdays and death days of leaders are exemplary outcomes of Republican Chinese Personality cults (Taylor 2006:348). Chiang's personality cult already started during the Nanjing decade (1927–1937), in which period he was portrayed as the leader of the Republican revolution and father of the Chinese nation. Chiang often linked himself to Confucian values, such as loyalty and piety, as well as a devoted pupil of Sun Yat-sen (Taylor 2006:98). By linking Chiang to Sun Yat-sen's legacy, he was portrayed as a symbolic leader of Nationalist China. Loyalty to

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<sup>3</sup> For example, the Officers' Moral Endeavour Association (OMEA), which prime task was to promote the cults of Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling. They believed in the need of a single, strong leader for China (Taylor 2006:99).

Chiang therefore was synonymous with being loyal to China itself (Taylor 2015:667). As such he personified China and its five-thousand years long history. This meant that criticising Chiang equated to treason of China itself (Taylor 2006:349). A rare site that highlights the magnitude of Chiang's personality cult is the photo below depicting Chiang's portrait at Tiananmen Square. Before Mao Zedong's famous image appeared at the Square in Beijing, Chiang Kai-shek's portrait enthroning over this powerful spot characterized him as leader of China.



**Chiang Kai-shek's portrait at Tiananmen Square.** Image via pinterest.nz. Available from: <https://www.pinterest.nz/pin/525654587748400277/>

Moreover, also foreign powers, especially the US, contributed to the positive image of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. As the “first couple” of the Republic of China, Chiang and his wife also were portrayed on various title pages of American magazines, including the Time Magazine. As their attitudes were quite “western”, their image was much better received as the alternative, being the Chinese Communists (Skillingstad 2016:23).

The tactics used on the mainland to paint a positive image of Chiang were also used instantly after Taiwan was “given back” to China (Taylor 2006:100). Only weeks after the jurisdictional take-over, streets, schools, parks, etc. were renamed in Chiang's honour. For example the Presidential Office was renamed to Hall of Chiang Kai-shek's Longevity (*Jiè shòu táng* 介壽堂) (Matten 2012:63). 192 days after retrocession, the first statue of Chiang

Kai-shek was erected on the island (Taylor 2006:101). Interestingly enough, a great number of statues and busts in the 1950s were not ordered by the central government but were voluntarily created by artists in order to improve their professional and commercial position (Taylor 2006:108). The KMT tried to legitimize its power by fabricating a cultural and political identification with mainland China and proclaimed itself the true successor to China's heritage (Matten 2012:63). Even though some aspects of the personality cult on the mainland were also applied on Taiwan, there still needed to be some alterations for the Taiwanese population which had been under Japanese jurisdiction for a long period of time. This is why the relics of the Japanese colonial rule were incorporated into the Chiang Kai-shek personality cult, as for example the before mentioned Presidential Office (Taylor: 2006:102). Nevertheless, the culture promoted by the KMT mostly ignored local Taiwanese customs and culture (Matten 2012:64).

If one suspected this grand personality cult and the creation of physical manifestations of such would cease to exist or at least weaken after the generalissimo was gone, one would be in the wrong. The death of Chiang resulted in numerous memorial sites and commemoration activities. His death therefore did not lead to a toned-down version of the personality cult, on the contrary it strengthened the myth surrounding his person. This post-humous cult was also used by his predecessors and family to legitimize their power (Taylor 2006:109). On May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1975 even an act, called “points of attention for the building of bronze statues of president Chiang Kai-shek” (*Sùjiàn zǒngtǒng jiǎnggōng tóngxiàng zhùyì shìxiàng* 塑建總統 蔣公銅像 注意事項) was passed. This act instructs every county and town to build a statue of Chiang, unless they already possess one. It also specifies in detail the preferred location and surroundings, appearance, height, need for a pedestal, inscription etc. of the statue. These instructions should help to ‘fully display the godly appearance of Chiang Kai-shek’s kindness and grace’<sup>4</sup> (cf. Instructions for building Chiang Kai-shek bronze statues 1975). The cult surrounding Chiang Kai-shek resulted in an estimated four thousand five hundred statues across the island, which compares to a density of more than one statue per square kilometre (Allen 2011:124). These statues became the centre of rituals and commemoration ceremonies in the everyday life of people and served as a constant reminder of Chiang Kai-shek’s achievements (Klotzbücher forthcoming). Contrary to the statues being erected in the 1950s, which often were not officially ordered, the statues after 1975 were being instructed by the

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<sup>4</sup> *Yīng chōngfēn xiǎnshì jiǎnggōng cíxiàng, yōngróng zhī shénmào, bìng hányùn dàrén* 應充分顯示蔣公慈祥、雍容之神貌，並含蘊大仁 (cf. Instructions for building Chiang Kai-shek bronze statues 1975)

government and left no room for artistic freedom. So, after the death of Chiang an officially promoted personality cult could no longer be denied. Also, in 1975 the preparation committee for the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, a building that should commemorate the country's leader forever, announced a competition for designing the Hall and the connected National Theatre and National Concert Hall. The constructions should visualize and remind people of their loyalty to Chiang and the KMT (Musgrove 2017:300–302). After the completion of the Hall in 1980, it was used for commemoration ceremonies of Chiang, especially his death anniversary on April 5<sup>th</sup> which also coincides with the traditional Tomb Sweeping Day (*Qīngmíngjié* 清明節)<sup>5</sup> in Taiwan. A large number of governmental representatives and KMT associated organisations usually participated on the memorial of the generalissimo's death, with a small number of important and high-ranking officials commemorating the death anniversary also at the Cihu Mausoleum (Musgrove 2017:306). In May 1975 also a measure was released to eternally commemorate president Chiang Kai-shek (*Yǒngjiǔ jìniàn zǒngtǒng jiǎnggōng bànfǎ* 永久紀念總統 蔣公辦法) (cf. Measures for the eternal commemoration of President Chiang Kai-shek 1975). It states that exactly this Tomb Sweeping Day and as such the death anniversary of Chiang shall be a public holiday, as well as October 21<sup>st</sup>, the birthday of Chiang. It also states the construction of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, as well as the required bronze statues for each county and city. It goes on to outline the creation of a commemorative song for Chiang, as well as the emergence of teaching material for schools, which incorporate the 'great deeds'<sup>6</sup> of the late president (cf. Measures for the eternal commemoration of President Chiang Kai-shek 1975).

However, with the end of martial law and the transition to democracy many statues and portraits were removed from public spaces. This was initiated by reformist sections of the KMT under Lee Teng-hui (*Lǐ Dēnghuī* 李登輝). Beyond that, the DPP also began to remove remnants of Chiang's cult on a local level after they gained power in municipal elections in 1994 (Taylor 2010:186).

The emergence and progression of Chiang's personality cult is still a contemporary topic in Taiwan. The Chiang family still holds an important position in the public domain and is treated in some way similar to a royal family by paparazzi. Their affinity to the former first couple resulted in some kind of celebrity status, with their personal life being regularly

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<sup>5</sup> During this festival families traditionally visit their families' and ancestors' gravesites to pray, present offerings and clean the tombs.

<sup>6</sup> *fēnggōng wěiyè* 豐功偉業 (cf. Measures for the eternal commemoration of President Chiang Kai-shek 1975)

covered by gossip magazines (Taylor 2006:349). To this day, there are countless statues, portraits and other relics in memory of Chiang Kai-shek spread across the island. These relics carry a strong potential for conflict. For some communities the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's personality pose important sites of memory and as such bridges to their past. Consequently, they are also crucial for their sense of identity. For others these relics are contested, which is why they are being frequently vandalized. The Cihu Mausoleum is one of these physical manifestations that divide the Taiwanese public.

## 4.2. Origins of the Cihu Mausoleum

When discussing the personality cult of Chiang Kai-shek and the physical remnants it left spread all over Taiwan, it is important to also address the countless residences the former president had in his possession. The Cihu Mausoleum, which will be examined in further detail in this chapter, is only one of many mansions built for the generalissimo.



**The Cihu Mausoleum.** Image via Taiwan News. Available from: <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3125815>

During the Martial Law period the residences of Chiang were patrolled and guarded by military personnel, meaning ordinary citizens could not enter or get a glimpse of the area. The isolation of these residences presents another symbol of the privilege Chiang Kai-shek and his family enjoyed. Overall, one can subdivide Chiang's mansions into roughly four categories. Firstly, official residences that were inhabited by Chiang Kai-shek and his family and therefore served as his actual home. Chiang Kai-shek would also receive guests there and discuss official political matters. Into this category the Shilin Mansion (*Shílín guāndǐ* 士林官邸), Grass Mountain Chateau (*Cǎoshān xíngguān* 草山行官), Zhongxing Guesthouse (*Zhōngxīng bīnguǎn* 中興賓館), Cihu Guesthouse (*Cíhú bīnguǎn* 慈湖賓館) and Qihai Mansion (*Qihai Guāndǐ* 七海官邸) fit. Second are buildings that were constructed for vacations and pleasure. These include the Sun Moon Lake Hanbi Building (*Rìyuètán hánbìlóu* 日月潭涵碧樓), Chengqing Lake Guesthouse (*Chéngqīnghú chéngqīnglóu* 澄清湖澄清樓), Fushou Mountain Villa (*Fúshòushān dáguāntíng* 福壽山達觀亭), Jiaobanshan Residence (*Jiǎobǎn shānguì bīnguǎn* 角板山貴賓館), Sizihwan Guesthouse (*Xīzǐwān bīnguǎn* 西子灣賓館) and Penghu First Guesthouse (*Pēnghú dìyī bīnguǎn* 澎湖第一賓館). Many of these residences are leftovers from the Japanese colonial era (Yang & Chang 2013).

The Grass Mountain Chateau for example originally hosted the crown prince Michi-no-mia-Hirohito (cf. The Taipei City Department of Cultural Affairs). This again exemplifies how Japanese remnants and architecture were recontextualized and repurposed for the personality cult of Chiang. However, some buildings were also chosen due to their strategic location in case of evacuation scenarios. The third category are so-called “rest-stops”, which housed Chiang during his frequent tours of the island. Among these the Bagua Mountain Pavillion (*Bāguà shānxíngguān* 八卦山行官), Chiayi Citizen Farm Guesthouse (*Jiāyì nóngchǎng xíngguān* 嘉義農場行官), Qilan Guesthouse (*Qílán xíngguān* 棲蘭行官) etc. can be found. And lastly, the fourth category, not easily distinguishable from the third, are also “rest-stops”, but these buildings were more secretive and hidden. Chiang actually stayed at these sites quite frequently. Overall, it is estimated that there are between thirty and forty residences spread across Taiwan that were inhabited or used in some manner by Chiang (Yang & Chang 2013). Many of these originally isolated residences experienced a conversion after the Martial Law period ended. The Shilin Residence Park in Taipei for example is freely accessible for visitors. The Grass Mountain Chateau today is used as an art centre and restaurant. The Sizihwan Guesthouse in Kaohsiung, located on the Sun Yat-sen University campus, was also repurposed. While the second floor serves as an exhibition space for art, the first floor still



displays relics of Chiang, such as his former Nanjing car. Again, the Sizihwan residence was originally built by the Japanese and after World War II was taken by Chiang to serve as a vocational spot in the south of Taiwan (cf. Natural Cultural Heritage Database Management System).

The Cihu residence however distinguishes itself in a few aspects from Chiang's other housing spots. Since Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975, this former residence was converted into Chiang's resting place and Mausoleum. The Cihu Mausoleum<sup>7</sup> is relatively remote from the political centre in Taipei. The said area is located in Daxi District in Taoyuan City. The journey by public transport takes approximately 2,5 hours from Taipei city centre. The space on which the mausoleum is located is divided into a front and back lake surrounded by mountains.

The Mausoleum's location was originally the Daxi district's site for a regional mineral development office (*Dìqū kuàngchǎn kāifā chùsuǒ yuánzhǐ* 地區礦產開發處所原址) till its closure in 1939. In 1955 the renowned Lin family from Banqiao (*Bǎnqiáo lín běnyuán jiāzú* 板橋林本源家族), who at that time possessed the grounds around the Cihu lake, decided to lend approximately 127 hectares<sup>8</sup> of land for free in order for Chiang to build his residence (cf. Time for Taiwan; You 2019). Chiang had originally chosen the region because it reminded him of his hometown Xikou in Fenghua County in Zhejiang province. He himself designed the residence in traditional Chinese architecture<sup>9</sup> formerly named Dongkou Guesthouse. The construction of this residence finished on June 13<sup>th</sup>, 1959. The area was originally called *Bishui Huze* (碧水湖澤), which can be translated as "jade green water lake" (Skillingstad 2016:4). In 1962 however Chiang changed the name of the area in memory of his mother to Cihu, which translates to "lovely lake" or "benevolent lake", leaving the residence with the name Cihu Guesthouse (cf. Taoyuan Travel; National Cultural Heritage Database Management System). As already described, Chiang Kai-shek often chose quite remote and "protected" locations for his residences. In the instance of the Cihu residence the buildings are backed by hills and hidden by trees. Other residences also share this quality with being located at isolated places, such as the Grass Mountain Chateau, which is also located in the Yangmingshan mountain area in Taipei. The area of back Cihu (*hòu cíhú* 後慈湖) was

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<sup>7</sup> also referred to as Mausoleum of late President Chiang (*xiān zǒngtǒng jiǎnggōng língqǐn* 先總統蔣公陵寢)

<sup>8</sup> Original as „19 Qing“ (*qīng* 頃) (cf. Time for Taiwan), which is a traditional measurement unit. One Qing amounts to roughly 6.66 hectares

<sup>9</sup> A traditional Siheyuan (四合院), which is a compound of houses surrounding a square courtyard, in Shaoxing style (cf. Appendix Image 1).

originally a military restricted zone and as such was only made accessible to the public when the military lifted the prohibition of access (cf. Taoyuan Travel). Back Cihu is connected to the Cihu residence, and now Mausoleum, by a one hundred and fifty metre long air-raid defence tunnel. The area also housed five war preparations offices serving as potential command posts in case mainland China were to attack Taiwan (Shyu 2018).

After Chiang's death on April 5<sup>th</sup>, 1975, his wife Soong Mei-ling and son Chiang Ching-kuo transformed Chiang's favourite building into the current mausoleum and resting place (cf. Appendix Image 1). For this purpose, the lobby of the previous residence was transformed into a mourning hall. The hall houses a black marble tomb. This tomb holds another bronze casket containing the mortal remains of Chiang Kai-shek. The late president was buried with various everyday objects, such as his cane and hat. Additionally, three medals<sup>10</sup> and five classic books<sup>11</sup> were entombed with his body (cf. Image 3). Shielded from public view Chiang's body is regularly treated by German-trained embalmers (Taylor 2006:349). Originally, the mausoleum was intended as a temporary resting place, as the generalissimo hoped to be buried in his hometown after the Nationalists had recaptured the mainland. Furthermore, in 1984 the Lin family from Banqiao ultimately decided to donate the lands to the Chiang family (You 2019).

In 2004 the Mausoleum was listed as a historic building by the Taoyuan Municipal Government (cf. Appendix Image 1). It is now under the administration of the Taoyuan Municipal Government (*Táoyuánshì zhèngfǔ* 桃園市政府). The administrative management as well as the rights of use are held by the administrative office of the Ministry of Defence (*Guófāngbù cihú dàxī língqǐn guǎnlǐchù* 國防部慈湖大溪陵寢管理處). According to the National Cultural Heritage Database, the furnishings and the surrounding buildings of the former residence are to be preserved, regardless of whether the site is open or closed to public access (cf. National Cultural Heritage Database Management System). Therefore, an annual budget is made available for the maintenance of the site, which is carried by Taiwanese taxpayers. Said annual budget amounts to approximately NT\$ 61.66 million (US\$ 2 million) and applies to the preservation of the mausoleum, as well as the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park (Huang 2016). The mausoleum is guarded by honour guards, which are posed by the

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<sup>10</sup> Order of Brilliant Jade, Order of National Glory, Order of Blue Sky and White Sun (cf. Appendix Image 3).

<sup>11</sup> Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, the Christian Bible, Exegesis of the Collections of Texts from the Four Books, Streams in the Desert, Poetry of the Tang Dynasty (cf. Appendix Image 3).

Republic of China Armed Forces<sup>12</sup>. Visitors originally were reminded to bow before the coffin to show their respect for the late president. A sign placed right next to the coffin of Chiang Kai-shek used to read in English “Please show your respect to the portrait of Chiang Kai-Shek”. The Chinese wording although should rather be translated to “please bow on your own accord”<sup>13</sup> The second photo shows another sign placed in front of the entrance to the mourning hall. Again, the wording of the English translation is different from the Chinese instructions. In English the sign reads “You are welcome to enter the hall”, whereas in Chinese it translates to “When entering the mourning hall, bow”<sup>14</sup>



**Sign inside the Mourning Hall at Cihu Mausoleum.** Image via youku.com.

Available from:

[https://v.youku.com/v\\_show/id\\_XMzMwNTQ4OTMy.html?spm=a2h1n.8251843\\_playlist.5!5~1!2~3~A&f=16720536&o=1](https://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzMwNTQ4OTMy.html?spm=a2h1n.8251843_playlist.5!5~1!2~3~A&f=16720536&o=1) [00:10]

<sup>12</sup> The Honour Guards are posted as a sign of gratitude towards the late president's contributions to Taiwan. Their missions are to defend the Mausoleum, perform funeral services and an hourly changing of the guards (cf. Appendix Image 2).

<sup>13</sup> *Qǐng zìxíng xínglǐ* 請自行行禮 (cf. Image via youko.com)

<sup>14</sup> *Qǐng jìnrù língtáng xínglǐ* 請進入靈堂行禮 (cf. Image via Natural Cultural Heritage Database Management System)



**Sign in front of the Mourning Hall at Cihu Mausoleum.** Image via Natural Cultural Heritage Database Management System. Available from:  
<https://nchdb.boch.gov.tw/assets/advanceSearch/historicalBuilding/20040113000003>

What differentiates the Cihu residence from other official residences of Chiang is that it did not experience a conversion. Keeping the Cihu Residence in its original form is partly reason for the controversy surrounding the site. In 2004 discussions were held to properly bury the two Chiangs at the Wuzhi Mountain Military Cemetery (*Wúzhǐshān guó jūn shìfàn gōngmù* 五指山國軍示範公墓). The Wuzhi Cemetery was constructed in 1981 and lies east of Yangmingshan National park in Taipei. The cemetery was built in honour of military martyrs and heroes and since 2013 is managed by the Reserve Command of the Ministry of National Defence (cf. Republic of China Military Cemetery). The Cemetery already houses the grave of Chiang Wei-kuo and former president Yen Chia-kan. Some members of the Chiang family hoped for an official state burial of the two Chiangs at the Wuzhi Cemetery. Chiang Fangliang (*Jiǎng Fāngliáng* 蔣方良), the widow of Chiang Ching-kuo, applied to the Ministry of Defence under the then DPP government of Chen Shui-bian for a state funeral for her late husband and his father. Chen Shui-bian instructed the Ministry of Defence to approve the request and bury the two Chiangs according to National Burial Act of 1948 (*Guózàngfǎ* 國葬法) in an official state burial (Chang & Chuang 2004). The act formulates that citizens who made ‘outstanding contributions to the improvement of the status of the nation, honour of the people or benefit of mankind’ qualify for a state burial (cf. National Burial Act 1948).

The act details that such a burial has to be approved by the majority of the Executive Yuan and published by Presidential Order. The budget shall also be decided by the Executive Yuan and ultimately be paid for by national treasury. Furthermore, after the burial presidential staff should be sent to the funeral site every year at Tomb Sweeping Day to show respect (cf. National Burial Act 1948). Chen's decision to grant such a state burial therefore seemed to contradict his general stance on Chiang Kai-shek and received a lot of criticism. A supporter of the planned burial, director of the DPP's Information and Culture Department Cheng Wen-tsan (*Zhèng Wéncàn* 鄭文燦) however welcomed the Chiang family's decision to finally bury the Chiangs in Taiwan, stressing that this illustrates their identification with Taiwan (Chang & Chuang 2004). According to Taiwanese media at the time, a proper burial in Taiwanese soil would also end the Chiang family's bad luck and the constant decline of the KMT (Wang 2004). It would also acknowledge the failed plan to retake mainland China. However, the planned burial in 2004 was postponed to 2005, then 2006 and ultimately failed, after the Chiang family could not reach a consensus. KMT member Chiang Xiaoyan (*Jiǎng Xiàoyán* 蔣孝嚴) grandson of Chiang Kai-shek and member of the Legislative Yuan opposed the burial during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, as Chen had formerly stated that the management and guards of honour at the Mausoleum were a waste of taxpayers' money. In 2007 the plans for a state burial were ultimately put aside, after NT\$ 27 million (US\$ 900,000) had already been spent for construction work at the Wuzhi Cemetery (Matten 2012:56–57). If the mortal remains of Chiang actually would have been moved out of Cihu, the building could have easily been converted, same as other residences and as such would be much less controversial today.

Other peculiarities of the Cihu Mausoleum are the adjoining tourist attractions in the area, which include Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park, as well as the Touliao Mausoleum<sup>15</sup> of Chiang Ching-kuo, about 1 km away<sup>16</sup>. Chiang Ching-kuo's Mausoleum is also a former guesthouse of Chiang Kai-shek. Before its function as the Mausoleum of Chiang Ching-kuo, it was transformed to the presidential palace archive and then to the Chiang family collection of information (cf. Revolv<sup>2</sup>). The Touliao Mausoleum is also classified as cultural heritage, same as the Cihu Mausoleum as a historic building (cf. National Cultural Heritage Database Management System). Together the Cihu Mausoleum, Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park and the Touliao Mausoleum form the Chiangs Cultural Park (cf. Revolv<sup>2</sup>). Due to the existence of

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<sup>15</sup> Also known as Daxi Mausoleum (*Dàxī língqīn* 大溪陵寢)

<sup>16</sup> The Touliao Mausoleum can be reached by foot from the Cihu Mausoleum or one stop by public bus.

two Mausoleums of former presidents of the Republic of China the area is often called “Township of the Presidents” (*Dàxī zǒngtǒng zhèn* 大溪總統鎮) (cf. Taoyuan Travel).



**Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park.** Image via flickr.com. Available from: [https://www.flickr.com/photos/peace-on-earth\\_org/23652957378/](https://www.flickr.com/photos/peace-on-earth_org/23652957378/)

When mentioning the Chiangs Culture Park, it is important to further discuss the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park and the image of Chiang Kai-shek it promotes. The Sculpture Park is located right next to the Cihu parking lot. From the Sculpture park one only has to follow a short walkway alongside the lake to reach the Mausoleum itself.

As Chen Shui-bian became president of Taiwan in 2002 a new policy was introduced to deal with the countless remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's personality cult, especially the numerous statues and busts in Chiang's image. It was decided to remove these sculptures from public places, such as universities and schools. The local authorities in Daxi agreed to relocate the island's discarded statues to their administrative zone and thus "save" them from demolition. The creation of the park started in 1997 by the Daxi district office and currently houses about 200 sculptures of Chiang Kai-shek (Skillingstad 2016:4). Among these statues one of the biggest depictions of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan is to be found, a eight metre tall, seated bronze sculpture from the originally called Kaohsiung Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (*Gāoxióng shìlì zhōngzhèng wénhuà zhōngxīn* 高雄市立中正文化中心) which was intended to function as a Memorial Hall for the former president in the south of Taiwan. Its memorial function was however revoked in 2007 by the Kaohsiung city government and the name

changed to Kaohsiung Cultural Centre (*Gāoxióngshì wénhuà zhōngxīn* 高雄市文化中心) (Zhang 2007).

Currently, the sculpture park is managed by the Tourism Department of the Taoyuan Municipal Government (Skillingstad 2019). The first statues were moved to this site between 1999 and 2000 under then mayor and KMT member Zeng Rongjian. The park is the only statue park in the world dedicated to a single individual (cf. Travel King). In 2003 Daxi's mayor and KMT member Su Wen-sheng (You 2019) stated that he hoped the park would help visitors to reflect on Chiang's legacy and achievements. The aim is to promote a fair discussion and evaluation of the country under Chiang's leadership. According to the mayor, in a democratic country like Taiwan, every leader and his actions should be evaluated by the public in such a fashion. He also stated, that each statue was originally created individually by an artist and thus the park should also be perceived as an art exhibition. The statues are equipped with tags describing the material and artist as well as its former location. The costs for the construction of the park amounted to approximately NT\$ 30.83 million (US\$ 1 million) (Leavey 2003). In 2008, the park, same as the Mausoleum, was closed for several months by the local authorities for renovation<sup>17</sup> (Skillingstad 2019).

### 4.3. Cultural Heritage

Sites of memory can be centrepieces of contestation and conflict, making a legislative framework crucial in dealing with them. Classifying a site of memory as a cultural heritage site, as is the case with the Cihu Mausoleum, goes along with certain legalities protecting and maintaining said site. Consequently, the label cultural heritage is paralleled by financial subsidies, governmental protection and other diverse resources. But selecting which sites qualify is a complex task. Choosing what is defined as worthy to protect and what not is a highly politicised and culturally biased process (Marschall 2010:36). Current political agendas and priorities can gravely influence this decision.

The Cihu Mausoleum is protected as a 'historic building' by the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act of the Republic of China (*Wénhuà zīchǎn bǎocúnfǎ* 文化資產保存法)

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<sup>17</sup> It is unclear whether the closure was really due to renovation work or whether it was related to the closure of Mausoleum. But since the relocation of the statues was part of Chen Shui-bian's QuJianghua policy, it may well be that the timing of the restoration was only a coincidence and that it really was the actual reason.

issued by the Ministry of Culture (*Wénhuàbù* 文化部) (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act 2016). The value of a cultural heritage site depends on various stakeholders. The decision-making process regarding what, for whom, for how long and how something should be protected, involves different parties. Taking their distinct agendas into consideration can be a complex responsibility. Whereby one also has to take into account that the value of a cultural heritage site changes over time and space. The worth of these sites is therefore dependant on various interest groups and is not objective. It has to be understood by taking social, cultural, political and historic references into account. Overall, the idea is not only to preserve the material site, but the values of a cultural heritage site (Vecco 2019:23–24). Each of these sites possesses various cultural characteristics – aesthetic, spiritual, social, historic, symbolic or authentic. These characteristics describe the site’s form, connection to religion, identity and symbols of a society, history and originality. These categories correspond with the different stakeholder’s interests during the preservation process (Vecco 2019:26). The categories do not necessarily coexist, meaning a cultural heritage site does not have to possess every category (Vecco 2019:30). Cultural heritage sites maintain and conserve values from the past for present and future generations. Same as sites of memory they enable certain memories, however cultural heritage does so in a more officially conducted manner.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) divides cultural heritage into two classifications: Tangible cultural heritage, like paintings, monuments, manuscripts, ruins etc. and intangible cultural heritage, like oral traditions, customs, rituals (Hosseini & Kock & Josiassen 2016:1–2). The connection here between UNESCO’s classification and Nora’s description of material, symbolic and functional sites of memory is undeniable. The Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (2016) also differentiates between tangible and intangible heritage sites. Tangible Cultural Heritage in the Act includes monuments, historic buildings, commemorative buildings, groups of buildings, archaeological sites, historic sites, cultural landscapes, antiquities, natural landscapes and monuments. Intangible cultural heritage covers traditional performing arts, traditional craftsmanship, oral traditions and expressions, folklore, traditional knowledge and practices (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act 2016:1). The Cultural Heritage Preservation Act states that the central government can delegate power to municipal, county, or city authorities to handle the review, revocation and registration of these sites. This means that local authorities can submit nominations for historic buildings, as happened with the Taoyuan Municipal Government in case of the Cihu Mausoleum, but the central government still decides if the site is suitable for recordation. After a historic site’s approval, the site is intended to be managed and conserved



by its owners, users or managers (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act 2016:2–4). What is interesting here is, that the Taoyuan Municipal Government classified the Cihu Mausoleum as a ‘historic building’ (*Lìshǐ jiànzhú* 歷史建築) and not as a ‘commemorative building’ (*Jìniàn jiànzhú* 紀念建築) (cf. Appendix Image 1). Historic buildings in the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (2016) are defined as ‘buildings where historical events occurred, or which are of value from the point of view of history, art or science’ (p.1). Commemorative buildings on the other hand are described as ‘having a connection with persons having made important historical, cultural or artistic contributions’ (p.1). So, the building itself, as a former residence of Chiang Kai-shek is inscribed historical importance, but it is not the other way around. The building does not receive its meaning because it belonged to Chiang Kai-shek or houses his mortal remains. The person Chiang therefore is not prescribed historical or cultural importance, only the building. So, on the one hand the label cultural heritage preserves the Mausoleum and as such the memory of Chiang Kai-shek, but the categorization as historic building does not grant it the significance or prestige of a commemorative building.

According to the Act cultural heritage that receives government subsidies also should be open to the public to an ‘appropriate extent’ (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act 2016:6). If an individual destroys or damages for example a historic building, he or she is liable to a fine of NT\$ 300,000 up to 2,000,000 (US\$ 10,000 to 66,000). Also, he or she has to compensate for the restoration of the damaged portion to its original condition (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act 2016:16).

When discussing cultural heritage, one does not only have to address the legal framework and the government’s responsibility in dealing with these sites, but also shed light on tourists’ influence on the preservation of the sites in question. Tourists can be active stakeholders in negotiating the meaning of a site. Thus, the Cihu Mausoleum can be perceived by tourists either as a site of memory, where people pay their respects and reminisce about Chiang Kai-shek, or just a tourist attraction for entertainment (Banaszkiewicz 2018:88). For example, average tourists often consume a country’s or community’s past in a packaged, commodified form (Banaszkiewicz 2018:78). This would mean that some tourists visiting the Cihu Mausoleum do not have enough background information or knowledge of Chiang Kai-shek and his actions. With their visit of the tourist attraction, they further the continuous funding of the site, but they quite likely do not realize what this place signifies for the Taiwanese society. An official cultural heritage site is quite interesting and attracting for some tourists, as they have the perception of experiencing something meaningful. The money that cultural heritage tourism attracts, in turn flows back into the maintenance of the site. Without the tourism

revenue and interest one important argument for the Chiangs Culture Park advocates, namely the Daxi residents' livelihood, would be gone. Tourists are therefore a crucial part in the discussion and assessment of cultural heritage.

#### **4.4. The Cihu Mausoleum as a Site of Memory**

In order to later on analyse the iconoclastic measures' impact on the Cihu Mausoleum as a site of memory, we at first have to discuss why the Mausoleum can be classified as such. The situation before the first caesura, meaning the circumstances in 2006 will be taken as the reference point for the following analysis.

Generally speaking, one has to state that the Cihu residence was finished in 1959 and since 1975 functions as a Mausoleum. In 2006 the building therefore already existed for roughly forty-seven years and as a Mausoleum for thirty-one years. The construction of the building can thus be classified as the first phase of the emergence of a site of memory, that is construction and adaption (Winter 2012:13). The continuing existence of the site as a Mausoleum in commemoration of Chiang, despite a democratization process and therefore changed political circumstances, is the second phase of the process, that is routinization and standardization (Winter 2012:13). This second phase is even more crucial for the existence of a site of memory. Chiang possessed countless residences, as already discussed some of them have been conversed, some have already fallen apart, but the Cihu residence still exists in its original form. As a site of memory, it creates a direct connection between past, present and future. The official and private routinization of the commemoration of Chiang at the Mausoleum for the last thirty years distinguishes this residence from others and makes it a site of memory. In the next part of the analysis we will have a closer look at the three dimensions of a site of memory – material, symbolic, functional – and their realization at the Mausoleum. Firstly, the Cihu Mausoleum is a material site of memory in the sense that it used to be an official residence of Chiang Kai-shek. The area itself therefore has symbolic meaning. The residence could also be classified by the subcategory topographical, as these are defined by the specificity of their location and being rooted in the ground. As mentioned before, Chiang chose the area since it reminded him of his home in Zhejiang. Moving the residence to another place would therefore alter its meaning, which excludes portable and, in some way, monumental sites of memory as a subcategory. Architectural sites of memory are characterized by their specific architectural elements and the relationship between them, which does not fully grasp the Mausoleum's importance. Even more critical than the

specificity of the building is the fact that the actual mortal remains of Chiang Kai-shek are preserved at the site. Even though one could argue that changing the location of his tomb would not alter the meaning of it, as it is intrinsic, this thesis claims that it is more complex than that. The location for his mortal remains was cautiously chosen by his family. Not only the fact that it resembles the landscape in his hometown, which was his original wish to be buried at, but also the location of the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park has to be taken into account. As already mentioned, sites of memory are subjected to constant re-interpretations and transformations. The construction of the sculpture park can be seen as materialization of such. A further addition to the existing site of memory. What is even more important for the material aspect of the site, is that the remains of Chiang Kai-shek are kept at a place where the generalissimo's former personality cult and authority are still omnipresent. Contrary to other residences, the Cihu residence's solely purpose is the commemoration of the late president. In this respect the building still holds the same meaning and authority as during Chiang's lifetime. With this in mind, it is clear that moving the remains to another location would not only alter the meaning but also the power balance of the site. This does not mean, that Chiang's legacy would become less important, but the privilege of his resting place being a manifestation of his former power would be dissolved.

Secondly, considering the mourning-ritual at the Mausoleum, which is practiced by visitors, can be classified as a symbolic site of memory. People who want to pay their respects and tributes to Chiang often bow or salute in front of the black sarcophagus. As showed earlier, signs originally instructed visitors to do so. This mourning-ritual was thus officially promoted and implemented by state actors. As a result, one cannot argue that all tourists who bowed or saluted did so out of their own conviction. Still, it is believed that a certain amount of people did so out of free will. These people visit the Mausoleum as part of a social activity to share their believes with like-minded visitors. Commemorating Chiang in this fashion can strengthen their sense of identity. It is difficult to integrate the symbolic aspect into the two further sub-categories. On the one side one could argue that the Mausoleum is a dominant site of memory, as the sign officially instructed visitors to show their respect, however not exactly specifying in what manner. On the other hand, the site can also be classified as a dominated site of memory, as there is no official annual ceremony at the site to commemorate Chiang. Even though, some KMT members and politicians, as well as members of the Chiang family itself, visit the resting place on the anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek's death on April 5<sup>th</sup> and coincidentally Taiwan's traditional Tomb Sweeping Day, KMT members are not obligated to participate. Still, on this day in particular the Mausoleum has higher visitor numbers.

(Cheng/Wang 2018; Zheng 2018). This shows that the aspects of dominant and dominated site of memory interplay at the Mausoleum.

Thirdly, the Mausoleum is a functional site of memory. It is categorized as a historic building in the national cultural heritage site database (*Guójiā wénhuà zīchǎn wǎng* 國家文化資產網) and consequently has cultural and historical value. In this sense, it is protected from alteration or demolition and therefore has to maintain its outer and inner appearance. As a result, it can serve as a witness to history<sup>18</sup> (cf. National Cultural Heritage Database Management System). This also serves as a reminder that Chiang Kai-shek is not only part of Taiwanese history, but also a part of present-day Taiwan. By protecting the site and embedding its importance in a legal text, the area also gains more attention from tourists. With the upkeep of the Mausoleum and production of another incentive by creating the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park, it is attempted to satisfy the public and touristic interest in Chiang Kai-shek (Skillingstad 2016:31). Categorizing the Mausoleum as cultural heritage is also a sign of Chiang's continuing importance. This classification involves financial subsidies and a pledge to protect this site from decay. This could also be interpreted as an attempt to keep of Chiang's memory alive. The consumption of the late president's legacy by tourists can create a different version of the past, a new meaning for the site of memory. Tourists make their own sites and their own meanings - making the Mausoleum not only an important historic site, but also a profitable one (DeLyser 2003:886–887). One can thus classify the site with the subcategory preserving, as its importance is not only strengthened by its status as a tourist site, but also by its classification as a historic building, assuring its preservation by law. The Mausoleum should rather not be classified as a strictly pedagogical site. Although the Mausoleum does make future generations aware of a certain person, one should not go as far as to say the site educates visitors. There is some information provided regarding the architecture and history of the buildings, as well as the artists and former locations of the statues in the Sculpture Park but in the author's opinion this is not sufficient to receive the label pedagogical site of memory. To apply this classification without hesitation, the site would have to exhibit more information on the legacy and actions of Chiang Kai-shek.

Summing up, the Cihu Mausoleum demonstrates how all three dimensions of a site of memory –material, symbolic and functional – actually do coexist. Furthermore, the site exemplifies that it appeals to a broad community which consequently ensures its continuing “survival”.

As it was argued before that the Mausoleum and the Memorial Sculpture Park should not be

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<sup>18</sup> *Lìshǐ jiànzhèng* 歷史見證 ( cf. National Cultural Heritage Database Management System)

classified as two completely separate entities, it is also important to analyse the park's contribution to the meaning of the site of memory. Even though one could interpret the park as a dumpsite for unwanted statues, its location makes the circumstances more complex than that. If the park were an isolated attraction, its meaning would be completely different. One could agree with Allen's perception of the bizarre and comic aura the park transmits (Allen 2012:125). Still, the fact that the actual mortal remains of Chiang lie just a couple of hundred metres away completely changes matters. This is why this thesis argues contrary to Skillingstad (2019) that the park enables a somewhat neutral perception of Chiang. Individuals who decide to visit the resting place of the former president are probably less likely to perceive the park as a dumpsite or suchlike. It is assumed that it is more likely for these visitors to perceive the site as a place where one can commemorate and pay tribute to the late president. By initially moving the statues to the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park, they were detached from their initial ideological and social space and re-integrated into another location. By moving them away from their sites of social prestige and political authority and as such detaching them from the rituals that were performed in the original space, the statues were isolated from their previous power. As described in chapter 3.1., the statues can be labelled as monumental sites of memory, as they possess an inherent meaning and commemorate a dead individual. By replacing them, they consequently do not completely lose their meaning. However, through the representation in the Sculpture Park and the new symbolic framework, a different perception of these relics is presented. As such they are individual sites of memory, isolated from the political centre. Nonetheless they are now placed right beside the dead individual they intended to commemorate and thus gain a powerful and new connotation.

The Mausoleum and the annexed Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park are spaces where claims and counterclaims, collective memory and counter-memory perpetually collide. The analysis of the forthcoming four iconoclastic measures will show exactly that.

#### **4.5. First caesura: QuJianghua 2007 – 2008**

Chen Shui-bian already began dealing with sites associated with Chiang Kai-shek when he was elected mayor of Taipei in 1994. In 1996 for example the DPP changed the street name

Jieshou Road to Ketagalan Boulevard<sup>19</sup>. Chen stated that actions such as this would transform authoritarian symbols into signs of democracy (Taylor 2010:187). Still, at the beginning the DPP's course of action was not to eliminate symbols of Chiang, but instead to return spaces, that had been dominated by the Chiang family to the public. The programme "returning to the people" (*Jiāohuàn gěi shìmín* 交換給市民) included for example the former official Shilin Residence of Chiang in Taipei and was followed by various other official residences and guesthouses all over Taiwan. Even though the DPP implemented those measures in order to democratize former authoritarian spaces, they had quite an unexpected effect. By opening these spaces to the public, Chiang's personality cult and his private life were in some manner made consumable by the Taiwanese public and tourists. This allowed for non-state agents to re-interpret Chiang Kai-shek and to make his person more approachable. Instead of transforming these sites into public spaces, they turned into sites, where people could feel close to Chiang Kai-shek and interpret his legacy however they wished (Taylor 2010:189–190).

However, it was not until the beginning of Chen Shui-bian's presidency in 2000, that the removal of Chiang associated spaces and relics became a nationwide undertaking. Initially, the DPP began to focus on indigenization to stress the importance of a Taiwanese national identity, detached from the identity of the People's Republic of China. Through this creation of a new identity the DPP wanted to process Taiwan's difficult past. Addressing the conflicts of the past, also meant discussing and assessing the role of the late president (Matten 2012:66–67). With this agenda in mind, Chen Shui-bian and his administration started a fundamental debate about the relics of Chiang Kai-shek's personality cult, which were still spread across Taiwanese public spaces. This discourse was referred to as *QuJianghua* and was introduced by Chen Shui-bian on February 26<sup>th</sup>, 2007 for the first time (Creaders 2007). This programme referred not only to the removal of Chiang Kai-shek remnants from the public landscape, but also the alteration of spaces that were built in Chiang's honour. The project by the first DPP lead administration, signifies a clear-cut change compared to the previous KMT dominated government. There are different interpretations of Chen Shui-bian's programme. It can be depicted as a step in Taiwan's democratization process, whereby the removal of Chiang's remnants stands for the dismantling of authoritarianism in general. But one could

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<sup>19</sup> The original name, meaning "Long live Chiang Kai-shek street" (*Jièshòulù* 介壽路) was changed to "Ketagalan Boulevard" (*Kǎ dág lán dàdào* 凱達格蘭大道) (Taylor 2010:187). The Ketagalan (*Kǎidágélánzú* 凱達格蘭族) are a Taiwanese aboriginal minority.

also portray it as an overall QuZhonghua (去中華 de-Sinicization<sup>20</sup>) process, by which the elimination of Chiang relics would stand for a removal of references to China in general (Taylor 2010:181–183). These QuZhonghua efforts entailed a promotion of “Taiwanization”, specifically the strengthening of non-Mandarin languages and the revision of school history curricula (Rowen & Rowen 2017:101).

One very important additional aspect of QuJianghua is, that the programme relates to how the Taiwanese public perceives the past. Of course, QuJianghua presented more than just a removal of Chiang statues, for example the erection of memorials in honour of the victims of the White Terror, as well as the recovery of illegally attained state assets by the KMT were crucial aspects of the policy. Intellectuals and politicians involved in the process argued that Chiang’s influence still dominated the island and that his legacy was solely based on violence. In this discourse Chiang Kai-shek’s responsibility in the White Terror and 228 Incident were clearly framed (Taylor 2010:184–185).

In 2001 the Ministry of Defence began to remove references to the late president on the areas and bases under their control. Also, the former Chiang Kai-shek International Airport was renamed to Taoyuan International Airport in 2006. The KMT, which still had enough power in Taipei and Taoyuan by holding the office of mayor, responded to the DPP’s efforts in promoting and acknowledging the late president and his contributions to Taiwan. This sentiment lead to the “Love Taiwan and Protect the Republic of China Rally” in Taipei in March 2007 roughly a year before presidential elections. One has to ask, if such an event would have occurred, without the QuJianghua programme trying to eliminate Chiang remnants in the first place (Taylor 2010:192–193).

One important development of the QuJianghua policy is the construction of the before discussed Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park. As a lot of statues were being removed from public spaces the Taoyuan City government took said statues in to “save” them from total destruction. Compared to other communist monuments, such as in the former Soviet Union, Chiang’s statuary and monuments were not demolished or torn down in a similar violent manner but relocated. So, even though the statues were not demolished, they were removed from their original ideological space and taken outside of the political centre, which exemplifies the complexity of this highly politicised undertaking. Perhaps the most evident example for this is the sitting statue of Chiang, which was removed from his second Memorial Hall in Kaohsiung and brought to Cihu.

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<sup>20</sup> Henceforth the Pinyin romanization “QuZhonghua” instead of the English translation “de-Sinicization” will be used.

However, the most heated discussion was still to come when the DPP proposed to rename one of the most prominent spots in the landscape of Taipei (Matten 2012:73). On May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2007 Chen Shui-bian announced the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei to National Taiwan Democracy Hall (*Guólì táiwān mínzhǔ jìniànguǎn* 國立台灣民主紀念館) (Matten 2012:51). Instead of leaving the Ministry of Education with the administration of the Hall, the DPP placed its control onto a lower department. This made a name change possible without the central government's final authority and approval (Matten 2012:75). Moreover, the name of the square in front of the Memorial Hall was also changed. The square was a crucial venue for the Wild Lily Student Movement in 1980. The name was therefore changed to Liberty Square (*Zìyóu guǎngchǎng* 自由廣場) (Matten 2012:62). The undertaking was severely critiqued by KMT supporters and politicians who condemned the DPP's decision-making without public consensus. The changing of the name also entailed broad protests in the Taiwanese public who was dissatisfied with the top-down decision and lack of participation (Matten 2012:79).

As Jeremy Taylor of the University of Nottingham points out in his paper (2010), QuJianghua's lack of a uniform programme in addressing the remains of Chiang Kai-shek's personality cult had unexpected consequences. Chen Shui-bian's policy lead to a re-appraisal and new public interest of Chiang's legacy and ultimately to a change of government with the KMT winning back the presidential office. What the media and the DPP promoted as QuJianghua actually were single events strung together to sell it as a coherent governmental project. The re-interpretation of Chiang lead to an emergence of new perceptions of the late president, such as a "domesticated" Chiang. This was among other reasons made possible through the DPP's decision to grant the public access to former residences (Taylor 2010:193). The efforts made by the DPP known as QuJianghua were an attempt to create a new Taiwanese collective memory, which differed not only from China, but also the Republic of China (Matten 2012:84). However, the lack of a proper assessment of Chiang Kai-shek's legacy, still hinders the development of a collective identity in Taiwan (Matten 2012:85). Nonetheless, it is important to mention, that the whole QuJianghua process only concerned Chiang's life and legacy on Taiwan. The re-interpretations did not mention his role in the War of Resistance on the mainland. The goal of QuJianghua therefore was not to completely erase Chiang from history, but to eliminate him from the Taiwanese landscape (Taylor 2010:195). In this respect, namely eliminating physical remnants of Chiang's personality cult, the QuJianghua agenda was quite successful. However, the programme also reignited Chiang Kai-shek's prominence on Taiwan. Admittedly, the Taiwanese people were no longer forced



to commemorate the generalissimo, but this did not mean they were willing to forget his legacy all together (Taylor 2010:196). Furthermore, the KMT saw it as their duty to defend their founding father at least to a certain extent, which also lead to a promotion of Chiang's contributions to the island.

Chen Shui-bian's approach to appraise Taiwan's history and Chiang Ka-shek's legacy did not gain broad support. It did not correspond with his pre-election promises, nor did it implement a far-reaching Transitional Justice programme. Chen's shortcomings, of course not solely in regard to QuJianghua, paved the way for another KMT presidency from 2008 till 2016 with the election of Ma Ying-jeou who promoted a closer economic, cultural and political relationship with China (Rowen & Rowen 2017:102).

#### **4.5.1. The Cihu Mausoleum's closure in 2007: course of events**

The Cihu Mausoleum and Touliao Mausoleum<sup>21</sup> were closed from December 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2007 till May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2008. The action is considered as one of the last actions of Chen Shui-bian's QuJianghua agenda. The end of Chen Shui-bian's presidency appeared quite tumultuous and with this last milestone, the former DPP president tried to please his pan-green voters (Zhang 2014).

People, especially residents of Daxi were outraged by the decision. A major income source for the locals is tourism, with the Cihu Mausoleum and the Chiangs Culture Park in general being the main attraction. By closing the gates to the Mausoleum, it was estimated the area would lose 15,000,000 tourists annually, amounting to damages of NT\$ 400,000,000-500,000,000 (US\$ 13,000,000-16,400,000) in tourism revenue. Locals were angered by the central government overlooking their livelihood and fixating on politics. They even took to the streets and protested the administration's decision (Wen 2007). Before closing the Mausoleum for the first time a visitor record was set with 70,000 tourists touring the site on the last open day. The last changing of the guards attracted 1300 people, after that the access to the Mausoleum was closed (Xin 2007). Chiang Kai-shek's granddaughter Chiang Fang Chih-yi (*Jiǎng Fāngzhìyí* 蔣方智怡) also visited her grandfather's temporary resting site before the closure. She was upset about allegations that the Mausoleum would waste public

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<sup>21</sup> The Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park was also closed for a few months in 2008. It can however not be argued that this was due to the QuJianghua program, as the official reason stated was maintenance work (Skillingstad 2019).

funds<sup>22</sup>. She further stated that the Chiang family had handed the Mausoleum over to the state out of free will. Moreover, she emphasized that visitors were not forced to worship<sup>23</sup> Chiang Kai-shek but decided freely to do so. She also expressed hopes of burying Chiang Kai-shek according to his wishes in his hometown in Zhejiang (Wen 2007). The handling of the remains of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo is a highly discussed topic. During this first caesura voices were raised again demanding a final burial at Wuzhi Mountain Military Cemetery. Due to continuing conflicts and a missing agreement within the Chiang family on the matter, the mortal remains of the two Chiangs continue to be located at Daxi. As discussed earlier, superstition and rituals are still a prominent belief in Taiwan and should not be ignored when discussing burial options for Chiang Kai-shek and his son. Going against the family's wishes could therefore carry consequences in certain people's minds.

The just described, first caesura, can be categorized as iconoclasm from above. Then president Chen Shui-bian decided to make the Cihu Mausoleum a last example of QuJianghua. Because the Mausoleum was under the management of the Ministry of National Defence and no longer belonged to the Chiang family, making it therefore public property, the government was able to determine how to proceed with the site. Because the Cihu Mausoleum is a contested site of memory this decision brought about a lot of criticism and protests. On the one hand, tourism and financial aspects played a crucial role in the anger of especially the local people. But also voices about Chiang Kai-shek being part of Taiwanese history were being raised. People wanted to choose freely whether to worship the generalissimo or not and being able to do so on their own terms 365 days of the year (Lin 2008).

#### **4.5.2. The Cihu Mausoleum's closure in 2007: significance for the site of memory**

It is evident that the decision-makers in this instance acted in quite a subjectively manner, meaning they prioritized the current policy and not the victims' sentiments regarding the Mausoleum. Even though the closure was probably intended to "please" the victims of the White Terror and 228 Incident, it appears the main goal was to push through the DPP's policy at the time. As Naiteh Wu (2005) points out only the victims of the White Terror have 'the right to decide whether to forget, to forgive or to remember' (p.92). But still, there was no involvement or consulting with the victims in this decision-making process. No signs of

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<sup>22</sup> As earlier mentioned, in Chen Shui-bian's opinion the upkeep of the Mausoleum and the guards of honor were a waste of taxpayers' money (Matten 2012:56).

<sup>23</sup> *Cháobài* 朝拜 (Wen 2007)

reconciliation or inclusiveness are to be found, quite the opposite, the resolution alienated the people who still wished to visit the burial site. As the Mausoleum is labelled a cultural heritage site, which receives subsidies from the government, it should 'be open to the public to an appropriate extent' according to the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act:6). It is questionable, if under those circumstances, without changing the Mausoleums cultural heritage status, a total closure is even legally acceptable. Restricting access to the site in such a way hinders the public in interacting with the site, whether it's in a positive or negative way. It is doubtful whether a complete public restraint with the goal of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek's legacy has a constructive effect for Taiwan's collective memory. Disposing of sites of memory, can never truly eradicate Chiang's traces in Taiwan's history. Not to mention, if such an elimination would even be favoured by all the victims. In this case the decision to close the Mausoleum had the unexpected outcome of a rush of tourists, as well as protests by not only the local residents, but the broader public. Same as the other iconoclastic measures under the QuJainghua policy, this action "awakened" the personality cult, instead of eliminating it. More important than closing the Mausoleum would have been to overall re-contextualize and re-define the site and not to eliminate the memory of Chiang. One could have taken South Africa as an example and revised tourist guides or added a museum to the site. A new context could have been created and the new, former suppressed version of history could have been emphasized and as such the opportunity created for the victims to find themselves at this controversial site. As outlined earlier, appending new monuments or a museum to a contested site of memory can have a more inclusive and reconciliatory effect.

One idea that could also have been executed or discussed in greater detail during the decision-making process, was the final burial at the Wuzhi Mountain Military Cemetery. Even though the Chiang family did not reach a consensus, the central government could have taken the lead and decide to finally bury the two Chiangs, as the state still bears the costs of the Mausoleum's upkeep and management and therefore could decide to end that funding. Putting them finally to rest, could also imply putting this chapter of authoritarian history in Taiwan to rest. A recent example for such action is the Spanish supreme court's ruling in favour of exhuming Franco's body and burying him in a municipal cemetery outside of Madrid. Franco will therefore be moved away from his former Mausoleum in the Valley of the Fallen to the outskirts of Madrid in order to prevent the new burial site from becoming a place of pilgrimage. Moreover, the family's wish to move his body to a Cathedral in Madrid was ignored. Same as with the Cihu Mausoleum, Franco's Mausoleum was being criticized as

glorifying him, rather than commemorating the victims of the Civil War. This is one step welcomed by the victims of Franco's regime, but they demand more measures, like a judicial resolution officially condemning the past regime. Still, there is criticism regarding the chosen resting place in the outskirts of Madrid, as this cemetery is also maintained by taxpayers (Burgen & Jones 2019). However, one distinct difference regarding these two Mausoleums is that Franco was buried right next to his victims in the Valley of the Fallen, making his former resting place even more controversial than the one of Chiang Kai-shek. While this the decision to move Franco's mortal remains was surely not welcomed by the entire Spanish population, the victim's feelings and dispositions were given priority in the decision-making process. This is a further step of Spain out of a Policy of Forgetting and towards societal reconciliation. The dictator's remains were moved out of his pompous palace surrounded by his victims and put to rest beside his wife, just far enough outside the political centre in Madrid to avoid a visitor rush of people idolizing him.

In the instance of the Cihu Mausoleum, this first iconoclastic caesura exemplifies the split collective memory of the Taiwanese people. When a state agent decides to alter a site of memory and a certain part of the population is dissatisfied with that arrangement and voices this by protesting, it is obvious that they perceive their past and identity differently. As discussed in chapter 3.2. collective memory is only one specific interpretation of the past influenced by external factors. It is always associated with current political and social interests. In prohibiting the public from entering the Mausoleum the DPP implements a state ideology that only some part of the Taiwanese society can identify with. With this decision they emphasize their assessment of Chiang's legacy, while neglecting others. In this instance, the people who want to commemorate Chiang possess less power than the state actor who is in the position to determine how to proceed with the site. Their counter-memory contests the official historiography promoted by the DPP government and thus requires more effort to remember. The Cihu Mausoleum is a perfect example of the collective memory and counter-memory constantly challenging one another. Still, the powerless protested the neglect of their version and demanded the freedom to remember differently. By hindering the access to the Mausoleum, all three dimensions of this site of memory were gravely affected. Logically by confining the material dimension, also the symbolic and functional realities were restricted. By closing the Mausoleum, the material site of memory, which enabled certain communities to remember Chiang and perhaps more importantly to commemorate him without encountering resistance, which is not as easily possible elsewhere in Taiwan, was withdrawn. As a consequence of not having the material site, the symbolic site of memory, meaning the

mourning-ritual at Chiang's tomb was also made impossible. And lastly the label cultural heritage was made obsolete with not granting the public access to the site. Resulting in only abiding the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act's upkeep of the site, but not granting access to it.

#### **4.6. Second caesura: Ma Ying-jeou 2008 – 2016**

After Ma Ying-jeou's return in 1981 from his overseas studies in the United States, he entered public service back in Taiwan. One of his earliest tasks was the work as an English interpreter for then president Chiang Ching-kuo (Hollar 2019). Ma later also worked as the senior secretary of Chiang Ching-kuo (Matten 2012:74). This close working relationship between the two might also explain Ma's persistent sense of respect and duty to the Chiang family.

In 1998 Ma was elected as mayor of Taipei and the KMT city government started countering the DPP's policies. For example, Ma introduced "one-day-tours" in Taipei, which guided tourists to spots throughout the city that were associated with Chiang (Taylor 2010:192). When the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was renamed to National Taiwan Democracy Hall in May 2007, Ma Ying-jeou strongly opposed the action and criticised the central government's procedure. He argued that the changing of the name without public consensus would create societal conflict. He labelled the central government's decision a nondemocratic and illegal action, because it was conducted without the approval of the city's authority. Ma, who at the time was campaigning for the presidential office, promised to restore the original name if elected in the upcoming voting (Matten 2012:79–80). The KMT responded to the DPP's policies in encouraging the public to remember Chiang's positive achievements and contributions to the nation (Taylor 2010:192). Hereby Ma Ying-jeou considers the main achievements of Chiang to be the restoration of the island in 1945, Taiwan's overall economic, political and social development and lastly the protection of the nation during the Cold War (Matten 2012:71).

At the end of 2008 the KMT pursued an overall pro-China policy with the intent of strengthening its ideological hegemony (Matten 2012:81). Part of this tendency was also to restore the former name of the Memorial Hall. When the KMT won the presidential election with Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008 the party finally had the means to actually implement this change. On January 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009 the honour guards and with them the changing of the guards ceremony returned to the Memorial Hall. And ultimately on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2009 president Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT administration changed the name back to Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, also without any public discussion (Matten 2012:82–83). Overall the KMT profited

from the DPP's former QuJianghua policy. When the KMT again held the presidential office in 2008 they obtained an official record of historic buildings associated with Chiang and consequently began to renovate certain deteriorating buildings. For example, in July of the same year renovation work started at the Shilin Residence, which formerly had been neglected. With these projects, the KMT started to protect and preserve their own heritage (Taylor 2009).

Naturally Ma Ying-jeou's attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek is quite the opposite from Chen Shui-bian's. Although Ma does not deny that Chiang should bear responsibility for the White Terror and 228 Incident, he continuously stresses the achievements and contributions of the generalissimo to the island. In a Facebook post from 2016 Ma expresses the following: 'Had it not been for the Republic of China Armed Forces, security across the Taiwan Strait would not have been achieved. Had it not been for the land reforms that Chiang's government implemented, Taiwan's agricultural villages would not have been able to grow and prosper. Had it not been for Taiwan's economic take-off at the time, the present prosperity would not have been achieved. Had it not been for 66 years of universal education and local elections, Taiwan surely would not be a democracy today.'<sup>24</sup> (cf. Ma, Y. 5<sup>th</sup> April 2016). In this post Ma also condemns the acts of vandalism of Chiang statuary in recent years. Ma furthermore stresses that the criticism of Chiang and his legacy should without a doubt be allowed, but at the same time Chiang's contributions should not be ignored or dismissed (Ma, Y. 2016).

Obviously the KMT presidency and Ma Ying-jeou pursued a different policy in respect to the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's personality cult. Not only the close relationship of Ma with Chiang Ching-kuo, but also the very strong affiliation of the KMT with their eternal leader (*Yǒngjiǔ zǒngcái* 永久總裁), a titled bestowed to Chiang Kai-shek after his death (Stolojan 2017:31), lead them to reverse the DPP's policies.

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<sup>24</sup> Original post on Facebook: 今天是蔣中正總統逝世 41 週年紀念日，一早我前往慈湖謁陵，回顧他在臺灣 26 年的努力。近年各地出現了一些對蔣總統銅像潑漆、破壞等暴力行為，有的甚至發生在校園，令人遺憾。二二八事件、白色恐怖發生的時候，他身為國家元首，當然有責任。但是，沒有蔣委員長領導抗戰勝利，就沒有臺灣光復；沒有國軍保衛臺灣，就沒有臺海安全；沒有土地改革、臺灣就不會有相對平等的成長與富裕的農村；沒有經濟起飛，臺灣不會有今天的繁榮；沒有 66 年普及的教育與地方選舉，臺灣更不會有今天的民主自由。蔣總統光復臺灣、保衛臺灣、建設臺灣，他對臺灣的重要貢獻不容否認。臺灣早已是一個開放社會，我們對蔣總統當然可以批評，但對於他的貢獻也不能視而不見。看問題只有理性公平，就事論事，才是一個具有民主素養的公民。臺灣解嚴已經 29 年，總統直選也已經 6 次、政黨輪替 3 次，希望我們從現在開始，徹底告別暴力，回歸理性，一起完成臺灣真正的民主轉型。(cf. Ma, Y. 5<sup>th</sup> April 2016).

#### **4.6.1. The Cihu Mausoleum's reopening in 2008: course of events**

After Chen Shui-bian's presidency ended the Taoyuan Municipal Government strived to re-open the Cihu and Touliao Mausoleum. On April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2008 the 33<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek's death Ma Ying-jeou payed his respects by bowing three times in front of Chiang's sarcophagus, which was symbolically quite meaningful, as the KMT had just regained the presidency. Ma and other KMT top officials, as well as members of the Chiang family took part in the ceremony (cf. Taiwan Straits Network 2008). Ma noted that he would pay his respects at the Mausoleum every year after taking office. Further he remarked that the memory of Chiang should neither be worshipped nor suppressed and his deeds and misdeeds should be openly discussed. The public was also allowed to enter the site on this specific day in order for them to be able to pay their respects (cf. China News Network 2008). Furthermore, on the morning of the same day the Ministry of Defence announced that the Mausoleum would be officially re-opened (Li 2008). On May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2008, only eleven days after KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration as president, the Mausoleum was officially re-opened. Following the re-opening, the honorary guards returned as well and resumed their work. Tourists and locals attending the ceremony were excited and relieved, stressing that Chiang Kai-shek is part of Taiwan's history and culture and that later generations should decide by themselves how to evaluate his legacy (Lin 2008). To attract tourists, especially from the Mainland, specific "Chiang food" that the former president himself had enjoyed, was offered at the park, as well as countless souvenirs (cf. Taiwan Straits Network 2008).

#### **4.6.2. The Cihu Mausoleum's reopening in 2008: significance for the site of memory**

Exactly as with the first caesura the priority was to push the party's own agenda, which was to make Chiang Kai-shek accessible again. Again, neither the public in general nor the victims were involved in the decision-making process. So, in the instance of the Cihu Mausoleum the approach of both KMT and DPP was very similar to the name changing issue of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. One could perceive the KMT's strategy as some kind of retaliation for the DPP's former policies. The first and the second iconoclastic measures have very similar outcomes, namely alienating some parts of society by making decisions without letting the public participate in the process. Both parties promote their ideology and interpretation of Chiang's legacy. By doing so they ignore the complexity of the problem, which is that there exist more nuances in the public's assessment of the generalissimo. Also, Ma's stance to neither worship, nor suppress the memory of Chiang Kai-shek seems quite

questionable, as the act of bowing before a sarcophagus can certainly be defined as worship of a person. His yearly visit at the Mausoleum appears very contradictory to this statement.

It is also quite obvious that no re-contextualization took place under the KMT administration, as Chiang Kai-shek goes on to be the eternal leader of the KMT. While criticising the former government for restricting the public's freedom to hold on to their version of the past, the KMT administration dealt with the issue in exactly the same manner. Although they reversed the decision to actively hinder people from accessing the site and as such alienating them, they did not acknowledge the victims. The argument that granting public access to the Mausoleum is a more inclusive approach in dealing with this contested site, as people can decide for themselves whether they want to visit the resting place or not, is also a faulty one. Of course, this resolution does not physically exclude anyone, but neither does it present the whole context. Even though no one is actively marginalized, the missing acknowledgement of Chiang's responsibility, promotes the version of history with Chiang as the father of the nation and neglects the misdeeds and violence of his regime. Consequently, both the KMT and DPP failed to fully grasp the complexity of the site and instead put the focus on demonstrating their decision-making power. To put it in Nora's terms, the site of memory was re-opened, meaning that the material dimension was reinstated. This naturally had as a consequence that the symbolic and functional aspects of the site of memory were reintroduced as well. People were again able to participate in their mourning-ritual and the site was fully re-established as cultural heritage as intended by the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act. However, the DPP's and KMT's approaches made it clear that the country needs to come to terms with the past and that it will not be an easy task. The Cihu Mausoleum manifests the collision of a collective memory and counter-memory and how the government's decision empowers one part of society, while weakening another. The KMT, as the former party of Chiang Kai-shek, still practiced a Policy of Forgetting by not officially clarifying responsibilities. Though same could be argued for the DPP as they only restricted the access to the Mausoleum, which could be interpreted as an attempt to ignore and forget the country's violent past. The DPP and KMT both had the opportunity to apply more inclusive methods and, in this way, reduce the conflict potential this space holds. Although, as mentioned in chapter 3.3. collective forgetting can have productive aspects when it furthers reconciliation and prevents revenge or violence, in this instance, the goal was not to reconcile society, but for the KMT and DPP to implement their ideology and policies. The victims' repressed memories were not given a voice, positioning them yet again in a powerless situation.



#### **4.7. Third caesura: Transitional Justice Commission 2017 – ongoing**

Transitional Justice is a far-reaching and complex task, which is why explaining every detail and specificity of the process would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, only one aspect of Transitional Justice in Taiwan, namely the Transitional Justice Commission's task to deal with authoritarian symbols will be discussed in further detail. Said Commission stands for another example of iconoclasm from above.

As QuJianghua cannot quite be classified as Transitional Justice, Tsai Ing-wen took it upon herself to openly and rigorously call for Transitional Justice in Taiwan. As she was the first DPP president with a legislative majority she was endowed with more influence than her predecessor Chen Shui-bian. During her inauguration speech in 2016 she promised that history would no longer divide Taiwan (Rowen & Rowen 2017:105).

The ultimate goal of Transitional Justice is not only to correct the wrongdoings and injustices of the past, but to also guarantee these inequalities and crimes will not ever happen again (Jau-Yuan 2016:181) Principally, the Transitional Justice process can be divided into the following components: truth-finding, victims' reparations, wrongdoers' liabilities, and institutional reforms. Hereby Taiwan is said to have concentrated foremost on victims' reparations and to some extent institutional reforms and truth-finding. Wrongdoers' liabilities have been given the least focus (Jau-Yuan 2016:171).

One version of institutional reform is the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice which was announced on the December 27<sup>th</sup>, 2017 by the Executive Yuan (*Xíngzhèngyuàn* 行政院). The Transitional Justice Commission is an independent, second-tier government agency which was officially founded in May 2018 (Yeh & Su 2019:611). The Commission is tasked with five different responsibilities: providing public access to political archival records; removing authoritarian symbols and preserving sites where injustices were committed; redressing judicial wrongs, restoring historical truth and promoting social reconciliation; settling and utilizing ill-gotten party assets; handling other matters pertaining to transitional justice. The Transitional Justice Commission has nine commissioners who are nominated by the Executive Yuan and consensually appointed by the Legislative Yuan. Five of the commissioners are full time, four are part-time, with a maximum of three members of the same political party and a staff of seventy people at their disposal. It receives its funding from the Executive Yuan with a semi-annual budget of approximately NT\$ 51,870,000 (US\$ 1,700,000) from June to December every half year. The Commission consists of the following four departments: Department of Historical Truth Restoration (*Huányuán lìshǐ*

*zhēnxiàngzǔ* 還原歷史真相組), Department of Authoritarian Relics Handling (*Wēiquán xiàngzhēng chǔlǐzǔ* 威權象徵處理組), Department of Redressing Past Judicial Wrongs (*Píngfù sīfǎ bùfǎzǔ* 平復司法不法組), Department of Rebuilding Social Trust (*Chóngjiàn shèhuì xìn rènzǔ* 重建社會信任組) (cf. Act on Promoting Transitional Justice 2017; Yeh & Su 2019:611–613).

Despite each one of these departments has to fulfil crucial tasks, this thesis will only focus on the Department of Authoritarian Relics Handling. Although municipal governments, schools, universities and suchlike are tasked with the maintenance of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo statues and monuments, the Department of Authoritarian Relics Handling now has the authority to determine how exactly to handle these authoritarian symbols (Yeh & Su 2019:610). The Department receives a budget of NT\$ 15,190,000 (US\$ 498,000) for 2019 (Chen & Hetherington 2018). It has to inspect the numerous locations of monuments, statues, memorial etc. in commemoration of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. For example, soon after the Act's passing in December 2017, Minister of Education Pan Wen-chung (*Pān Wénzhōng* 潘文忠) declared that he would hold meetings with several schools in Taiwan named in honour of Chiang Kai-shek. He stressed that the Act would require a name change for these facilities (Caldwell 2017:479). The Act itself and the Commission's intention to rename and remove authoritarian relics can be perceived as a direct attempt to at last place blame on the generalissimo and make him accountable for his actions (Caldwell 2017:479).

While attempting to remove the authoritarian relics, the Department also has to educate and explain to the public why these symbols contradict a democratic constitutional order and the general agreed upon discourse in Taiwan.

Article 5 of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice phrases the Commission's task as follows:

'In order to establish a liberal democratic constitutional order, deny the legitimacy of authoritarian rule, and learn the historical lessons of human rights abuses, symbols appearing in public buildings or places that commemorate or express nostalgia for authoritarian rulers shall be removed, renamed, or dealt with in some other way. Places where the rulers engaged in large-scale human rights abuses during the period

of authoritarian rule shall be preserved or rebuilt, and plans shall be made for their designation as historic sites (cf. Act on Promoting Transitional Justice 2017:2).<sup>25</sup>

It is quite obvious that the wording of Article 5 is very vague, with no explicit mentioning of Chiang Kai-shek, nor proper instructions on how to actually fulfil this assignment. It lacks further details on what to do with these authoritarian symbols after removal. Should they all be relocated to the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park or should they in fact be destroyed after removal. Phrasing it as ‘be dealt with in some other way’<sup>26</sup> leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Seen pragmatically, the easiest way to deal with the situation would probably be to just destroy the statues or to store them somewhere hidden from the public. But dismantling statues is not as “easy” as it seems, because a lot of superstition and respect is connected with these sculptures. People still often strongly believe that damaging or completely demolishing Chiang Kai-shek statues can bring bad luck on them or their whole family. And while they do not approve of Chiang’s legacy, they are still convinced that his statues and memorials should be treated with respect and not brutally torn down (Personal Communication, 16<sup>th</sup> August 2019). Especially in the case of the Chiangs Culture Park a removal seems nearly impossible, based on the fact that the attempt to bury Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo at Wuzhi Military Mountain Cemetery already failed. Furthermore, if the demolition of a statue depicting Chiang is already associated with bad luck, the elimination of his resting place should be linked with an even higher grade of superstition. Currently there are still 837 statues<sup>27</sup>, 104 images and portraits of Chiang Kai-shek, thirty-eight statues, thirty-one images and portraits of Chiang Ching-kuo and 577 honorary site

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<sup>25</sup> Original wording in Chinese version: ‘為確立自由民主憲政秩序、否定威權統治之合法性及記取侵害人權事件之歷史教訓，出現於公共建築或場所之紀念、緬懷威權統治者之象徵，應予移除、改名，或以其他方式處置之。威權統治時期，統治者大規模侵害人權事件之發生地，應予保存或重建，並規劃為歷史遺址。’ (cf. 促進轉型正義條例 2017:2)

<sup>26</sup> *Qítā fāngshì chūzhì* 其他方式處置 (cf. 促進轉型正義條例 2017:2)

<sup>27</sup> According to the Transitional Justice Commission’s data: 129 statues in Taipei, 111 in Taoyuan, 98 in Taichung, 82 in Kaohsiung, 45 in Hsinchu County, 40 in Pingtung County, 37 in Taitung County, 35 in Changhua County, 34 in New Taipei City, 30 in Hualien County, 29 in Yunlin County, 28 in Tainan, 25 in Chiayi County, 19 in Keelung, 16 each in Kinmen and Lienchiang County, 14 each in Hsinchu and Yilan counties, 13 in Miaoli County, 10 in Nantou County, 9 in Penghu County and 3 in Chiayi City (Chen & Hetherington 2019; Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2018:23). See Appendix ‘statue map’ for illustration.

names for the two Chiangs, excluding the authoritarian relics in the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park, spread across Taiwan (cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2018:22). The extensive amount of these relics in the Taiwanese landscape makes the need for a Department for Authoritarian Relics Handling even more obvious. One difficulty that the Commission faces is to clearly identify these objects as authoritarian symbols, which would make opposition to a removal unlawful and illegitimate (Chen & Hetherington 2019).

The Department also has to detect and establish sites where victims of the White Terror were imprisoned, tortured or killed and is entrusted with the responsibility of deciding whether these sites shall be turned into memorials. Locating and removing authoritarian symbols on the one hand and protecting sites of past atrocities for educational purposes on the other shall serve as a reminder and warning of the cruelty of authoritarian systems (Yeh & Su 2019:612). Hence, the Commission's duties are at two ends of a spectrum, but surely equally important. Article 5 stresses that 'places where the rulers engaged in large-scale human rights abuses during the period of authoritarian rule shall be preserved or rebuilt, and plans shall be made for their designation as historic sites' (cf. Act on Promoting Transitional Justice 2017). Noteworthy here is the use of 'historic sites' (歷史遺址), which in the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act are described as 'spaces [...] where historic events occurred and are of value from the point of history' (cf. Cultural Heritage Preservation Act 2016:1). The sites are therefore defined on a different scale than the Cihu Mausoleum, which is "only" characterized as a historic building. These sites that need to be preserved or rebuilt include the National Human Rights Museum in New Taipei City, Green Island White Terror Memorial Park, Martial Law Era Victims Memorial Park, 228 Peace Memorial Park in Taipei, Machanding Memorial Park<sup>28</sup> and many more (Shattuck 2019:35). The preservation of these sites is an essential aspect in reappraising Taiwan's history. Maintaining sites where such atrocities took place and hence highlighting this dark part of history, again illustrates the emotional potential space can contain.

What is also worth mentioning in regard to the Transitional Justice Commission's work is the Ministry of National Defence' attitude. In their released progress report in December 2018 the Commission asked for the Ministry of National Defence' help in removing statues and symbols of Chiang. Moreover, they requested the elimination of authoritarian symbols in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The Ministry swiftly countered that this was not their responsibility and that they would maintain the current conditions and as such not oblige the

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<sup>28</sup>A former execution site of the KMT. The execution ground was later moved to Ankeng in 1954 (Shattuck 2019:35).

suggestions of the Commission. Furthermore, the Ministry stressed the importance of Chiang for the founding of the national army and country's military academy. They went on to explain that it was the Ministry of Culture's responsibility to change the status quo if necessary and until then they would maintain the military presence and changing of the guards at the Memorial Hall (Deaeth 2018).

As discussed, the vague phrasing of the Act would also present the opportunity for the Commission to exert more inclusive methods, as discussed in chapter 3.4. The possibility of re-interpretation, re-contextualize, innovation etc. could be an option as the Act does not specify whether the Commission has to deal with the symbols in a total iconoclastic fashion. In this regard the acting chairperson of the Transitional Justice Commission Yang Tsui (*Yáng Cui* 楊翠) emphasized that there were more viable options than just demolishing the remaining statues of Chiang Kai-shek and his son. For example, she presented the option to replace the statues with sculptures of important local figures, using the Chiang statues in installation art exhibitions or donating them to former military dependants' villages (*Juàncūn* 眷村) which may be interested in receiving them. Eliminating them would not be the only option and the Commission will consult other foreign government agencies in the future. She also wishes for more public participation in the decision-making process and hopes to start a dialogue with affected communities. Discussion could be helpful for the Commission to receive more diverse input (Lee & Wen 2018).

In the first Transitional Justice Commission progress report, which was released in November 2018, the Commission states that in an inventory of Taiwan's cultural assets, that the registration of these reflects the interplay of remembering and forgetting and shows how a country recalls history through space. In their inventory the Commission divided the authoritarian assets into three subcategories: authoritarian symbols (*Wēiquán xiàngzhēng* 威權象徵), memory spaces (*Jìyì kōngjiān* 記憶空間) and sites of injustice (*Bùyì yízhǐ* 不義遺址). The report also specifically states that certain cemeteries and residences commemorate historical figures that have gravely violated human rights and the constitutional order of democratic freedoms. Among these the Cihu Mausoleum and Daxi Mausoleum are listed. It goes on to say that these spaces contain a complex history that should be recorded and passed on. If not, the state continues to practice selective forgetting of negative history, which does not further a dialogue in society (cf. cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2018:27–28). The progress report of the Transitional Justice Commission from November 2019 further addresses the handling of the disposal of authoritarian symbols. During a

removal process the different historic sentiments of ethnic groups<sup>29</sup> should be considered, as well as the costs of implementation. Furthermore, it is stated that the removal of authoritarian symbols on campuses is a bottom-up process and students are encouraged to participate in the discussions and decision-making process. The Commission also proposes a nationwide investigation of street names and honorary names of public spaces. Lastly, the Commission states that it is aware of the different assessment certain institutions hold due to different historical feelings<sup>30</sup> and thus is aware of a continuous pluralistic dialogue. Local governments are also called upon to jointly work on the removal of authoritarian symbols. The Commission will also expand communication channels and promote a public understanding for the need of a “de-authorization”<sup>31</sup> process (cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2019:22–23).

The work of the Transitional Justice Commission has not only lead to an official debate regarding the remnants of Chiang’s personality cult and as such implemented measures in the sense of iconoclasm from above, but also posed an incentive for civilians to voice their dissatisfaction with certain authoritarian symbols. Even though acts of vandalism of remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek personality cult also occurred before the passing of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, the Act allowed the public to frame their iconoclastic measures in a different context. The next two examples of iconoclasm from below, including the discussion of the vandalism at the Cihu Mausoleum, all pleaded their acts were in accordance with Taiwan’s Transitional Justice process.

Especially during the annual anniversary of the 228 Incident acts of vandalism of authoritarian symbols arise more frequent. Apart from smaller Chiang statues that have been beheaded or besmeared with paint or insults, such as murderer or butcher, some more prominent sites have been vandalized as well. For instance, in July 2018 the statue and KMT emblem of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei were splashed with red paint, the colour symbolizing the blood of the White Terror victims’ blood. The pro-independence group “From Ethos to Nation” (*Mánfān dǎoyǔshè* 蠻番島嶼社), which is also responsible for the later discussed vandalism at the Cihu Mausoleum, admitted to the act. They did not only protest Chiang’s legacy, but demanded a removal of all authoritarian symbols over Taiwan

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<sup>29</sup> *Kǎoliáng bùtóng zúqún lìshǐ qínggǎn* 考量不同族群歷史情感 (cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2019:22)

<sup>30</sup> *Duì bùfēn jīguān yīn bùtóng lìshǐ qínggǎn ér chí bùtóng zhī quánshì guāndiǎn* 對部分機關因不同歷史情感而持不同之詮釋觀點 (cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2019:23)

<sup>31</sup> *Qù wēiqúánhà* 去威權化 (cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2019:23)

and a stop of the utilization of Chiang remnants for touristic purposes (Hsu 2018). With this act they tried to attract attention to the Transitional Justice Commission's work and the importance of addressing this topic and starting an official discourse.



**Activist splashing Chiang Kai-shek statue at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.** Image via From Ehtos to Nation Facebook. Available from: <https://www.facebook.com/FromEthnosToNation/photos/a.574065109613420/658167304536533/?type=3&theater>

Other “high-profile” vandalisms that occurred in Taipei are the incidents targeting Chiang statues at the National Chengchi University. The National Chengchi University was officially founded in Nanjing in 1927 by Chiang himself to train KMT officials (cf. [nccu.edu.tw](http://nccu.edu.tw)). One of the targeted statues is one of the biggest in Taipei and in comparison to other statuary of Chiang on school campuses, universities etc. unusual, as Chiang is depicted in military uniform sitting on a horse. The second affected sculpture, which depicted Chiang in a sitting position in his traditional Sun Yat-sen suit, was situated in the university's library hall. Sascha Klotzbücher of the Department of East Asian Studies of the University of Vienna discusses these events in a forthcoming paper. Klotzbücher states that university students had already campaigned for the statues' removal in 2008 during the Qujianghua agenda, but these claims

were being ignored. After that, protests and acts of vandalism of said statues occurred from 2014 forth. These acts however were still being continuously disregarded by the university, the discussion regarding the removal was being ignored by university leaders and the traces of vandalism were dispersed quickly. Klotzbücher goes on to argue that the changed political climate and the DPP's passing of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice opened the opportunity for the students to frame their demand in the new Transitional Justice context. Lastly in January 2018 the university senate voted for the removal of the statue in the library hall, but still not for the removal of the bigger statue of Chiang on a horse (Klotzbücher forthcoming). The university ultimately decided, contrary to the students' proposal to relocate the statues to the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park, to move the smaller statue to the Hua Hsing Children's Home (*Huáxìng yù yòu yuàn* 華興育幼院), which was founded by Soong Mei-ling (cf. nccu.edu.tw; Strong 2018; Klotzbücher forthcoming). However on February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2019 a group of activists called "Shot for Democracy" (*Gōngmín shèyǐng shǒuhù mínzhǔ zhènxian* 公民攝影守護民主陣線) cut off the leg of the bronze horse in protest of the decision. The group posted an official statement of their protest on Facebook, stressing the need for stronger Transitional Justice measures and a complete removal of authoritarian symbols from the campus (Morris 2019; 2018). The bronze statue was later restored, and preventive measures implemented to safeguard the sculpture from further vandalism. The university decided to place a glass barrier around the statue and install various security cameras. The decision to only relocate one statue demonstrates the importance of space. Even though both statues were disputed and contested, only one of them got re-located, the other was repaired and even prevention measures implemented to safeguard the statue from further destruction. One of the main reasons for this distinction has to be the location of both statues. The seated one was situated in one of the university's most central and frequently visited areas, namely the library, making it nearly impossible to ignore. The statue with the horse on the other hand is positioned much more remote on the university campus, which is why it is easier to "overlook" the existence of the second sculpture.





**Chiang Kai-shek statue at National Chengchi University.** Image via Morris, J. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-228-incident-still-haunts-taiwan/>



**Severed leg after vandalism.** Image via Morris, J. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-228-incident-still-haunts-taiwan/>



**Statue after implemented restoration and prevention measures.** Own Image (National Chengchi University 21<sup>st</sup> August 2019)

These two examples of iconoclasm from below demonstrate how emotionally charged contested sites of memory can be. It also shows that collective memory and counter-memory do not only collide at the Cihu Mausoleum, where the actual mortal remains of Chiang Kai-shek lie, but also at sites of memory that materialize the generalissimo's former personality cult. In these instances, activists, students, political groups, etc. decide to take matters into their own hands and destroy these symbols of authoritarianism. The just described examples of iconoclasm from below were all clearly political acts and were also received as such by the public. The activists and students also openly admitted to the acts on Social Media, making the importance of the matter for these people even more obvious. The third caesura which will be discussed in the following two chapters also made use of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice' content. For the purpose of this thesis it was important to show that the event at the Cihu Mausoleum is not an isolated incident, but that these acts occur quite frequently.

#### 4.7.1. The Cihu Mausoleum's “vandalism” in 2018: course of events

The third caesura deals with an act of vandalism that occurred on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2018, the 71<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the 228 Incident. In this case, a group of civilians decided to wilfully damage the Mausoleum and stage a protest there, consequently breaking the law.



**Activists splashing red paint.** Image via Taipei Times. Available from: <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/03/01/2003688461>



**Activists splashing red paint.** Image via udn.com. Available from: <https://udn.com/news/story/7321/3708315>



On the day of the vandalism hundreds of demonstrators in Taipei were also calling on the government to officially list the persons responsible for the 228 Incident and to open the remaining restricted records (Chung et al. 2018). The protesters at Cihu splashed the black marble sarcophagus and the altar behind it with red paint which symbolized the blood of the countless victims of the 228 Incident and White Terror period. Hurling the paint at the resting place of Chiang Kai-shek was a method to identify him as one of the main culprits of these episodes. The protest group consisted of roughly ten students and activists (cf. Hong Kong Free Press 2018). The act was carried out under the name of the pro-independence group “From Ethos to Nation” (*Mánfān dǎoyǔshè* 蠻番島嶼社), the same group that splashed the statue at the Memorial Hall in Taipei with paint. They claimed responsibility for the vandalism on their Facebook Page (Kuan-lin et al. 2018). In their statement they criticized the government for spending financial resources on the Mausoleum and memorialization of Chiang Kai-shek and his son. Furthermore, they stated that as long as people in Taiwan keep worshipping the past dictator, Transitional Justice cannot be achieved.



**Activists presenting banner.** Image via Hong Kong Free Press. Available from: <https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/02/28/video-taiwan-protesters-hurl-red-paint-former-ruler-chiang-kai-sheks-coffin/>

The group also held up a banner which called for the abolition of Chinese authoritarian rule<sup>32</sup> and the establishment of the Republic of Taiwan<sup>33</sup> (cf. Hong Kong Free Press 2018). For many Chiang Kai-shek and his authoritarian regime are synonymous with the current People's Republic of China's claim of Taiwan. They feel like in an authoritarian regime, they still do not have the right to govern themselves with China continuously claiming Taiwan as its territory (cf. Agence France-Presse 2018). Thus, in this instance protesting Chiang's legacy is paralleled with the resistance of China's legitimacy claim over Taiwan. Similar as during the personality cult discussed in chapter 4.1., Chiang Kai-shek is synonymous with China itself. "From Ethos to Nation" justified their act in being consistent with the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, saying their hopes that the Commission would swiftly rid Taiwan of authoritarian symbols had been deceived. They also specifically quoted the Taoyuan Municipal Government's online tourism guide for the Cihu Mausoleum, which described the site as a 'sacred ground where people from around the world reminisce about a great man'. The passage was removed the same day the vandalism took place (Hsu 2018). The guide now reads 'commemorate Chiang Kai-shek in the solemn hall'<sup>34</sup>. For the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park on the other hand, the wording was apparently not revised in accord to the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, as they promote the Park as a place where one can 'commemorate Chiang Kai-shek's countless and great achievements'<sup>35</sup> (cf. Taoyuan Travel). After the vandalism the Ministry of National Defence instructed the local police to investigate the event and additionally decided to station more guards at the site as a precaution. Former president Ma Ying-jeou also commented on the protest action, by calling it an act of vandalism and stressing that Chiang had also made positive contributions to Taiwan. According to Ma, Chiang protected and rebuilt Taiwan, but as head of state at the time he should also bear the responsibility for the White Terror and the 228 Incident (Chung et al. 2018). Chiang Wan-an (*Jiǎng Wàn'ān* 蔣萬安), Chiang Kai-shek's great grandson also commented on the incident, saying that he felt distress and sorrow. Such an action would only deepen the societal divide and not foster social harmony. He also advocated a burial of the

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<sup>32</sup> For their banner the protesters used a derogatory term for „China“, namely *Zhina* (支那). The colonial term was originally used by the Japanese and is generally considered discriminatory.

<sup>33</sup> *Qùchú zhīnà wēiquán chóngjiàn táiwān gònghé* 去除支那威權重建台灣共和

<sup>34</sup> *Zài zhuāngyán sù mù de tīngtáng miǎnhuái jiǎng gōng guòwǎng* 在莊嚴肅穆的廳堂緬懷蔣公過往 (cf. Taoyuan Travel)

<sup>35</sup> *Miǎnhuái jiǎng gōng guòqù de fēng gōng wěiyè* 緬懷蔣公過去的豐功偉業 (cf. Taoyuan Travel)

two Chiangs at Wuzhi Cemetery or a local cemetery but stressed that he would respect the beliefs of the older Chiang generation (Zhang 2018).

On April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2018 various supporters of Chiang, including KMT politicians and retired military officials, voiced their concern about the vandalism of the Mausoleum. They gathered at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and demanded protection for the generalissimo's legacy. They were worried that the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice would completely strip Taiwan of Chiang's relics and ultimately repurpose the Memorial Hall (cf. Agence France Presse 2018).

After the vandalism the Mausoleum was closed for the first time on the anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek's death day on April 5<sup>th</sup> and coincident Tomb Sweeping Day. The public could not enter the site to commemorate the late president. Still, former president Ma Ying-jeou accompanied by other KMT officials obtained permission to enter Cihu. The Daxi District Veterans Association (*Dàxīqū tuìwǔ jūnrén xiéhuì* 大溪區退伍軍人協會) which gathers at Cihu every year to pay their respects were not allowed to enter and therefore instead had to bow and lay down their flowers in front of the entrance gate which is quite remote from the actual Mausoleum. This is obviously the reason why there were less tourists visiting the site in comparison to the year before (Wang 2018).



**Ma Ying-jeou at Cihu Mausoleum on April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2018.** Image via Liberty Times Net. Available from:  
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1190205>





**People bowing in front of the entrance gate of Cihu Mausoleum on April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2018.** (Photo via [dailynews.sina](http://dailynews.sina.com). Available from: <http://dailynews.sina.com/gb/tw/twpolitics/phoenixtv/2018-04-05/doc-iwcwuqni7070633.shtml>)

Eleven people, including six university students were charged in June 2018 by the Taoyuan District Prosecutor's Office, with the plaintiff being the Reserve Command of the Ministry of Defence. The prosecutor's office stated that Taiwan protects any historical and political interpretation and belief but that the expression of these still needs to abide the law (cf. Agence France-Presse 2018). The protesters were charged with publicly insulting and damaging a tomb<sup>36</sup> and public memorial site<sup>37</sup>, as well as obstructing public service<sup>38</sup> due to pushing a security guard. The trial was held at the Taoyuan District Court. Seven of the defendants used Taiwanese (*Táiyǔ* 台語) throughout the hearing, stating that they did not speak Mandarin. Consequently, a court interpreter was ordered to interpret between Mandarin and Taiwanese (Zeng 2019). Insisting to speak Taiwanese and simultaneously stating that they do not speak Mandarin reinforces the activists' demand for a Republic of Taiwan which is independent from the Peoples Republic of China.

<sup>36</sup> *Gōngrán wǔrǔ fénmù* 公然侮辱墳墓 (Zeng 2019)

<sup>37</sup> *Gōngzhòng jìniàn* 公眾紀念 (Zeng 2019)

<sup>38</sup> *Fángài gōngwù* 妨害公務 (Zeng 2019)

At a press conference before the trial the defendants also expressed four demands – a complete removal of authoritarian relics; a stop of using Taiwanese resources to worship dictators; the closure of the Chiangs Culture Park because authoritarian heritage is not a tourist attraction; freedom of speech should not be something “granted” by the Republic of China, but is a basic human right of the Taiwanese people, which is why the rule of the Republic of China should be terminated and a new state erected (cf. Central News Agency 2018).

Moreover, as already discussed earlier a few hours before the start of the trial other members of “From Ethos to Nation” splashed the Chiang Kai-shek statue and KMT emblem of the Memorial Hall in Taipei with red paint. They held up the same banner as in the protest at Cihu calling for a Republic of Taiwan. They stated that true reconciliation should not mean making compromises with conservatives, but freedom and democracy for future generations and an ending of the worship of dictators. They also declared the same demands as the defendants in their press conference (Hsu 2018).

On April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2019 the eleven people<sup>39</sup> were sentenced to a short criminal detention<sup>40</sup> of 55 to 59 days (Zeng 2019). The sentence could also be commuted to a fine<sup>41</sup> of NT\$ 1000 (US\$ 33) per day (Wu 2019). The Reserve Command of the Ministry of Defence spent NT\$ 240,000 (US\$ 8,000) to repair and restore the Mausoleum. Still, there is some red paint which was not removeable and therefore the sarcophagus is permanently damaged. The Ministry stated that with the expression of their opinion the activists harmed the social order and violated property rights, thereby not using legitimate channels to voice their political views. Still, the Taoyuan court classified the vandalism as a “symbolic statement” and not as an “insult” (Zeng 2019). Therefore, they were not found guilty of insulting a grave. The prosecutor however wrote a separate letter to the Taoyuan Municipal Government regarding an administrative fine in accordance with the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, which specifies the penalty for damaging a historic building, as earlier discussed in chapter 4.1. (Wu 2019). Nonetheless, the activists declared that they would appeal the verdict, as the purpose of the protest was to remove authoritarian symbols in accordance with the content of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice (Qiu 2019).

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<sup>39</sup> Li Jiayu (male, 32 years old), Chen Yudi (male, 37 years old), Zhuang Chengyi (male, 21 years old), Guo Runting (female, 23 years old), Guo Yingying (female, 21 years old), Luo Yi (male, 21 years old), Zhou Weili (male, 24 years old), Wang Tengwei (male, 30 years old), Zhang Minqiao (female, 22 years old), Yang Yicheng (Female, 27 years old), Qiu Junxiang (21 years old) (Zeng 2019)

<sup>40</sup> *Jūyì* 拘役 (Zeng 2018)

<sup>41</sup> *Yīkē fájīn* 易科罰金 (Wu 2019)



#### **4.7.2. The Cihu Mausoleum's "vandalism" in 2018: significance for site of memory**

The act of vandalism at the Cihu Mausoleum exemplifies the two different perspectives regarding iconoclasm from below. On the one hand, the activists perceived the act as expression of their political views and in accordance with the Transitional Justice Commission's task to remove authoritarian symbols. Assaulting the resting place of Chiang Kai-shek was a post-humous punishment for the late president and his misdeeds. With the defacement of the Mausoleum these civilians condemned Chiang as an idol and the values in association with his person. By calling on the Transitional Justice Commission to speed up their work during their press conference and demanding the erection of a Republic of Taiwan the activists introduced new values separate from Chiang's Republic of China. On the other hand, the Ministry of Defence regarded it as an unlawful damaging of their property paired with financial costs. The Ministry recognized it as a violation of property rights and as such being an antisocial act. In their eyes it was the symbolic destruction of a public site of memory and as such restricted the Taiwanese people to openly remember.

The iconoclasm from below at Cihu fits into Cohen's classification, that is being a clear-political act. "From Ethos to Nation" made a political statement and the public also received it as such. The vandalism's incentive was tactical, meaning the activists tried to achieve public awareness for their political cause. This is why, there was no need to "decipher" the meaning of the protest. The cause of the act was clear, due to the banner, a statement on Facebook and a press conference before the trial.

To remind us of the initial research question, how did this act of vandalism transform the material, symbolic and functional site of memory? Firstly, the material alteration is quite obvious – the site of memory was to some extent demolished by the red paint and therefore had to be closed for restoration for a certain period of time. During the closure a visit to the burial site of Chiang Kai-shek was refused to the public, restricting the memorial community in a major manner. Compared to the first caesura the physical restriction of the site of memory was very similar, as people could no longer decide on their own if they wanted to go to the Mausoleum to remember or not. On the other hand, it was not initially the government's decision to close the Mausoleum, but they were forced to do so due to the damages of the tomb. The symbolic site of memory was likewise deprived of its meaning. Naturally, by closing the Mausoleum the people could not perform their mourning ritual any longer. They could not salute or bow before the sarcophagus as they used to. Naturally

mourning or commemorating a person can take place at different locations. It is not imperative to stand exactly in front of the mortal remains to pay one's respects to a person. Yet doing so at the actual resting place does strengthen the symbolic meaning. By taking away the option to do so from the community, their site of memory was drastically transformed. Thirdly, as the Mausoleum is protected by the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act as a historic building, the vandalism also violated the law. By damaging the building, which is financed by public funds, they also caused damage to the Taiwanese society itself. Additionally, tourists interested in cultural heritage could not visit the site leading to financial losses for the Daxi residents, dependant on this income. In the activists' eyes they performed a crucial act in promoting societal progress by tearing down a symbol of a violent regime. But from another viewpoint, they caused harm to parts of society, as in the end the taxpayers had to cover the arising costs for the renovation. Focusing on this aspect, their protests had the opposite effect, as again public funds were being used for the former president's resting place. In regard to the theoretical framework of collective memory and counter-memory, the activists clearly spoke out against a Policy of Forgetting. They demanded an unambiguous position by the government regarding the country's past. A stance that openly speaks out about the responsibilities of Chiang and stresses Taiwan's independence from China. Therefore, they obviously side rather with the DPP's policy than the KMT's. They are convinced that the government should only promote a common Taiwanese identity isolated from the Peoples Republic of China. The protesters also demand a stoppage of the Mausoleum's funding which presents a more complex task for state actors. Stopping the total upkeep of the building and the subsidies destined for this cultural heritage site, would probably account to a steady decay of the building, which would lead to a decline in tourism. As already remarked, this still is an important source of income for the Daxi residents which should therefore be taken into account. The incentive of constructing the Chiangs Cultural Park was to promote the area as a tourist hotspot. This is exactly what the activists protest, namely that there should not be any public space, where people can worship and commemorate Chiang. The remoteness of the Mausoleum from the political centre is in the activists' eyes not sufficient, which is why they chose to take their protests right to the spot where people used to commemorate the generalissimo undisturbed and openly. However, "From Ethos to Nation" disregarded a crucial factor, that is stripping the Daxi locals of their only tourist attraction could have massive consequences for the residents. So even though the activists do have an important agenda, they should not ignore other communities' rights and livelihoods. Still, a balance could have been struck by removing the honour guards and their

hourly changing of the guards ceremony. The expenses for the guards of honour are not only quite lavish, but also send a clear signal, that Chiang is a person that greatly contributed to Taiwan and therefore needs to be respected and protected even after his death.

#### **4.8. Fourth caesura: The Cihu Mausoleum's physical transformation in 2019**

The fourth and last iconoclastic measure described in this thesis is the partial physical transformation that followed the renovation which had to be conducted due to the activists' intervention. This measure can be classified same as the first two as iconoclasm from above. The difference however is that this action initially only took place because the previous vandalism forced the administration to take action. If the paint splashing did not occur, the Mausoleum would not have been temporarily closed and it is highly likely that the partial physical transformation would not have been implemented. This last caesura exemplifies that the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice was not only used by civilians for their agenda, but also allowed the government to apply measures that differed from the first two. It also seems as this last caesura was overall the least controversial one. The reason for this will be discussed in the next two chapters.

##### **4.8.1. The Cihu Mausoleum's physical transformation in 2019: course of events**

After the re-opening of the Mausoleum on July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2018 the site had been restored to its former state by the Ministry of Defence. However, some alterations had been implemented before the re-opening. The courtyard of the traditional building and the funeral hall housing the tomb of Chiang Kai-shek are no longer open to the public. The entrance of the Mausoleum was therefore sealed off by a red cordon barrier. Consequently, the wooden panel which previously had shielded the direct view of Chiang's tomb when entering the Mausoleum was removed. Instead it was replaced by a glass panel. This allows visitors to get a glimpse of the tomb without actually entering the Mausoleum. Furthermore, the signs reminding people to bow and show their respect when entering the mourning hall are no longer visible. Logically they are obsolete in front of the barrier, when the entering of the actual mourning hall is forbidden<sup>42</sup>. The Cihu Sculpture Memorial Park and the Mausoleum

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<sup>42</sup> It is not sure if the signs are still in place in front of the tomb for tourist groups who officially applied for entering the Mausoleum on the allowed dates.

are now open six days a week, from Tuesday to Sunday. Yet, entering the Mausoleum will only be possible for the public on January 13<sup>th</sup> (death day of Chiang Ching-kuo), April 5<sup>th</sup> (death day of Chiang Kai-shek) and October 31<sup>st</sup> (birthday of Chiang Kai-shek) after applying online for admission.




**Cihu Mausoleum with wooden panel.** Image via Liberty Times Net. Available from: <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2481795>



**Cihu Mausoleum with glass panel and barrier.** Image via Liberty Times. Available from: <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2481795>

Additionally, the military, police and Taoyuan Municipal Government set up a service centre at Cihu<sup>43</sup>. Military guards are patrolling the scene wearing black uniforms. Also, the honour guards continue to hourly perform their changing of the guards ceremony. On the day of re-opening 3,300 people visited the Mausoleum (Li 2018). The Chiang family initially expressed their wish for the Mausoleum to be publicly accessible in the same manner as before. The Ministry of Defence however declined the family's wish due to reinforced military and security manpower such circumstances would require (Wang 2018).

The photo below depicting the layout of the Cihu Mausoleum makes the now existing distance between visitors and the mourning hall evident. People are no longer able to enter the courtyard of the traditional Chinese building. The entrance is sealed off by the barrier just before the first steps with military guards patrolling at the first elevated platform. The Taoyuan Municipal Government and the Ministry of Defence reached this consensus to safeguard the Mausoleum from further damage and vandalism (Li 2018).



**Layout of Cihu Mausoleum.** Image Chiangs Culture Park; 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2019

Upon my personal visit of the Mausoleum in August 2019 visitors were also quite harshly urged by military personnel to not take any photos of the Mausoleum. That is also the reason why I did not take any photos of the building, except of information panels. While walking from the Cihu Memorial Sculpture Park to the Mausoleum I could spot at least three different

<sup>43</sup> *Yóu jūn, jǐng jí shìfǔ yú yíngqū nèi shèzhì cǐhú yuánqū liánhé fúwù zhàn* 由軍、警及市府於營區內設置慈湖園區聯合服務站 (Li 2018)

locations with military guards carefully watching the tourists. One felt as if doing something forbidden just by strolling around the site, at least that was my personal perception and feeling upon my visit.

#### **4.8.2. The Cihu Mausoleum's physical transformation in 2019: significance for the site of memory**

The placement of the red cordon barrier fits into one of Cohen's classifications of handling vandalism. The method fits his description of a physical approach, whereby building and design improvements are undertaken in order to secure a specific site. The raised number of security personnel can also be categorized as a deterrent resolution as patrol methods were improved. What lacks in this instance are social prevention mechanisms. Same as in the first two caesurae neither the memorial community nor the victims were involved in the decision-making process regarding the alteration of the Mausoleum and as such also the third caesura seems not very inclusive at first glance. But, on a closer look one realizes that more attention to the complexity of this case was given than was with the first two iconoclasms from above. As discussed earlier, at this specific site of memory collective memory and counter-memory collide, which could be the reason the public was not involved in the transformation. The difference to the first two caesurae here is, that the decision-makers tried to not physically alienate a certain community. As such, the restoring of the Mausoleum should not just be perceived as a method to make the vandalism and conveyed message invisible, but an attempt to please both parties. For those people who wish to see the Mausoleum open or depend on the touristic revenue, no major exterior changes were implemented. One could even interpret it as the government's effort to safeguard Chiang Kai-shek's resting place from further insults and damages, same as with the glass walls at the National Chengchi University. As Chiang is an important personality in the founding of the national army, it probably was also in the Ministry of Defence favour to maintain the status-quo (Shattuck 2019:32). As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Defence is still keen on maintaining the current circumstances and at this time does not plan to take immediate action in removing the guards of honour at the Memorial Hall in Taipei (Deaeth 2018) and consequently very likely also those at the Cihu Mausoleum.

One could definitely argue that on the surface the status-quo was kept intact, as the structure of the Mausoleum itself was not changed, nor did the complete closure of the site last longer than needed for the renovation work to be finished. In contrast to the total closure of the first caesura, no protests followed this iconoclasm from above. For those people who detest the

site of memory and wish Chiang Kai-shek's legacy to disappear from Taiwan, at least a considerable symbolic change took place. Although the new barrier might not appear as an important or massive transformation, its impact on the Cihu Mausoleum as a symbolic site of memory was rather significant. Due to the big distance between the visitor spot and the burial hall, the mourning-ritual becomes obsolete. Bowing or saluting twenty something metres apart from the actual mortal remains of the generalissimo would appear rather absurd for most visitors. As people are not only prevented from entering the mourning hall, but the courtyard in general, a physical and symbolic separation between the visitors and Chiang is created. Because it is no longer possible to position oneself right in front of the tomb of Chiang Kai-shek, there is also no longer a need for any official signs reminding the visitors to show their respects and salute. In this aspect the state does no longer control or navigate the mourning-ritual of visitors. Unlike before, through the new alteration the late president now does not seem accessible or consumable anymore. Of course, there will always be some visitors who will not be deterred by the new measures, but it is the author's belief that a steady decline in tourism numbers will be seen in the future. In this respect the implemented measure complies to some extent to "From Ethos to Nation's" protest message, namely ridding Taiwan of public spaces where Chiang Kai-shek can be officially worshipped. Even though the site was not completely closed, at least the commemoration ritual was complicated. Moreover, the functional dimension of the site of memory however did not experience any shift in meaning. The site is still labelled as cultural heritage and thus subsidized by the government and open to the public.

Still, what the last caesura lacked was a clear statement on Chiang Kai-shek's legacy. Though the Chiangs Culture Park can be perceived as a dumpsite of unwanted statues connected to a Mausoleum far from the political centre in Taipei, it can also be interpreted as a park dedicated to one single individual. A simple inscription at the Sculpture Park or at the Mausoleum regarding Chiang's responsibility could make a huge difference to the victims and a further concession for the protesters. As mentioned earlier, tolerating contested sites can also be a method to represent peacefulness and inclusiveness. But remoulding a contested site of memory can also speak for an inclusive community. By adding a new monument or memorial dedicated to the victims of the White Terror and 228 Incident, the Mausoleum would obtain new meaning due to the presence and interaction of the second site of memory. Often people are aware of Chiang's responsibility in these past atrocities, but it is easy to forget those circumstances while visiting the Mausoleum. They are sensible towards the historical discourse, the course of events of the 228 Incident and White Terror, but still they



choose to identify with Chiang Kai-shek as part of their history. This is why a total closure would mean a great cut in their identity and self-perception. As a result, a seemingly unnoticed site far from the thriving metropolis Taipei can lead to such heated discussions.

When dealing with contested sites of memory it is important to present a new beginning. This thesis argues that making the experiences of the victims visible at Cihu would be an important step towards realizing Transitional Justice. The first Transitional Justice progress report states the importance of recording and passing on the violations of historical figures, such as Chiang Kai-shek. The third report also discusses possible transformations for the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (cf. Transitional Justice Progress Report 2018:23), but it is crucial that the Cihu Mausoleum is not forgotten in this discourse. These buildings are both public spaces with the original intent of commemorating the former president and therefore should be treated accordingly. Admittedly, altering sites of memory that are protected as cultural heritage sites, such as the Cihu Mausoleum requires more effort. But one has to recall that the Transitional Justice Commission has the rightful authority to deal with authoritarian symbols in a manner they see fit. The vague wording would open lots of possibilities in this instance. One has to stop looking at this matter only in black and white – leaving the Mausoleum open for the public or closing it. There are countless options that could be implemented. One possible solution that could re-emerge is a re-location and final burial at Wuzhi Mountain Cemetery. Spain demonstrated that such a decision can still be an option after decades (Burgen & Jones 2019). On the other side, a factor that one has to be considerate about is the tourism argument. Daxi does not really provide much touristic hotspots, which is why they are keen on maintaining the Chiangs Culture Park. Such a park, without housing the mortal remains of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo in their Mausoleums would highly likely be obsolete. These two groups – the Daxi residents and tourists – strongly influence the preservation of this site of memory.

While it is impossible to please all parties involved, the most essential aspect is to give the former repressed communities a voice. Of course, the Chiang family has a right to be heard, but the Mausoleum is still maintained with taxpayer's money, which is why the victims and protesters have as much right to voice their thoughts. It is especially crucial for the victims and their families to feel empowered and affirmed that their opinions are no longer overheard or ignored. Although some meaning was taken away from Chiang's supporters by placing the red cordon barrier, nothing really concrete or palpable was presented for the victims. While for example a tourism guide could make a major contribution to clarify historical facts, the Taoyuan tourism guide still regards Chiang as someone who made great contributions to



Taiwan. Even though the passage about the Mausoleum was altered, the Sculpture Park paragraph remained, despite statements that the guide would be revised in accordance with the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice.

When analysing this iconoclastic measure in regard to collective memory and counter-memory, it contrasts with the first two caesurae. The Mausoleum of course is still open, but its symbolic meaning was restricted in a major way. It seems with this measure an attempt was made to strike a balance. It is still possible for the people who want to commemorate Chiang to visit his former residence, but they can no longer worship him directly in front of his mortal remains. The DPP learned from their failed attempt to completely shut down the Mausoleum and as such tried to partially transform the space in order to make it less contested. This approach is the closest to inclusiveness in all four caesurae.

As this last caesura only became effective in July 2018, it is not clear yet if the measure will have further protests or vandalism as a consequence. At least with the recent re-election of Tsai Ing-wen a set-back of her course regarding authoritarian symbols, such as happened with Chen Shui-bian's policies after Ma Ying-jeou took office, is not expected. It will be interesting to follow her administration's work on Transitional Justice and to see how the Commission proceeds with the remaining authoritarian symbols. Furthermore, her upcoming term will show if the transformation at the Cihu Mausoleum is indeed the final settlement for this site, or if it was just the first measure in more to come. As the discussions about repurposing the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall are continuously ongoing, it is not far-fetched to also assume further transformations at the Cihu Mausoleum. However, if the situation as of now is maintained, with no grave protests or criticism being voiced in respect to the transformation, this instance of iconoclasm could be seen as a "win-win" solution. By pushing forward the Transitional Justice Process in other aspects, such as opening political archival records, redressing judicial wrongs or restoring historical truth the administration can set an example for acknowledging the victims' experiences. If the responsibilities of the White Terror and 228 Incident are clarified in the official discourse, certain parts of the Taiwanese society may require less drastic methods in regard to the physical manifestations of Chiang's personality cult. Therefore, the fourth caesura's approach could serve as an example in how to deal with these relics in a more moderate and inclusive manner.

## 5. Conclusion and Outlook

To deal with a country's authoritarian past also implies discussing how to proceed with the physical remnants of that regime. In the case of Taiwan countless material manifestations of the Chiang Kai-shek personality cult are still spread across the today already democratized country. Frequent iconoclastic measures regarding symbols of the former authoritarian leader, whether performed by state actors or civilians, reveal the relevance of examining this phenomenon. The temporary resting place of Chiang, namely the Cihu Mausoleum, as a contested site of memory exemplifies the emotional affect these relics of the past still contain. The back and forth between Taiwan's two major parties, the DPP and KMT, in dealing with the Mausoleum illustrates the island's struggle with a collective memory and common identity. How Cihu was transformed in regard to four distinct iconoclastic measures and what impact physical alterations entailed for the symbolic and functional dimensions of the site of memory, were the research questions this thesis intended to answer. In order to do so, four iconoclastic measures and their consequences for the material, symbolic and functional dimension of the site of memory were examined.

The first caesura, a total closure of the Mausoleum in 2007 under the DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian was followed by protests and criticism from parts of the Taiwanese population itself, specifically from the Daxi residents and naturally the KMT. Even though the Mausoleum as a material site of memory remained, the symbolic and functional reality of the site were no longer existent. Overall, Chen's QuJianghua policy to rid the Taiwanese landscape from the remnants of Chiang had not quite the anticipated effect. Even though many statues, street names etc. in honour of Chiang were removed, the personality cult of the generalissimo was re-energized. Due to certain measures, such as making Chiang's former residences publicly accessible, as well as the KMT's efforts to counter the DPP's policies and stress the positive achievements of Chiang, the late president became again prominent in the public discourse.

The second caesura, the re-opening of the Mausoleum in 2008, was neither a compelling nor inclusive event as well. Even though this iconoclasm from above in comparison to the first one, was longer lasting, as the KMT administration was in office till 2016, it angered countless communities, who felt that the victims of the White Terror and 228 Incident again were being silenced. However, with the re-opening all three dimensions of the site of memory were being reinstated for the memorial community. The thesis showed that the first two caesurae were very similar in their approach. Even though the KMT completely negated the DPP's policy, the two parties' intention was very much alike, namely implementing their

ideology while ignoring other assessments of Chiang Kai-shek and alienating a certain part of society.

The third caesura, an iconoclasm from below, was perceived as a destructive act of vandalism by the Taiwanese public. The activists' action was motivated by the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice issued in 2017, which intends to eliminate authoritarian symbols. They were dissatisfied with the progress of the Transitional Justice Commission's work and took the Act's content as an incentive to frame their protest. The approach of this iconoclasm differed from the first two, not only because civilians undertook the iconoclasm, but also due to the actual damage done to the material dimension of the site of memory. The activists actively tried to damage the Mausoleum with their paint splashing in order to stop the continuous funding by the Taiwanese government and force a permanent closure. As the discussion has demonstrated this caesura cannot be described as a complete success. Even though the activists were able to bring attention to their cause and thereby also the Transitional Justice debate in Taiwan, in the end however it was again taxpayers' money that was used for the renovation and re-opening of the Mausoleum.

The fourth caesura, the physical transformation in 2019, did not cause any major protests or criticism up till now. It allows people to remember Chiang, but otherwise makes it no longer possible to actively worship the generalissimo at his resting place. Shaping this site in a more acknowledging fashion for the victims, such as the Transitional Justice progress report from 2018 similarly stated, did ultimately not take place. Spaces with a complex history, according to the report, should be recorded as such in order to avoid a continuing implementation of a Policy of Forgetting (cf. Transitional Justice Commission Progress Report 2019:28). As of now the material site of memory still exists in its former state. So does the functional dimension, as the site is still protected by the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act and as such its maintenance and protection is secured by subsidies. But the symbolic site of memory does not exist in the same manner as before. The mourning-ritual is complicated by the newly created distance between the visitors and Chiang's remains. In essence, the ritual to actively remember Chiang was made nearly impossible, but the community was neither physically restricted nor alienated from the site. The site of memory now stands as an isolated place, where no community, neither the memorial community nor the people negating this site of memory, can effectively interact with Chiang Kai-shek's legacy. As actively remembering is an integral part of a site of memory, it is debateable if the Mausoleum can still be classified as a site of memory.

The analysis of the four distinct measures supports Taylors argumentation that the QuJianghua policy reenergized the personality cult of Chiang. The closure of the Cihu Mausoleum was followed by protests, vast criticism and an increased tourism boom before the closure in 2007. This confirms the thesis' hypothesis that total iconoclastic measures in regard to this site of memory are not opportune. The back and forth at the Mausoleum exemplify the emotions that can be attached to a certain space. The government's and society's struggle to deal with this site of memory illustrates Taiwan's continuous search for a collective identity.

Labelling the third caesura as just another instance of vandalism falls short of the event's actual importance. One has to begin to assess these acts in a multi-faceted manner, taking the activists' social, political and cultural background into consideration. With their iconoclasm they protested the selective remembering that takes place at the Cihu Mausoleum and consequently the repression of the victims' memories. By insulting Chiang Kai-shek and the values associated with him, they on the other hand neglected the collective memory of other parts of society. Degrading a community's site of memory insults society itself and therefore can be perceived as an antisocial act.

The fourth caesura foremost demonstrates the vague wording of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice and the potential this circumstance contains. The people responsible for the restoration interpreted the phrasing in such a manner, as they had not to completely eliminate or transform the site, which would just be another repetition of the first two caesurae's approaches. They instead decided to limit the access to the Mausoleum in a way that did not seem as a total restriction for the memorial community. This transformation therefore did not completely upset or neglect any community's needs and feelings. This is the reason why the fourth and last caesura seems the most successful one.

This thesis shows that the Cihu Mausoleum requires more complex measures, tailored to the needs of the pluralistic Taiwanese society, than total iconoclastic methods. The discussion of caesura one to three demonstrates that such contentious iconoclasms only alienate parts of society and fosters fragmentation instead of furthering reconciliation. Even though the fourth measure is far from perfect, it does however gravely alter the site's symbolic meaning by implementing only a small physical alteration and as such creates an isolated space with less potential for controversy.

With the recent re-election of Tsai Ing-wen and consequently a continuing DPP administration, the future handling of authoritarian symbols will be an interesting subject for further examination. The focus hereby should not only lie on the still high number of

remaining statues, busts and portraits of Chiang, but also the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the Cihu Mausoleum. These two buildings commemorating the generalissimo still divide public opinions and therefore should be re-evaluated. In both instances this is a highly complex undertaking, as the Memorial Hall is a huge tourist-attraction and landmark in the centre of Taipei and the Mausoleum houses the mortal remains of Chiang making it more difficult to transform the site. However, by the newly implemented entrance restriction it is highly likely that not only tourists, but also the memorial community loose interest in visiting the Mausoleum. Ultimately the absence of people actively remembering Chiang at his resting place would diminish the controversy this space holds.

However, even though there were no notable protests after the re-opening in 2019, this does not ensure the ceasing of any further escalation at the site. With Tsai's re-election her pledge to deal with these contested remnants of Chiang's personality cult should be implemented even more vigorously. The Transitional Justice Commission already took the first steps in clarifying the exact number of objects that need to be addressed, the next step and undoubtedly more complex one will be starting to actively transform, re-locate or eliminate said objects. These developments surely will make an interesting opportunity for future research.

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## 7. Appendix



Image 1 (Chiangs Culture Park 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2019)



Image 2 (Chiangs Culture Park 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2019)




### 1 靈堂Funeral Hall

原為賓館大廳，蔣故總統中正先生逝世後改為靈堂，靈槨長3.2公尺，寬1.8公尺，高1.13公尺，外為大理石；內為銅棺，長2.13公尺，寬0.76公尺，高0.6公尺，重約300公斤，底部計有68朵蓮花浮雕圍繞，故總統入殮時著藍色長袍、黑色馬褂，佩采玉大勳章、國光勳章、青天白日勳章。棺內放置總統生前所用手杖、帽子及三民主義、聖經、四書集注、荒漠甘泉、唐詩等五本書陪殮。

After the late president Chiang Kai-shek deceased, the lobby of the guest house changed into the funeral hall. In the hall, there's a marble tomb in the size of 3.2 meters in length, 1.8 meters in width, and 1.13 meters in height. Inside the marble tomb is a bronze casket in the size of 2.13 meters in length, 0.76 meters in width, and 0.6 meters in height. In detail, the casket weighs around 300 kilograms. Apart from that, the bottom of the casket is surrounded by 68 lotus reliefs. The late president wore a blue gown and a black Mandarin Jacket with 3 medals on it when he was encoffined. The medals are the Order of Brilliant Jade with Grand Cordon, Order of National Glory with Grand Cordon, and Order of Blue Sky and White Sun with Grand Cordon. Inside the casket, people put the cane and the hat that the late president used in his lifetime. Other than that, 5 classic books are included as well. Those books are the followings, Three Principles of the People, Bible, Exegesis of the Collections of Texts from the Four Books, Streams in the Dessert, and Poetry of the Tang Dynasty.

Image 3(Chiangs Culture Park 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2019)



**Statue Map.** Image via Foreign Policy Research Institute. Available from: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/11/transitional-justice-in-taiwan-a-belated-reckoning-with-the-white-terror/>

# Abstract

## English:

In recent years acts of vandalism targeting the physical remnants of the personality cult of former authoritarian leader Chiang Kai-shek have occurred more and more frequently in the Republic of China. The assessment of Taiwan's authoritarian past and the late dictator's responsibilities in the White Terror and 228 Incident often manifests itself in terms of iconoclastic interventions of Chiang's physical manifestations which displays the emotional potential these relics and spaces contain. Various iconoclastic measures, implemented by state actors as well as dissatisfied civilians, regularly aim at these contested sites of memory, revealing the relevance of this phenomenon. Especially during the yearly anniversary of the 228 Incident students and activists take the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction through vandalism. This paper will examine in the form of a case study one of these contested sites, namely the resting place of the generalissimo. The Cihu Mausoleum was the object of various iconoclastic measures. The thesis will analyse how four instances of iconoclasm transformed the Mausoleum's different dimensions as a site of memory, that is material, symbolic and functional. The chosen interventions are as follows: total closure under DPP administration in 2007, re-opening under KMT administration in 2008, activists' protest and vandalism in 2018 and finally partial transformation under DPP administration in 2019. The Transitional Justice Commission promoted by Tsai Ing-wen, as well as Chen Shui-bian's QuJianghua agenda will be classified as iconoclasm from above, while the vandalism fits into the category iconoclasm from below. The thesis argues that three of the discussed instances were overall ineffective, whereas the physical alteration under Tsai Ing-wen being the most successful and reflective one.

## **German:**

In den letzten Jahren treten in der Republik China immer häufiger Fälle von Vandalismus der physischen Überbleibsel des Personenkults des autoritären Führers Chiang Kai-shek auf. Die Bewertung Taiwans autoritärer Vergangenheit und Chiangs Vermächtnis materialisiert sich oft in Form von ikonoklastischen Interventionen und offenbart somit das emotionale Potenzial, welches diese Relikte weiterhin beinhalten. Verschiedene ikonoklastische Maßnahmen, die sowohl von staatlichen Akteuren als auch von unzufriedenen Zivilisten durchgeführt werden, zielen regelmäßig auf diese umstrittenen Räume der Erinnerung ab. Insbesondere während des jährlichen Jahrestages des 228 Vorfalles, einer der blutigsten Ereignisse taiwanesischer Geschichte, nutzen Studenten und Aktivisten die Gelegenheit, ihre Unzufriedenheit durch die Zerstörung von Statuen, Denkmälern und dergleichen zu äußern. Die vorliegende Masterarbeit untersucht in Form einer Fallstudie einen dieser umstrittenen Orte, nämlich die Ruhestätte des Generalissimo – das Cihu-Mausoleum – welches über die Jahre immer wieder Gegenstand verschiedener ikonoklastischer Maßnahmen war. Es soll analysiert werden, wie verschiedene Fälle von Ikonoklasmus die drei Dimensionen des Mausoleums als Raum der Erinnerung, d.h. materiell, symbolisch und funktional, verändert haben. Es sollen vier verschiedene Fälle von Ikonoklasmus diskutiert werden - die vollständige Schließung während der DPP Regierung im Jahr 2007, die Wiedereröffnung während der KMT Regierung im Jahr 2008, der Protest und Vandalismus von Aktivisten im Jahr 2018 und schließlich die teilweise Transformation unter der DPP in 2019. Dabei werden die von Tsai Ing-wen geförderte Kommission zur Vergangenheitsbewältigung, sowie Chen Shui-bians De-Chiang-Kai-shek-ifizierungspolitik als Ikonoklasmus von oben eingestuft, während der Vandalismus in die Kategorie Ikonoklasmus von unten eingeordnet wird. Diese Masterarbeit argumentiert, dass drei der diskutierten ikonoklastischen Interventionen ineffektiv waren, und somit die teilweise Transformation in 2019 die erfolgreichste Herangehensweise darstellt.