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III. Abbreviations

AEAR	Association of East Asian Relations
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DTA	Discourse-theoretical approach
IA	Interchange Association
IR	International Relations
JTEA	Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association
KMT	Kuomintang
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ROC	Republic of China
TJRA	Taiwan-Japan Relations Association

Japanese and Chinese names appear last name first, first name second.

If the actor is principally known through writings in English, then they appear in the standard English order.

1.Introduction

1.1. Recent research on Japan-Taiwan relations

In 1972 Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka normalized relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which automatically meant breaking the diplomatic relations with Republic of China's (ROC) government in Taiwan. The Blue Storm Society together with pro-Taiwan activist Shintarō Ishihara, tried to reverse the normalization. They did not succeed but their actions restrained Tanaka's government in fully accepting the One China principle (Sun 2007, 799). After that time, the main points of contact between Japanese and ROC's governments are the Interchange Association (IA) in Japan and the Association of East Asian Relations (AEAR) in Taiwan (Kawashima 2016, 56). In 2017, The AEAR was renamed as the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association after the Interchange Association, Japan was changed into the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association earlier in the same year (Gerber 2017).

Despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) since 1972 (Fukuda 2018, 298), Japan remains an important actor within Taiwan's foreign policy. At the same time, Taiwan's colonial past, Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes, as well as the actions of major global powers such as the People's Republic of China (China) and the USA, all have an impact on contemporary Taiwan-Japan relations.

In existing research Taiwan-Japan relations had been analyzed from multiple perspectives. Realism perceives both Taiwan and Japan as countries affected by the rise of China, the rivalry among China and the USA, and shifting cross-strait military capabilities (Wilkins 2012, 115). Studies also emphasize Taiwan and Japan's shared history and common values such as capitalism and democracy (Lam 2004, 249), as well as focus on the strategic positioning of Taiwan within the Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle (Matsuda 2010, 140). In his analysis of Taiwan's relations with Japan, Yinan He (2014, 471) treated identity politics as an important domestic determinant of foreign policy preferences and used the Self-Other theory to approach it. Christina Lai (2018, 2) examined the political discourse on identity of South Korea and Taiwan in 1960-1970s in order to explain the different threat perceptions towards Japan after the Second World War, and how they justified their economic policies towards a former empire. Jing Sun (2007, 792) finds three mutually reinforcing processes, indigenous to Japan and Taiwan that influence the changes in their relations: a positive interpretation of the colonial experience, a new bond of democratic identity, and a mutual cultural attraction that enjoys immense popular support. Through those processes Taiwan deepened the legitimacy of its political independence among Japanese elites and public.

There is also a rich research of Taiwan-Japan relations concentrating on describing the shifts in approach towards Japan between presidential terms; Yasuhiro Matsuda (2019, 150) focused on the duality of Japan-Taiwan relations before and during the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes under Ma Ying-jeou

administration; Tse-Kang Leng and Nien-chung Chang Liao (2016, 358) identified Taiwan's hedging strategy's role in shaping relations with Japan, whereas June Teufel Dreyer (2016, 607) wrote about potential deepening of two countries' relationship in the Tsai era. Wei-chin Lee (2018, 2) explained Tsai's strategic alteration towards Japan by the need to counterbalance China's security pressure, whereas Madoka Fukuda (2018, 304) emphasized the impact of the 1990s democratization of Taiwan and the role of President Lee Teng-hui in promotion of relations with Japan.

1.2. Research question and relevance

Material factors, such as trade interdependence and military capabilities etc. are important factors defining foreign policy possibilities, but they have only limited explanatory power within such tangible power-defined scope (Sun 2007, 794). Additionally, Taiwan exists in a complex and ambiguous political space and during history it was often the subject to repeated waves of settlement and colonization, which resulted in a creation of a political identity that was and is constantly changing and open to manipulation (Clulow 2010, 1). Regarding the construction of Japan's identity, Japan's historical memory is one of the dominant components of national discourses, with special focus on the narratives on Japan's imperial and colonial history (Bukh 2009, 13). The role of the "Other" in the construction of the discursive identity is particularly interesting. Japan's construction of Taiwan as the Other also changed throughout its modern history, starting with the discourse on Japan being a "mixed nation" after the annexation of Korea which was utilized to justify assimilation policies and conscription of Koreans and Taiwanese into the imperial Army, following with the post-war "homogenous nation" discourse that drew on the presence of the Taiwanese as the result of imperial expansion that needs to be excluded from the "pure Japanese" population (Oguma 2002, 291).

Due to the both states' shared history, their mutual influences, as well as the spatial proximity that results in the need to respond to similar challenges within the changing international environment, the analysis of Japan-Taiwan relations stands as a representative case for understanding the identity politics. That is why this master thesis investigates the influence of identity politics in both countries on Japan-Taiwan relations. Based on a short literature review, a research puzzle was identified in terms of nonsufficient research concerning Japan-Taiwan relations that applied discourse analytical approach. Therefore, this research contributes to He's approach to Othering by utilizing a discourse analysis in order to enhance the understanding of Japan-Taiwan relations in Taiwan's and Japan's domestic discourses. Drawing on the intertextual research models designed by Lene Hansen (2006, 57) the analytical focus will lie within the official discourse, as well as the wider foreign policy debate. Especially Taiwan's former presidents Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang - KMT) and the current president Tsai Ing-wen's (Democratic Progressive Party - DPP), as well as Japan's former prime minister Shinzo Abe's (Liberal Democratic Party - LDP) speech acts will be analyzed in order to specify the shifts within the identity politics of Taiwan and Japan and the way in which Taiwan/Japan is portrayed in both countries' official discourse.

The goal of this thesis is to answer the following main research question with the help of three sub-questions:

RQ: *How did the construction of Self and Other change over time in the official discourse in Taiwan and Japan regarding their bilateral relations?*

Sub-RQ1: *What are the strategies and argumentation schemes used most frequently in the KMT and the DPP's speech acts regarding Japan, and Japan's government speech acts regarding Taiwan?*

Sub-RQ2: *How did framing of Japan as an Other to Taiwan's Self change from Ma Ying-jeou to Tsai Ing-wen's administrations?*

Sub-RQ3: *How did framing of Taiwan as an Other to Japan's Self change during Shinzo Abe's second administration from 2012-2020?*

Apart from answering the above questions, this research aims to show possible identification processes that coincide with the processes of Othering and the respective identity politics that manifest themselves in both countries' official discourse. The official discourse is centered on political leaders who have the authority to sanction foreign policies, such as heads of state, as well as high-ranked officials who play central roles in executing foreign policies, e.g., Ministers of Foreign Affairs or heads of international institutions (Hansen 2006, 53), such as Taiwan-Japan Relations Association or Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association. The wider foreign policy debate is discussed occasionally, resulting in broadening the analytical scope above the hegemony of the official discourse to include the opinions of the political oppositional parties, academics, and the media (Hansen 2006, 54).

1.3. Case selection

Since the KMT's settlement in Taiwan around 1949, as a consequence of the civil war in China, the two normative axes of Japan and China delimitate Taiwan's imagination of nationhood (Sun 2007, 792). The new immigrants in Taiwan, born outside Taiwan province, became the core of the KMT, which formed a dictatorial regime and enforced martial law. The KMT government aimed at Sinicization of Taiwanese population and forming a base of a counteroffensive against the Communist mainland. Only after the process of democratization began in 1980s, the original Taiwanese who make up the majority of Taiwan's population were allowed to express their own identity, together with the narrations of Taiwanese history or language (Hakka or Hokkien dialects). The election of the DPP government in 2016 (and again in 2020) marks the culmination of the process of Taiwanization of Taiwan's politics, as the native Taiwanese became the central figures in politics (Kawashima 2016, 47). In Taiwan's political system, the President is the head of state and represents the nation in foreign relations (Taiwan.gov.tw, n.d.). Because the KMT and the DPP's stance on the issue of Taiwan's identity, their collective historical memory and their perception of Japan differs significantly due to the ethnic divide between native Taiwanese (represented mainly by the DPP) and Mainlanders (represented by the KMT) (Hwang 2010, 75), this research will include the analysis of the discourse done by the previous

administration of the KMT's former President Ma Ying-jeou and the current administration of the DPP's President Tsai Ing-wen. In order to include the most recent developments in Taiwan-Japan relations, only the events happening in the last decade are analyzed. In Japan, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet form Japan's executive branch. The Prime Minister is the one driving domestic policy and guiding foreign diplomacy (Neely 2016). Since Shinzo Abe served as a Japan's Prime Minister from 2012 to 2020, the analysis mainly focuses on his and his government's official discursive acts.

The questions on Taiwan's legal and international status are not discussed in this thesis. For simplicity reasons, Taiwan is sometimes referred to as a "country" or a "state".

1.4. Thesis outline

The following literature review will illustrate key concepts in the field of national identity and Othering, and the discourse analysis as a chosen method. The brief history of Taiwan – Japan relations during Ma and Tsai's administrations is going to be presented in the following chapter in order to determine the points in history around which the analysis will be employed. Additionally, the history of Taiwan's colonial experience and the impact of Japan is introduced as it holds an explanatory function needed in the empirical study. Subsequently, an analytical framework will be applied in the practical part to the discursive acts connected to the events chosen for analysis. Following the comparative analysis of the case studies, discussions will deal with the implications resulting from potential similarities and differences identified in both approaches. Conclusions will close this thesis with a summary of obtained findings and an outlook in further potential research fields.

2.Literature Review

2.1. National identity and Othering

One can speak about identity in broader or narrow terms, including the universal identity (natural and community identity) and identity within human communities (social and cultural ties) (Zasuń 2011, 1). Within social sciences, there are many definitions of identity and multiple theoretical models regarding identity construction were developed by various humanistic disciplines. The perspective on identity applied by this thesis will be one from the field of International Relations.

International relations or, generally speaking, intergroup relations, are founded on the grounds of identity and the perception of difference coupled with a strong intra-group identification. Identity stays as an important issue not only in political and social sciences, but also in psychology (Zasuń 2011, 6). Studies on IR include issues related to the theory of communication, conflicts and strategies for solving them. Perfect examples of IR's thematic interests can be the different orientations of individuals and groups towards their own nation, which come with a number of terms: "national awareness and identity",

"national assertiveness", "national loyalty", "national pride", "patriotism", "pseudo-patriotism", "national chauvinism" or even "xenophobia" and "nationalism". Each of these orientations or attitudes, has its own specific emotional, cognitive, and behavioral components. A person's relationship to their own group can be defined as an attachment, a sense of superiority or domination, as an identification that includes or excludes the values of "alien" groups (the Other), or it can finally be called an act of sacrifice that are conditioned by feelings of patriotism (Zasuń 2011, 6).

Similarly, the national identities form against the foreign Other(s). According to Ruth Wodak (2009, 31), national identity is based on the formation of sameness and difference. On the other hand, Jacques Lacan understood identification as an unstopping process implicated in each moment of engagement with words of the Other (Neill 2013, 5). Lacan also emphasized that identity is fundamentally gained in the gaze of the powerful and that it is language that plays a central role in constituting identity (Jensen 2011, 64). Therefore, the discourse analytical approach, discussed in the next subchapter, serves as a helpful tool to analyze the constructions of identity.

There is a difference between the way mainstream IR theories treat the Other and the position of poststructuralists or constructivists. Realists consider the Other mainly as a threat, and typically they focus on the need of the Self to defend itself against the Other. On the other hand, cosmopolitan scholars perceive world politics as increasingly globalized and culturally homogeneous, which makes them overlook the forces of identity and diversity (Tsygankov 2008, 765). When it comes to the structuralist understanding of identity formation inherent in the concept of Othering, it can be grasped as dichotomous relation between Self and Other. This comprehension is still based on an assumption that the power to construct identity lies with the powerful one, regardless of whether it is Self or Other, which contrasts with the realist approach (Jensen 2011, 63).

Contributing heavily to poststructuralist theory, David Campbell contended that discourses on foreign policy constitute the state's identity through constructing Others and representing these Others as different and threatening to the Self (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2019, 288). According to Campbell, world politics is characterized by flux and uncertainty that results in a crisis of representation making identities unstable and in doubt (Laffey 2000, 434). Representations of difference not only affect interaction on the international stage, but also regard issues of competition for leadership, the rise of new actors, levels of friendship and hostility, and the perception of threats and resulting policies implemented (Reinke de Buitrago 2012, 14). Indeed, Othering can play a major role in the shaping of foreign policy. Competing Othering discourse will steer policy preferences towards confrontation, or distancing from the Other (He 2014, 474). Interestingly, to a greater degree than other forms of community, nationalist attitude demands a more violent relationship with the Other (Laffey 2000, 436).

Simultaneously, a positive Othering discourse would advocate cooperation with the foreign country in question. Thus, identity politics is a powerful player in foreign policy development (He 2014, 474). The

Other does not have to stand in opposition to the Self or engage in confrontational behavior. Relations between the two can be cooperative, or even harmonious. The narratives about the national Self are fluid, largely depending on actors and their discursive goals. Moreover, the social boundaries between the Self and the Other are not permanent and their relation can change with paradigmatic shifts (He 2014, 473). There are three main motivations for national Othering: as means for national integration, as a counter-threat when the integrity of a nation is thought to be in danger and as means to legitimize policies, or whole ideologies (He 2014, 473). All of the aforementioned factors also play a role in explaining Japan-Taiwan relations, especially when it comes to the representations of difference and Othering.

Process of Othering is also impacted by geographical proximity, which can motivate and strengthen Othering (Reinke de Buitrago 2012, 17). Such process was also taken into account in works of Edward W. Said, one of the contributors to the Self-Other theory. Based on his postcolonial works “Orient” was described as an imagined geography constructed as Other in a reductionist, distancing and pathologizing way (Jensen 2011, 64). Similarly, another study in which postcolonialism was employed was that of Gayatri Spivak, in which he designed three dimensions of Othering based on the archives of the British colonial power in India. First dimension regards the power understood as the powerful that produces the Other as subordinate. Second is about constructing the Other as pathological and morally inferior. The third dimension of Othering implies that it is the powerful empirical Self, not the colonial Other that owns the knowledge and technology. Therefore, Spivak’s understanding of the identity formation is that the center has the power to describe and the Other is always constructed as inferior (Jensen 2011, 64-65). These theories also have explanatory power regarding the construction of Taiwanese postcolonial identity, and the Japanese perceptions of Taiwan even today.

Lene Hansen (2006, 41-42) has also recognized the importance of spatiality for construction of identity, but she emphasized the equal theoretical and ontological status of dimensions of temporality and ethicality. At the same time, some constructions of identity can be better explained by the use of one of these three dimensions, for example a focus on the temporal identity can be useful for understanding of regional conflicts or development. As for the dimension of ethicality, Othering also concerns the consequences of racism, sexism, class, or the combination of all, in terms of symbolic degradation as well as the processes of identity formation related to this degradation (Jensen 2011, 64).

According to Yinan He (2014, 472), “Self vs. the Other”, or “Othering” is a way to build a sense of common fate and mutuality, which generates national unity. In other words, Othering is a condition for national integration. In the principle that identities exist in relation to others, self-identification is predicated on encounters with the outside world. However, the Other can be different ethnic, religious or political actors inhabiting the same territory as the Self, or it can be other nations that interact with the Self in a political or historical context (He 2014, 472).

In fact, many national identities are defined in relation to one dominant contrast and national sentiments can be stimulated through the development of abstract self-other distinctions mediated by symbols (Eriksen 1995, 430-431). Processes of identity formation include dichotomization – establishment of identity vis-à-vis the other or complementarization, which is based on creation and reproduction of a comparative terminology, or a shared language, for comparing group characteristics that results in the ability of a group to present itself as a ‘culture’ which is equal but different in comparison with another group (Eriksen 1995, 434). Such dichotomization and complementarization processes are also visible in identity politics of the DPP and the KMT in Taiwan.

Commemorating the past through the founding of museums, staging commemorative events aimed at celebration of victories, end of wars, etc., all aim at marking the end of a collectively perceived traumas. Most often, success stories are discursively constructed and serve to unify citizens and create hegemonic narratives of national identity (Wodak and Richardson 2009, 231). Events aimed at commemoration of the past also serve to distinguish between agonistic struggles and conflicting interpretations, so that only one past can exist and one narrative, or a set of narratives which interprets the event are allowed for reflection. (Wodak and Richardson 2009, 231).

With reference to Todorov’s framework, Beyza Tekin (2010, 14) describes Todorov’s three level analysis of Othering. On the first level – axiological – the Self determines the value of the Other, if it’s “good or bad” and decides if the Other is identical or different from the Self. The Self then determines if it’s superior or inferior to the Other. On the second – the praxeological level – the relation to the Other can change depending on the value that was assigned to the Other on the axiological level. An appropriate approach is decided whether the Self should build rapport or distance itself. The praxeological response to the axiological value of the Other can be indifference, submission of Self to Other, or submission/assimilation of Other to Self. The third level is epistemic and determines whether the Other is known or not (Tekin 2010, 15).

Table 1 Literature review on Identity formation and Othering: main approaches and their assumptions. Source: Author based on Literature Review.

Approaches to Identity Formation/Othering	Main assumptions
Wodak (2009)	National identity based on the formation of sameness and difference
Lacan (Jensen 2011)	Identity fundamentally gained in the gaze of the powerful; language plays a central role in constituting identity
Realism (Tsygankov 2008)	Other seen mainly as a threat, emphasis on the need of the Self to defend itself against the Other.
Structuralism (Jensen 2011)	Identity forms through dichotomous relation between Self and Other. The power to construct identity lies with the powerful one, regardless of whether it is Self or Other
Campbell (Aydın-Düzgüt and Rumelili 2019)	Discourses on foreign policy constitute the state’s identity through constructing Others and representing these Others as different and threatening to the Self

Spivak's three dimensions of Othering (Jensen 2011)	1) the powerful produces the Other as subordinate. 2) construction of the Other as pathological and morally inferior. 3) it is the powerful empirical Self, not the colonial Other that owns the knowledge and technology
Hansen (2006)	Importance of the equal theoretical and ontological status of spatiality, temporality and ethicality for construction of identity
Eriksen (1995) two processes of identity formation	1) dichotomization – establishment of identity vis-à-vis the other; 2) complementarization - creation and reproduction of a comparative terminology, or a shared language, for comparing group characteristics
Wodak and Richardson (2009)	Events aimed at commemoration of the past serve to distinguish between agonistic struggles and conflicting interpretations of the past, as well as create an allowed and preferred narrative of the past
He (2014)	Identities exist in relation to others and self-identification is predicated on encounters with the outside world. 3 motivations for national Othering: as means for national integration, as a counter-threat when the integrity of a nation is thought to be in danger, as means to legitimize policies or whole ideologies
Todorov's framework of Othering analysis (Tekin 2010)	Three level analysis of Othering. 1) axiological – the Self determines the value of the Other; 2) the praxeological level – the relation to the Other changes depending on the value that was assigned to the Other on the axiological level; 3) epistemic level – the Other is determined to be known or not

2.2. Discourse analysis

2.2.1. The role of language in the discourse analysis

There is no unified approach towards analyzing discourses, but the discourse analysis must be regarded as distinct from other forms of textual analysis, such as content analysis or thematic analysis (Caulfield, 2019). Starting within the field of psychology, discursive psychology criticized logical empiricism that is usually applied to social sciences, and offered alternative approach based to a large extent on the philosophical views of i.e., Michel Foucault or Jürgen Habermas (Zajacova 2002, 25). Concerning the roots of discourse analysis, authors such as Foucault and Habermas linked a critical program, that regarded language, as a central parameter in power relations, and discourse as a core dimension of society. According to them, discourse was mainly a sociological concept, used to convey power dimensions in social life (Holzscheiter 2014, 149). The basic assumption is that the world is socially constructed and that our knowledge and understanding of the environment is produced and maintained in communications with other members of the society (Zajacova 2002, 26).

Constructivist scholars developed the methodology of discourse analysis by adapting linguistics methods. Predicate analysis focuses on the analysis of linguistic practices (use of verbs, adverbs, and adjectives attached to nouns) in order to distinguish relational differences and hierarchies within discourses. Metaphor analysis treats language as an instrument and the IR system as a discursive

structure based on the use of certain metaphors affecting people's thoughts and actions (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2019, 290-291).

On the other hand, there exist techniques of quantitative corpus linguistics such as relative frequencies, correlations and collocations with context. Using such methods allows for elimination of subjective bias, but the ability to find and analyze meanings is lost (Chilton, Tian and Wodak 2012, 5).

2.2.2. Poststructuralist approaches to discourse analysis

The poststructuralist research paradigm not only recognizes constitutive force of discursive practices, but also recognizes that people are capable of exercising choice in relation to those practices (Davies and Harre 1990, 45). Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre (1990, 45) argue that the constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its provision of subject position that incorporates a conceptual repertoire (images, story lines, concepts, metaphors), and a location for individuals within the structure of rights - an idea of importance of positioning in the discursive production of selves. Poststructuralist theorists of international relations introduced multiple methods of discourse analysis, e.g., genealogical and juxtapositional methods. Genealogical method of analyzing the evolution of discourses aims at deconstructing the specific historical socio-political contexts that contemporary discourses rely on to maintain their hegemonic status. Juxtapositional method serves to denaturalize and discredit dominant discourses by contrasting them with alternative narratives (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2019, 288).

Drawing on the poststructuralist approach, Hansen (2006, 52) proposes the Intertextual analysis as a method to analyze discourses. The intertextual reading would analyze discourse on three levels; firstly, how identity and policy are articulated within the original text; secondly, how are these constructions represented in later re-readings; third, how the original text and re-readings compare (Hansen 2006, 52). There are three possible research models for conducting intertextual analysis. The first one aims to evaluate the construction of identity within an official discourse in which the objects of analysis are e.g., political leaders, high ranked military staff or senior civil servants. The second model's analytical scope is broader in scope and takes a wider foreign policy debate into account. Its' analytical objects include political oppositional parties, the media, or corporate institutions. The second research model is especially helpful in providing indication of how official discourse might change, either via adjustment made by the present government or a change in the government itself. The third model focuses on how popular representations reproduce or contest those of official discourse and how representations transfer between the spheres of politics and entertainment (Hansen 2006, 53-55). Chosen Hansen's models are used in the research design of this thesis.

2.2.3. Discourse analysis as a method to identify hegemony and injustice.

Similarly to poststructuralists, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) acknowledges the historical and cultural specificity of discourses, but it also assumes that the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourses (Wodak 2009, 8). Ruth Wodak's (1989, XIV) opinion about the main

function of critical analysis is that it should not be descriptive and neutral but that it should show injustice and inequalities and take side with those less powerful.

Regarding the identification of injustice and inequalities within discourses, postmodernists argue that objective knowledge is an illusion, and that the difference between scientific and other ways of knowing (often discredited as prejudice, ignorance, and myth) is actually a discursive strategy used to legitimate the perspective of society's dominant groups at the expense of marginalized (Miller 2000, 318).

Similarly to the postmodernist stance, the Discourse-theoretical approach (DTA) proposed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is positioned within poststructuralist and post-Marxist frameworks, and uses analytical tools of hegemony and antagonism to define the construction of an 'us' as a political identity. The logic behind DTA approach is that hegemonic projects' ultimate goal is to construct and stabilize systems of meaning, at the same time such hegemony is always met with resistance from antagonistic forces that operate in a discursive field (Filimonov and Svensson 2016, 52).

Feminist scholars are also aware of political nature of discourse and argue that discourse is often gendered and that it forms one the main means through which oppressive norms and social practices, including patriarchy, are constructed and reproduced (Speer 2005, 1).

According to Hansen (2006, 40), who applied poststructuralist approach in her research on the discourse analysis and the Bosnian War, the processes of linking and differentiation provide methodological tools and concepts for a systematic analysis on how discourses construct stability, where and when they become unstable, how can they be deconstructed, and the processes through which they change. She proposes the aforementioned intertextual analysis as a best method to answer these questions.

2.2.4. The role of history in the discourse analysis

'Sydney School' of functional linguistics' discourse semantics focuses on recording and interpreting the past. The issues of who speaks about the past and in what terms in a postcolonial world stand at the core of the analysis (Martin 2003, 19).

On the other hand, Vienna School of Discourse Analysis (Discourse-Historical Approach DHA) is situated within CDA and the philosophical and sociological tradition of Critical Theory. The focus of historical and political topics lies on the historical dimension of the discursive acts. It attempts to integrate historical background and the original sources in which discursive events take place (Wodak 2009, 7). In contrast to the CDA, Viennese Critical Discourse Analysis places more emphasis on the establishment of the linguistic relations between specific linguistic subsystems and social structures in order to explore the specific social significance, rather than on the linguistic system itself (Wodak 2009, 9). Additionally, the discursive construction of the "us" and "them" dichotomy is a central focus of the discourse-historical approach (Aydın-Düzgüt and Rumelili 2019, 295).

Regarding the DHA, Martin Reisigl (2017, 54) lists two challenges an analyst is challenged with when analysing the historical dimension of discourses: 1) the time-relatedness of the internal perspective and the one of the researchers, meaning that both the historical discourse participants' perspective and the present perspective must be taken into consideration; 2) the discrepancies between asserted and lived continuities and discontinuities that can be detected in the national rhetoric.

2.2.5. Discourse and National Identity

Apart from the historical dimension, the Discourse-Historical Approach is concerned with the areas of discourse studies such as discourses on identity, discrimination (nationalism or ethnicism) and politics (Reisigl 2017, 48). That is why it was chosen as a main approach in this thesis. The discursive strategies listed below are discussed in greater detail within the Analytical Framework.

Wodak (2001, 73) recognizes five main discursive strategies that are involved in the positive-Self and negative-Other presentation. The strategies are defined as a more or less intentional plans of practices aimed at achieving a particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic aim. The main discursive strategies include nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, and mitigation and intensification strategies.

Dimensions of DHA analysis regarding the national identity include contents, strategies, means and forms of realization. The contents' major thematic areas are the narration and confabulation of a common political past (founding myths, political successes, times of prosperity and stability, defeats and crises); the linguistic construction of a common political present and future (citizenship, current and future political problems, crises and dangers, future political objectives and political virtues); the linguistic construction of a 'national body' (extension, delimitation, physical national artefacts), and the linguistic construction of a common culture (topics of language, religion, art, everyday culture, science, technology) (Wodak 2009, 30-31). According to Wodak, strategies are more or less accurate and intentional plans of practices aimed at achieving a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim (Wodak 2001, 73). On the macro-level, Wodak (2009, 8) distinguishes discursive strategies of construction, perpetuation/justification, transformation, and dismantlement. Strategies can occur simultaneously during a discursive act (Wodak 2009, 33).

2.2.6. Discourse and Positionality

Positionality describes the way people are defined by their location within shifting networks of relationships rather than fixed identities. This implies that the way we perceive and interpret the world depends on social negotiations and hegemonic strategies of representation. Factors such as race, gender, class, as well as historical, political and social settings position people before they are born (Nkonyane 2014, 167). The positionality of discourse is always constructed and non-universal due to the fact that the meanings and reality, or the "situated meanings" change over time, between different "cultural

models,” as well as with the “discursive construction,” that is due to the power dynamics in setting language that controls how concepts are understood (Gee 2011, 99).

Table 2 Literature review on discourse analysis: main approaches and their assumptions. Source: Author based on Literature Review.

Approaches to discourse analysis	Main assumptions
Feminism (Speer 2005)	Discourse as a mean through oppressive norms and practices are constructed and reproduced
Genealogical method (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2019)	Deconstruction of the specific historical socio-political contexts that contemporary discourses rely on to maintain their hegemonic status
Juxtapositional method (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2019)	Denaturalization and discreditation of dominant discourses by contrasting them with alternative narratives
Intertextual analysis (Hansen 2006)	Three-level analysis: 1) how identity and policy are articulated within the original text; 2) how are these constructions represented in later re-readings; 3) how the original text and re-readings compare
Postmodernism (Miller 2000)	Objective knowledge is an illusion and a discursive strategy used to legitimate the perspective of society’s dominant groups at the expense of marginalized
Sydney School (Martin 2003)	Focus on postcolonialism. Subject of analysis: by whom and how is the postcolonial experience described
Predicate analysis (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2019)	The analysis of linguistic practices in order to distinguish relational differences and hierarchies within discourses
Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak 2009)	Situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourses
Vienna School of Discourse Analysis (Wodak 2001; Reisigl 2017)	The emphasis on the historical dimension of the discursive acts Focus on the specific social significance, rather than on the linguistic system
Positionality (Gee 2011)	The positionality of discourse is always constructed and non-universal

2.3. Japan and Taiwan’s identity constructions

Construction of the discourse involves the justification of policies by politicians, as well as the processes of gaining recognition for the policies within specific historical contexts (Lai 2018, 8). Therefore, it is crucial to contextualize the current developments within the history and respective historiography of Japan and Taiwan, especially when it comes to the constructions of identity.

Since the 19th century encounters with the West, Japan has constantly reproduced its identity in the context of its relations with the more powerful and modern Other – the West (Iida 2002, 4). Asia stood as another Other to Japan-Self, and Japan felt the need to differentiate itself from Asia in order to escape the fate of becoming a “barbarian nation” that stands at the periphery of civilization, as well as maintain political and cultural independence. Hence, via engagement with Western discourse on the Orient, Japanese historians created independent Oriental (Chinese) history. Subsequently, the Japanese

historiography described Japan as a nation that emerged from the Orient in the past but developed and modernized in fashion comparable to that of the West (Bukh 2009, 17).

Apart from the West and Asia, there were multiple Others that influenced the construction of the discourses on Japan's national identity. The homogeneity discourse had differentiated and constructed the "Japanese" against Others such as the minorities (the Ainu or Ryukyuans) or colonial subjects (Taiwanese and Koreans). These Others were excluded through the "pure Japanese" discourse or incorporated into Japan's national body through the "mixed Japanese nation" theory (Oguma 2002, 3-15). The theories served as argumentation schemes for different goals, for instance the "mixed nation" theory was used in justifying the assimilation policies in the colonies and the conscription of Koreans and Taiwanese into the Imperial Army (Oguma 2002, 291). In 1910s, the discourse of Asianism grew in popularity. Asianism constructed Asia in either depoliticized terms, or as the colonial enterprise of Japan, which has already colonized Taiwan, Korea, and later, China (Ida 2002, 23).

Regarding Taiwan's colonial period, Japanese presence in Taiwan grew as Meiji officials took advantage of the weak power of Qing dynasty and claimed right to civilize savage periphery of Taiwan. Since formal colonization in 1895 that came with the Treaty of Shimonoseki (which concluded the first Sino-Japanese War), Meiji lawmakers erected an unstable and contradictory legal structure that sought both to integrate Taiwan politically into the Japanese empire (e.g. by the extension of the Japanese Constitution to its new domain), but also to ensure clear divisions between the colonizer and colonized nation (Clulow 2010, 2). As an example of such legal solutions was that Taiwan was the only Japanese colony recognized by Western powers that was included in the Japanese Nationality Law, at the same time Taiwanese were excluded from the Family Register Law that worked as a mechanism for differentiation among imperial subjects (Nomura 2010, 67).

Interestingly, instead of using the term of 'colony', Japan used terms such as 'inner land' (naichi) and 'outer lands' (gaichi) to denote homeland and colonies respectively. It was to distance itself from European imperialism that Japan was fearful of, but also to conceal and legitimize the invasion and occupation of foreign lands, especially since the conquered lands were similar in appearance and culture. Such conflicting emotions about colonialism resulted in the colonial relationship being described in terms of the relational distinction between self and other (inner and outer). It was also the criticism of investing in colonies at home that kept Japan from implementation in Taiwan many projects aimed at modernization, such as free public schools or the compilation of a formal family register (Nomura 2010, 69-70). Fong (2006, 161) in his studies about hegemony and identity in the Taiwan's colonial experience claimed that Japanese colonizers achieved a 'weak hegemony' by polarizing Taiwanese population into two types of membership: a 'modern' Japanese-based identity for the elites, and a traditional Chinese identity for the masses.

The assimilation policy only intensified after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937: Chinese-language newspapers were banned, and imperial subject training centers were established (Huang 2006, 312). Around 200,000 Taiwanese soldiers fought in the Japanese Imperial Army and these troops are also honored at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo (Schreer and Tan 2020, 125). This cultural campaign resulted in the double increase in enrollment in the elementary schools and Japanese literacy in less than ten years. In addition, a planned economy campaign aimed to expand military-related industries and in 1939 Taiwan industrial output outpaced agricultural output (Shōzō 2006, 70).

After that period, the Taiwanese were to a certain degree Japanized, and after the Second World War around 70% of society used Japanese. Therefore, banning the use of Japanese in middle schools and removing Japanese sections of newspapers were major events in cultural reconfiguration implemented by KMT in the immediate postwar period (Huang 2006, 319).

After the war in Pacific, a discursive divide into ‘pre-’ and ‘post-war’ eras was created in Japan, and the past was demonized as a shameful mistake and a sole responsibility of the group of elites (Iida 2002, 5). *Nihonjinron* is a discourse of Japanese uniqueness that developed in 1980s and gave rise to the narcissistic and exclusionary nationalistic voices (Iida 2002, 8).

Taiwan was a settler colony, and its national Self has been defined in response to the perception of its master nations. China and Japan played the most important Others in Taiwan’s self identification. Both Japan and China utilized the identity discourse when trying to engage with the local population. Nowadays, also Taiwan’s creole nationalists draw upon Japanese colonial legacy so that a national identity that is detached from the historical and cultural basis of China is created (He 2014, 471-472). Creole nationalism is a concept describing nationalist movements led by the descendants of the original settlers against the colonial rulers, with whom they share common language and cultural heritage. In Taiwan, such movement emerged in response to the new settlers from China that took over the political control from Japan after 1945 and treated earlier Han Chinese immigrants to Taiwan as second-class citizens (He 2014, 475).

2.4. Japan-Taiwan relations in Ma and Tsai’s eras

Nowadays the younger generation of Taiwanese is fascinated by the Japanese popular culture, and the expressions of nostalgia toward Japanese colonial rule is allowed, but it was not always the case. The positive perceptions of Japanese rule in Taiwan were suppressed for decades by the authoritative KMT’s government (Sun 2007, 792). After the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 and the subsequent severance of diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, Taiwan-Japan relations were lukewarm for almost two decades. Only after the democratization process in Taiwan started in 1990s and the greater freedom for expression of alternative narratives of the Japanese rule and re-imagination of colonial ties was allowed, Japan-Taiwan relations improved significantly and became what Jing Sun

characterizes as “unofficial in name only” (Sun 2007, 790). Today’s administration of Taiwan was brought up under the KMT’s education that portrayed Japanese rule as enslavement. Thus, they lack personal experience of the Japanese colonization period, unlike the former pro-Japanese President Lee Teng-hui (Sun 2007, 803).

Under the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, Japan, Taiwan’s colonial past and the war period were portrayed negatively within the official discourse, as Ma openly criticized Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine; demanding Japan to offer a ‘broader view of history.’ Ma also made a decree that government documents that refer to Japanese ‘rule’ in Taiwan are to be changed to ‘occupation’ (Schreer and Tan 2020, 130).

In 2009 Ma Ying-jeou proposed Taiwan-Japan Special Partnership (台日特別夥伴關係) that included dialogs in the area of security. Although it did not succeed, other projects were implemented, including working holidays, flights between Haneda and Songshan airports, or an exhibition of artifacts from the National Palace Museum in Japan (Kawashima 2016, 56). In 2010, Ma’s politics resulted in the Interchange Association and the Association of East Asian Relations signing the first relatively high joint document issued after 1972: “Memorandum of understanding for strengthening mutual exchanges and cooperation between Japan and Taiwan”.

On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake struck Japan and the Taiwanese provided 20 billion yen in assistance with disaster relief, which was very warmly welcomed in Japan and boosted Japan-Taiwan friendship on the level of society. Also, in 2011 deals such as Japan-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement and open skies agreement were concluded (Kawashima 2016, 57). At the same time, the government failed to formally thank Taiwan for its generosity after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, and in 2012 coastguards on both sides fired water cannons over fishery disputes concerning Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Schreer and Tan 2020, 130).

Japan-Taiwan fishery agreement, which demonstrated a certain degree of resolution of the issues concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, was signed in 2013. The last agreement signed between Ma’s administration and Japan signed in 2015 was the “Agreement between the Interchange Association and the Association of East Asian Relations for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income” (Japan-Taiwan tax treaty) (Kawashima 2016, 57).

In 2015 former President Lee Teng-hui was interviewed by the Japanese magazine Voice, and his remark that “When I was young, I regarded Japan as my fatherland and I fought for Japan.” was criticized by Ma’s administration, showing the contradiction between views on history held by the Taiwanese and the Republic of China (Lim 2018, 64).

Before the election of Tsai Ing-wen in April 2016, an incident in Okinotorishima’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provoked tensions between Japan and Taiwan, after Japan captured Taiwanese fishing

vessels there. In response, Ma commented that Okinotorishima was “a rock, not an islet,” which left the next Tsai’s administration with a need to ease these tensions (Kawashima 2016, 56). However, Kawashima (2016, 55) notes that Japan’s foreign minister Fumio Kishida sent a congratulatory message to Tsai in January 2016 after the elections, and that it was reported that Tsai has visited Japan and met Prime Minister Shinzo Abe “by chance”.

Shin Kawashima (2016, 46) claims that the process of Taiwanization of the Taiwanese society culminated in 2016 with the election of Tsai Ing-wen which not only meant that DPP’s candidate won (as in the case of the earlier victory DPP’s Chen Shui-bian), but also that DPP holds a majority in Legislative Yuan. This process started with the fall of dictatorship, as more native Taiwanese could become central figures in politics, and more people could freely express their own identity, Taiwanese history, literature, folk beliefs, language, etc. It is noteworthy that Tsai Ing-wen was a protégé of pro-Japanese Lee Teng-hui, while Shinzo Abe has strong pro-Taiwanese leaning: his brother Kishi Nobuo has acted as Abe’s contact with the Taiwanese leadership while Abe’s mother has been active in promoting cultural exchange between both sides (Schreer and Tan 2020, 130).

In 2017 and 2018 Taiwan and Japan signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) regarding maritime operations; first one on maritime search and rescue operations and the next two ones on cooperation of the maritime security authorities and scientific research. Additionally, Japan and Taiwan also seem to cooperate in the military field, as Japan has provided retired naval engineers to help with Taiwan’s indigenous submarine building programme (Schreer and Tan 2020, 131-132).

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, Taiwan banned the import of food from the most affected provinces. The food ban was upheld for the consecutive two years in the referendum on renewing the regulations in 2018. The outcome of the referendum stalled Tokyo-Taipei negotiations regarding a full free trade agreement and the admission to the CPTPP and it was widely criticized in Japan (Siripala 2018).

Simultaneously, Tsai’s government no longer attempts to elicit a formal Japanese apology regarding the period of colonization, an issue that was pursued by Ma explicitly. Also, the government did not support the unveiling of Taiwan’s first ‘comfort women’ statue in Tainan in 2018 (Schreer and Tan 2020, 133).

3. Operationalization

3.1. Thesis’ philosophical background and Epistemic goal

Realist approach to epistemology privileges causal research projects over those requiring other sources of knowledge, whereas constructivist approach allows more scope for non-causal theory, but still uses causal testing to assess the theoretical validity of the results (Hansen 2006, 8). This thesis derives the most from ideas of post-structuralism and behaviorism as the leading theoretical approaches. Post-

structuralism focuses on axiology (study of value) rather than on ontic – a physical existence and understands a phenomenon as an integrative part of the system of knowledge and cultural values that produce it (Sandu 2011, 40). Poststructuralists seek to understand how the knowledge is produced and highlight the processes in which sociohistorical forces and discursive practices constrain behavior in a given socio-cultural context (Dickerson 2010, 350). Poststructuralists also do not demand that the theory introduced will be able to uncover causal truths, as they understand knowledge as historically and politically situated (Hansen 2006, 9). Poststructuralism's break with causality should not be seen as a research design's flaw but as an ontological and epistemological choice (Hansen 2006, 25).

The political behavioralists recognize that scientist's choice of topics, observations and interpretation of the scientific evidence can be influenced by values, interests and biases held by him/her (Jung 1974, 18). The behavioral model of verbal communication is based on an assumption that a verbal exchange is a differentially consequential interaction in which each party acts differently and asymmetrically in relation to one another. There are disparities between what is being transmitted by the sender and what is finally received by listener(s) due to the different background ("different life-histories" as verbal creatures) (Andersen 1992, 4-5).

Additionally, the core approach in regards with identity applied in this thesis corresponds to Eriksen's (1995, 435) view on the nature of identity: identities are not static, the compass of the group with which we identify ourselves changes through time, and so do the criteria for that groupness. Poststructuralism's discursive ontology is also deeply intertwined with its understanding of language as an inherently unstable social and political systems of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference (Hansen 2006, 15). Consistent with this poststructuralist's ontological emphasis on language, the practical epistemological focus is on how identities and policies are articulated (Hansen 2006, 20). Therefore, the epistemic goal of this research is to enhance the understanding of processes that affect Japan -Taiwan relations, rather than finding their causes, the truth or justifications.

3.2. Terms and definitions

Definition of a "discourse" most relevant to this research is that of Hansen's (2012, 95): particular representations of the countries, places, or national or institutional Self that foreign policies are dependent upon. To a high extent, discursive acts are responsible for production and construction of particular social conditions, they contribute to maintenance, reproduction, restoration, legitimization, relativization, or transformation and destruction of a social status quo (Wodak 2009, 8). Discourses should be understood more as "framings of meaning and lenses of interpretation," rather than objective, historical truths (Hansen 2006, 6).

3.3. Methodological approach

3.3.1. Research design

According to Reisigl (2017, 53) the discourse historical analysis can be done in three ways. An utterance or a fragment of discourse can be taken as a starting point and then analyzed through relating the present to the past and recontextualization. The second way is done by taking a sequence of functionally or thematically connected utterances or discourse fragments as a starting point, and then reconstructing its historical interrelationships within a specific period. Lastly, the analysis can focus on how different social actors such as politicians portray the past in terms of different semiotic representations regarding the truth or normative rightness (Reisigl 2017, 53-54).

This thesis will mix the second and third way of applying the discourse historical analysis, as both the historical change and actors will be taken into consideration.

Hansen (2006, 47) proposes structuring the research according to three main methodological points. Firstly, the research should focus on a small number of discourses, preferably two to three. The general goal is to identify discourses that articulate different political landscapes and separate constructions of identity. Secondly, the chosen discourses shall be built on explicit articulations of key representations of identity: political concepts, striking metaphors, historical analogies or geographical identities. Lastly, the analysis should draw upon available conceptual histories of the representations chosen, in order to identify past discourses, and to understand the formation of the present discourse (Hansen 2006, 47). The choice of the discourse historical approach is motivated by the last point, while Othering analysis is beneficial for the overall understanding of identity formation.

When designing a research projects centered around discourse analysis, one needs to decide on intertextual models, whether to focus on one Self or multiple Selves, whether to make a study of a particular moment or analyze a historical development, and whether to examine one foreign policy event or compare different policy discourses across a larger number of events (Hansen 2006, 65). A comparative research design with a focus on different Selves' responses to an event can be achieved through expanding the number of selves, but the study can also contrast the discourse of the Self with the Other's 'counter-construction' of Self and Other within a discursive encounter (Hansen 2006, 67-68). As the aim of this thesis is to compare the discourses on mutual relations of both Japan and Taiwan, the discursive encounter is chosen in regard to the number of selves. As for the intertextual model, the second model's focus on a wider political debate will provide the greatest explanatory power regarding the topic, as the third model that investigates cultural representations and marginal political discourses is out of scope of this paper due to the time and space constraints. As for the temporal perspective, the comparative moments are chosen as choosing one moment would have little explanatory power while the historical development would be out of scope. The events will be related by time (Abe's second administration 2012-2020), but also issue – as they must evolve around Japan-Taiwan relations.




Figure 1 Thesis' research design. Author: based on Hansen (2006, 72) elaborated research design for discourse analysis.

3.3.2. Scope of research

Figure 2 below identifies main events that affected Japan-Taiwan relations since the start of Ma Ying-jeou presidency in 2008 chosen from the literature review on the contemporary history in Chapter 2.4. As Shinzo Abe returned to power only in 2012, apart from Tohoku earthquake most of the events chosen are after this date. Tohoku earthquake, the opening of a special exhibition of 70th anniversary of the ROC's victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Okinotorishima Incident, congratulatory messages between Abe, Kishida and Tsai, the food import ban and the negotiations for Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP, as well as the unveiling of 'comfort women' statue in Tainan were chosen for analysis. The discursive acts that accompanied those events in both Taiwan and Japan will be analyzed and compared.




Figure 2 Japan and Taiwan relations 2008-2020: main events. The red circle marks the events chosen for analysis. Author: based on literature review section 2.4.

3.3.3. Choice of material

Poststructuralist discourse analysis gives epistemological and methodological priority to the study of primary texts, such as speeches, interviews, parliamentary debates, presidential statements, and, under a wider media discourse, reportage and editorials (Hansen 2006, 74). However, according to Hansen (2006, 73), historical materials should also be included, while the majority of texts should come from the time under the study.

The analysis undertaken in the next chapter focuses on the political writings and speeches by politicians (mainly the heads of state, as well as high-ranked officials who play central roles in executing foreign policies, e.g. Ministers of Foreign Affairs or heads of international institutions, such as Taiwan-Japan Relations Association or Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association), popular journals, as well as the opinions of mainstream academics that often appear in the media as commentators on Japan-Taiwan relations.

As stated by Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili (2019, 302), it is important that texts are read and analyzed in their original languages, therefore, whenever possible original Chinese or Japanese text will be translated and interpreted.

3.4. Analytical Framework

3.4.1. National Identity and Othering

The othering analysis employed in this paper will be based on He's contribution as well as chosen levels of Todorov's framework: the axiological, and the praxeological levels. The third level of analysis will not be used as it has little explanatory value in relation to this thesis' interest.

As aforementioned, main motivations for national Othering include fight-back when the nation's security is perceived to be in danger, as means to legitimize policies, and national integration (He 2014, 473). The next part of analysis within the analytical framework of Othering will be identification of the axiological level by asking the following questions: Is the Other "good or bad"? Is the Other identical or different from the Self? Does the Self determine itself to be superior or inferior to the Other? Lastly, the praxeological level will be identified by evaluation possible strategies and approaches regarding the relation of the Other and the Self: indifference: submission/assimilation of Other to Self/ of Self to Other, cooperation with the Other, distancing or confrontation (Tekin 2010, 15).

In addition to the main framework based on He (2004) and Tekin (2010), a number of other theories and assumptions mentioned in the literature review will be employed throughout the analysis. Firstly, the assumption raised by He (2004, 473) and Campbell (Laffey 2000, 434) about the fluidity of the narratives about the national Self will be taken into consideration: the narratives depend on the positionality of the actors and their discursive goals and the positions towards the Other are changeable. This will be manifested throughout the whole analysis. Secondly, Spivak's (Jensen 2011, 64-65)

understanding of postcolonialism and identity formation will be especially helpful in the explaining the constructions of Taiwanese postcolonial identity as well as Japanese narratives of its own colonial rule. Lastly, the input of Eriksen (1995) and Wodak and Richardson (2009) on the importance of dominant contrast, national sentiments and events aimed at commemorating the past in the identity formation will be used when determining main narratives about the past designed by various actors.

3.4.2. Discourse-historical approach (DHA)

3.4.2.1. Main discursive strategies within DHA

Due to its comprehensiveness, the discourse-historical approach will be used in the empirical part of this thesis. Below, the aforementioned strategies used in the DHA are explained in greater detail.

The main discursive strategies include nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, and mitigation and intensification strategies Wodak (2001, 73). The purpose of the **nomination strategy** is the discursive construction of in-groups and out-groups, social actors, objects, phenomena, event, processes and actions. The devices of this strategy include i.e. membership categorization, synecdoches, or biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies. The **predication strategy** concerns the characteristics or qualities, either positive or negative, attributed to social actors, objects, events, phenomena, or processes. Evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits as well as implicit and explicit predicates are the devices of the Predication strategy. The **argumentation strategy** aims at persuading addresses of the validity of specific claims, and to approach to this strategy one must start by identifying arguments employed in the discourse. The devices used are multiple topoi – the topics and arguments – that aim at justification of positive or negative attributions. As the next section draws on the discursive strategies regarding identity constructions, the argumentation strategy as a dimension on its own will not be used in the analytical framework – rather the more specific strategies will be pointed out in the course of analysis. The goal of the **perspectivization strategy** (framing of discourse representation) is on positioning the actor's point of view and his or her involvement or distance, and the approach of analyzing this strategy focuses on the perspectives around which the nominations, attributions, and arguments are expressed in the discourse. The last **strategy of mitigation and intensification** regards the way in which the utterances are articulated, and whether the illocutionary force of utterances is intensified or mitigated (Wodak 2001, 73).

3.4.2.2. DHA and identity – dimensions of analysis

3.4.2.2.1. Discursive strategies

On the macro-level, Wodak (2009, 8) distinguishes discursive strategies of construction, perpetuation/justification, transformation, and dismantlement. Strategies can occur simultaneously during a discursive act (Wodak 2009, 33).

Constructive strategies aim to construct a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation (Wodak 2009, 33). Sub-strategies include:

Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation strategy which puts emphasis on similarity or on positive political continuity, Autonomisation strategy of Unification which puts emphasis on the will to unify/cooperate/feel and show solidarity, Autonomisation strategy of Exclusion and Discontinuation that emphasizes the difference between then and now, and the strategy of Avoidance (Wodak 2009, 37-39).

Perpetuation strategies attempt to preserve, support or protect a threatened national identity. Sub-strategies include strategy of Positive Self-Presentation; strategy of Portrayal in Black and White; strategy of Continuation which puts emphasis on positive political continuity, strategy of Defense; and Avoidance (Wodak 2009, 39-40).

Justification strategies are employed in relation to problematic events in the past to restore, maintain and defend a common 'national self-perception' (Wodak 2009, 33). Sub-strategies include strategies of Shift of Blame and Responsibility such as casting doubt, emphasis on extra-national dependence, emphasizing the difference between 'us' and them'; strategies of Downplaying such as Discountinuation, avoidance, or euphemizing and the Legitimation/Delegitimation strategies (Wodak 2009, 36-37).

Strategies of transformation aim to transform a well-established national identity into another identity which the speaker has already conceptualized (Wodak 2009, 33). Sub-strategies include: Warning against Heteronomy (warning against the loss of national autonomy), and Discountinuating strategy which puts emphasis on difference between then and now, or on emphasis on necessary difference between now and the future) (Wodak 2009, 40-41).

Dismantling or destructive strategies aim at dismantling existing national identity constructs, but they usually do not provide a model for replacement (Wodak 2009, 33). Sub-strategies include strategies of Discrediting Opponents and Negative Presentation (of Self/Others) (Wodak 2009, 42).

3.4.2.2.2. Argumentation schemes and means and forms of realization.

The attempt at classifying everyday arguments as instances of argument schemes resulted in creation of topoi or loci (topics and arguments or techniques of argumentation) (Kienpointner and Kindt 1997, 556). They are content-related warrants that connect arguments with the claim or conclusion (Wodak 2001, 74). The most common topoi used in the discourse historical approach include: topos of justice, topos of more/less, topos of danger/threat, topos of responsibility, topos of number, topos of burden or weighing down, topos of reality, topos of law, and topos of history.

Schemes of comparison are those that rely on similarities or differences of entities. One variant of the schemes is the **topoi of justice**, according to which two entities that are identical or similar in particular respects have to be evaluated or treated in the same way. Another variant is **the topos of more/less** or 'locus a maiore/a minore,' which is formulated as norm of action (Kienpointner and Kindt 1997, 565). A scheme of argumentation called '**pragmatic argument**' is a future-oriented causal argument in which

the evaluation of one action depends on the positive or negative consequences of another actions (Kienpointner and Kindt 1997, 566).

The **topos of danger** or the **topos of threat** are formulated on the condition that if a political action or decision might bear threatening or dangerous consequences, one should not perform, or some actions should be done against them. The **topos of responsibility** is based on the following conditionals: if a state of a group of people are responsible for emergence of specific problems, they shall act in order to find solutions to alleviate these problems. Most of the time, this topos is employed to argue against discrimination or for ‘reparations’ or ‘compensation’ for a committed crime (Wodak 2001, 75). A specific causal topos or the **topos of consequence** warrants that ‘something follows as a direct result of something else’ (Wodak 2009, 41).

The warrant of the **topos of numbers** is that if numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should or should not be carried out. The **topos of burden or weighing down** warrants that is a person, institution or a state is burdened by a specific problem, it should act in order to diminish that burden (Wodak 2001, 76). The **topos of reality** is detected as a tautological argumentation scheme which is conditioned on the following logic: as the reality is as it is, specific actions or decisions should or should not be performed or made. The **topos of law** (right) is paraphrased as follows: if a law or any codified norm forbids or prescribes a particular action, the action must be performed or omitted. The **topos of history** implies that history teaches that there are specific consequences of the specific actions, and therefore in a situation which is allegedly similar to the historical example, one should omit or perform a specific action (Wodak 2001, 76).

When it comes to means and forms of realization, the focus of analysis shifts to the linguistic means involved in the discursive construction of national identity that “serve to construct unification, unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt change, autonomy, heteronomy (...)” (Wodak 2009, 35). The most important linguistic means include a) Personal reference (anthroponomic generic terms, personal pronouns, quantifiers); b) Spatial reference (toponyms/geonyms, adverbs of place, spatial reference through persons, by means of prepositional phrases such as ‘with us’, ‘with them’); c) Temporal reference (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, temporal conjunctions, temporal references by means of nouns, semi-prefixes with temporal meaning). Other important means of realization include the referential vagueness, euphemisms, allusions, rhetorical questions, linguistic hesitation, as well as direct or indirect mode of discourse representations, or reported speech (Wodak 2009, 35). In addition, personifications, metaphors, metonymy (replacement of the name of a referent by a name of an entity), and synecdoche (replacement of the name of a referent by the name of another referent of the same but semantically wider or narrower meaning) can be employed mostly within constructive discursive strategies in order to create sameness or similarity between people (Wodak 2009, 43). The deictic expression ‘we’ can also be used as a linguistic means to indicate sameness. ‘We’

can be ‘speaker inclusive’ or ‘speaker exclusive,’ ‘paternalistic,’ ‘historical,’ ‘historically expanding’ or a metonymic form ‘person for country’ (‘national body’) (Wodak 2009, 45-47).

3.4.3. Analytical Framework: Summary

In order to provide the answers to the research questions in the most comprehensive way this paper will apply discourse historical approach based on Wodak’s (2009) and Reisigl’s (2017) works, as well as the Othering analysis based on works of He (2014) and Tekin (2010). It has to be noted that the dimension of content of DHA will not be applied in the Analytical Framework, as the dimension of Motivation within the Othering Analysis covers the explanatory value of this dimension. The analysis follows the categories defined in the Analytical Part and focus on the use of topoi and the choices of discursive strategies in particular. The analytical framework based on a literature review is presented below in the tables 3 and 4:

Table 3 Discourse historical approach: main strategies, sub strategies, argumentation schemes and means of realization. Author’s design based on Wodak (2009, 2011), Reisigl (2017) and Kienpointner and Kindt (1997).

Discursive strategies	Purpose of strategies	Explanation and examples	Argumentation Schemes and Means of realization
Nomination	Discursive constructions of: social actors, objects, phenomena, event, processes, actions	How are they referred to linguistically?	Argumentation schemes: the topos of justice, the topos of more/less, the topos of danger/threat, topos of responsibility, topos of number, topos of burden or weighing down, topos of reality, topos of law, topos of history, topos of changed circumstances, topos of illustrative example, topos of consequence, pragmatic argument
Predication	Discursive characterization of: social actors, objects, phenomena, event, processes, actions	What are their attributed characteristics and qualities? E.g. positive and negative attributions	
Perspectivization	Positioning the actor’s point of view and expressing involvement or distance	From what perspective are the nominations, attributions, arguments expressed?	
Mitigation and Intensification	Modifying the illocutionary force of utterances	How are the utterances articulated? Are they mitigated or intensified?	
Discursive strategies regarding identity	Purpose of strategies	Sub-strategies	
Construction	Construction of a certain identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, or differentiation	Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation (emphasis on similarity, emphasis on positive political continuity); Autonomisation; Unification (emphasis on the will to unify/cooperate/feel and show solidarity); Exclusion and Discontinuation (emphasis on a difference between then and now); Avoidance	

Perpetuation	Preservation, support or protection of a threatened national identity	Positive Self-Presentation; Portrayal in Black and White; Continuation (emphasis on positive political continuity) Defense; Avoidance	Means of realization: Personal references Spatial references Temporal references Referential vagueness Euphemisms, allusions, rhetorical questions, personifications, metaphors, metonymy, synecdoche, Deictic expression 'we'
Justification and Relativization	Restoration, maintenance or defense of "self-perception"	Shift of Blame and Responsibility (casting doubt, emphasis on extra-national dependence, emphasizing the difference between 'us' and them'); Downplaying (discontinuation, avoidance, euphemizing); Compensation; Legitimation/Delegitimation	
Transformation	Transformation of a well-established "identity"	Warning against Heteronomy (warning against the loss of national autonomy); Discountinuating/Dissimilation (emphasis on difference between then and now, emphasis on necessary difference between now and the future)	
Destruction/Dismantlement	Destruction of existing constructs of identity	Discrediting Opponents; Negative Presentation (of Self/Others)	

Table 4 Othering analysis. Author' design based on He (2014) and Tekin (2010).

Motivation	Axiological level	Praxeological level
Countering threats Policies/ideologies legitimation National integration Other (e.g. improvement in bilateral relations)	Is the Other "good or bad"? Is the Other identical or different from the Self? Does the Self determine itself to be superior or inferior to the Other?	indifference submission/assimilation of Other to Self/ of Self to Other cooperation with the Other distancing/ confrontation

3.5. Outline of the analysis

Taking into consideration the points in section 3.3.1. - research design, an initial research into identifying the discursive acts accompanying the most important events in Japan-Taiwan relations based on section 2.4 was done. Subsequently, the events with most informative discursive acts were chosen for analysis. These events are presented in section 3.3.2. - scope of research. After choosing the events and the discursive acts, major themes that the selected discourses are structured around were identified. The major themes include the discourses centered around how Japan and Taiwan frame each other and the discourses centered around Japan's and Taiwan's own past.

In the next chapter, the analytical framework is going to be applied to the speech acts, utterances and other material collected that accompanied the selected events. The findings of the analysis will be presented and compared in the subsequent section.

4. Empirical Part

4.1. Discourses centered around how Japan and Taiwan frame each other.

4.1.1. Japan-Taiwan relations after the Great East Japan Earthquake

4.1.1.1. Introduction

The analysis starts with identifying how Japan and Taiwan relate to one another within their official discourses. The first event identified for the analysis is the Great East Japan Earthquake, or Tōhoku earthquake that hit Japan on March 11th, 2011. Tōhoku earthquake, most powerful earthquake in Japan's history of records, was followed by a tsunami in the north-east coast (Branigan 2011). In a response, Taiwan had contributed monetary donations totaling NT\$6,839.76 million (¥18,740 million), 560 tons of relief supplies were provided by the public and private sector as well as Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 3). Even though the event was chosen before Abe returned to power and became the Prime Minister of Japan in December 2012, it is important to assess the impact the event had on Japan-Taiwan relations in the following ten years.

4.1.1.2. Taiwan's support and (the lack of) Japan's official response

Even though Taiwan's donations surpassed those of the US, South Korea and China, Japan failed to officially thank Taiwan in the earliest public announcement that marked the first month after the disaster had happened. Prime Minister Naoto Kan's announcement was published in newspapers in multiple countries and singled out the contributions of the US, China, Australia, Mexico, and Europe. Taiwan was not mentioned (Bosco 2011). Due to the lack of the official expressions of gratitude, many Japanese citizens individually bought advertisements in Taiwanese newspapers to thank Taiwan for help, and other unofficial events were organized, for instance six Japanese athletes swam from Yonaguni Island to Taiwan in a show of gratitude (The Associated Press 2011). The failure of Japan to thank Taiwan was explained by Japan choosing to ignore Taiwan's humanitarian contribution so that embarrassing China and its relatively small donation could have been avoided (Bosco 2011).

On April 11, 2011, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan has published a private open letter expressing his gratitude to the Taiwanese authorities, among others the Taipei office of the Japanese Interchange Association, and major media (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 3). In the open letter, he wrote "*Thank you for the Kizuna*," a Japanese word 'kizuna' means strong mental linkage between people, which can also be translated into a 'family tie,' 'strong emotional bonds' or a 'thick, heavy friendship' (Agence France-Presse 2011). The use of such positively attributed words shows that the Self perceives the Taiwan-Other as "good," as well as an equal in their mutual relations. On the praxeological level, the emphasis is put on assimilation of the Self to the Other. The motivation for the letter came from the societal pressure to thank Taiwan in an appropriate way.

It was not until September 2011 that the fact that Japan has yet to show gratitude for Taiwan's contributions was raised during a Diet's (Japan's parliament) session. On September 14, 2011 parliamentarian from the Liberal Democratic Party, Yoshihisa Furugawa has pointed out that Japan deliberately ignores Taiwan's enormous donation and friendship. He said: "*Japan should repay kindness with sincerity, which I believe represents the noble spirit of the nation.*" Furugawa added he did not bring the issue up for diplomatic reasons. "*I am making the inquiry as a grateful person.*" (Chang 2011). Furugawa added: "we hope that you will do everything to safeguard Japan's honor as the priority, (...). Japanese are not cowards who don't know how to convey gratitude and repay the kindness" (Taipei Times 2011).

Furugawa uses the topos of justice as an argumentation scheme, as Taiwan was not treated in the same way as other countries were when it comes to the Japan's official expression of gratitude. Additionally, Furugawa uses a Transformation strategy of Discontinuating indicated by the emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future and the use of the topos of consequence. He says that "sincerity" from Japan towards Taiwan should be a direct result of Taiwan's "kindness." Furugawa also uses the emphasis and normative-deontic modal "should," which indicates the Intensification Strategy. He points out the nation's "noble spirit," and such positively connotated attribution indicates the use of Constructive strategy of Singularisation as Furugawa simultaneously puts an emphasis on subnational uniqueness and national model character. Repeated references to self "I" indicate the subjectivity of his stance. He justifies his stance by comparing his personal gratitude with the diplomatic issues, so that even if recognizing that the status of Taiwan can make it difficult for the government to articulate their gratitude officially, Furugawa insists that it still needs to be done based on basic human values, or even more so due to the nation's "noble spirit." Furugawa again applies the Transformation strategy of Discontinuating again when he directly addresses the Prime Minister Noda and equates thanking Taiwan in official capacity with safeguarding Japan's honor. Such direct references to the Prime Minister and the Japanese national model character again indicate the use of the Intensification strategy. Furugawa uses the deictic expression 'we,' which suggests that there are other people within the Japanese Diet, who share the same opinion regarding the issue.

Taiwan is othered as "good" by Furugawa, but it is insinuated that the government's position towards Taiwan is based on indifference. Furugawa suggests that the Japan-Self shall feel inferior towards the Other once it forgets about its national qualities and fails to thank the Taiwan-Other. At the same time, the assimilation of the Self to the Other is accentuated in Furugawa's speech on the praxeological level.

In a response to Furugawa's questions, back then newly elected Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said: "*Former [Japanese] prime minister Naoto Kan expressed appreciation to the Taiwanese authorities under President Ma Ying-jeou for their assistance. In addition, Japan has expressed appreciation through our Web page and newspaper ads (...). Although the Japanese government has expressed appreciation in an appropriate form, I want to express my deep, sincere appreciation for the assistance*

and *warm friendship from Taiwan again.*” (Taipei Times 2011). Noda’s statement was the first one in which the Japanese government has officially expressed gratitude towards Taiwan (Chang 2011).

In response to Furugawa’s accusations and his references to the “Japan’s honor,” Noda lists actions of the previous administration in which the gratitude towards Taiwan was already expressed. He also emphasizes that the appreciation was expressed “in an appropriate form”. It can be interpreted as an attempt at “saving face”. Saving face is a strong motivating force in the Japanese culture, and an action of disagreeing with someone who ranks higher in social hierarchy is seen as causing them embarrassment (Matsumoto 2018). Furugawa not only points out the failure of showing an appropriate behavior but also refers that the “Japan’s honor” is at stake. “Japan” here is metonymically standing for the Japanese Diet. Eventually, Noda thanks Taiwan and Taiwan-Japan relations are being positively attributed as having a “warm friendship,” which means that the Taiwan-Other is considered “good.” The fact that the Japanese government has not officially thanked Taiwan before Noda’s statement means the previous use of the Strategy of Avoidance, potentially aimed at suppression of possible disruptions coming from the People’s Republic of China. It also implies that Noda’s government did not prioritize Japan-Taiwan relations.

As the Japan-Taiwan relations became more amicable following the Tōhoku earthquake, on October 10th, 2011, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou stressed that he values the relationship with Japan and has positioned Japan-Taiwan relations as a “special partnership.” He said: “*I am well-versed in Japan and I am also pro-Japan, so I hope that further progress in Japan-Taiwan relations will be achieved, building on the existing foundations.*” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 12).

Ma’s assurance of his positive perception of Japan, such as saying he is experienced and knowledgeable about Japan and even a “pro-Japan” person, is especially interesting as such statements rarely came from the KMT’s leaders in the past. In his speech he emphasizes the positive political continuity as he appeals for “further progress” in the two countries’ relations, which implies the use of Constructive strategy of Continuation. Ma mentions “existing foundations” which potentially point out to the positive shift in Japan-Taiwan relations due to Taiwan’s generous assistance after the Tohoku earthquake. The motivation for such portrayal of Japan as the Other is the willingness for enhanced international cooperation with the Other. The Other is considered “good,” while the Self does not determine itself to be either superior or inferior to the Other. On the praxeological level, the assimilation of the Self to the Other, as well as the cooperation with the Other, is accentuated.

4.1.1.3. Shift in Japan-Taiwan relations after Shinzo’s Abe return to power.

The shift in the intensity in acknowledgement of Taiwan’s assistance and donations occurred when Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party came to power. After becoming a Prime Minister again in December 2012, on March 11th, 2013, Shinzo Abe expressed his gratitude for Taiwan’s support on his

Facebook page, saying, "*Taiwan is an important friend of Japan, having donated ¥20 billion - more than any other country - after the quake*" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 3).

As for the nomination strategy, Abe does not call Taiwan a "country" directly, but he emphasizes the enormous contribution of Taiwan, accentuated also as the statement was made one year after the earthquake has taken place, which implies the use of the strategy of Intensification. Taiwan is attributed positively as an "important friend" and as a country which donated the most when Japan experienced trying times. Citing an exact amount of contribution aims at intensifying the illocutionary force of the utterance. Regarding the Othering, Taiwan is portrayed as "good" and on the praxeological level, the cooperation with the Taiwan-Other is accentuated.

In an inaugural address on May 20, 2012, Ma Ying-jeou said: "*We have built a special partnership with Japan... with relations between us at the most cordial level seen in the last 40 years.*" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 4). Later, while mentioning the "caring spirit" of the Taiwanese, he added: "*When Japan was hit by the tsunami in March of last year, NT\$6.6 billion in donations were raised through joint private sector and government effort. This was not only the largest amount worldwide; it also exceeded the combined amount donated by over 90 other countries. There is also a girl from Tainan City, Cai Yuhua, who went to the disaster area and quietly helped old people there. People in both Japan and Taiwan were deeply moved by her acts of kindness*" (Taiwan News 2012).

After his reelection Ma has emphasized his extremely positive stance on Japan-Taiwan relations during his inaugural address. He highlights the fact that ever since severance of the diplomatic ties in 1972, the relationship has never been as good. The fact that he accentuates a good relationship with Japan at that time is especially interesting, as he was considered by critics as being "too China-friendly" (Aljazeera 2012). While accentuating the massive contribution made by Taiwan, Ma uses the Perpetuation strategy of Positive Self-Presentation, indicated also by the positive attribution of "caring spirit". When presenting the amount of contribution he uses the topos of illustrative example to intensify the illocutionary force of his utterance. Ma points out to the example of positive actions of a girl from Tainan in order to emphasize the solidarity of the Taiwanese nation, which indicates the Constructive Strategy of Unification. This strategy is also visible in the use of the spatial reference to the people in "both Japan and Taiwan" being moved by her actions. The emphasis is laid on the will to co-operate as well as the will to show solidarity at a subnational level. Regarding the Othering of Japan, the motivation of Ma's speech is the national integration as he emphasizes the "caring spirit" of the nation which suits the contents of the inaugural address. On the praxeological level, the willingness for cooperation with the Other is emphasized.

On January 31st, 2013, Fumio Kishida, Japan's Foreign Minister, has made a statement regarding Japan-Taiwan's relations together with congratulations to Japan's Exchange Association that handles Taiwan relations on its 40th anniversary (Hou 2013). In a statement on association's website Kishida especially

mentioned the support and donations made by the Taiwanese people after the 2011's earthquake (Hou 2013) and added: *"Taiwan is an important partner of Japan, as evidenced by the close economic ties and people-to-people exchanges between Japan and Taiwan... Underpinning the deep friendship and relationship of trust between Japan and Taiwan are our shared values of democracy, freedom, and peace... I hope that cooperative relationship between Japan and Taiwan will continue to grow."* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 4).

By reference to the shared values Kishida indicates the use of the topoi of comparison and more specifically the topos of similarity. He puts emphasis on international similarities that Japan and Taiwan share, and potentially he also vaguely compares Taiwan with the PRC, as they lack such values as democracy and freedom. However, it is being left unsaid. Additionally, Kishida uses the Constructive Strategy of Unification when he appeals for cooperation in the future. Taiwan is portrayed as "good" and almost identical to the Self, due to the shared values. On the praxeological level, the cooperation with the Other is accentuated.

4.1.1.4. President Ma Ying-jeou's Meeting with Soka Gakkai's Hiromasa Ikeda

The next discussed event sheds light on how the Taiwanese government approaches communication with Japan in a semi-public capacity. On June 4th, 2012 Hiromasa Ikeda, the Vice President of the Japanese lay Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai International (SGI) paid a visit to the Presidential Office in Taiwan. The Chairman of Association of East Asian relations Liao Liou-yi, National Security Council Advisor Lee Chia-chin and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Simon Shen-Yeaw Ko also attended the meeting (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012).

Ma Ying-jeou said: *"At the time of the 311 earthquake in Japan last year, our people eagerly extended a helping hand, and this kind of interaction also promoted the deepening of the feelings between the two peoples. The Japanese also described the friendship between the two countries as "great friendship"."*¹ (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012).

"Although Taiwan and Japan do not have formal diplomatic relations, they are closely related in substance. For example, Japan is Taiwan's second largest trading country, and Taiwan (counts as) Japan's fourth largest trading country. At the same time, Taiwan and Japan have frequent exchanges of tourists and are each other's second largest visiting country; Since 2009, Taiwan and Japan have successively signed major agreements, including the "Youth Working Holiday Agreement", "Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement" and "Open Sky Agreement", etc., and made some important breakthroughs, such as the establishment of an office in Japan in Sapporo, The Japanese side amended

¹ 去年日本发生 311 大地震之际，我国人即踊跃伸出援手，而此种互动关系亦促使两国人民感情愈发深厚，日人也以「厚重情谊」描述两国情谊。(Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012)

the regulations on the registration of overseas Taiwanese in Japan and the direct flight from Matsuyama-Haneda Airport.”² (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012).

Ma also pointed out that: *“the ‘Hatta Yoichi Memorial Park’ was opened in Taiwan last year. This is a result of our country’s attitude of ‘judging the matter as it stands and making grievances clear,’ affirming the historical positioning of the Japanese with merits; and the Japanese Diet passed the ‘Overseas Art and Other Public Promotion Act (...) It also removes the obstacles to the exhibition of (belonging to) Taiwan Forbidden City cultural relics in Japan. It is expected to be exhibited in Japan in 2014, marking a new milestone in the history of Asian cultural exchanges. It also shows that since the severance of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Japan in 1972, within 40 years the relationship between the two sides has never been closer.”³ (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012).*

Ma Ying-jeou pointed out the latest advances in Taiwan-Japan relations, spoke about the future, and emphasized the close relationship between the two states. At first glance, it seems peculiar that such statement, coming from Taiwan’s president, was made in front of the leaders of a religious group. However, Soka Gakkai is the most influential of new religious movements in Japan, it has an affiliated political party in Japan – Komeito Party, and it is a nongovernmental organization with official ties to the UN (Gebert 2011). It is noteworthy that Komeito has also been in a coalition with the LDP since 1999 (Johnston 2020). Because of such close political affiliations of Soka Gakkai, it is understandable that such high Taiwanese officials have been involved in such event.

As for the Predication strategy, Ma uses positive attributions while characterizing Japan-Taiwan relations. They are referred to as a “great friendship,” two countries are “closely related in substance” despite the lack of official recognition of Taiwan, and their relationship “has never been closer”. “Our people” metonymically standing for “the Taiwanese” and “Taiwan,” are described by extending “a helpful hand” towards the Japanese. Taiwan is a “fourth largest trading country” of Japan, while Japan is Taiwan’s “second.” The exchanges and breakthroughs are referred to respectively as “frequent” and “important”.

In his speech, Ma refers to the 2011 earthquake and the subsequent Taiwanese humanitarian assistance. He also refers to Naoto Kan’s letter in which he thanks Taiwan “for the kizuna” – a strong friendship,

² 台日双方虽无正式外交关系，但实质关系密切，例如日本为我第二大贸易国，我则为日本第四大贸易国，同时台日旅客交流频繁，互为第二大造访国；此外，自 2009 年起，台日双方陆续签署重大协议，包括「青年打工度假协定」、「台日投资协议」及「开放天空协议」等，并取得若干重要突破，例如我于札幌设立驻日办事处、日方修正我旅日华侨居留登记规定及松山－羽田机场直航等。(Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012)

³ 去年「八田与一纪念园区」在台落成启用，此系我国采取「就事论事、恩怨分明」态度，对有功日人历史定位的肯定；而日本国会通过「海外美术品等公开促进法」，亦排除我故宫文物赴日展览之障碍，可望于 2014 年在日展出，为亚洲文化交流史划下崭新里程碑，也显示台日自 1972 年断交以来，双方关系创 40 年来前所未见之紧密状态。(Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012)

which was previously discussed. He draws a connection between the Taiwan's contribution and an apparent improvement in Japan-Taiwan relations. Additionally, Ma uses the topos of comparison when saying that Taiwan and Japan are "closely related", which indicates the constructive strategy of inclusion. This strategy is also indicated by the use of emphasis on positive political continuity, when Ma applies temporal references indicating continuity, such as "frequent" exchanges, or adverbial constructions "since 1972 (...) relationship (...) has never been closer".

The opening of Hatta Yoichi Memorial Park indicates that the positive narrative of the great constructor was approved as a symbol of the positive influence of Japan's colonial presence in Taiwan. Hatta Yoichi, the constructor of a 16,000 km long irrigation canal (Amae 2011, 54), is now a god-like figure in Taiwan and the anniversary of his death on 8 May is celebrated every year by making a pilgrimage to his statue overlooking the Wushantou Reservoir. It is also noteworthy, that Ma Ying-jeou himself attended the commemoration ceremony in 2008 and 2009 (Amae 2011, 49-50). Ma presents the opening of Hatta Yoichi Memorial Park as an example of his government's attitude of "judging the matter as it stands and making grievances clear (就事论事、恩怨分明)," meaning that they work on distinguishing which past events can be interpreted negatively or positively. It also presupposes that there are alternative events and narratives, other than the Hatta Yoichi example, that are not recognized by the KMT's government.

When it comes to analyzing how Taiwan is Othering Japan, Ma's motivation is tightening of relations with Japan. Japan is envisioned to be "good" and almost identical to the Self, as the Self and the Other are "closely related in substance". On the praxeological level, it can be determined that the Self aims at cooperation with the Other, as Ma emphasizes that the relationship "has never been closer".

4.1.1.5. Greetings from Chief Representative to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Izumi Hiroyasu

In his greetings, the newly appointed Chief Representative of Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, said: *"(...) No words can describe how close of a relationship Taiwan and Japan have maintained in terms of geography, history, and culture. I highly respect the spirit of the Taiwanese people in preserving a considerable number of Japanese-era buildings, including the Presidential Office, in excellent condition (...). Taiwan is an important partner of Japan, sharing fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law. Our bilateral relationship is becoming more important than ever before amid the changing international community and the increasing uncertainty over the existing world order.*

Numata Mikio, my predecessor as Chief Representative, advised me to visit all the members of the Japanese National Diet who have worked closely with Taiwan before assuming my present office. I did not expect that it would turn out to be such a daunting task. There are as many as 300 pro-Taiwanese legislators! All of these lawmakers strongly believe in supporting Taiwan and strengthening the relationship between Japan and Taiwan. There is also an organization called the Taiwan-Japan

Parliamentary Friendship Association in Taiwan's Legislature, and I have been told that more than 90% of the legislators participate in this association – a clear indication of the solid bond between Japan and Taiwan from the grassroots up to the leadership level (...).

From the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, and the floods in western Japan last year to the damage caused by Typhoons Mitag and Hagibis this year and even the fire at Shuri Castle in Okinawa, whenever Japan has experienced adversity and difficulty, Taiwan has always been the first to express sympathy and offer assistance (...) (Japan - Taiwan Exchange Association 2019).

Izumi starts his greeting with the argumentation scheme of the topos of comparison, spatial referential assimilations, and temporal references regarding continuity. The emphasis is put on international sameness and shared “geography, history, and culture,” and “fundamental values,” as well as on the positive political continuity as he spoke about the “close relationship” that Taiwan and Japan “have maintained”. He intensifies the utterance by using a phrase “no words can describe” in order to accentuate the positive relationship two countries have. He pays attention to the Taiwanese initiatives to preserve Japanese-era buildings, which is especially interesting as preservation of the Japanese colonial buildings is said to be an important catalyst of cultural tourism and national identity construction. It is also a manifestation of pro-colonial historiography (Amae 2011, 22). It is worth mentioning that the Japanese colonial architecture could only be listed as “historic sites” after the revision of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in 2000, which indicated a shift from the KMT's cultural policy of sole preservation of Han Chinese settlements in Taiwan (Amae 2011, 21). Thus, Izumi's reference to the Japanese cultural heritage preservation alludes to him recognizing the pro-Japanese sentiments in Taiwan.

The reference to the “changing international community” and “uncertainty” over the “world order” indicates the use of the topos of threat and the topos of changed circumstances. Izumi puts emphasis on the extra-national dependence of both Japan and Taiwan which can be interpreted as the Transformation strategy of Warning against Heteronomy as well as the strategy of “we are all in the same boat”. This strategy is also indicated by the use of vagueness as the mean of realization: Izumi does not directly say what the threat is, the agent is deleted, and it can only be assumed that he is indirectly referring to the growing influence of the PRC.

Izumi intensifies his argument that there is a solid bond between Japan and Taiwan by mentioning the pro-Taiwanese and pro-Japanese groups in their respective governments and using the topos of illustrative example and the topos of comparison. 300 pro-Taiwanese legislators in Japan are compared with over 90% of Taiwan's legislators being pro-Japanese.

Lastly, Izumi uses the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation while referring to Taiwan's humanitarian aid. The use of adverbial constructions “always” indicates the presupposition

of positive political continuity when it comes to the bilateral assistance. The temporal reference “from” in “from the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011” is indicating that this event is seen as a major shift in Japan-Taiwan relations, even though there were previous events in which Japan or Taiwan offered each other help after disasters struck.

Regarding the Othering analysis, Izumi others Taiwan as “good” and similar to the Self. The main motivation for such portrayal is the integration and to some extent the future countering threats. On the praxeological level, the cooperation with the Other is emphasized.

4.1.1.6. The show of gratitude on 10 years anniversary of the Tōhoku earthquake

From the latest news, on December 1st, 2020, The Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association presented a design of a new logo in recognition for Taiwan’s contributions and humanitarian response after the March 11 earthquake, as the 10th anniversary takes place in 2021. Hiroyasu Izumi, Japan's representative to Taiwan, said the JTEA will hold an event in Taipei to officially launch the new logo on January 23, 2021. The event is planned six months before the opening of the summer Olympic Games in Tokyo (Chen, Ku and Mazzetta 2020).

"This experience led us to rediscover Taiwan, our long-time good neighbor and valued friend. Taiwan's expression of friendship inspired us," said the member of the JTEA, which unofficially represents Tokyo's diplomatic interests in Taiwan (Chen, Ku and Mazzetta 2020).

JTEA points out to the Taiwan’s response to Tohoku earthquake as the turning point in Japan-Taiwan relations. The use of the verb “rediscover” might indicate that before the catastrophe Japan’s stance on Taiwan was based more on indifference than mutual friendship. Thus, the use of the Transformation Strategy of Discontinuating can be identified through the topos of consequence (rediscovery of Taiwanese friendship as a direct result of Taiwan’s enormous assistance). By application of this strategy, JTEA emphasizes a difference between then and now, as in the shift in Japan-Taiwan relationship before and after the earthquake. Taiwan is called a “long-time good neighbor” which indicates the reference to the common political past. The motivation behind such Othering of Taiwan is international integration as well as feeling of gratitude towards the Other. The Other is portrayed as “good,” and cooperation with the Other is accentuated on the praxeological level.

The new design of the logo portrays lowercase Latin alphabet letter “j” as in Japan, and “t” as in Taiwan, leaning together to form the character “人” meaning “a person” or “people” both in Chinese and Japanese. The official website of JTEA explains the meaning behind the new logo as follows:

“Create beauty together. Create the future together. Pile up hope together. Connected into a line of hope, let friendship and beauty find the direction of free growth. No matter how the future changes, we will listen to each other's needs; no matter how far apart, we will share joy with each other; The

friendship between Japan and Taiwan is Always Here, always supporting and helping each other.”⁴
(Japan - Taiwan Exchange Association 2020).

The means of realization such as appeals for cooperation and solidarity used in the explanation indicate the Constructive Strategy of Unification and Cohesivation, as the emphasis is put on the will to cooperate, as well as on unifying joys and sorrows. The adverb of time “always” indicates the continuity and repetition and is a sign of application of the Perpetuation Strategy of Continuation. This strategy is also indicated by repeating the structure “no matter...” which creates continuity, so that the emphasis is on positive political continuity. The part of the sentence “No matter how the future changes...” almost sounds like a promise made by Japan, as well as a vague reference to possible topos of threat in the changing international environment. The Othering of Taiwan is motivated by the willingness for cooperation and mutual friendship, as well as countering threats together. Taiwan is visualized as “good,” and the equal relationship of two parties is accentuated. Again, cooperation with the Other is emphasized on the praxeological level.

4.1.1.7. Japan-Taiwan relations after the Great East Japan Earthquake: Summary

All the discursive acts presented in the above subchapter exemplify the shift in Japan-Taiwan relations connected with Taiwan’s contribution and assistance to Japan after the Tōhoku earthquake. All the topics stemming from the core discourse on Japan-Taiwan relations after the earthquake are presented in Figure 1 below.

The analysis started with the discussion among the Japanese members of the Diet, whether the Japan’s official show of gratitude towards Taiwan was sufficient. The topos of justice, the Transformation Strategy of Discontinuing, the Intensification Strategy, as well as the Constructive Strategy of Singularisation were used to urge the Japan’s Diet to officially thank Taiwan. Before Prime Minister Noda’s public show of gratitude, it can be said that the Japan’s government used the Strategy of Avoidance regarding the acknowledgement of Taiwan’s contribution, most probably in order to suppress any possible disruptions coming from the PRC.

The shift in the discourse on Japan-Taiwan relations came with the Abe’s LDP government in 2012. In Abe’s and Kishida’s speech acts, the strategy of Intensification, the topos of similarity, as well as the Constructive Strategy of Unification are predominantly used. The positive shift is also noticeable in Izumi’s greetings. Apart from the topos of comparison and the strategy of Intensification, Izumi uses the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation. At the same time, he points out to the changing regional circumstances by using topos of threat and the topos of changed circumstances,

⁴ 一起创造美好。一起创造未来。一起堆砌希望。连成一条希望的线，让友谊与美好找到自由成长下去的方向。无论未来如何变化，我们相互聆听彼此的需求；无论距离相隔多远，我们彼此分享喜悦；日台友情 Always Here，永远相互扶持，彼此帮忙。(Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association 2020)

as well as the strategy of “we are all in the same boat,” aimed at intensification of Japan-Taiwan cooperation.

On the Taiwanese side, Ma used the improvement in Japan-Taiwan relations to further enhance the cooperation and exchanges between the two countries, which is visible in his speech acts by the use of the Constructive strategy of Continuation, the Constructive strategy of Inclusion and the topos of comparison in his speech acts. He is also using the topos of illustrative example and the Perpetuation strategy of Positive Self-Presentation in order to show-off Taiwan’s (standing metonymically for both the Taiwanese population and the ROC’s government) good deeds.

The change of JTEA’s logo in 2020 emphasize how important the Taiwan’s donations were, as well as the consequential improvement in Japan-Taiwan’s relations resulting from Taiwan’s generosity.

Positive portrayals of the Other dominate the discourse on Taiwan-Japan relations after the earthquake when comes to previously discussed speech acts. On both sides the cooperation with the Other is emphasized on the praxeological level. The motivation for such Othering of one another was the willingness to improve bilateral relations, as well as the expression of gratitude from the Japanese side.




Figure 3 The discourse centered around Japan-Taiwan relations after the Tōhoku earthquake: main discursive topics. Author’s design.

4.1.2. Okinotorishima Incident: Taiwan-Japan relations in the time of crisis

4.1.2.1. Introduction

Okinotorishima Incident on April 25th, 2016 can serve as another example of how two countries frame each other in the time of crisis. The incident happened when Japanese authorities detained a fishing boat registered in Taiwan after it crossed the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone around Japanese

Okinotori – a small islet, an “island” according to Japan, and “reef” according to Taiwan (Jennings 2016). The theme of majority of reactions to the incident was casting doubt about the legal status of Okinotori, and if it should hold the status of an island, however, some statements cast light on how Japan and Taiwan relate to one another.

4.1.2.2. Taiwan’s response to the Okinotorishima Incident

On a high-level security meeting on April 27th, 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou presented three declarations, the second of which states: “*Opposing Japan's illegal expansion of power. Japan's claim that "Okinotori Reef" is "Okinotori Island" is a violation of Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is an illegal extension of power and is not recognized by the ROC government. Japan's act of detaining Taiwan's fishing boats on the high seas and demanding security deposits violated Taiwan's fishermen's freedom of high seas fishing in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.*”⁵ (Chen 2016).

In the statement above, Ma uses a perpetuation strategy of defense, by attributing Japan’s legal claims to the violation of international conventions and the “illegal expansion of power”. The repeated use of the word “illegal” intensifies the illocutionary force of his utterance. Additionally, the topos of threat towards “Taiwan’s fishermen’s freedom” is used as an argumentation scheme. Delegitimation strategy can also be distinguished as Ma applies the topos of authority, in this case, the authority of the UN Convention. On the axiological level, Japan is othered as “bad”, and aiming for confrontation can be identified on the praxeological level. Both national integration and ideologies legitimization can be distinguished as motivations for such Othering of Japan. As for the positioning of Ma’s point of view, Lin Chong-pin, a retired strategic studies professor in Taiwan claimed that “One of the reasons [for Ma to challenge Japan] is to distinguish the KMT from the Democratic Progressive Party, which is soft on Japan.”, and that “Ma’s stance on territorial issues is one differentiating point for his Nationalist Party, or KMT, vis-à-vis Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party.” (Jennings 2016). On the other hand, Alex Chiang, an international relations professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei, pointed out “Ma doesn’t have anything to lose, only one month left, and this will be the last chance to show he’s the protector of Taiwan’s national dignity” (Jennings 2016).

Zhang Shanzheng, Premier of ROC from February to May 2016 used even a stronger language regarding the Okinotori incident, including such utterances as: “Don't test Taiwan's determination.”; “*The government's attitude will stay tough.*”; and “*Don't treat Taiwan like a push-over.*”⁶ (Zheng 2016a). In addition to the strategy of defense, the use of constructive strategy of autonomisation is visible in Zhang’s statements, as he puts an emphasis on national autonomy and independence. The strong

⁵ 反对日本违法扩权。日本擅自定义「冲之鸟礁」为「冲之鸟岛」的主张，违反《联合国海洋法公约》第 121 条规定，属于违法扩权的主张，中华民国政府不予承认。而日本在公海扣捕台湾渔船并强索保证金的行为，侵犯了台湾渔民依据该《公约》规定，有关公海捕鱼之自由。(Chen 2016)

⁶ 不要测试台湾的决心”；“政府态度该强硬就会强硬”；“不要把台湾当软柿子吃” (Zheng 2016a)

wording of Zhang's statements also indicated the strategy of Intensification as its goal is to strengthen the illocutionary force of the utterances. The obvious addressee of Zhang's utterances is Japan, and the direct motivation for such Othering of Japan seems to be countering threats (Japan's expansion of power), but also the national integration, as the tough stance of Taiwan's government would possibly result in gaining political bonuses within KMT's electorate. Japan is Othered as "bad" and on the praxeological level, the Othering aims at distancing and confrontation.

4.1.2.3. Japan's response to Okinotorishima Incident

The Japanese side used more balanced statements regarding the incident. At the inaugural meeting of the "Taiwan-Japan Exchange Association" Nobuo Kishi said that "*Taiwan and Japan are important neighbors. We hope to brainstorm many issues and overcome difficulties together.*"⁷ (Zheng 2016b). Kishi applies constructive strategies of inclusion and continuation by putting emphasis on friendly relations, using deictic expression "we" and personal reference "together", and by negating an alleged discontinuity "we hope to (...) overcome difficulties together". Regarding the othering of Taiwan, Kishi determines the Taiwan-Other as an equal of Japan and emphasizes the cooperation with the Other. The main motivation for such framing of Taiwanese Other is the conflict alleviation.

The following citation comes from the Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida on May 20th, 2016: "*Reporter: Taiwan is holding the swearing in ceremony for its President today, and Ms. Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party will be assuming the position of President. What is the Government's reaction to the launch of a new administration in Taiwan? Also, please explain if you have any expectations. Regarding Taiwan, some issues surfaced in the latter half of former President Mr. Ma Ying-jeou's years such as the issues related to the Okinotorishima Islands and the comfort women issues. What are your expectations for responses in these areas?*"

Minister Kishida: First, I would like to congratulate President Tsai Ing-wen on her inauguration. Taiwan is an important partner and friend for Japan that shares fundamental values and with whom we have close economic ties and extensive human-level exchanges. The Government intends to maintain our working relationship with Taiwan on a non-governmental basis and promote further advances in cooperation and interaction in light of this stance. Japan plans to address various issues based on this view and policy.

Reporter: This goes back to a portion of the previous question. Do you expect a slight change in the attitude from the Taiwan side under President Tsai Ing-wen regarding the Okinotorishima Islands and comfort women issue?

⁷ "台日重要的邻邦，许多问题希望集思广益，一起克服困难"。(Zheng 2016b)

Minister Kishida: Japan intends to improve mutual communication on various challenges in line with the policy that I just described.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016a).

When asked about Japan-Taiwan relations and the possible shift due to the change of administration in Taiwan, Kishida described Taiwan as an “important partner” and “friend”, and mentioned maintaining a “working relationship”, which indicates the extensive use of constructive strategies in his speech. He put emphasis on the international sameness by saying that both countries share “fundamental values,” which also indicates the use of the topos of similarity. The emphasis was also put on a positive political continuity (Perpetuation strategy of Continuation): “promote further advances in cooperation”, “improve mutual communication”. At the same time, Kishida highlighted the unofficial status of Taiwan as a state which results in a relationship on a “non-governmental basis”. Additionally, when asked about such burning issues as Okinotorishima islands or comfort women, Kishida resorts to referential vagueness and does not address these problems directly. The fact that Kishida evades answering interviewer’s question on the most recent issues indicates the use of the strategy of Avoidance, which belongs in the Perpetuation strategies. Kishida barely answers the interviewer’s last question, which also indicates the Mitigation strategy.

Main motivation for such Othering of Taiwan could be the intention to alleviate recent conflicts. Taiwan is portrayed as a “good” Other, nearly identical to the Self as it shares “values”. On the one hand, the Self stresses an equal partnership, on the other hand, the “non-governmental” basis of the relationship is highlighted. Overall, the cooperation with the other is emphasized.

4.1.2.4. Okinotorishima Incident: Summary

Okinotorishima Incident serves as a good example to show how Taiwan and Japan react in the time of crisis. The use of strategies and argumentation schemes within the Okinotorishima Incident discourse differ greatly between the two states. The Taiwanese side used the Defence (Perpetuation Strategy), Autonomisation (Constructive Strategy), Intensification strategy as well as the topoi of authority and threat. The Japanese side mainly aimed at cooling off the tension by using the topos of similarity, the Perpetuation strategy of Avoidance and referential vagueness, as well as the Constructive Strategy of Inclusion and Continuation, Perpetuation Strategy of Continuation and the Mitigation Strategy.

Regarding the Othering, the Taiwanese side portrayed the Other as “bad” and different, while the Japanese side accentuated the similarities with the Other. The motivation of the KMT government was the national integration before handing over the office to the DPP, while on the praxeological level the distancing and confrontation of the Self to the Japan-Other was implied. The Japanese side was motivated by the willingness to alleviate the tensions and emphasized the Cooperation with the Other.

4.1.3. Congratulatory messages between Tsai, Abe and Kishida

4.1.3.1. Introduction

In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, starting in an election for the second time (she was defeated by Ma Ying-jeou in 2012), was elected president. Shinzo Abe and Japan's then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida had sent congratulatory messages for her victory. These actions were called "unprecedented" as it was the first time such communications were issued by such senior Japanese officials (Hornung 2018).

4.1.3.2. Abe's congratulatory message to Tsai

Abe congratulated Tsai on her election during a session of the Upper House Budget Committee.

"I would like to express congratulations from the bottom of my heart. I'm hoping that the cooperative relationship between Japan and Taiwan will advance further," Abe stated and added that: *"Taiwan is an old friend of Japan's"* and *"Deciding on a leader through an election based on freedom of speech, the presidential election is a testimony to freedom and democracy in Taiwan."* (Kyodo 2016).

Taiwan is referred to as an "old friend of Japan's," which is a positive attribution which might also refer to the common political past. Abe applies the strategy of Intensification by using the idiom "from the bottom of my heart" which means that he is personally concerned with Japan-Taiwan relations and that he is pleased with Tsai's victory. He hopes that cooperation "will advance" which indicates continuity and puts emphasis on positive political continuity at the international level, and therefore the use of Constructive Strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation.

By highlighting the democratic elections Abe gives them legitimization, which can be interpreted as peculiar: Taiwan's first free direct presidential elections were in 1996, when Lee Teng-hui was elected (Lim, 2011). After 20 years, Abe is highlighting this fact congratulating a president-elect known as being "pro-Japan."

Abe portrays the Taiwan-Other as "good" and identical to the Japanese-Self due to their similarities such as being democratic states. The Other is treated as a partner, and the Self is not determining itself to be superior. At the praxeological level, the cooperation with the Other is identified as an approach. The motivation for Abe's speech is the willingness for improvement in Japan-Taiwan relations.

4.1.3.3. Kishida's congratulatory message to Tsai

In a press release on the Result of the Presidential Election in Taiwan Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida gave a following statement:

"1. Ms. Tsai Ing-wen was elected in today's presidential election in Taiwan. The Government of Japan congratulates Ms. Tsai on her victory and praises the smooth implementation of the election which demonstrates that democracy in Taiwan has deeply taken root."

2. Taiwan is an *important partner and a precious friend of Japan*. We *share basic values* and enjoy close economic relationship and people to people exchange. The Government of Japan will work toward *further deepening cooperation and exchanges* between Japan and Taiwan, based on the existing position to maintain Japan-Taiwan relations as working relationship *on a non-governmental basis*.

3. We expect that the issue surrounding Taiwan will be resolved peacefully by direct dialogue *between the concerned parties* and that it will *contribute to the peace and stability of the region*.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016b).

The fact that it was the first time a congratulatory message was sent by the Foreign Minister shows the shift in Japan-Taiwan relations in a symbolic way. Similarly to Abe, Kishida applies the Constructive Strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation. It is visible in his use of topos of similarity as he mentions the “shared values,” as well as the emphasis on working towards “deepening cooperation and exchanges.” The shared values such as democracy are emphasized, which might also be a vague reference to the lack of thereof in other countries, e.g., the People’s Republic of China. The emphasis is put both on the international similarity, and on positive political continuity. Even though the willingness for cooperation is highlighted, the Perpetuation Strategy of Continuation is simultaneously applied in reference to the nature of “non-governmental” ties Japan and Taiwan have. Interestingly, the third point of Kishida’s statement refers to the cross-strait relations. The agent deletion, as China is not mentioned directly, as well as referential vagueness indicates the Strategy of Avoidance. On the one hand, Japan does something as unprecedented as sending Tsai a congratulatory message, on the other hand it accentuated that it is not going to interfere in China and Taiwan’s issues, a move aimed most probably at calming China down.

Regarding the Othering analysis, the motivation behind Kishida’s statement is recognition of presidential elections in Taiwan. Taiwan was othered as “good” and similar to the Self, and cooperation as well as assimilation to the Other is visible on the praxeological level.

4.1.3.4. Tsai’s congratulatory message to Abe

The congratulatory messages from Abe and Kishida were reciprocated by Tsai in October 2017 when Abe’s party won in parliamentary elections (Hornung 2018).

In a message relayed by Chiou I-jen, president of the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association, to Mikio Numata, chief representative of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, Tsai Ing-wen congratulated Abe’s on his party victory in 2017 by saying: “*Japan and Taiwan are neighbors, with frequent people-to-people interactions and a close relationship that fosters meaningful cooperation and exchanges. (...) Under the prime minister’s leadership, it is expected bilateral ties will further deepen and develop for the well-being of the people in both nations, as well as maintain regional stability and prosperity*”. She also thanked Abe for supporting the country’s participation in international organizations and activities (Taiwan Today 2020).

Referential assimilation such as the use of spatial reference: “Japan and Taiwan are neighbors” indicated the argumentation scheme of a topos of similarity within topoi of comparison. Thus, Tsai uses the Constructive Strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation. Personal reference to Abe together with a temporal reference indicating continuity “under the prime minister’s leadership,” as well as the spatial reference through persons and toponyms “the well-being of people in both nations,” indicate the same Constructive Strategy but the emphasis is being put on positive political continuity at the international level. Tsai reference to the need to “maintain regional stability and prosperity” might be a vague reference to the possible threats in the changing international arena. The direct reference to Abe’s leadership being expected to result in tightening of the bilateral ties indicates the use of Intensification Strategy. The motivation of such Othering of Japan is giving a setting for future foreign policy and showing willingness for further cooperation. Japan is portrayed as “good” and the Self determines the Other to be an equal. Cooperation is accentuated throughout the statement, however the vague reference to the topos of threat as well as an emphasis on the needed support of Japan, especially regarding participation in international organizations, might mean the submission of the Self to the Other on the praxeological level of analysis.

4.1.3.5. The Congratulatory messages between Tsai, Abe and Kishida: Summary

The official congratulatory messages from Abe and Kishida indicate a shift in Taiwan-Japan relations, as well as the expectations of the Japanese government that the DPP’s administration’s foreign policy regarding Japan will be more favorable than that of the previous KMT’s government.

The strategies and argumentation schemes used by Abe, Kishida and Tsai are almost identical, and they include the Constructive Strategy of Continuation, Intensification Strategy as well as the topos of similarity. At the same time, Tsai brings up the topos of threat regarding the changing regional environment, while the Japanese side emphasizes the continuation of solely non-governmental basis of the two state’s relationship by using the Perpetuation Strategy of Continuation. Kishida also accentuates Japan’s lack of intention to impose on cross-strait relations vaguely referring to the “issue surrounding Taiwan” and by the usage of an argumentation scheme of agent deletion.

As for the Othering, in both cases the Other was determined to be “good” and similar to the Self, while the willingness for improvement in bilateral relations and cooperation was emphasized on the praxeological level.

4.1.4. Discourse centered around the food ban and discourse centered around Taiwan’s application to the CPTPP.

4.1.4.1. Introduction: The lingering “food ban” issue

After 2011 earthquake followed by the Fukushima disaster, Taiwan’s KMT government banned imports from five Japanese prefectures due to concerns about nuclear radiation contamination affecting the food safety (Yang and Kao 2020). After the election of Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the DPP has been trying to lift

the restrictions but did not succeed due to the strong opposition. In addition, Taiwan upheld the food ban for the consecutive two years in the referendum on renewing the regulations in 2018. The outcome of the referendum stalled Tokyo-Taipei negotiations regarding a full free trade agreement and it was widely criticized in Japan and portrayed as being politically motivated by anti-Japanese feelings (Siripala 2018).

The 2020 annual white paper of the Taipei's branch of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated that the continuing food ban stalls Taiwan hopes for signing economic agreements with Japan as well as the admission to the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). The food safety issue is highly politicized by the KMT, but the issue also stems from protectionist sentiments, questions of self-determination and national sovereignty, as well as nationalism (Ko, 2020).

4.1.4.2. A 'Liberty Times' interview with Foreign Minister Nobuo Kishi

In December 2016 Nobuo Kishi (then Japanese State Minister for Foreign Affairs) stated in an interview: *"I must first say that in the view of the Japanese government, Taiwan shares common values, maintains close economic and personal ties with Japan, and is an important friend (...). I believe Japan-Taiwan relations depend on more than exchanges at the level of our leaders or those frameworks (the AEAR and Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office). Rather, the heartfelt connection of our people for each other is crucial to the relationship. Japan-Taiwan economic relations have been in continuous development, with cooperative agreements having been signed on investment and aviation. We believe our deep exchanges that are conducted on multiple levels need to be strengthened further. We also believe that maintaining regional peace and stability is highly important.*

As we bolster trilateral relations between Japan, US and Taiwan, we also hope for the stable development of cross-strait relations. (...). We fully understand that Taiwan has expressed great interest in this (economic exchange agreement), but the Japanese government is working hard to facilitate the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which we know Taiwan is also interested in joining. Taiwanese participation in the TPP is something that we very much welcome.

As I said, due to the close nature of our bilateral relationship, there are numerous issues that we need to overcome together. The issue we currently face is solving the prohibition of Japanese food imports to Taiwan. We feel this needs to be appropriately resolved to progress on trade talks" (Kishi 2016).

As for the nomination and predication strategies, Taiwan was referred to as an "important friend," and Taiwan-Japan relations were positively attributed as having "close" economic and personal ties, and "our people" (a synecdoche meaning the Taiwanese and Japanese) having a "heartfelt connection." Kishi applies the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation as he puts emphasis on international similarities, such as shared values, by the use of the topos of comparison. He accentuates the positive political continuity by using temporal references and adjectives indicating continuity, such

as “continuous” development; exchanges that need to be “strengthened further”. Kishi intensifies his speech by the use of personal pronouns “I” and “we”. The personal pronoun “I” indicates that the shared opinion is subjective and personal, the example is his stance that Taiwan and Japan relations “depend on more than exchanges” of the official frameworks of communication. The deictic expression “we” in his answers comes in multiple meanings, most of the time “we” is a metonymic form meaning the ‘national body’ or the ‘Japan’s government,’ but it also comes as a linguistic mean to indicate sameness, for instance in the sentence “we need to overcome (numerous issues) together”. The appeals for cooperation such as aforementioned “(issues) we need to overcome together,” “bolster trilateral relations,” or “much welcome” Taiwanese participation in the TPP indicate the use of Constructive strategy of Unification and Cohesivation, as the emphasis is put on the will to cooperate.

The interview was made shortly after Donald Trump’s election for the US president, and before the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) through an executive order signed by Trump on his first day in office (Solís 2017). Therefore, Kishi still emphasizes the US-Japan-Taiwan trilateral relations and the possibility of Taiwan’s admission to the TPP. Therefore, it is meaningful that the subject of lifting the food ban was already raised in 2016 regarding previous trade agreements. Kishi uses the topos of consequence as an argumentation scheme, implying that the “progress” on trade talks can only follow as a direct result of a food ban issue resolution. Regarding the “numerous issues” the emphasis is on a necessary difference between now and the future, indicating the application of the Transformation strategy of Discontinuing.

4.1.4.3. Jiro Akama’s visit to Taiwan – the food ban in the background.

In March 2017, Jiro Akama, Japan’s Deputy Minister, attended a tourism promotion event in his official capacity, which was counted as a breakthrough in Japan-Taiwan relations, as Akama was the highest-level government official to visit Taiwan since the severance of relations in 1972 (Reuters 2017).

In his welcoming speech, Chiou I-jen, a president of the Association of East Asian Relations said that “*it was not easy*” for Akama to make the trip and that he had to “*go through many difficulties*.” Chiou said: “*Both Taiwan and Japan face many difficulties. But because we both face the same difficulties, it only shows how closely connected we are.*” (Kyodo 2017).

Chiou refers to common difficulties using the argumentation scheme of the topos of similarity (within topoi of comparison). It is indicated by the use of personal pronoun “we” as well as the emphasis on international similarities and the strategy of “being in the same boat.” This shows the application of the Constructive Strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation. When asked about explanation of “difficulties” Chiou answered: “Isn’t that a rhetorical question?” and then refused to answer saying “I will not tell.” (Kyodo 2017). Therefore, it is visible that he resorts to referential vagueness regarding the pressure coming from China that influence Taiwan-Japan relations. It indicates the use of Strategy of Avoidance. As for the Othering analysis, Chiou portrays Japan as a “good” Other that is closely

connected with the Self. The Self determines itself to be similar to the Other. On the praxeological level, the Self aims for cooperation. The assimilation of the Self to the Other is also emphasized.

Jiro Akama said, *“There was no big problem”* with the pressure coming from China regarding the visit, but he had to *“factor in many international situations before making the final decision.”* (Kyodo 2017).

Akama also uses the Strategy of Avoidance, as he also deletes the agent (China) and refrains from directly explaining the nature of the problems. By saying that there was no “big problem” he is intently downplaying the extra-national heteronomy and the pressures coming from China. Akama also resorts to the referential vagueness when mentioning factoring in “many international situations.” It is a part of the Transformation Strategy of Calming Down. The fact that the difficulties concerning Jiro Akama’s visit to Taiwan were discussed, and were even mentioned in Chiou’s welcoming remarks, is peculiar and indicates that the two parties have to consider the factor of the PRC in any of their interactions, even as common as the tourism promotion events. It also shows how emotional the Taiwanese are about the fact that the Japanese official has visited Taiwan in his official capacity.

He then urged the Taiwanese media to promote Japanese food and tourism by saying: *“I hope that my visit will help the Taiwanese understand that many food products from the region hit hardest by the March 11, 2011, earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis have passed strict examinations and are safe to consume.”* (Kyodo 2017).

Akama directly mentions the safety of the food under the Taiwanese food import ban next to the request to promote tourism. It is peculiar as the venue was the tourism promotion event. Therefore, it can be said that one of the underlying reasons for Akama’s visit was an attempt at convincing Taiwanese to lift the ban. He uses the argumentative scheme of the topos of consequence within the Transformation strategy of Calming Down – his visit, as well the facts about the food safety should result in the Taiwanese lifting the import ban. It is also accentuated how important the food ban issue is for the Japanese side, as it is raised during the first official visit since 1972. Therefore, considering the Othering analysis, the Other is considered different from the Self, as it fails to understand the other side when it comes to the food safety. Because of that, the Taiwan-Other is considered neutral, and on the praxeological level the submission of the Other to the Self is accentuated, at least as the lifting of the import ban is concerned.

4.1.4.4. The consequences of the referendum over the food ban

4.1.4.4.1. The KMT’s stance on the food import ban

On April 13th, 2018, KMT legislator said: *“Why does Japan insist on sending these products to Taiwan? Taiwan is not a second-class country or a Japanese colony. With regards to this issue, we urge our government to stay firm and not do anything to cater to Japan. I don't think people would accept that.”* (Public Television Service Foundation 2018). His speech was shortly followed by a referendum on the issue proposed by the KMT.

Strategy of casting doubt is used already in the first sentence, and it indicates the relativization strategy of shifting of blame and responsibility. The KMT member insinuates that there is a hidden motive behind Japan's urging Taiwan to lift the ban. The use of transformation strategy of Autonomisation is visible in the statement, as an emphasis is put on national autonomy and independence, but also because it draws on the topos of threat that was insinuated in the first sentence. He or she accentuates that Taiwan is not a "Japanese colony," drawing on Taiwan's colonial past and the narration of a common political past, that no longer persists. The perpetuation strategy of Defense is implied by the negation of a political change, which would be the lifting of the ban. The used argumentation scheme includes the fictitious disaster topos – urging the government to not lift the ban is depicted as a rejection of an actions whose consequences would be negative for Taiwan. In the last sentence the emphasis on unifying common worries which indicates the constructive unification strategy. The "people" are depicted as if they shared the same sentiments and worries, but these sentiments seem to be less about food safety, and more about the potential threats coming from being subordinated to Japan. The motivation for such portrayal of Japan by the KMT legislation is the national integration, as Taiwan's independence is accentuated vis-à-vis its relationship with Japan. The Japan-Other is "bad," its motives are hidden and potentially evil, it is different from the Self, and the Self accentuates the fact that it is not inferior to the Other. On the praxeological level, the distancing and confrontation is accentuated.

KMT's Vice Chairman Hau Lung-bin, who was personally involved in preparation of the referendum regarding the food ban, said: "*Taiwan and Japan have always had an uneven trade relationship. Taiwan holds a trade deficit of NT\$600 billion [US\$19.45 billion] with Japan. Haven't we bought enough?*" Hau also added that the Taiwan-Japan relationship should not solely rely on meeting Japan's demands (Hsu 2018).

Hau brings up a new topic of Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan as a topos of comparison. By doing so he aims to balance one thing against the other: a less important food ban against a serious problem of trade deficit. This indicated the use of Justification strategy of Downplaying or Trivialization. Hau uses a suggestive rhetorical question "haven't we bought enough?" regarding the Taiwan-Japan trade deficit which indicates the use of a Discontinuating Strategy of Transformation, as he emphasizes the necessary difference between now and the future. As he points out that the relationship is too one-sided and focused on meeting the demands of Japan, he again highlights the necessary difference between now and the future, which is an indication of the Discontinuating strategy. At the same time pointing out to the trade deficit indicates the use of the topos of force of facts and topos of illustrative example. As for the Perspectivization strategy, as a KMT's Vice Chairman, which at the time is an opposition Party, the hidden motivation for such Othering of Japan can be the domestic power struggle. The Japan-Other is portrayed as different and "bad" on the axiological level, and the Self determines itself to be inferior to the Other. On the praxeological level, the confrontation and distancing are emphasized.

4.1.4.4.2. Foreign Minister Taro Kono's response to the referendum

In response to the results of the referendum, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Kono said: *"If this [Taiwan's import ban] violates WTO regulations, Japan does not rule out taking the matter to the WTO. In addition, the CPTPP pact is expected to take effect this year and it is very regrettable that this matter has made it unlikely for Taiwan to join the partnership."* (Hsu 2018).

Argumentation schemes used include the topos of 'you can't have one without the other,' and the topos of consequence: Taiwan cannot keep the food ban and join the CPTPP, it cannot join in as the consequence of not lifting the ban. This indicates that Kono used the Transformative strategy of Discontinuating/Dissimilation, as he puts an emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future. When Kono mentions the possibility of violating WTO regulation by Taiwan, he uses the topos of appeal to authority and thus the Justification strategy of Legitimation as well as the topos of external constraints within the Justification strategy of heteronomisation (an emphasis on extra-national dependence). Through those strategies, Kono vaguely justifies that Japan cannot support Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP due to the regulation coming from an authority: the WTO, not just because the food ban displeases Japan. Simultaneously, by insinuating the ban may violate the WTO violations, Kono also uses the strategy of casting doubt within the Justification strategies of Shifting of Blame and Responsibility. Additionally, Kono uses the word "regrettable" which is also an indication that Taiwan's action comes as contrary to his expectations – he might have expected a different outcome since Tsai's DPP came to power. In Kono's statement, Taiwan is Othered as "bad" and different from the Self, as it is insinuated it is involved in unlawful behavior. The Self determines itself to be superior to the Other, as it has the power to decide if the Taiwan-Other can participate in international trade agreements. On the praxeological level, the distancing and confrontation is accentuated. + topos of threat

4.1.4.4.3. Japanese response to the referendum: wider policy debate

The governor of Chiba, Kensaku Morita, who visited the Taiwanese city of Taoyuan in November 2018 asked for the ban on food products from the five Japanese prefectures affected the most by the Fukushima pollution to be lifted by saying: *"We've tried to convince the Taiwanese public of the safety of local food products and our response to the matter based on scientific grounds. We'd like to continue tireless efforts to win their understanding"* (Mainichi Japan 2018).

His statement was made after the referendum concerning the food import ban, which prevents the Taiwanese authorities from implementing any policy measures against the outcome of the referendum for a two-year period (Mainichi Japan 2018). By reference to the "scientific grounds" Morita applies the topos of the force of facts, which implies the use of the Justification strategy of Shifting responsibility. The strategy emphasizes the extra-national dependence that Japan faces as the Taiwanese are not "convinced." It can be argued that Morita uses the topos of ignorance within the strategy of isolation/strategy of emphasizing the difference between 'us' and 'them' as he refers to the Taiwanese

public (not) understanding their response “based on scientific grounds.” In the second sentence, he applies the topos of consequence – the “tireless efforts” will “win their understanding” – which implies the discontinuating strategy of transformation. The Taiwan-Other is treated as “good” but different from the Self. The Self determines itself to be inferior to the Self as it is dependent on it to some degree. On the praxeological level, the assimilation of the Other to the Self is emphasized.

Tetsu Nozaki, leader of the Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations said: *"We can't completely reject Taiwanese people's ideas and force them to ease restrictions on our Fukushima products."* (Mainichi Japan 2018).

The use of verbs such as “reject” or “force” in reference to Taiwanese shows that emphasis is put on the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the extra-national dependence. These strategies are similar to those used by Morita and indicate the justification strategy of shift of responsibility. Thus, the Taiwan-Other is portrayed as different from the Self. On the praxeological level, the above speech act alludes to the indifference of the Self towards the Other, as Nozaki, unlike Morita, does not propose alternative ways of dealing with the issue or the will to continue efforts that would lead to cooperation of the two sides.

According to Shin Kawashima, an expert in Taiwan-Japan relations and Tokyo University professor, the DPP failed to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FDA) with Japan in 2016, as it failed to resolve the issue of the ban on food imports. Shinzo Abe hoped that Tsai’s government would remove the ban, which is seen as going counter to Taiwan’s generous offers and contributions to the region (Strong 2019).

4.1.4.4.4. Frank’s Hsieh’s response to the outcome of the referendum

Frank Hsieh: *“if there is no scientific justification for the ban on food imports from the five Japanese prefectures, it could fuel opposition to Taiwan's participation in the CPTPP.”* (Yang and Kao 2020).

In the speech act, Frank Hsieh uses the heteronomisation strategy of transformation, as the topos of the force of facts is brought up in reference to the food imports ban: “if there is no justification...”. Hsieh stating that the ban “could fuel opposition” to Taiwan’s admission to the CPTPP indicates the use of the topos of threat. Such argumentative scheme can also be interpreted as ‘threatening with the stick’ as the lack of admission stays as a possible threatening scenario, even though Hsieh implies that if Taiwan removed the ban, it would be in a better position to join the CPTPP. On the praxeological level within the Othering analysis, the assimilation of the Self to the Other is emphasized, while the motivation is the Delegitimation of policies (food imports ban) and countering (fictitious) threats. Regarding the perspectivization strategy it is important to mention Hsieh’s background in order to show his involvement in the discourse on Japan-Taiwan relations. Hsieh served as Taiwan’s premier from 2005 to 2006 under the former DPP’s president Chen Shui-bian. He had studied in Japan, speaks fluent Japanese and maintains good connections in Japan’s political circles (Taipei Times 2016). When being appointed a representative to Japan back in 2016, Hsieh said that the new (DPP) government “would

neither form an alliance with China against Japan nor form an alliance with Japan against China.” (Loa 2016), a statement aimed at calming down those afraid that the government change would bring deterioration in the cross-strait relations due to the DPP’s and Hsieh’s more pro-Japanese stance.

4.1.4.5. President Tsai’s meeting with Akihisa Nagashima

In a meeting on April 30th, 2019 with Akihisa Nagashima, Japan’s House of Representatives Member and former Senior Vice Minister of Defense, Tsai made the following speech: “*You have always been a staunch supporter of Taiwan. Last year, the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council passed a resolution supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, protesting China’s forcing airlines to change Taiwan’s designation, and condemning China’s poaching of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.*

In the future, we hope to safeguard regional stability together with Japan, based on our shared values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Taiwan and Japan maintain close economic and trade relations, and the number of tourists travelling between our countries is very high. Many of Taiwan’s agriculture and fisheries products are very popular in Japan as well.

I sincerely hope that our friends in Japan can offer Taiwan the assistance we need most by supporting our inclusion in the second round of CPTPP negotiations. Japan is the most crucial and influential economy within the current CPTPP framework, and if the Japanese government would lend us their strong support, it would greatly help Taiwan’s bid to participate, and would be particularly meaningful to us. Both Taiwan and Japan play crucial roles in the Indo-Pacific strategy. China’s actions in the East China Sea are increasing in frequency, and I hope that we can work together with Japan to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

I hope that Representative Nagashima and our fiends in the Consultative Council will continue to speak up for Taiwan, and lend Taiwan your full support.” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2019a).

Tsai uses the constructive strategy of continuation and inclusion when she puts emphasis on international similarity of Japan and Taiwan, including the use of strategy of “we are all in the same boat” when mentioning challenges faced by “both” countries in regard to China’s presence in the East China Sea. The means of realization in her speech include the spatial reference “both Taiwan and China”, she also accentuates “shared values”. Adverbs of time such as “always” when she addresses Nagashima directly, also indicate the use of continuation strategy, as the emphasis is put on positive political continuity. Tsai appeals for co-operation when referring to Taiwan’s participation in CPTPP framework, as well as when saying that Taiwan “can work together with Japan to maintain peace (...)” in Indo-Pacific. At the end of her speech, Tsai refers directly to Nagashima and appeals for political continuity in the future as she hopes he “will continue” to support Taiwan, she also repetitively uses the verb “hope”. This indicates the use of perpetuation strategy of continuation. That strategy is also visible in the use of an adverb of

time “always” which indicates continuity when referring to Nagashima’s ongoing support. The motivation of such Othering of Japan is to counter threats, specifically the threat of China’s growing regional influence, as Tsai clearly refers to the CPTPP framework, which poses as an alternative for China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the South China Sea issue. She portrays Japan as “good” and identical to the Self for instance when it comes to shared values and common challenges. At the same time, the Self considers itself to be inferior to the Other, as Taiwan needs Japan’s support to both remain an internationally significant actor (within structures of CPTPP) and face China’s “actions” that “increase in frequency. The cooperation or even submission of the Self to the Other is accentuated in Tsai’s speech.

4.1.4.6. President Tsai’s meeting with Mitsuo Ohashi

On July 24th, 2019, Tsai Ing-wen met with Mitsuo Ohashi, a Chairman of the JTEA during his fourteenth visit to Taiwan. Tsai has expressed gratitude regarding Ohashi’s efforts at building Japan-Taiwan relations, and his contributions such as signing of cooperative agreements or changing of the Japan Interchange Association’s name to include Taiwan (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2019b).

The president further stated that in addition to closer cooperation on international affairs “*friendly relations between Taiwan and Japan are also being bolstered through commercial and cultural interactions. Just this month Taiwan amended several tariff regulations to reduce certain tariffs, and some of those tariff reductions will benefit Japanese exports. The people of Taiwan are avid users of Japanese products in their daily lives.*

Looking to the future we will continue to enhance our trade partnership with Japan, and will prepare for negotiations on Taiwan's admission to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). I hope that, with the assistance of Chairman Ohashi, these important cooperative undertakings will continue moving forward.” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2019b).

The initiative to use “Taiwan-Japan” to name associations not only indicate a shift in Japan-Taiwan relations, but also in Taiwan’s own construction of identity within the official discourse. The first proposal to name the associations using “Taiwan-Japan” came from the Japanese side right after the diplomatic ties were severed, but it was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek, who insisted on the use of “Chinese-Japanese” (Gerber 2017).

The analysis of the above speech becomes particularly interesting when compared with the speech Tsai made three months previously, when she met Akihisa Nagashima, former Japan’s Senior Vice Minister of Defense. When meeting with Mitsuo Ohashi, she again used the constructive strategy of unification a Cohesivation, showing the will to cooperate, and “enhance” relations. Tsai also uses the perpetuation strategy of continuation, as she wishes for continuous cooperation, through means of realization in such

sentences as “we will continue”, “looking to the future”. Similarly to the previous speech, she again refers directly to the listener with the plea for further support, specifically meaning the support for Taiwan’s participation in the CPTPP. Interestingly, while in previous speech in April she mentions the popularity of Taiwanese agriculture and fisheries products in Japan, in July’s speech she mentions that Taiwanese are avid users of Japanese products, therefore she again draws on the topos of comparison within the constructive strategy of assimilation. She also uses the topos of an illustrative example when pointing out to the newest commercial and cultural interactions between the two countries. As for the Othering analysis, the motivation is also the need for Japan’s support, however, the threat of China is not mentioned at all. This results in a less urgent call for support, and thus the Self no longer determines itself to be either inferior or superior and the speech accentuates the cooperation with the Other rather than the submission of Self to the Other.

4.1.4.7. President Tsai’s meeting with cross-strait relations research group from University of Tokyo

On September 3rd, 2019 President Tsai met with cross-strait relations research group from University of Tokyo led by Professor Yasuhiro Matsuda, in her welcoming speech she stated: “*We hope to work together with Japan and countries throughout the region to deepen democratic development.*”

The implementation of our New Southbound Policy over the past three years has helped Taiwan establish more diversified, multi-level exchanges and cooperation with countries in the region. We also sincerely hope to participate in the CPTPP to strengthen cooperation with Japan and contribute more to regional economy. Taiwan is able and willing to comply with high-standard international rules and practices.” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2019c).

After the next two months, Tsai again called for Japan’s support for Taiwan joining the CPTPP framework. This time, she emphasized the similarities Taiwan and Japan share, for example the shared values of democracy, and the ability and willingness “to comply with high-standard international rules and practices”, which can be a vague reference to the authoritarian China. Such use of the topos of comparison (vague reference to China) and mentioning of Taiwan’s successful implementation of New Southbound Policy indicates the strategy of perpetuation, and specifically the strategy of positive self-presentation. This differs greatly from the strategies Tsai used in two previous speeches, in which past cooperation was highlighted. The international integration is emphasized in how the Taiwan-Self presents itself – it focuses on deepening “democratic development” as well as contribution to the “regional economy”. The Japan-Other is portrayed as a partner, and the Self does not show the feeling of inferiority. Cooperation with the Other is accentuated, but this time on equal grounds.

4.1.4.8. President Tsai meeting with Hiroyasu Izumi

On November 14th, 2019 Tsai Ing-wen welcomed the new Chief Representative of Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Taipei Office Hiroyasu Izumi with the following speech: “*Mr. Izumi has a wealth*

of diplomatic experience, having previously served in the United Kingdom, China, and the United States. We are confident that his posting to Taiwan will be an unforgettable experience for him. I am told that very soon after arriving in Taiwan, Mr. Izumi took note of Taiwan's cultural diversity. He mentioned on Facebook that he enjoys Taiwanese cuisine every day, and especially likes beef noodles. (...)

Every time Taiwan or Japan encounters disasters, the people in the other country have always reached out to help their friends overcome difficult times. Volunteers from Taiwan traveled to Miyagi Prefecture earlier this year to help with the post-typhoon recovery effort, and my fellow citizens generously donated funds to support reconstruction after many of the main buildings at Shuri Castle burnt down. Such friendship transcends politics and national boundaries. We hope our two countries can continue enhancing disaster relief training and cooperation. (...)

At a time of global economic recession, now is a good time for Taiwan and Japan to discuss Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP, which would facilitate Japan's effort to expand its overseas markets and achieve better balance among them. We hope to see bilateral cooperation between our two countries move in this direction.” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2019d).

Tsai uses lexemes with semantic components that construct individualization such as “Taiwan’s cultural diversity” as well as “Taiwanese cuisine” while referring directly to Izumi’s first experiences in Taiwan. This suggests the use of constructive strategy of singularization, as the emphasis is put on national positive uniqueness. Regarding the Taiwan-Japan’s disaster relief cooperation, time expressions adverb “every time” as well as “always” imply the use of a constructive discursive strategy of continuation, as the emphasis is placed at positive political continuity. The topos of an illustrative example is used to emphasize Taiwan’s ongoing support in times of trouble. The reference to the global recession indicates the use of the strategy of “we are all in the same boat”, stemming from a constructive strategy of inclusion. However, the recession could have also been brought up as a topos of threat within Discontinuating strategy of Transformation. Additionally, Tsai emphasizes how inclusion of Taiwan in the CPTPP would help Japan “expand its overseas markets” and “achieve better balance”, which can be interpreted as the use of ‘sugarcoated world’ topos, which is a special form of the topos of consequence, as Tsai points out positive consequences of a propagated action, here: helping Taiwan join the CPTPP. Thus, the motivation of such Othering of Japan would be the admission to the framework. Japan is perceived as “good”, while Taiwan-Self determines itself to be worthy and deserving of Japan’s assistance, as it has helped Japan multiple times in the past. The topic of the previous assistance of Taiwan is new when it comes to the discourse around the CPTPP, as Tsai highlights it for the first time towards Izumi. On the praxeological level, the cooperation with the Other, or even the submission of the Other to the Self, is accentuated.

4.1.4.9. President Tsai's second meeting with Mitsuo Ohashi

On December 3rd, 2019 President Tsai met Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Chairman Mitsuo Ohashi for the second time in 2019. In her speech she stated: “*Chairman Ohashi knows better than anyone about the breakthroughs and progress that we have achieved over the past several years in Taiwan-Japan exchanges, as he has played an important role in promoting them. We achieved outstanding results at the 44th Taiwan-Japan Economic and Trade Meeting held a month ago in Tokyo, signing four MOUs covering areas such as environmental protection and promotion of the import and export of organic foods. I want to thank Chairman Ohashi for his hard work and contributions to enhancing Taiwan-Japan relations.* (...)”

Today is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 2,900th day in office, and I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the prime minister for becoming the longest-serving prime minister in Japan's history. I would also like to thank Prime Minister Abe for his many years of friendship and support for Taiwan. His efforts have brought about increasingly close cooperation and exchanges between Taiwan and Japan. We hope that the Taiwan-Japan partnership will grow deeper and more comprehensive, so that we can respond together to the various challenges we face within our region.

Given recent international economic and trade conditions, and in light of the mutually beneficial economic and trade ties between Taiwan and Japan, we feel confident that now is an excellent time for our two countries to discuss Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP. This will help enhance our partnership and facilitate Japan's efforts to expand its overseas markets and achieve better balance among them. I look forward to Chairman Ohashi's assistance and support so that we can achieve this objective together.” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2019e).

On the second meeting between Tsai Ing-wen and Mitsuo Ohashi in 2019, Tsai again raised the matter of Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP. She again highlighted achievements and developments in Taiwan-Japan relations, but also spoke indirectly to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, congratulating him and appealing for further cooperation. It should be noted that Tsai, although being a prime minister herself, does have a possibility to directly meet with Japan's prime minister, therefore the meetings with the chairman of Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association serve as a channel of communication between the two prime ministers. In her speech, Tsai addresses Abe and rationalizes the need for a closer cooperation due to the “various challenges” both Japan and Taiwan “face within our region”, which implies the use of topos of threat and allusion to actions of China. Thus, it implies the use of unification strategy, and the fictitious threatening scenario aims at unification of two parties against a common threat. Tsai's reference to recent trade conditions as well as the “mutually beneficial economic and trade ties” between two countries imply the use of the transformation strategy of discontinuating; the argumentative scheme of a topos of a favorable time (“now is an excellent time”) is applied while emphasis is put on a necessary difference between now and the future. The motivation for Othering is integration with Japan on regional

level as well as countering threats. Japan is portrayed as a “good” partner and the cooperation with the Other is accentuated.

4.1.4.10. The KMT’s critique regarding the DPP’s government failure in admission to RCEP/CPTPP.

In November 2020, the KMT criticized the DPP for not trying proactively enough to join China-led RCEP within the last four years. The KMT spokesperson said: *“The trade volume between Taiwan and RCEP members accounts for about 59 percent of the nation’s total trade volume, and Taiwan’s investment in those nations accounts for 65 percent of its total foreign investment, so if Taipei cannot join the trade pact, the nation would suffer”* (Lu and Lin 2020).

The KMT presented statistics of Taiwan’s trade and investment with the RCEP members which implies the use of the argumentative schemes of the topos of the force of facts and the topos of an illustrative example. This in turn implies the Heteronomisation strategy of Transformation as the extranational dependence of Taiwan to other members of the RCEP is emphasized. The use of normative-deontic modals such as “cannot” (join) and “would” (suffer) indicates the use of the topos of consequence. The conditional sentence in the last part of the speech act puts emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future and implies the Discontinuating strategy of Transformation.

The KMT added that *“The DPP, trying only to please the US in the hopes of furthering economic and trade cooperation with Washington, neglected the development of the RCEP and the CPTPP (...) the DPP’s failure in this regard could result in Taiwan being marginalized economically”* (Lu and Lin 2020).

The KMT bluntly accuses the DPP government of incorrect handling of foreign policy. The strategy of emphasis on extra-national dependence is brought up again, mixed with a topos of threat, as the KMT threatens that the DPP’s failure “could result” in Taiwan’s marginalization. The CPTPP is brought up along with the RCEP this time, however the KMT is vague or simply uses the strategy of avoidance regarding the DPP’s continuous efforts to join the CPTPP with the support from Japan. The preference of the RCEP over the CPTPP can be explained by the KMT’s leaning towards the mainland China. The KMT’s statement speaks more about the positionality of the discourse concerning admission to the CPTPP within Taiwan’s domestic politics rather than Taiwan’s relations with Japan as the leading member state of the CPTPP framework.

4.1.4.11. Possibility of resolving the issue in 2021.

As per the latest news, Japan’s Chief Representative in Taiwan, Izumi Hiroyasu said that *“the main task I had set for myself is to assist the country to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (the CPTPP)”* (Strong 2020). Such appeal for cooperation indicates the use of the Constructive strategy of Unification and Cohesivation and means that Japan is willing to resolve

the food ban issue, which is becoming a real possibility as the validity of the referendum's outcome expires in 2021.

4.1.4.12. Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP and the food import ban issue: Summary

The issues of the food import ban and the resulting difficulties for Taiwan to join the CPTPP are perhaps the most important ones affecting Japan-Taiwan relations. The main discursive topics stemming from the discourse of these two issues is illustrated in the Figure 2.

Regarding the lack of justification for the food ban enforced by Taiwan, Japan and the food import ban opponents (such as Hsieh) use the Transformation strategies of Calming down, the Justification Strategy of Legitimation, the topos of force of facts as well as the topos of ignorance. On the other hand, Taiwan's food import ban supporters coming from the KMT, apply the strategy of Casting doubt, the topos of a fictitious disaster and the topos of force of facts regarding the food safety. The KMT also points out to the issue of Taiwan and Japan trade deficit, using the topos of force of facts and the topos of illustrative example.

Securitization of the food safety issue by the KMT resulted in the prolongation of the import ban due to the outcome of the national referendum on the issue. The Japanese side reacted strongly, using the topos of consequence, the topos of "you can't have one without the other," as well as referring to the topoi of authority and threat when referring to taking the issue to the WTO and excluding Taiwan from the CPTPP. The Taiwan's side continued the efforts to convince Japan to support its admission to the CPTPP. During several meeting with the Japanese officials, President Tsai used the Constructive strategy of Continuation and the strategy of 'we are all in the same boat' multiple times. Additionally, the Constructive strategy of Unification and Cohesivation (used 3 times), the topos of comparison (used 3 times), the topos of favorable time, the topos of threat (used 2 times), the Perpetuation Strategy of Positive Self-Representation as well as the Transformation strategy of Discountinuating (used 3 times) were used.

Even though it was due to the KMT's actions that the food import ban was prolonged, the KMT still criticized the DPP's government for failing to join neither the China-led RCEP nor the Japan-led CPTPP. The strategies used in the criticism include the use of topos of threat and the fictitious disaster topos (possible economic marginalization of Taiwan). Still, Japan does not rule out the possibility of Taiwan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as implied in the most recent appeals for cooperation coming from Japan's Chief Representative in Taiwan.




Figure 4 Discourse centered around the food ban and discourse centered around Taiwan's application to the CPTPP: main discursive topics. Author's design.

4.1.5. President Tsai Ing-wen's reelection

After Tsai Ing-wen's reelection Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said in a statement: "*Japan expects Taiwan will continue to contribute to the peace and stability in the region, (...) Taiwan is an important partner and a precious friend of Japan.*" (Tachikawa 2020). He later added: "*Japan will work toward further deepening cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Taiwan based on the existing position to maintain Japan-Taiwan relations as a working relationship on a non-governmental basis.*" (Taiwan News, 2020).

Foreign Minister Motegi's statement was not as "unprecedented" as those of Abe and Kishida in 2016, but it shows that Japan continues to acknowledge Taiwan as a player within an international arena. Still, Motegi's statement is almost identical to 2016's Kishida's one, as the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation regarding the deepening of two parties' cooperation, is used simultaneously with the Perpetuation strategy of Continuation, referring to the "non-governmental" basis of their relationship. Motegi's statement draws on the linguistic construction of a common political present and future. The motivation of such Othering of Taiwan is the willingness for further cooperation. The Other is shown as a "good" friend and the Self responds to the presence of the Other by being cooperative.

The same day, Tsai Ing-wen said on Twitter: "*I'll exercise leadership more than before and put into practice policy measures, looking ahead to the future, (...) I'll listen to the voices of the public humbly*

and overcome difficulties with an unwavering heart. I also want to deepen Taiwan-Japan ties,” (Tachikawa 2020).

By using such superlative adjective as “more” in reference to the exercising of leadership, and the temporal reference of the “future,” the use of the Transformation Strategy of Discontinuating is indicated. Tsai puts and emphasis on the necessary difference between now and the future, and she can also mean in it in terms on Taiwan-Japan relations, which can be backed by her admitting directly that she wants to “deepen Taiwan-Japan ties.”

These two statements came shortly after a proposal of Tokyo-Beijing meeting in the spring of 2020, during which a new political document laying foundation for the future Japan-China relations would be crafted, adding to the four former documents signed in 1972, 1978, 1998 and 2008, respectively. That was supposed to be the first official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Japan (Tachikawa 2020). This visit has not taken place yet, on the one hand due to the coronavirus pandemic, on the other hand due to Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong back on May 30th, when the Japanese government even considered withdrawing its invitation (Kyodo 2020). The ongoing emphasis of the Japanese side on the “working relationship on non-governmental basis” can be interpreted as what Tai Wan-chin, a professor emeritus at Tamkang University in New Taipei City calls a “voluntary restraint” that Japan exercises toward relations with Taiwan in the political arena. However, Tai still claims that “the grassroots relationship between the two is very good” (Tachikawa 2020).

In her Inaugural address of ROC 15th-term on May 20th, 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen said: “(...) *We will also continue to guide the global expansion of our industries. We will keep working to sign trade or investment protection agreements with the United States, Japan, and European countries. (...)*

Over the next four years, we will continue to fight for our participation in international organizations, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with our allies, and bolster ties with the United States, Japan, Europe, and other like-minded countries.” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2020).

In her Inaugural address Tsai mentions Japan in reference to signing trade and investment protection agreements which shows how crucial this issue is for Taiwan. She also calls Japan a “like-minded” country which vaguely indicates the reference to the countries that are not like-minded, possibly China. By doing so, Tsai differentiates Taiwan from China by highlighting common values shared Japan, the US, and Europe, but not China.

4.2. Discourses centered around Japan’s and Taiwan’s own past.

4.2.1. Introduction: Positionality and the differences in historiography

This subchapter is started by providing a few contextualizing remarks regarding the discourses centered around Japan’s and Taiwan’s past. After Japan ceded Taiwan to the Republic of China in 1945, the KMT positioned Taiwan in the orbit of 5.000 years of Chinese history, and the period of the Japanese

colonization was considered a “national stigma” by the party (Amae 2011, 22). At that time, KMT’s discourse of identity was mainly centered around Chiang Kai-shek’s “anti-communism and reclaiming China” (Fǎngòng fù guó 反共复国) agenda (Lai 2018, 16). Chiang Kai-shek used Taiwan-Japan bilateral trade as an instrument of his anti-communist propaganda. He pursued the policy of magnanimity (Yǐ dé bào yuàn 以德报怨) towards Japan at the end of the Second World War as Japan and China shared a strategic interest in deterring a common threat – communism. After the KMT’s settlement in Taiwan, the policy of seeking reconciliation with Japan continued. As an example of afterwar Taiwan-Japan cooperation can be the fact that a group of Japanese military officers stayed in Taiwan to assist a professional and strategic training of Chiang’s troops, which means that Taiwan maintained a close but secret military collaboration with Japan (Lai 2018, 17).

In 1970s new interpretations of the past emerged in Taiwan. It originated in the nativist Taiwanese nationalism and was called Taiwanshi (台湾史 Taiwan’s history), and gained popularity in the 1990s (Amae 2011, 22). The Japanese past and its preservation are consumed by the Taiwanese elites or nationalist in order to deconstruct the China-centric historiography and advance a Taiwan-centric one (Amae 2011, 54). Japan starred in the role of principal Other in Taiwan’s modern history, both at the time and in historical retelling. Historical retelling of the Japan-Other is focused mainly on the colonial period or WWII and the positioning of Japan in those narratives differs among different countries in Asia and Pacific region.

The people in Taiwan vary in opinions and feelings toward Japan as they lack of common collective historical memory of Japan due to the differences in ethnic, class, or gender identity (Hwang 2010, 75). The positionality (of the discourse) is best manifested in the different approaches towards the experience of the WWII in Taiwan, depending on the actor’s background – age, whether he is a ‘native’ Taiwanese (本省人), or a Mainlander - Chinese Taiwanese (外省人), or what his or her political affiliation is. This was well exemplified in different reactions to Shinzo Abe’s statement regarding the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 2015, and the Ma Ying-jeou’s reaction to the Lee Teng-hui’s utterance regarding the experience of the wartime.

“Japan” plays a considerable role in identity formation of both native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. For Mainlanders, the World War II experiences of fighting the Japanese army and being ultimately exiled from the motherland as an indirect cause strongly affected their identity. On the other hand, the experiences of colonization made an impact on the identity of the native Taiwanese (Hwang 2010, 76).

Japanese colonization and the Sino-Japanese War remain powerful subtexts within the context of the contemporary Taiwan identity conflict (Hwang 2010, 76). These two subtexts are also related with the unresolved post-war traumas, damages done by the Japanese, and the “comfort women” issue.

4.2.2. Japan as a benevolent colonizer

Tarō Asō, who most recently criticized the WHO for not allowing the participation of Taiwan in times of global pandemic (Krishnan 2020), has made a couple of controversial statements regarding Taiwan in the past. Although the next two discussed events have taken place before the timeframe set for this thesis, they serve as informative examples of the influence of postcolonial narratives on identity formation. In February 2006, serving as a Foreign Minister, referring to the Taiwan colonization, Asō said: “*Thanks to the significant improvement in educational standards and literacy (during colonization), Taiwan is now a country with a very high education level and keeps up with the current era,*” and “*This is something I was told by an important figure in Taiwan and all the elderly people knew about it. That was a time when I felt that, as expected, our predecessors did a good thing.*” (Japan Times 2006).

Taiwan is linguistically referred to as a country with high educational level, while the phenomenon of the Japanese colonization is referred to as a “good thing.” The positive attributions predominate, and the main argument given for the claim that Japan’s colonization was a positive experience in Taiwan’s current educational standards. These nominations, attributions and arguments are expressed from a position of a person in power coming from a higher society, and a Japanese national. The involvement is expressed through the use of the linguistic constructions such as “I felt, as expected” or “I was told.” The utterance was intensified by the use of examples and constructions indicating being emotional about the topic. The Taiwanese side did not comment on Asō’s statement at that time.

Referring to Taiwan’s colonial period Asō emphasized the contributions Japan has made regarding the improvement in education and literacy and uses the topos of consequence together with allusion that Taiwan’s current educational level is a direct result of Japan’s governance. Because of this positive attribution regarding Japan’s colonialism, it can be said that Asō applies the strategy of positive Self-Presentation. When he backs his statement with the claim, that it was an opinion shared by an “important figure in Taiwan” and “all the elderly people,” it indicates the use of the topos of appeal to authority and thus the Justification strategy of Legitimation. The motivation for such Othering of Taiwan is the national integration that draws on colonial sentiments. The Other is treated as inferior to the Self, which corresponds to Spivak’s understanding of identity formation – the center, in this case Japan, has the power to describe Self-Other relations, and the Other is always constructed as inferior. The Other is also framed as “good,” but it is portrayed as different from the Self, as power relations are emphasized. On the praxeological level, the submission of the Other to the Self is accentuated.

In 2005, then-Premier Frank Hsieh spoke about the Taiwanese colonial experience in an interview: “*By the latter stages of the colonial period, Japanese rule on Taiwan had settled down to a standard pattern. Comparing that situation with the February 28 Incident and the white terror that followed the arrival of the Nationalist government, Taiwanese were led to wonder how it was that the government of their own motherland was not as good as the colonial government!*”

When I was small I always felt it was odd. How was it that Japan was a defeated country yet so advanced? At the time it was popular to read Japanese magazines. There was one magazine, Stars, that had a hundred library stamps on it. Everyone fought to read it.” (Hsieh 2005).

As per the perspectivation, Frank Hsieh was the Premier in Chen Shui-bian’s government at the first time when the DPP came to power, he is also known for his pro-Japanese stance, discussed in earlier chapters. The exclamation, personal references, and the use of adverbs of time and pronouns such as “always” and “everyone” indicate the involvement of the speaker, as well as the use of Intensification strategy. Regarding predication strategy, Japan described in contrastive terms as being “defeated” and “advanced” at the same time, and it is contrasted with the Nationalist government as being “better”, which also indicates the use of the topos of comparison. Hsieh uses the Justification and Relativization strategy of Downplaying in regard to the Japanese colonial period, as he balances the KMT’s rule with the Japan’s rule by using the topos of comparison. At the same time, he weights the topics one-sidedly, presenting the atrocities of the KMT’s rule (references to the February 28 Incident and the white terror) in detail while the negatives of Japanese rule are not even briefly mentioned. Hsieh also uses the topos of illustrative example of popular Japanese magazines to portray the popularity of the Japanese culture among the Taiwanese population.

Hsieh motivation for such Othering of Japan is mainly to differentiate his government stance on the narrative of Japanese colonialism from the one of the previous KMT government. On the axiological level the Other is determined to be “good,” and on the praxeological level the assimilation of the Self to the Other is emphasized.

4.2.3. 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II

4.2.3.1. Introduction

The discourse around the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II or the 70th anniversary of the Republic of China’s victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War in 2015 serves as a good example to show how identity formation is used by different actors both in Japan and Taiwan. The discussed speech acts were mainly a reaction to an awaited speech delivered by Shinzo Abe on August 14th, 2015.

4.2.3.2. Abe’s speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II

The most informative fragments of Shinzo Abe’s speech are cited below: *“More than one hundred years ago, vast colonies possessed mainly by the Western powers stretched out across the world. With their overwhelming supremacy in technology, waves of colonial rule surged toward Asia in the 19th century. There is no doubt that the resultant sense of crisis drove Japan forward to achieve modernization. Japan built a constitutional government earlier than any other nation in Asia. The country preserved its independence throughout. The Japan-Russia War gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa. (...)*

Also, in countries that fought against Japan, countless lives were lost among young people with promising futures. In China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands and elsewhere that became the battlefields, numerous innocent citizens suffered and fell victim to battles as well as hardships such as severe deprivation of food. We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honor and dignity were severely injured. (...)

Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours: those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China, among others; and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war. (...)

In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed eighty per cent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future. (...)

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honor of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women's injured hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women's human rights are not infringed upon. (...)." (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2015).

In his statement, Abe positively attributes Japan's actions after the Second World War, which is visible in the following sentences: "(...) we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region"; "Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women's human rights are not infringed upon". For fragments above the strategies mainly employed include strategies of justification and perpetuation. Within strategies of justification, multiple micro-strategies were used. Strategy of Heteronomisation with the argumentation scheme of the topos of external force was manifested in the fragment saying that "vast colonies possessed mainly by the Western powers" that "drove Japan" to "achieve modernization." In reference to the issue of 'comfort women', that remains a flash point in e.g., Japan-South Korea relations, Abe employs the strategy of avoidance – as he never uses the term "comfort women" or mentions the sexual slavery, and the strategy of euphemizing manifested in such means of realization as euphemistic verbs: "(women) were severely injured"; vague personal reference: "many women". Strategy of Compensation was also used, evident in the following statement: "we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war". Additionally, the strategy of Discontinuation or the strategy of emphasizing the difference between then and now was used in reference to the shameful past by stating that "we must

not let (...) generations to come, who have nothing to do with war, be predestined to apologize”. Abe uses the deictic expression ‘we,’ incorporating multiple different meanings: as a historically expanding ‘we’ meaning both alive and dead Japanese who worked to achieve “peace and prosperity,” ‘we’ as a national body who must ‘inherit’ and ‘engrave’ the past, as well as the Japanese ‘we’ excluding the younger and next generations of Japanese (who should not “be predestined to apologize”).

The topos of history as a teacher was also brought up: “we Japanese (...) must squarely face the history of the past”. Lastly, the perpetuation strategy of avoidance, or a referential vagueness was visible, both in the way comfort women issue was brought up, as well as the reference to “actions during the war” without explicitly stating what kind of actions they were. Taiwan is mentioned next to South Korea and China, among countries with “histories of suffering”, therefore it can be deducted that the Japan-Self differentiates itself from the Taiwan-Other as the history of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan (and the Republic of Korea) is not mentioned. At the same time, the fact that Taiwan was mentioned along China, as a separate entity, is significant and shows that Abe’s attitude toward Taiwan is not indifferent.

4.2.3.3. Taiwan’s Presidential Office response to Abe’s speech

Talking about the past can also serve as a way to talk about the present relationship, the Office of the President of ROC had responded to Abe’s speech on August 14th, 2015 in the following way: “*Chen Yixin pointed out that World War II caused the most tragic casualties in human history. Our military and civilians, Asian countries, and Japanese people are actually victims of militarism. The solid and friendly relations established between the Republic of China and Japan after the war have become the best model for Asian countries to step out of the shadow of war and reach reconciliation and cooperation. He emphasized that since President Ma took office in 2008, he has attached great importance to Taiwan-Japan relations, positioning the two countries as a “special partnership,” and promoting friendly relations on the basis of long-term cooperation between the two sides, and has achieved rich results. In April 2013, my country signed the “Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement” with Japan to develop the East China Sea into a “sea of peace and cooperation”, effectively enhancing peace and stability in East Asia. These developments are completely consistent with the goals set in the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.*”⁸ (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2015).

Chen statement’s draws upon the common past as well as includes the linguistic construction of a common present and future. The responsibility or a blame for the World War II is shifted as the strategy of Heteronomisation is being used – Chen puts emphasis on extra-national dependence by bringing up

⁸ “陳以信指出，二戰在人類史上造成最慘痛的傷亡，我國軍民、亞洲各國與日本人民，其實都是軍國主義下的受害者。而中華民國與日本在戰後所建立的堅實友好關係，已成為亞洲各國走出戰爭陰影，達成和解與合作的最佳典範。他強調，馬總統 2008 年上任後十分重視臺日關係，將兩國定位為「特別夥伴關係」，在雙方長期合作基礎上推升友好關係，現已獲致豐富成果。2013 年 4 月，我國更與日本簽署《臺日漁業協議》，將東海發展成為「和平與合作之海」，有效增進東亞區域和平穩定。這些發展，與 1952 年《中日和約》設定的目標是完全一致的” (Office of the President Republic of China [Taiwan] 2015)

the topos of external force – “militarism” and says that both Taiwanese and “(...) Japanese people are actually victims of militarism,” which indicates the topos of similarity. This is followed by the emphasis on Ma Ying-jeou’s successes regarding the Taiwan-Japan relations development. The use of temporal reference “long-term” cooperation, as well as the referentially vague spatial reference “(...) enhancing peace and stability) in East Asia”, indicates the application of the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation by putting emphasis on positive political continuity at the national level. At the end, the topos of law is being brought up when Chen states that the “developments are completely consistent with the goals set in the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty”. The goal he most probably refers to are stated in Articles VII and IX. Article VII of Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (Treaty of Taipei) stating: “The Republic of China and Japan will endeavor to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty or agreement to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.” Article IX: “The Republic of China and Japan will endeavor to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.” The motivation for the legitimization of policies regarding Taiwan-Japan relations developments can explain the use of constructive discursive strategies as well as references to history. In Chen’s statement the Japan-Other is portrayed as similar to the Self, and the Self does not determine itself to be either superior or inferior to the Other. Overall, on the praxeological level, the cooperation with the Other (Japan) is highlighted.

At the same time, Chen Yixin, Taiwan’s Presidential Office spokesperson in response to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s speech added that: *“President Ma Ying-jeou’s consistent stance on history is to “to judge the matter as it stands” and “to know clearly to whom to show gratitude and against whom to feel resentment.” While affirming the contributions made by Hatta and other engineers to Taiwan during the Japanese occupation, we should also face the massive number of casualties within our country’s military and civilians due to the aggressive war started by Japan, large number of people that have been displaced, and the problem of so far still hard to heal scars and victimization of comfort women. After all, historical mistakes may be forgiven, but historical truth cannot be forgotten.”*⁹ (Yang 2015).

Chen Yixin’s speech act includes the narrations of a common political past as he is “affirming the contributions” of Japanese engineers in the time of Japanese occupation of Taiwan, and interestingly Hatta Yoichi is brought up again as a positive symbol. At the same time Chen applies the strategies of transformation when talking about the experience of the WWII. Those include the strategy of Discontinuating, with the argumentation schemes such as topos of history as a teacher as in the sentence: “(...) historical truth cannot be forgotten”. Regarding the Othering analysis, the main motivation might

⁹ “马英九总统对历史的一贯立场，就是“就事论事”，“恩怨分明”，在肯定日据时期八田与一技师等对台湾所做贡献的同时，更应面对日本发动侵略战争造成我国军民大量伤亡，许多民众流离失所，以及迄今伤痛仍难抚平的慰安妇的受害问题。毕竟，历史错误或可原谅，但历史真相不能忘记。” (Yang 2015)

be the national integration, as he lists the still unresolved issues, such as war casualties, displacement or comfort women that are raised in Chinese-centric narratives of the past, aimed at construction of a certain national identity. On the axiological level, Chen clearly differentiates the Other from the Self – he does not recognize Taiwan’s common history at the time, as a Japanese colonial subject. In this narrative the Japanese Other is “bad” as it is responsible for the war, but at the same time, its’ being “good” is also recognized, as in “affirming” Japanese contributions during occupation. It might be said that the Self determines itself to be superior to the Other in this context, as it allows itself to be the one to “forgive” the historical mistakes and demand the “historical truth”. On the praxeological level, this speech act is mainly about distancing and confrontation.

4.2.3.4. The DPP’s response to Abe’s speech

A different position was taken by the Democratic Progressive Party in their official statement: *“On the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Shinzo Abe expressed deep introspection for the aggressive behavior during World War II, apologized for the harm caused to the people of many countries, including Taiwan, and declared his determination to face international disputes through peaceful diplomacy in the future. In this regard, the Democratic Progressive Party affirmed and believed that Prime Minister Abe’s willingness to face history would contribute to regional peace and stability.”*¹⁰ (Yang 2015)

Again, the common political past in the time of the World War II was not mentioned. The statement employs constructive strategies of Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation manifested by the presupposition of and emphasis on positive political continuity at the national level, seen for example in the use of temporal reference “(...face international disputes through peaceful diplomacy) in the future”. The topos of consequence is also used, as the willingness to face the future should result in contribution to “regional peace and stability”. The direct personal reference to “Prime Minister Abe” indicates the use of Intensification strategy. It is noteworthy that the DPP paid special attention to the fact that Abe listed Taiwan as a separate country in his speech. As for the Othering of Japan in the DPP’s statement, the main motivation would be legitimation of policies, that is the will of a closer relationship with Japan. The sentence “Democratic Progressive Party affirmed and believed that Prime Minister Abe’s willingness to face history would contribute to regional peace and stability.” shows the trust DPP puts in Japan regarding their future relations. The Japan-Other presented in this speech act is “good”, a one that apologized and is focused on the future rather than past grievances. On the praxeological level, the DPP-Self puts an emphasis on the cooperation with the Other.

¹⁰ “在二战结束 70 周年之际，安倍晋三为二战期间的侵略行为表达深刻反省，对包括台湾在内的多国人民造成的伤害表示道歉，并宣示未来将以和平外交的方式来面对国际纷争的决心。对此，民进党表示肯定，也相信安倍首相愿意面对历史的态度，有助于区域的和平稳定。” (Yang 2015)

4.2.4. The “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” experiences of the war

The positionality of the discourse regarding the World War II shifts with the ‘discursive construction’, or in other words due to the changing power dynamics in setting language that controls how we understand concepts. It was visible in the way Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s former president born before Kuomintang’s flight from the mainland, spoke about the true role of Taiwan during the World War II and the strong reaction of President Ma Ying-jeou, whose Kuomintang’s discursive construction stands by the belief that Taiwan is and was a part of the Greater China during the wartime. They both used the Perspectivization strategy, but while Lee expressed the distance towards the Chinese identity, Ma embraced it and strongly criticized Lee’s stance.

Lee Teng-hui stated in interview with Japanese media Voice: “70 years ago, *Taiwan and Japan were the same country*. Since they were the same country, *Taiwan’s (participation) in the war of resistance against Japan is certainly not a fact*.”¹¹ (Lu 2015).

Ma Ying-jeou said in response to Lee Teng-hui’s interview: “How could Lee Teng-hui *be worthy* of the martyrs and sages who resisted Japan? I hope that Lee Teng-hui will immediately take back these words and apologize.”¹² (Lu 2015).

Lee’s utterance emphasizes the common political past of Taiwan and Japan, Japan as Other is identical to the Self and on the praxeological level, the assimilation of Self to the Other is indicated. As for the discursive strategies, Lee uses the Strategy of Casting doubt (that Taiwan was fighting Japanese in the WWII) topos of force of facts and the topos of consequence (Taiwan could not have participated in the war of resistance as it was being a Japan’s colonial subject). On the other hand, Ma’s speech act also draws on the confabulation of a common political past, but not the past regarding Japan, but China. Ma uses the Constructive strategy of Avoidance visible in the suppression of obvious intra-national differences and ignoring the extra-national heteronomy. He reacts to the discursive construction employed in Lee’s utterance by employing the Destruction strategy by discrediting opponents with the topos of comparison - by saying “How could Lee Teng-hui be worthy (...)” of comparison to the “martyrs and sages”. This sentence can also be interpreted as the use of the Strategy of Delegitimation, in which Ma points out that Lee has no right to criticize something as he is not “worthy of the martyrs and sages”. These two short speech acts exemplify two different types of memory of the war, both found in today’s Taiwanese society. In the past, when still in office President Lee Teng-hui was likened to Wang Chingwei, the KMT leader during the 1930s known from his collaboration with the Japanese. Such opinions were expressed especially by the Chinese Democratic Reformers Alliance, one of the KMT’s factions, which also claimed that Lee abandoned the party’s responsibility to restore the mainland and tacitly fought for Taiwan’s independence (Hood 1996, 479).

¹¹ “70 年前，台湾与日本是同一个国家，既然是同一个国家，台湾对日抗战当然不是事实”。(Lu 2015)

¹² “李登辉怎么对得起抗日的先烈先贤？希望李登辉立刻收回这些话并道歉。”(Lu 2015)

When attending the "Soochow People and the Far East International Military Trial Photo Exhibition and Symposium", Ma Ying-jeou said: *"When Japanese war criminals were under the international military trial after World War II, even if it can be accounted that all these people are dead, that they all were punished, (but) how can they repay so many blood debts to the Chinese?"* (Sohu 2020).

Ma Ying-jeou also mentioned the 28 Class A Japanese war criminals. He also cited the fate of the most important war criminals such as Hideki Tōjō, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Yoshijirō Umezu (Sohu 2020). For instance, Hideki Tōjō, a War Minister and Prime Minister of Japan during the World War II, was sentenced to death. He permitted the Japanese Army in Taiwan to ship 50 "comfort women" from Taiwan to Borneo without the ID. According to the documentation, as his approval was needed for the people without the ID to travel, he was aware and approved of the "comfort women" corps (Yoshimi 2000, 81-83). In addition, Ma mentioned that the two Japanese officers responsible for the Nanjing Massacre were originally sent back and were not prosecuted. Later, the Japanese media reported that it was discovered and the two (officers) were listed as war criminals for a trial, and were finally sent back to Yuhuatai, Nanjing, China to be shot (Sohu 2020).

In his speech, Ma uses the Constructive Strategy of Dissimilation, Exclusion and Discontinuation as the emphasis is put on the international differences as well as the difference between then and now. He draws on the topos of compensation as he balances the punishment of the war criminals with the remaining wounds of the Chinese. Simultaneously, the topos of responsibility is employed, as the Japanese are responsible for the war crimes and should still find solutions to alleviate the remaining problems. The strategy of Intensification is also visible in the use of the metaphor "blood debts." Regarding the Othering of Japan, it is interesting that Ma's Self is Chinese, not Taiwanese. Thus, it is implied that he Perspectivization strategy of the Chinese side and expresses the distancing from Japan. In addition, he ignores the fact that Taiwan's status during the World War II was a Japanese colony. In other words, there is a discrepancy between the assertion of continuity (of the Republic of China rule) and the factual discontinuities in the area (the shift from the Japanese colonial rule to the Republic of China's rule). Within Ma's national rhetoric, ignoring this historical break is done for reasons of positive national self-presentation. This fact also implies that in the KMT's vision, the Taiwan's society is solely Chinese. Thus, the motivation for Othering of Japan in Ma's speech is the national integration: his logic is that Taiwanese people are inherently Chinese, and their common understanding of the past should be through the Chinese lens. The Other is presented as "bad," and different from the Self, also because its' damage done to the Self was too large to forgive. On the praxeological level, the distancing and confrontation is emphasized.

4.2.5. Discourses centered around Japan's and Taiwan's own past: Summary.

Three main topics were analyzed in the previous subchapter: the discourse on Japan's colonization coming solely from the Japanese point of view, the responses to Abe's speech on the 70th anniversary

of the end of the World War II and the discourse of the different perceptions on wartime history in the Taiwanese society.

Regarding the first topic, the topos of appeal to authority and the Justification Strategy of legitimization were used to convince the audience, that the Japanese rule of Taiwan was a positive experience for a Taiwanese population at the time. Additionally, the topos of consequence and the strategy of Positive Self-Representation were applied when referring to the Japan's colonial contributions. On the Taiwanese side, the topos of comparison was applied to judge the Japanese and the KMT's rule and the Justification and Relativisation strategy of Downplaying was used in regard to the negatives of the colonization period.

When talking about Japan's colonial history and militarism, Abe used the Strategy of Heteronomisation with the argumentation scheme of the topos of external force (influences of Western powers). Abe used the Strategy of Avoidance when talking about unresolved issues, such as the 'comfort women' issue, as well as the Strategy of Compensation, Discontinuation, as well as the topos of history as a teacher while referring to Japanese actions during the war.

The KMT's administration responded to Abe's speech by using the Strategy of Heteronomisation and the topos of external force regarding the development of militarism in the past. Additionally, the topos of similarity and the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation was brought up, which indicated the willingness for cooperation. Regarding the actions of Japan during the wartime, the Presidential office applied the topos of history as a teacher as well as the Transformation strategy of Discountinuating. On the other hand, the DPP did not directly refer to the Japan's actions during the war, instead the Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation and the Intensification strategy was used, which also aimed at showing the willingness for further cooperation.

The last topic shows the positionality of the Taiwanese population in regard to their perceptions of the common history. While the stance of the DPP (as in the words of Lee Teng-hui) is justified by the use of the topos of force of facts and the topos of consequence, the KMT (Ma Ying-jeou) attempts to write its own history and responds to doubts of Lee with the Strategy of Avoidance and the Strategy of Delegitimation. Regarding the discourse on the World War II within the last speech act, Ma uses the topos of compensation and responsibility referring to the Japanese actions and war crimes against the Chinese.

4.2.6. Extra topic: between the domestic politics and talking about the past: The Comfort Women issue

4.2.6.1. Comfort Women' bronze statue unveiling in Tainan.

On August 14th, 2018, Ma Ying-jeou participated in an event of Comfort Women' bronze statue unveiling in Tainan. In his speech he stated: "After the DPP came to power, it has **never** brought up the

*issue of the comfort women. The DPP government is committed to transitional justice, it **should** speak up on this issue to ease the pain of history.*”¹³ (Huiliu 2018).

The event took place on an international day to remember comfort women after the testimony of the first Korean comfort woman Kim Hak-sun on August 14th, 1991 (Lee and Lee 2018). According to Wodak and Richardson (2009, 231), events aimed at commemoration of the past serve to distinguish between conflicting interpretations of history, so that a chosen set of narratives are highlighted and allowed for reflection. The unveiling of the Comfort Women statue is the second event that commemorates the past, discussed in this thesis, next to founding of the Hatta Yoichi Memorial Park. Both narratives chosen by the KMT serve to create a Taiwanese national identity vis-à-vis the Japan-Other. At the same time, the narrative on Hatta Yoichi exemplifies a positive Japanese influence in Taiwan whereas the comfort women narrative aims at confrontation with Japan and criticizing the DPP government.

By pointing out that the DPP is unwilling to bring up the comfort women issue, Ma uses the contrastive topos of comparison. It also indicates the use of the Perpetuation Strategy of Portrayal in Black and White, which here is combined with positive self-presentation. Ma uses normative-deontic modals: “DPP (...) should speak up...” which indicates the use of the Discontinuating strategy of transformation.

Although the issue regards the comfort women and draws on the stance on the relationship with Japan, the actual Other is the DPP. The main motivation of such Othering of the DPP is the national integration, the need to show that the two parties differ on the subject which many Taiwanese are emotional about. The Other is “bad” as it avoids the issue, and it is portrayed as different from the KMT-Self as shown by a comparison. The Self also determines itself to be superior to the Other as it actually cares about the raised issue. On the praxeological level, the confrontation with the Other is accentuated.

Following the statue’s unveiling, the New Party Youth Committee convener Wang Bingzhong led the protest next to the Japanese Exchange Association in Taipei and stated: “*Today we, **Chinese people**, all stood up to help our Taiwanese comfort women’ grandmas fight for the rights they deserve. What would you say, is that not right? Even fixing up a statue is almost impossible, because **our government is one ‘fascinated by Japan.**’ They want to ‘embrace’ Japanese ‘thighs’ all day, hoping they can succeed in securing Taiwan’s independence. Do you think it is possible?*”¹⁴ (Chen 2018).

Wang accentuates the Chinese identity of his Taiwanese audience. In his speech he uses a constructive strategy of unification by putting emphasis on the will to cooperate and show solidarity and the appeals

¹³ “民进党执政后从没提过慰安妇的事，民进党政府致力转型正义，应该要为这个议题发声，让历史伤痛得到平抚”。(Huiliu 2018)

¹⁴ “今天就是我们中国人，大家一起站出来，帮我们台湾的慰安妇阿嬷争取她们应有的权益，你们说对不对？却连搬个雕像上去都几乎做不到，因为我们的政府是一个媚日的政府，他们整天只想抱着日本人的大腿，希望他们可以搞台独成功，你们认为可能吗？”(Chen 2018)

for cooperation and the application of idiomatic metaphors such as “we (...) all stood up to help”. When comparing his own stance to the official government’s stance on the issue, he uses the dissimulation strategy and emphasizes the state-internal differences. It is visible in the exclusion through personal reference “they (want to embrace Japanese thighs)”. He says that the DDP government wants to “embrace Japanese thighs” and is a “government fascinated by Japan”, such use of metaphors indicates the use of the topos of threat as he alludes the warning against the loss of national autonomy. Again, the government-Other is “bad” in comparison to the righteous Self that fights for the right cause. Self clearly attempts to confront the Other. The motivation of Othering is also national integration, showing moral superiority of the KMT-Self.

The next day after the event took place, Yoshihide Suga, then Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, stated: *“This is inconsistent with the position of the Japanese government and the efforts made so far, (we) feel extreme regret over this matter.”* (Huiliu 2018).

Suga puts an emphasis on a difference between then and now, which indicated the Transformation strategy of Dissimulation. When pointing out the inconsistency of the action with the “efforts made so far,” Suga indirectly hints that the Taiwan-Japan relations might be affected by the event, which indicates the use of the topos of threat.

4.2.6.2. Frank Hsieh’s response to the statue unveiling.

Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), a former opponent of Ma, the head of the Association of Taiwan-Japan relations, post on Facebook, August 21st: *“The Chinese political parties in Taiwan continue to expand the contradictions between Taiwan and Japan: they dominated the city of Tainan and set up a bronze statue of comfort women; they initiated a referendum to ban the import of food from Northeast to Taiwan. It goes without saying that such actions undermine Taiwan-Japan relations. The Japanese cabinet spokesperson expressed regret for this, and the Japanese representative in Taiwan did not hesitate to say that it would affect the friendly relations between Taiwan and Japan. Such a draw and a split will destroy the friendship between Taiwan and Japan. The goal of isolating Taiwan seems to have been initially achieved, which is worrying and distressing”*¹⁵ (Hsieh 2018).

The multiple use of personal references “they”, as well as the synecdochical anthroponyms such as “Chinese political parties” indicates the constructive strategy of dissimulation as the state-internal differences are emphasized. Hsieh, similarly to Wang, warns against the loss of national autonomy, but instead he applies the topos of a fictitious and threatening scenario – destruction of Taiwan-Japan relations and isolation of Taiwan in the international arena. Regarding the Othering analysis, the main motivation

¹⁵ “另一方面台湾内部的中国政党却不断扩大台日的矛盾对立：在台南市主导，设置慰安妇铜像；发起禁止东北食物进口台湾的公民投票，其作用在破坏台日关系，不言而喻。日本内阁发言人对此表示遗憾，日本驻台代表也不讳言将影响台日友好关系。这样一拉拢一分化，破坏台日友谊，孤立台湾的目的似乎初步达成，令人忧虑痛心。” (Hsieh 2018)

for such portrayal of the KMT-Other seems to be either national integration (being Taiwanese 本省人 in the opposition to Chinese-Taiwanese 外省人) or countering threats (Chinese influences that result in worsening Taiwan-Japan relations). The KMT-Other is “bad” while the Japan-Other is “good”, which indicates that the Self determines itself to be different from KMT but is prone to assimilate with the Japan-Other. Hsieh also clearly distances himself and the DPP position from the KMT’s.

Hsieh’s Facebook post was interpreted as so pro-Japanese by the KMT members, that Ke Zhien, KMT legislator, said in response to Hsieh’s post: “*Could it be that you’re Japanese?*”¹⁶ (Zhonghua 2018). It is a short utterance, but it tells a lot about how the two parties position themselves in the discourse on Japan. While ignoring the independent Taiwanese identity, Ke implies that being pro-Japanese excludes the possibility of being Chinese. The motivation is the national integration through distancing and differentiation from the Japan-Other as well as pro-Japanese domestic opposition party members.

4.2.6.3. Responses to the kicking of the Comfort Women’ statue

The situation around the unveiling of the comfort woman in Tainan was elevated again when on the 6th of September 2018, Mitsuhiro Fujii of Rompa Project, supported by Happy Science – a Japanese religious organization that promotes comfort women denial in the U.S. - kicked a Comfort Women statue (Zhonghua 2018).

In response to the kicking, Frank Hsieh stated: “*If there is any evidence that the Japanese government (instructed) it, of course, we must protest, but if it is a non-governmental behavior, we will not protest. There are various personal behaviors among the people, there are also people in Taiwan who are violent against the Japanese, which cannot be said to be representative to (all) the people of Taiwan.*”; “*I don’t know the facts about the Japanese Mitsuhiro Fujii kicking the bronze statue, but my position is that I have always advocated reconciliation, symbiosis, peace, and opposed violence or any violence suggestive behaviors, so as for the kicking, I must solemnly condemn it.*”; “*I think this behavior does not represent (all) Japanese, because many Japanese on the Internet also condemned him, thinking that he undermined the “Taiwan-Japan” friendship, saying that he does not represent (all) the Japanese or the Japanese government. Basically, I also think that it should not be expanded to the opposition or contradiction between Taiwan and Japan.*”¹⁷ (Zhonghua 2018).

In his statement, Hsieh implements a justification strategy of casting doubt, as he tries to distance Fujii’s behavior from the stance of the Japanese government and the general public. He also uses the strategy

¹⁶ “难道你是日本人？” (Zhonghua 2018)

¹⁷ “如果有任何证据证明是日本政府（指使）的，当然要抗议，但若是民间行为，我们不会抗议。”“民间有各种个人行为，台湾也有人对日本人暴力，不能说是代表（所有）台湾民众。”；“对于日本人藤井脚踢铜像的事情，事实我不清楚，但是我的立场是，我一向主张和解共生、和平，反对暴力或反对任何暴力暗示的行为，所以有脚踢行为的话，我要严正谴责。”；“我认为这个行为不代表（所有）日本人，因为在网路上很多日本人也谴责他，认为他破坏‘台日’友好，说他不代表（所有）日本人，也不代表日本政府。基本上，我也认为不应该把它扩大到‘台日’对立或矛盾。” (Zhonghua 2018)

of avoidance in reference to the representation of negative actions, in that case the kicking of a comfort woman statue by a Japanese national: “I don’t know the facts...”. In addition, he uses the assimilation strategy of presupposition of international similarity when saying “many Japanese on the Internet also condemned him” or by justifying “there are also people in Taiwan who are violent against the Japanese”. The emphasis is also put on positive political continuity: “(the action) should not be expanded to the opposition or contradiction between Taiwan and Japan”. Such portrayal of a Japan-Other indicated the motivation for countering threats, which can be the worsening of the two countries relations. The other is “good” and Hsieh accentuates the similarities between the two parties, in order to show the will for cooperation with the Other, at the same time distancing the Other from the responsibility for Fujii’s actions.

4.2.6.4. Ma’s critique of Tsai’s handling of the Comfort Women issue in 2019.

After the unveiling of the comfort woman statue in Tainan in 2018, Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly raises the issue annually during the commemoration day on August 14.

A year after, in 2019, Ma again emphasized the difference between how the KMT and DDP handle the comfort women issue, by saying: *“The issue of comfort women was locked into the black box of historical memory by the DPP”* and *“‘comfort women’ grandmas have been passing away one after another, but during their lifetime they did receive an apology or compensation from Japan. Cai was called a ‘hot Taiwan chick’, but once she encounters the ‘comfort woman issue’, she becomes a ‘soft Taiwan girl’.* Now she again has become a muted ‘speechless Taiwan girl’.”¹⁸ (Yu 2019).

Regarding the treatment of the comfort women issue by the KMT and DDP, Ma implements the relativization strategy of shifting of blame and responsibility, indicated by emphasizing the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, by saying “issue (...) was locked into the black box (...) by the DPP”, and claiming that when President Tsai is confronted with the “comfort women issue” she “becomes ‘a soft Taiwan girl’ or even a “speechless Taiwan girl”. He plays with the nickname of Tsai which can translate into a “hot chick” as well as “hot Taiwan girl”, given to her by the netizens back in 2018. When on January 2, 2019 Xi Jinping warned that Taiwan reunification is inevitable, Tsai firmly rejected his speech. A week later a rapper Dwagie released a rap song “Hot Taiwanese girl” in which he praised Tsai’s attitude, and from then on, many people started using that nickname for Tsai on the Internet. Tsai embraced this nickname, which is popular among her supporters (The New Lens 2019). By saying that Tsai turned into a “soft” or “speechless” Taiwanese girl, he accentuates how differently Tsai reacts to two issues, however different the issues are, as well as implies that Tsai is unwilling to upset Japan, while she had no problem in confronting the People’s Republic of China. This can indicate the use of

¹⁸ “慰安妇的议题被民进党锁进历史记忆的黑箱”。慰安妇“阿嬷”相继离世，却一辈子也没有等到日本道歉、赔偿，蔡被称为“辣台妹”，可是一碰到“慰安妇议题”就变成“软台妹”，现在又成了哑巴的“哑台妹”。(Yu 2019)

strategy of downplaying, or of trivialization of Tsai's past successes as he balances Tsai's strong stance on Taiwan's independence against the lack of action regarding the comfort women issue. Additionally, the use of derogatory metaphors by calling Tsai "soft" and "speechless" indicates the implementation of dismantling strategy of discrediting opponents. When addressing the issue directly, Ma says that the "comfort women" grandmas did not "receive an apology or compensation from Japan" and that they "have been passing away". Such reference implies the constructive strategy of unification, as Ma draws on the emotionality of the listener and puts an emphasis on shared sorrow (suffering and injustice) as well as the need to feel and show solidarity towards the "comfort women". As for the Othering analysis, the DPP-Other is portrayed as "bad" and different from the Self and on the praxeological level, the distancing from the Other and confrontation is accentuated.

In response to Ma, the Tsai's Presidential Office stated: *"The wounds caused by wars such as "comfort women" should be faced with solemnity, not a frivolous manipulation of hatred and extortion of political bonuses."*¹⁹ (Yu 2019).

The statement implements the perpetuation strategies of portrayal in Black and White in combination with positive self-presentation. Contrastive topos of comparison is brought up: The President is solemn and does not use the "comfort women" issue in the political game, while the opposition does. The statement can also be interpreted as using a micro strategy of defense, also from among the strategies of perpetuation, as the comparative/superlative means of realization are used.

4.2.6.5. Ma's critique of Tsai's handling of the Comfort Women issue in 2020.

In 2020, Ma Ying-jeou referred to the "comfort women" issue during a memorial service in Tainan for a third time: *"The historical concern of comfort women is a worldwide movement. Sex slavery is still happening and crimes against women have not stopped. It is necessary to prevent similar incidents from repeating. However, the current government does not mention comfort women in the curriculum or mentions them briefly, downplaying the historical facts of Taiwan's resistance to Japan. We must not allow the correct history of comfort women to be annihilated. Facing history, we will make a clear distinction between right and wrong and face the victims. Comparing heart to heart, heal the wound and relieve the pain."*²⁰ (Fang 2020).

The use of the spatial reference "worldwide" indicates the constructive strategy of inclusion. Ma emphasizes that the "comfort women" issue concerns people internationally, drawing on topos of similarity. The transformation strategy of discontinuating is used by Ma, as he puts emphasis on a

¹⁹ "慰安妇"等战争带来的种种创伤，应该以肃穆的态度面对，不是轻佻地操弄仇恨、从中榨取政治红利。" (Yu 2019)

²⁰ "慰安妇历史的关注是一个世界性的运动，性奴隶到现在仍然在发生，对妇女的犯罪并没有停止，要防止类似的事件不断的重演，但是现在的政府在课纲里不提慰安妇或简略提过，淡化台湾人抗日的史实，我们绝对不能让正确的慰安妇历史被湮灭掉，面对历史就事论事，是非分明，面对受难者将心比心，疗伤止痛。" (Fang 2020)

necessary difference between now and the future. He uses the argumentation scheme of topos of consequence: ‘something follows as a direct result of something else’- the sex slavery is still common so as a result it must be prevented, which is also visible by the used means of realization including constructions such as “it is necessary”. Ma again brings up the relativization strategy of emphasizing the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in reference to the DPP’s government stance on the issue. Insinuations such as that the government is “downplaying historical facts” indicates the use of the topos of the force of facts, even though the “facts of Taiwan’s resistance to Japan” can be questionable. It is thus clear that he confabulates a myth of a common political past. Subsequently, Ma uses the constructive strategy of unification and cohesivation when accentuating the will to co-operate as well as feel and show solidarity towards the issue through the means such appeals for co-operation: “we must not allow...”, “we will make a clear distinction between right and wrong”. The DDP, not Japan, is the Other in the context of Ma’s speech. The Other is “bad” and different, and the Self determines itself to be morally superior to the Other. The need for confrontation is accentuated on the praxeological level.

“After the passage of the Transitional Justice Regulations, President Tsai had never formally expressed her views on the issue of comfort women, unwilling to offend Japan. President Tsai Ing-wen is a female president and should care more about women’s rights than we do. After being elected, she took the initiative to skip the promise given previously to the ‘comfort women’ grandmas. President Tsai also expressed in the Human Rights Committee of the Supervisory House earlier this month that she would investigate human rights violations and protect the human rights of our people, but she did not mention the protection of comfort women. I hope that the future curriculum will correctly preserve the history of comfort women. These efforts cannot be stopped. Although the grandmothers are gradually withering away, we must continue to speak out for all comfort women and women who have suffered abuse or unfairness in the world, and work hard for all human rights.”²¹ (Fang 2020).

Previously analyzed strategies are again applied in the above continuation of Ma’s statement, including i.a. the strategies of transformation, relativization, as well as constructive strategy of unification and cohesivation. The discontinuating strategy is used once again when referring directly to Tsai Ing-wen, as Ma emphasizes the necessary difference between now and the future by using the argumentation scheme of a topos of consequence, in this case: Tsai is a “female president” therefore she consequently “should” (normative-deontic modal) “care more about women’s rights than we do” (topos of comparison). This example shows how gendered the issue is. The topic of transitional justice, a reform initiated by Tsai Ing-wen aimed at investigating KMT’s government unfair practices and atrocities in

²¹ “蔡总统在《转型正义条例》通过后，均未曾对慰安妇议题正式表态，不愿意得罪日本，蔡英文总统贵为女性总统，应该比我们更关心女性权益，当选后却主动跳过曾经对慰安妇阿嬷的承诺，蔡总统在本月初监察院人权委员会中也表达要调查人权侵害事件，要保障我们国人的人权，但却未提慰安妇的保障，希望未来课纲要将慰安妇的历史正确的保留，这些努力不能停止，虽然阿嬷们逐渐凋零，但我们要继续为世界所有的慰安妇及遭受到凌虐或不公平的妇女来发声，更是为了所有人权来努力。” (Fang 2020)

the period 1945-1992 (Shattuck 2019, 10), has been brought up by Ma. By doing that, he contrasts Tsai's will to face the past and reconcile when it comes to the crimes of the authoritarian KMT regime, with her unwillingness to speak about the comfort women.

Jiang Qichen, the Chairman of Kuomintang, added that: *"The pain of the comfort woman grandma is not only the personal pain, but the pain of the nation. Because of the war such history, apart from being commemorated, must also be remembered by its ruthlessness, and cherishing the preciousness of peace even more. I can't wait for the Japanese government to apologize. They treat us and South Korea differently. Only a sincere apology can let this cruel history be forgiven."*²² (Fang 2020).

Equaling personal pain of the comfort women with the pain of the whole nation indicated the use of the constructive strategy of inclusion, as the intra-national sameness is accentuated. When talking about the difference in how Japan treats Taiwan and South Korea, Jiang uses the argumentation scheme of the topos of justice. At the same time, he applies the topos of difference which comes from the strategy of heteronomisation which puts emphasis on extra-national dependence. When bringing up apology, Jiang uses emphasis: "I can't wait...", "Only a sincere apology can...", which indicates the use of discontinuating strategy of transformation. The emphasis is put on a necessary difference between now and the future. The national integration as a motivation for such way of Othering of Japan is indicated by Jiang's referring to the unresolved comfort women issue. The Other is considered "bad", and the confrontational behavior is indicated in Jiang's speech.

4.2.6.6. The 'Comfort Women' issue: Summary

The discourse on the 'comfort women' not only throws light on how history is used in relation to the construction of the national identity and how it can be employed for political use, but also on how the KMT and the DPP prioritize Taiwan-Japan relations. The most important discursive topics stemming from the main topic of the 'comfort women' are presented in the Figure 3.

Referring to the fight for the rights of comfort women, the KMT uses the contrastive topos of comparison and the Perpetuation Strategy of Portrayal in Black and White combined with Positive Self-presentation in order to differentiate itself from the DPP. Ma goes as far as to publicly shame Tsai by calling her by a pejorative nickname and implementation of dismantling strategy of discrediting opponents. At the same time, when calling for justice for the victims, the KMT uses the strategy of Unification, the Constructive Strategy of Inclusion, as well as the topos of justice.

Japan reacted in a short statement using the Transformation strategy of Dissimilation and the topos of threat indicating the possibility of deterioration in Japan-Taiwan relation. Frank Hsieh has also used the

²² "慰安妇阿嬷的痛不是只有个人，而是国族的伤痛，这样的历史是因为战争，除了追思以外，也是要记取战争的无情，更珍惜和平的可贵。一直等不到日本政府的道歉，他们在对我们及韩国却有不同的待遇，只有诚挚的道歉才能让这段残酷的历史被原谅。" (Fang 2020)

topos of a threatening scenario in regard to the worsening of Japan-Taiwan relations, as well as the Constructive strategy of Dissimulation as he emphasizes the state-internal differences. Additionally, the DPP used the strategy of Defense and the Perpetuation strategies of portrayal in Black and White in combination with positive self-presentation while pointing out that the KMT is using the ‘comfort women’ issue for political advantage.

In the discussed speech acts, especially those coming from Wang Bingzhong and Frank Hsieh, the usage of the ‘comfort women’ discourse for the national identity construction is heavily implied. For Wang, if one does not speak up for the comfort women, he or she is “fascinated by Japan,” while for Hsieh the “Chinese political parties” influence the Taiwan’s relations with Japan, implying the KMT’s relationship with the CCP. This indicates, that in the discourse on Taiwan’s national identity, one has to position oneself to be either “Chinese” or “pro-Japanese”.




Figure 5 The discourse about the "comfort women" issue: main discursive topics. Author's design.

5. Key Findings

5.1. Key Findings: Introduction

The goal of this thesis was to answer the following research question and three sub research questions:

RQ: *How did the construction of Self and Other change over time in the official discourse in Taiwan and Japan regarding their bilateral relations?*

Sub-RQ1: *What are the strategies and argumentation schemes used most frequently in the KMT and the DPP's speech acts regarding Japan, and Japan's government speech acts regarding Taiwan?*

Sub-RQ2: *How did framing of Japan as an Other to Taiwan's Self change from Ma Ying-jeou to Tsai Ing-wen's administrations?*

Sub-RQ3: *How did framing of Taiwan as an Other to Japan's Self change during Shinzo Abe's second administration from 2012-2020?*

In the following sections the findings to each question will be presented and discussed.

5.2. The most frequently used strategies and argumentation schemes, and the outcomes of the Othering analysis

Table 3 presents the most frequently used strategies and argumentation schemes within the discussed discursive topics, as well as the outcomes of the Othering analysis.

Table 3 The summary of most frequently used strategies and argumentation schemes, and the outcomes of the Othering Analysis.
Source: Author based on the empirical data.

		Taiwan	Japan
Discursive topic: Japan-Taiwan relations after the Great East Japan Earthquake	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	The KMT administration: Constructive strategy of Continuation; Constructive strategy of Inclusion; topos of comparison; Perpetuation strategy of Positive Self-Presentation	Abe's government: strategy of Intensification; topos of similarity; Constructive Strategy of Unification; topos of comparison; Constructive strategy of Assimilation Inclusion and Continuation; the topos of changed circumstances
	Framing of the Other	<u>Motivation:</u> improvement in bilateral relations; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as "good" and similar; <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation with the Other	<u>Motivation:</u> expression of gratitude and improvement in bilateral relations; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as "good" and similar; <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation with the Other; assimilation of the Self with the Other

Discursive topic: Okinotorishima Incident	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	The KMT administration: Perpetuation Strategy of Defense; Constructive Strategy of Autonomisation; Intensification strategy; the topos of authority; topos of threat.	Perpetuation strategy of Avoidance; Constructive Strategy of Inclusion and Continuation; topos of similarity; referential vagueness; Perpetuation Strategy of Continuation; Mitigation Strategy.
	Framing of the Other	<u>Motivation</u> : national integration; <u>Axiological level</u> : Other presented as “bad” and different from the Self; <u>Praxeological level</u> : distancing and confrontation of the Self to the Other	<u>Motivation</u> : willingness to alleviate the tensions; <u>Axiological level</u> : Other presented as “good” and similar to the Self; <u>Praxeological level</u> : cooperation with the Other
Discursive topic: Congratulatory Messages	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	The DPP administration: Constructive Strategy of Continuation; Intensification Strategy; topos of threat.	Constructive Strategy of Continuation; Intensification Strategy; Perpetuation Strategy of Continuation.
	Framing of the Other	<u>Motivation</u> : improvement in bilateral relations; <u>Axiological level</u> : Other presented as “good” and similar; <u>Praxeological level</u> : cooperation with the Other	<u>Motivation</u> : improvement in bilateral relations; <u>Axiological level</u> : Other presented as “good” and similar; <u>Praxeological level</u> : cooperation with the Other
Discursive topic: Food import ban	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	The KMT: Strategy of Casting doubt; topos of a fictitious disaster; topos of force of facts; topos of illustrative example. The DPP: Justification Strategy of Legitimation; topos of force of facts Topos of threat (worsening Japan-Taiwan relations)	Transformation strategy of Calming down; Justification Strategy of Legitimation; topos of force of facts; topos of ignorance.
	Framing of the Other	<u>Motivation</u> : Prolongation of the food import ban (KMT)/ removal of the ban (DPP) <u>Axiological level</u> : Other presented as “bad” (KMT)/ “good” (DPP); <u>Praxeological level</u> : confrontation (KMT)/ cooperation with the Other (DPP)	<u>Motivation</u> : Removal of the food import ban; <u>Axiological level</u> : Other presented as “good”; <u>Praxeological level</u> : cooperation with the Other

Discursive topic: Admission to the CPTPP	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	<p>The DPP: Constructive strategy of Continuation; strategy of “we are all in the same boat”; Constructive strategy of Unification and Cohesivation; topos of comparison; topos of favorable time; topos of threat; Perpetuation Strategy of Positive Self-Representation; Transformation strategy of Discountinuating.</p>	topos of consequence; topos of “you can’t have one without the other;” topos of authority; topos of threat; Constructive strategy of Unification and Cohesivation.
	Framing of the Other	<p><u>Motivation:</u> Admission to the CPTPP; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as “good” and similar to the Self; <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation with the Other; Assimilation of the Self to the Other</p>	<p><u>Motivation:</u> Removal of the food import ban; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as “bad” and different from the Self; <u>Praxeological level:</u> distancing and confrontation of the Self with the Other</p>
Discursive topic: President Tsai Ing-wen’s reelection	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	Transformation Strategy of Discountinuating; topos of similarity;	Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation; Perpetuation strategy of Continuation
	Framing of the Other	<p><u>Motivation:</u> improvement in bilateral relations; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as “good” and similar; <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation with the Other</p>	<p><u>Motivation:</u> improvement in bilateral relations; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as “good”; <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation with the Other</p>
Discursive topic: Japan as a benevolent colonizer	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	topos of comparison Justification and Relativisation strategy of Downplaying topos of illustrative example	Intensification Strategy; topos of consequence; positive Self-Presentation; topos of appeal to authority; Justification strategy of Legitimation
	Framing of the Other	<p><u>Motivation:</u> differentiation of the DPP’s narrative of colonial history; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as “good” but different from the Self <u>Praxeological level:</u> assimilation of the Self to the Other</p>	<p><u>Motivation:</u> national integration drawing on the colonial sentiments; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as “good” but different and inferior to the Self <u>Praxeological level:</u> submission of the Other to the Self</p>

Discursive topic: 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II (responses to Abe's speech)	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	<p>The KMT: Strategy of Heteronomisation; topos of external force; Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation topos of history as a teacher; Transformation strategy of Discountinuating</p> <p>The DPP: Constructive strategy of Assimilation, Inclusion and Continuation; Intensification strategy;</p>	Strategy of Heteronomisation; topos of external force; Strategy of Avoidance; Strategy of Compensation; the topos of history; Transformation strategy of Discountinuating
	Framing of the Other	<p><u>Motivation:</u> national integration; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as "good" and equal to the Self but different from the Self <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation with the Other</p>	<p><u>Motivation:</u> national integration and living up to the expectations of the international community; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as "good" and equal to the Self but different from the Self <u>Praxeological level:</u> cooperation</p>
Discursive topic: The 'comfort women' issue	Main discursive and argumentation strategies	<p>The KMT: strategy of Unification; Constructive Strategy of Inclusion; topos of justice</p> <p>The DPP: topos of a threatening scenario Perpetuation strategies of portrayal in Black and White</p>	Transformation strategy of Dissimulation; topos of threat
	Framing of the Other	<p><u>Motivation:</u> national integration (KMT), alleviating the tensions in Taiwan-Japan relations (DPP); <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as "bad" and different from the Self (KMT), "good" (DPP) <u>Praxeological level:</u> distancing and confrontation with the Other (KMT); cooperation and assimilation with the Other (DPP)</p>	<p><u>Motivation:</u> avoidance and unwillingness to discuss the issue; <u>Axiological level:</u> Other presented as "bad" and different from the Self <u>Praxeological level:</u> distancing and confrontation with the Other</p>

Following the Tōhoku earthquake, the shift in the discourse on Japan-Taiwan relations came with the Abe's LDP government in 2012. The strategies used predominantly in Abe and Kishida's speeches emphasize the will to cooperate and show solidarity. The positive shift is also noticeable in Izumi's greetings, in which he accentuated the cooperation but also pointed out to the changing regional circumstances by using topos of threat as well as the strategy of "we are all in the same boat," accentuating the will to intensify Japan-Taiwan cooperation. President Ma responded by putting emphasis on similarities and positive political continuity regarding Japan-Taiwan relations in his speeches, simultaneously using the Strategy of Positive Self-Presentation aimed at national integration.

The strategies and argumentation schemes used within the Okinotorishima Incident discourse differ greatly between the two countries. The Taiwanese side used the Defence strategy as well as the Intensification strategy together with the topoi of authority and threat. The Japanese side mainly aimed at cooling off the tension by using the Mitigation and Avoidance strategies,

Regarding the congratulatory messages in 2016 and 2017 and after Tsai's reelection in 2017, the strategies and argumentation schemes used by Abe, Kishida and Tsai are almost identical, and they aim at emphasizing the similarities of two states as well as at accentuating the positive political continuity.

Securitization of the food safety issue by the KMT resulted in prolongation of the import ban which resulted in a strong reaction of the Japanese side. They mainly used the topos of consequence, and the topos of "you can't have one without the other" to argue that now they might not allow Taiwan's participation in the CPTPP.

The narration of Japan as a benevolent colonizer was used to convince the audience that the Japanese rule of Taiwan was a positive experience for a Taiwanese population at the time. On the Taiwanese side, the topos of comparison was applied to contrast the Japanese and the KMT's rule in Japan's favor, and the strategy of Downplaying was used in order to euphemize the colonial period.

During the 70th anniversary of the World War II, Abe referred to Japan's colonial history and militarism, as a result of the influences of Western powers by using the Heteronomisation strategy. He also used the Strategy of Avoidance when talking about unresolved issues, such as the 'comfort women' issue. Both the KMT's administration and the DPP responded to Abe's speech by emphasizing the positive political continuity, which indicated the willingness for cooperation. Regarding the actions of Japan during the wartime, the Presidential office put emphasis on the necessary difference between now and the future by applying the topos of history as a teacher.

As for the 'comfort women' issue, referring to the fight for the rights of comfort women, the KMT used the strategy of Positive Self-presentation in order to differentiate itself from the DPP. At the same time, when calling for justice for the victims, the KMT emphasized the willingness to unify and show solidarity as well as brought up the topos of justice. Japan reacted to the unveiling of a 'comfort women' statute in a short statement using the topos of threat indicating the possibility of deterioration in Japan-Taiwan relation. DPP's Frank Hsieh has also used the topos of a threatening scenario in regard to the worsening of Japan-Taiwan relations. He also emphasized the state-internal differences in Taiwan, indicating the difference in positionality of the KMT and the DPP towards the issue of the 'comfort women'.

5.3. The change in Othering of Japan during Ma and Tsai's administrations

The findings show that the focus of identity discourse shifts when undertaken by the KMT and the DPP. Referring to the main research question and the above findings, the political background affects the way Japan was portrayed in the discourse.

The negative Othering of Japan is caused by i.a. the KMT's narrative on the colonial "shameful" past, the KMT's narration on the Japan's atrocities of the Second World War, the "blood debts" to the Chinese, the 'comfort women' issue, the issue of the trade imbalance, as well as the Okinotorishima Incident. Interestingly, by using the chosen narratives about the past, the KMT positions itself not only against Japan, but also against its political opponents – the DPP. It was especially visible in handling the issue of the 'comfort women,' in which Tsai's and DPP's indifference towards the issue was pointed out.

On the other hand, Japan was framed positively mainly by the DPP regarding the relatively new narration of the positive experiences of the colonial period, the narratives emphasizing the difference in the experience of the wartime in China and Taiwan. The narration of shared values such as freedom, democracy, or human rights was used by both the KMT and the DPP. Additionally, Japan is Othered as 'good' when common regional challenges are being brought up as in the narrative that Taiwan and Japan are "in the same boat," used mainly by Tsai during multiple occasions. Also in the discourse on Taiwan's admission to the CPTPP, Japan is framed positively and the willingness for cooperation with the Other is implied by the Taiwan-Self.

5.4. The change in Othering of Taiwan during Abe's administration

The causes for negative or ambivalent Othering of Taiwan by Japan during Abe's administration include the issues such as Okinotorishima Incident, the Fukushima food import ban, the returning 'comfort women' issue that the Japanese nationalist government is not fond of resolving, as well as the need to comply with the status quo forced by the PRC.

Taiwan was Othered positively especially after the Tōhoku earthquake, due to its assistance and enormous contributions to the disaster relief in Japan. Additionally, the narration of "Japan as a benevolent colonizer" resulting in a positive imagination of Japan's rule in Taiwan also has an effect on Japan's positive perception of Taiwan. Taiwan is also Othered as "good" in regard to the narration of shared values and the possible partnership within the CPTPP. The fact that Abe and Kishida sent Tsai congratulatory messages on her victories in both 2016 and 2020 indicates even further shift in Japan-Taiwan relations, as Abe's government assumed that the bilateral relations would improve under the "pro-Japanese" DPP's rule. However, as aforementioned, Taiwan's domestic politics and more specifically the KMT's actions, such as backing the prolongation of the food ban or drawing attention to the 'comfort women' issue, affect the relations.

5.5. Conclusion: The change in the construction of Self and Other in Taiwan and Japan's official discourses in regard to their bilateral relations

This section provides the answers to the main research question: *How did the construction of Self and Other change over time in the national discourse in Taiwan and Japan regarding the bilateral relations?* The shift in positive and negative framing of the Other depend largely on the context of the event and the discursive topics. The Tōhoku earthquake and the subsequent Taiwan's contribution and assistance in 2011 was a breakthrough in Japan-Taiwan relations, and the constructions of the Other was predominantly positive in both countries, and the cooperation between the respective Self and Other was accentuated. On the other hand the Okinotorishima Incident resulted in a very strong reaction of the KMT's government which Othered Japan negatively and chose the approach of confrontation and distancing from the Other on a praxeological level. Japan reacted less strongly and aimed mainly at cooperation and alleviating the tensions. The most important issue currently affecting Japan-Taiwan relations is the ongoing Taiwan's import ban on food from Fukushima disaster affected provinces which also stalls Taiwan's efforts to join Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. While the DPP continued to Other Japan in superlative terms, Japan remained distanced, especially after the outcome of the referendum in Taiwan in favor of prolonging the import ban. The unprecedented congratulatory messages to Tsai from Abe and Kishida, as well as Jiro Akama's visit marked meaningful shifts and improvements in Japan-Taiwan relations, as small acts of recognition of Taiwan were undertaken in spite of Japan's commitment to One-China policy.

Regarding the discourse centered around Taiwan and Japan's narratives of the past, much more can be written about Japan's influence on Taiwanese national identity than the other way round. This point might sound obvious, but it also throws light on the fact that their relationship is unequal. As for Taiwan, history is used strategically within the KMT and the DPP's respective identity politics in order to construct preferred national identities. There are two linguistic constructions of a "Chinese" Taiwanese and historical "Japanese" Taiwanese. The first one exists in the present and can be defined in terms of emotional attachment to China, Chinese national mentality as well as supposed national behavioral dispositions. The "Japanese" Taiwanese is constructed on positive colonial sentiments and current fascination in Japanese culture and popular culture. As for such positionality, the discourse regarding the World War II, either regarding Japan's atrocities or Taiwanese participation in the war of resistance against Japan, shifts with the 'discursive construction' or, in other words, with the changing power dynamics in setting language that controls how we understand concepts. Different memories of the War embraced by the KMT and the DPP result in production in different narratives of the past, and in turn, in disparate constructions of the national identity. Figure 6 presents the summary of predominantly positive and predominantly negative representations of the Other within the discussed discursive topics.




Figure 6 Predominantly positive and predominantly negative representations of the Other within the discussed discursive topics. Source: Author based on findings.

Despite the use of positive attributions, big words such as “friendship” and references to “shared values” in the discourses, the relations between the two countries have not improved regarding the most important areas. There is still no set security agreement and for last four years little progress was made when it comes to Taiwan’s status of admission to the CPTPP. Therefore, the positive discourse does not translate into direct progress and improvement in bilateral relations.

6. Discussion

The theoretical framework employed in this paper helped structure the analysis of discourses about Taiwan and Japan’s identity politics and its impact on Taiwan and Japan’s bilateral relations. The framework enables us to observe how both countries delineate themselves against each other. It accounts for the discursive practices of actors coming from different political factions and their perception of history visible in speech acts that relate to the state’s identity. The value of the used analytical framework lies in its usability regarding other actors and discursive topics. Still, this approach poses several problems.

Firstly, discourse analysis was under criticism due to the lack of methodological rigor, subjective interpretations, low sample of interpreted texts, and low replicability and generalizability of the findings (Aydın-Düzgüt and Rumelili 2019, 289). As this is a qualitative analysis, some degree of subjectivity is inevitable. However, to make this paper’s analysis more representative a much bigger sample of analyzed speech acts would be needed. At the same time, the range of agents and speech-acts to be considered relevant to discourse analysis is potentially infinite (Holzscheiter 2014, 157). Therefore, it is important to note that the discussed discursive topics chosen for analysis might not be representative, and the over-time change of representations of Others in Japan and Taiwan’s discourses might look different if other discursive topics were selected for analysis.

Secondly, this analysis regarded only the two most recent presidents of Taiwan and only one LDP's prime minister's administration in Japan. In the analysis of how powerful discourses are sustained or transformed the focus on classical speaking agents in IR, such as heads of state, needs broadening. Including e.g. local communities, in order to expand the discourse research agenda to those without means to coerce or threaten, would be essential to show how much discourses shape the life of larger public not directly involved in politics (Holzscheiter 2014, 156).

Cultural bias also affects the analysis, especially when it comes to understanding the Othering and representations of the Other, and what they really mean for the Taiwanese. According to Reinke de Buitrago (2012, 14), IR scholars should also include their Self and own position in relation to the other in their analyses. In this analysis it is especially important to include speech acts which are in contrast to the analyst's expectations, as such expectations can be easily affected by e.g. the political views held.

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Appendix

Abstract (English Version)

Since the Kuomintang's settlement in Taiwan around 1949, the two normative axes of Japan and China delimitate Taiwan's imagination of nationhood. The Kuomintang's and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's stance on the issue of Taiwan's identity, their collective historical memory and their perception of Japan differ significantly due to the ethnic divide between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Because of the both states' shared history, mutual influences, as well as the spatial proximity, the analysis of Japan-Taiwan relations stands as a representative case for understanding the identity politics. Simultaneously, a research puzzle was identified in terms of nonsufficient research concerning Japan-Taiwan relations that applied discourse analytical approach. Focusing on selected events, this thesis uses the Othering analysis and discourse historical approach (DHA) to assess how the constructions of Self and Other changed over time in the official discourse in Taiwan and Japan regarding their bilateral relations. The findings show that the shift in positive and negative framing of the Other depend largely on the context of the event and the discursive topics. Taiwan's contributions after the Tōhoku earthquake in 2011 was a breakthrough in Japan-Taiwan relations, and resulted in positive representations of the Other in both countries. On the other hand, the Okinotorishima Incident resulted in a very strong reaction of the Kuomintang's government which Othered Japan negatively. The most important issue currently affecting Japan's Othering of Taiwan is the ongoing Taiwan's food import ban which also stalls Taiwan's efforts to join Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Abstract (German Version)

Seit der Besiedlung der Kuomintang in Taiwan um 1949 grenzen die beiden normativen Achsen Japans und Chinas taiwanesisches Vorstellung von Nationalität ab. Die Kuomintangs und die regierende Demokratische Fortschrittspartei Haltung in der Frage der Identität Taiwans, ihr kollektives historisches Gedächtnis und ihre Wahrnehmung von Japan, unterscheiden sich erheblich aufgrund der ethnischen Kluft zwischen einheimischen Taiwanesen und Festlandlern. Aufgrund der gemeinsamen Geschichte beider Staaten, der gegenseitigen Einflüsse sowie der räumlichen Nähe, ist die Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Taiwan ein repräsentativer Fall für das Verständnis der Identitätspolitik. Gleichzeitig wurde eine Forschungslücke in Form von nicht ausreichenden Forschungen über die Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Taiwan identifiziert, die einen diskursanalytischen Ansatz anwendet. Mit der Verwendung ausgewählter Ereignisse verwendet diese Masterarbeit Othering-Analyse- und Diskursverlaufsansatz (DHA), um zu beurteilen, wie sich die Konstruktionen von Selbst und Anderen im Laufe der Zeit im offiziellen Diskurs in Taiwan und Japan über ihre bilateralen Beziehungen verändert haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Verschiebung der positiven und negativen Gestaltung des Anderen weitgehend vom Kontext des Ereignisses und den diskursiven Themen abhängt. Taiwans Beitrag nach dem Erdbeben von Tōhoku im Jahr 2011 war ein Durchbruch in den Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Taiwan und führte zu positiven Darstellungen des Anderen in beiden Ländern. Auf der anderen Seite führte der Okinotorishima-Zwischenfall zu einer sehr starken Reaktion der Regierung der Kuomintang, die Japans Bild negativ beeinflusste. Das wichtigste Problem, das derzeit Japans "Othering of Taiwan" betrifft, ist das anhaltende Lebensmittel Importverbot Taiwans, das auch Taiwans Bemühungen um den Beitritt zum von Japan geführten umfassenden und fortschrittlichen Abkommen über die transpazifische Partnerschaft verzögert.