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**“Framing 2020 U.S. Elections on YouTube”**

A Quantitative Content Analysis of Right and Left-Wing Cable and YouTube News

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# Table of Contents

<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2.1 Problem Statement and Significance.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>2.2 Defining the Central Issues and Concepts.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<i>2.2.1 Defining the U.S. Political System, Parties, Ideologies.....</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>2.3.2 Defining the Algorithms and Machine Learning.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<b>2.4 The Structure of the Paper.....</b>	<b>15</b>

## **PART A) Theoretical Framework**

<b>2. Literature Review.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>2.1 Web 2.0.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>2.2 Changing Demographics and Its Influence Over Politics and Media.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>2.3 Television in the U.S.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>2.4 Political Communication and Framing among Cable News in the U.S.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>2.5 Political Communication on YouTube in the U.S.....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>2.6 Synopsis of the Literature Review.....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3. Theory.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>3.1 Framing.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>3.2 Medium Theory with the Complimentary Approach.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>3.3 Political Discourse.....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>3.4 Synopsis of the Theory.....</b>	<b>36</b>

## **PART B) Empirical Research**

<b>4. Research Questions and Hypotheses.....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>5. Operationalization.....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>6. Method.....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>6.1 Sampling.....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>6.2 Machine Training: Personalization and Sampling.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>6.3 Deductive-Inductive Codebook through the Text-Mining Strategy.....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>6.4 Pre-test.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>6.5 Limitations and Possible Solutions.....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>6.6 Time Frame and Descriptive Data of the Research.....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>7. Results.....</b>	<b>59</b>

7.1 Hypothesis 1.....	60
7.2 Hypothesis 2.....	61
7.3 Hypothesis 3.....	61
7.4 Hypothesis 4.....	62
7.5 Hypothesis 5.....	62
7.6 Hypothesis 6.....	63
7.7 Hypothesis 7.....	64
7.8 Hypothesis 8.....	64
7.9 Research Question 6.....	65
8. Conclusion.....	66
9. List of Sources.....	70
Appendix.....	83

## List of Tables

Table 1: Reliability Test.....	56
Table 2: Exploring the Dataset.....	58
Table 3: Frequency Analysis.....	58
Table 4: Skewness and Kurtosis.....	59
Table 5: Normality of Distribution.....	59
Table 6: Mann-Whitney U Test for H1.....	60
Table 7: Mann-Whitney U Test for H2.....	61
Table 8: Mann-Whitney U Test for H3.....	61
Table 9: Mann-Whitney U Test for H4.....	62
Table 10: Mann-Whitney U Test for H5.....	63
Table 11: Mann-Whitney U Test for H6.....	63
Table 12: Mann-Whitney U Test for H7.....	64
Table 13: Mann-Whitney U Test for H8.....	64
Table 14: Descriptive Results of Politicians-as-individuals Frame.....	65
Table 15: Mann-Whitney U Test for RQ6.....	65

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Immigration in the U.S.....	17
Figure 2: Immigrants Post-2000.....	18
Figure 3: 20 Metropolitan Areas with the Largest Number of Immigrants.....	18
Figure 4: Cable TV Usage.....	21
Figure 5: Right-Wing Persona.....	48
Figure 6: Left-Wing Persona.....	48
Figure 7: Right-wing YouTube News Channels.....	51
Figure 8: Right-wing Cable News Networks on YouTube.....	51
Figure 9: Left-wing YouTube News Channels.....	52
Figure 10: Left-wing Cable News Networks on YouTube.....	52
Figure 11: Categories, Subcategories, and Keywords.....	53

## List of Abbreviations

$\mu$	Mean
$\sigma$	Standard Deviation
CV	Coefficients of Variants
W	Statistic
df	Degrees of freedom
p	Statistical significant value
N	Population of the study
n	Sample size
r	Sample Correlation Coefficient
z	Altman Z Score
U	Mann-Whitney U Test
MDN	Median
U.S.	United States
TYT	The Young Turks
TDW	The Daily Wire

**Statutory declaration  
(Eidesstattliche Erklärung)**

I hereby affirm in lieu of an oath that I wrote this thesis independently and without outside help.

**"Hiermit versichere ich an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Diplomarbeit selbstständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe."**

**Vienna/Wien, August 2021**

## 1. Introduction

Media is an indispensable component of the political communication process since media create bridges between the governmental actors and the public. While cable news channels in the U.S. were for a long time the central source for information for election news, YouTube becomes the preferred space for political communication since the 2008 Presidential elections (Cooke, 2005; May, 2010; Rixon, 2014; Valck, 2013). Therefore, every major cable news outlet in the U.S. actively upload highlights of their news to YouTube. However, previous studies show a principal difference between political content and the used language not just between distinct political ideologies but also on TV and YouTube due to distinct communication model<sup>1</sup> audience age, regulation system, and tradition within the medium (Borah et. al., 2018; Vanwesenbeeck, Hudders & Ponnet, 2020).

Due to all these reasons, it is scientifically interesting to research frames used by YouTube and Cable News on YouTube during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S. Thus, the central research question of this paper is:

“What are the differences in the application of various frames in videos of YouTube news channels and cable news networks’ YouTube accounts during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.?”

According to research of Lee & Lee (1995), the main reason for TV’s major success was because it was the only medium that offered both comprehensive visual information, news, and immense entertainment. Today, another medium also offers the same features as Television does with less advertising and more intimacy: YouTube. YouTube, a product of Web 2.0, is a popular social media network used for video creating, sharing, and watching. As 2019, more than 73% of American<sup>2</sup> adults use YouTube, while this percentage increases to 91% among adults from age 18-34. Moreover, 51% of these users are visiting the website every day, while 37% of the American users between the age of 18-34 are binge-watching<sup>3</sup> every day on YouTube (Pew Research, 2021).

YouTube has been managed as a space for political communication since the Presidential campaign of elected President Obama in 2008. (Bimber, 2014). Hence, YouTube became a

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<sup>1</sup> While the communication model of cable news is one-way, YouTube has a two-way communication model.

<sup>2</sup> In this paper, the term of Americans will be used in a sense of citizens of the United States.

<sup>3</sup> According to Cambridge Dictionary, binge-watching is “to watch several episodes of a television series or program, one after another (2021).



vital platform for political communication. Borah, Fowler & Ridout (2018) point out that 32% of the users in the U.S. are actively using the platform to be politically informed, especially about election campaigns. As of 2021, numerous independent YouTube news channels create content as alternative news media with a focus on politics.

U.S. media and politics, and the public are polarized between liberals and conservatives (Levendusky 2010; Mayhew 2011). YouTube does not just reflect polarization in the mainstream media but also promotes it through its personalization (Celis, Kappor, Salehi, & Vishnoi, 2019). According to the research results of Ottoni, Cunha, Magno, Bernardina, Meira & Virgilio (2018) and Lewis (2019; 2020), YouTube includes the extremists from both sides. Therefore, they suggest that there are fundamental differences between the news by conservative and liberal YouTubers.

On the other hand, it is essential to emphasize that the core audience of YouTube is people from age 18-34, and the audience age increases with the TV. There are different types of regulation systems with these two media. While news on TV has long traditional and professional standards hence it has its own linguistic, formal structure often with a focus on moral, ethical, and legal associations, YouTube news is relatively new, and due to its young audience and absence of a media organization, it is more informal and it might be interpreted as intimate or relatable. However, there is a lack of professionalism within the majority of YouTube news channels. Resulting absence or lack of journalistic ethics, moral, and sometimes legal responsibilities (Djerf-Piere, Lindgren & Budinski, 2019).

Therefore, the political content created not just within distinct political ideologies but also these two media differs. Hence, the usage of targeted communication strategies, such as framing, tends to vary as well. It is also essential to point out that even though framing is originally a communication strategy, it can easily turn into a powerful manipulation technique, especially in a country with an authoritarian government or a democratic country with a multi-racial polarized political environment, such as U.S (Aydin-Düzgit & Balta, 2018; Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018; Ferree, 2011). Due to all these reasons, framing among various media and ideologies tends to differ since the aims and motivation of media organizations and/or individuals can be distinct.

### 1.1 Problem Statement and Significance

The clear majority of American citizens are using the video-sharing and watching platform, YouTube. The number of people who use the social media site is continually increasing along with the number of visitors who are using the platform to be politically informed (Pew Research, 2020). Additionally, more and more social media natives<sup>4</sup>, who have no habit of watching TV, are reaching the voting age (Walden, 2013).

There is a considerable difference in the video contents and the preferred language between left and right-wing YouTubers. On the one hand, Lewis (2020) points out that liberal YouTubers focus on trendy movements that are non-controversial among liberals. On the other hand, Röchert, Weitzel & Ross (2020) emphasize that the right-wing YouTubers are utilizing populist statements.

YouTube is an influential platform for political communication since 32% of the users in the U.S. receive election campaigning information on YouTube (Borrah et. al., 2018). The success of the platform in political communication during election time has been proved in Presidential election in 2008 (Bimber, 2014; May, 2010). Furthermore, there are many YouTube channels from both sides of the political spectrum focusing on political content. Additionally, previous studies showed there is a difference in the application of various frames between media with diverse characteristics (Gan et. al., 2005; Kim, Carvalho, Davis, A. G. & Mullins, 2011; Lo, Lam, & Cheung, 2019; Strömbäck et. al. 2008).

Gan et. al. (2005) focused on frames used by a French and Singaporean populist newspapers during 2000 Presidential elections and found significant differences within conflict frame, human interest frame, issue frame, regional perspective frame, horse-race frame and constitutional-crises frame. Moreover, after a big data analysis, Lo et. al. (2019) found some significant differences within strategy and issue frames used by TV and social media networks during election campaigns in China. Strömbäck & Dimitrova (2008) compared game, sensation, horse-race, political strategy, news management, politicians-as-individuals, and conflict frames used in Swedish, and U.S. newspapers during a political election. They found scientifically significant difference between game, horse-race, and political strategy frames (Strömbäck et. al. 2008). Nevertheless, there is no to a limited number of research on the differences in the usage of various frames by the left-wing and right-wing YouTube news channels and cable news networks on YouTube during the Presidential elections in 2020 in the U.S.

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<sup>4</sup> Generation that was born into social media era.

Furthermore, from the sociological perspective, elections are momentous events in democracies since the election results will determine the country's future and approach to various - lethal- topics in the next four to five years. In the scope of the 2020 Presidential elections in the U.S., the participation rate was 66.1%. According to Pew Research (2020) results, almost all of the people, who cast ballots for the Presidential election 2020, used media to be politically informed while young people from age 18-29 and 30-49 used social media and the internet primarily when they seek information regarding the election in 2020. This alone shows the importance of the new news media and the influence range of the media when it comes to politics and elections. Moreover, previous research point out that American media use framing to convince the audience in a preferred way during elections (Benkler, et. al., 2018; Faizullah & Sayyed Fawad, 2020; Kim & Wanta, 2018). Therefore, it is essential to investigate and find the different frames used during the U.S. 2020 Presidential election between distinct ideologies and different media of origin.

Due to all above-mentioned reasons, this paper aims to analyze different types of application of frames during the 2020 Presidential elections between distinct medium and ideologies by investigating a right, and a left-wing cable news network's YouTube account, a right-wing YouTube news channel and, a left-wing YouTube news channel during the election time in 2020.

## **1.2 Defining the Central Issues and Concepts**

In social sciences, it is essential to use understandable technical language. Therefore, researchers need to define central issues and terms before and throughout the research. This study focuses on frames used by right and left-wing YouTube and cable news on YouTube during the presidential election. Furthermore, it uses the personalization of YouTube for its sampling method. Therefore, it is crucial to explain the U.S. political system, including political parties, their ideologies, and define algorithms, machine learning, and AI. Due to this reason, the sub-chapters of this chapter next chapter (1.2.1 & 1.2.2) aim to explain the central issues and key terms.

### *1.2.1 Defining the U.S. Political System, Parties, Ideologies*

The United States of America is a representative democratic country with a peculiar political system. The separation of powers does not only occur within executive, legislative, and judicial functions but another type of separation of powers takes place within the political/executive system. "In the United States, the presidency, the House, and the Senate have their independent electoral bases." (Mayhew, 2011, XIII). This separation is planned to serve the voters better by whether "dissonance or skew" (Mayhew, 2011, XIII) depending on what voters prefer or need on a specific time frame. Moreover, there is also a separation of each state and federal government. The federal government is the central government governed by the head of the state; elected President, while each state is independent regarding its legislative, executive, and judicial branches. That means that every state holds a plenary power to create and regulate its laws as long as they are not contradictory to the federal constitution.

The U.S. is a country with an unofficial dual-party system. Today, the two major political parties of the U.S., their ideologies, and values are extremely polarized (Levendusky 2010; Mayhew 2011). In an election time, both parties chose two Presidential nominees within each party and practice primaries and caucuses to elect the Presidential candidate from each party. During primaries and caucuses, every United States citizen, whose eligible for voting and registered to whether Republican Party or Democrat Party, can elect their party's candidate for the Presidential run. While some states prosecute primaries or caucuses alone, some states decide to hold the primaries together on the same date. The most known and crucial primary in such kind is the Super Tuesday. The most recent Super Tuesday took place on March 3, 2020, and registered voters in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia voted for their favored nominee (Norrander, 2014).

Once the candidates of Republican and Democrat parties are elected by their registered voters, approximately three months of campaigning for the Presidential race starts. Nevertheless, the election rules and regulations in the U.S. differ from many other developed countries. In the U.S., every state has a number of electoral votes which are determined by the population density of the state. On the contrary of many other developed countries, the U.S. President is not elected through the popular vote<sup>5</sup> but by the number of electoral votes<sup>6</sup> (Mayhew, 2011).

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<sup>5</sup> Number of votes.

<sup>6</sup> Most of the time the elected President obtains both highest electoral and popular vote. Nevertheless, two times in the U.S. history (election 2000 and 2016), elected Presidents did receive the highest electoral vote while their opponents -Al Gore and Hillary Clinton- received the highest number of votes.

Today, U.S. politics, media, and the public are polarized between two parties and their ideologies. Nevertheless, significant polarization between the main political parties and their voters did not occur until the late 1960s and early 1970s, while the consequential polarization between the elites and parties initiated in the 1990s and followed by the polarization among the public in the 2000s (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Levendusky, 2010; Standi, 2001). The ideologies of the Democrat Party, the Republican Party, and their chosen leaders' political views were heterogenous for a significant amount of time in U.S history. While former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, who fought against slavery and for minority rights, was from the Republican party, Harry Truman, who followed more democratic approaches within the States and supported the conservative internationalism on the world arena, was from the Democrat party (Gienapp 1987; Patterson 1967). According to Levendusky (2010) and Fiorina et. al. (2008), the political elites<sup>7</sup> from both parties adopted certain ideologies in the late 1960s. While democrats embraced liberal values<sup>8</sup>, Republicans implemented conservative values<sup>9</sup>. Thus, they began to support policies according to the values represented at that point in time.

However, the exact time and process of polarization within the public are somewhat unclear. Even though there are controversial opinions also among scholars about the polarization of the U.S. public (Fiona et. al. 2008; Abramowitz & Saunders; Baker 2005), Levendusky (2010) suggests that once political elites became polarized and thus, parties' ideologies became diverged, elites presented to the average voter the clear distinction between the ideologies and which ideology fits their personal opinions, sociological environments, etc. better. Hence, ideologies were sorted sharper, resulting in a polarized political environment.

The role of media and social media cannot be overlooked, when it comes to political polarization. According to the research results of some scholars, social media networks' algorithms can detect the ideology of the user according to their user-behavior and then show one-sided news according to the users' ideologies or political views (Banks, Calvo, Karol, & Telhami, 2020; Guerra, Meira, Cardie, & Kleinberg 2018; Levy 2020). Thus, social media platforms can maximize users' time spent on their websites. Therefore, almost every country of today's world suffers from extreme polarization, including the birth place of the majority of social media platforms; the U.S.

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<sup>7</sup> Political elites are political actors who have a significant amount of power to influence the policies, and politics.

<sup>8</sup> "The pursuit of security both through the spread of liberty, in the form of free markets and democratic constitutions, and the rule of law, in the form of rule-based international institutions." (Porter, 2018, p. 2)

<sup>9</sup> On the contrary of liberalism, conservatism focus on collectivism, instead of individualism. Moreover, tradition and Christian -but not Catholic-values are crucial points for American conservatives since they believe tradition and following of Christian values will save the modern society (Dagger, Ball, Minogue, & Viereck, 2021).

It is also essential to emphasize that both liberal and conservative values change and adopt new arguments persistently. While these modifications were mainly decided by the politicians, elites and limited surveys about public opinion before the Web 2.0 and its creation social media, the situation became more reciprocal when social media allowed two-way-communication-model between the public and political elites (see Chapter 2.1). This situation can be explained by the transparency and easy-access of social media since everyone with a camera and access to internet can create a content about their views and policy requests on every major social media platform. The interactions, reactions such as, likes, dislikes, comments, retweet, etc. are easy to detect and they can show if a view or policy requests are supported and in which extend they are supported (Avery & Wooten Graham, 2013).

Moreover, people can create offline protests that turn into huge protests, which might lead to change in politics, policy, laws, as it did with the #blacklivesmatter protests. #BlackLivesMatter protests were initiated after a social media user shared video footage of an unarmed and un-aggressive African-American man suffocated slowly by a police officer. Despite Covid-19, the online protests turned into worldwide offline protests just before the 2020 Presidential election. The reaction and the protests showed first of all to liberals but also all types of policymakers what was needed within the society and what was asked by voters. These ongoing protests led to the first conviction of a police officer in the U.S. due to police brutality, including murder, against African-American people<sup>10</sup>.

Today's important republican/conservative values are freedom rights from the first amendment, free liberal economy, Christianity, restricted control by the federal government, pro-gun laws, anti-immigration policies, continuing American traditions. Republican Party uses often populism for their election campaigns mostly by creating us-against-them-feeling in a focus of being the silent majority<sup>11</sup>, avoiding politically correct language, etc. Republican populist statements mostly focus on illegal immigrants, the need for restrictions on immigration, identifying Islam with terror (Greven, 2016). Moreover, there are several Republicans who are against individual freedoms when it comes to various sexual orientations.

On the other hand, today's democrat/liberal values are individualism, respect, and empowerment of all races, individual rights, individual freedom in sexual orientation, protection and preservation of human rights, being politically correct, restriction on guns laws, support for

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<sup>10</sup> On April 20, 2021, Derek Chauvin -responsible police officer- found guilty on three charges, second degree manslaughter, second degree unintentional murder, and third degree murder.

<sup>11</sup> 59.7% of the U.S. population is shaped by the white population. Moreover, there is a very small amount of European immigrants coming to the U.S. after World War II. Due to all these reasons, the term "us" and silent majority within the populist statements and topics in the U.S refers to the white population (Greven, 2016).

immigrant-friendly laws and regulations, etc. (Desch, 2008; Kapur, 2018). Therefore, the majority of the immigrants in the U.S. tend to be on the liberal side of the political spectrum (see Chapter 2.2).

### *1.2.2 Defining the Algorithms and Machine Learning*

Algorithm is a term that is initially used in Mathematics, later in Computer Science. An algorithm by its most plain definition is “a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing some end” (Meriam Webster, 2021). Algorithms are essential for computer science, especially for creating an artificial intelligence through machine learning. Due to the topic and sampling method of this paper, this chapter focuses on defining the algorithms.

According to Erikson (2019), an algorithm in Computer Science “(...) is an explicit, precise, unambiguous, mechanically-executable sequence of elementary instructions, usually intended to accomplish a specific purpose.” (Erikson, 2019, p. 1) In other words, algorithms are used in programming online and offline software, apps, etc. for problem solving/aim reaching purposes. These algorithms are extraordinarily efficient and useful especially for entities that need to look through massive amount of data to reach their aim. For instance, all social media websites show personalized results to their users to increase the time spent on their website. For example, YouTube aims maximizing the viewers time spent on YouTube. Therefore, it has algorithms to find and suggest each user videos which will hook them up to the website resulting high amount of time spent on the website. However, it is crucial to point out that any computer program, including the websites such as YouTube, needs numerous algorithms to solve problems step by step.

Artificial Intelligence is actually result of machine learning which is created by algorithms. Machine learning is used for teaching the machine how to deal with excessive numbers of data in an efficient way. For instance, when someone wants create an app which will recognize different types of foods one needs to teach the “machine” all types of food. Therefore, one needs a huge amount of data, in this case, numerous pictures of each and every single food. Hence, machine can learn and differentiate the food. Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize that machine learning/AI is not as innocent and does not generate perfect results since all algorithms are directly or indirectly created by human-beings, they carry out the bias(es) of their creator(s). While this is quite harmless for a food-detector-app, biased algorithms can be dangerous for society, especially if they are related to political communication, public deliberation, etc. possibly causing increased polarization, lack of representation, etc.

As mentioned above, machine learning requires a huge amount of data to learn and many different algorithms to solve various problems (Mahesh, 2018). Google owns YouTube, and YouTube obtains alone a major amount of data. These data increase every single day, which turns the concept of machine learning into necessity and opportunity. It becomes compulsory since around 500 hours' worth of videos are getting uploaded to YouTube in a day, and YouTube is responsible for deleting harmful content. YouTube's algorithms analyze and harvest data to determine not just for understanding the performance of the videos, viewers' profile, personalization but also for fixing the correct ads up with people who are or might be interested in their products. Moreover, a machine learns through data. Therefore, dealing with a tremendous amount of data helps a machine learning system evolve better, faster and thus, it can become a high-quality artificial intelligence.

### **1.3 The Structure of the Paper**

This paper focuses on a quantitative content analysis to test its theory and research-based hypotheses (H1-H8) and a random sampling method based on personalization on YouTube (see Chapters 6.1 & 6.2). Furthermore, it uses an explorative inductive approach only for its last research question (RQ6) since there is not enough previous research to generate a hypothesis on how right-wing and left-wing YouTube and cable news on YouTube use politicians-as-individuals frame during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.

Due to these reasons, the first section of the theoretical part emphasizes the current state of the research. The second section draws on four related theories and approaches to this research paper and its research questions (see Chapter 3). The empirical part of this paper concerns first with the research questions, hypotheses, and operationalization of the related frames. Then, it describes the method, sampling method, personalization of the created YouTube accounts. Finally presents the findings of its hypotheses, and explores politicians-as-individuals frame to generate a hypothesis. The last section of this paper discusses the results, compares them with similar research, and suggests new topics for future scientific research.



## **PART A) Theoretical Framework**

### **2. Literature Review**

#### **2.1 Web 2.0**

World Wide Web is a technological innovation that changed the lives of our specie radically. The first version of Web; Web 1.0, offered its users non-interactive online information and different types of content which allowed them to reach information easier than any other time in human history. Nevertheless, Web, like every other technology with social context, evolves and adapts. Therefore, when the second version of Web, Web 2.0, was formed, it turned from a non-interactive information/content source to an interactive, dynamic, people-centric space in which two-way-of-communication was not just possible, but encouraged. On the contrary of Web 1.0, receivers can become senders with Web 2.0. In other words, a person who is media/content-consumer can become media/content-creator (Murugesan, 2007).

Murugesan (2007) defines Web 2.0 as “an umbrella term encompassing several new Web technologies” (p. 35). Thus, these innovations stimulate social media. As of 2021, around 53% of world’s population use social media actively (Smartinsights, 2021). "Social media tools allow users to participate in communication networks and to establish their own networks of relationships, connections, friends, or colleagues with whom they can interact through these services." (Meikle, 2016, p. 3). Today, social media is not just used to contact and communicate with people one knows but also to interact, influence new people and create an online community, thus, to shape public opinion, regardless of geographical limitations.


These technological and social developments had a significant influence over political communication, especially during elections. Wiora & Molek-Kozakowska (2021) stated in comparison to polarization in the U.S. public, mainstream media became too ambivalent on debated matters because non-controversial cable news has better chances for receiving sponsorships, ads, etc. since most of the brands does not wish to identify their brands with controversial statements. Furthermore, marginal groups from both sides of political spectrum and minorities do not find place for their opinions, struggles, and issues within the mainstream media. Therefore, various content consumers used the opportunity offered by Web 2.0 to generate alternative political content on social media to shape or create public opinion. Moreover, especially young people but increasing amount of people from all age groups started to consume news whether only on social media or both alternative and mainstream media. Thus, social media politic influencers such as YouTubers established a counter-journalism (Wiora, et. al., 2021).

Today, as one of the creations of Web 2.0; YouTube is not just a social media platform but it is a space for political news and public deliberation regarding the alternative news. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that YouTube includes polarized groups and it is far away being the space for Habermasian public sphere.

## 2.2 Changing Demographics and Its Influence Over Politics and Media

The United States of America is a country that has and received the highest numbers of immigrants throughout its history. As of today, there are more than 45 Million first-generation immigrants in the U.S. which adds up to 15% of the whole population (Migration Policy Institute, 2021). Therefore, various races exist in the U.S.; white population<sup>12</sup>, African-American population, the Hispanic population<sup>13</sup>, Asian-Americans, and American Natives<sup>14</sup>. The vast majority of the population, in order, are white population by 59.7%, then Hispanics by 18.7%, followed by African-Americans by 12.5%, Asian-Americans by 5.8%, other races 2.3 and Natives by 0.9% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). Nevertheless, according to U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration statistics in 2012, the nationality trends of immigration in the U.S. had changed after World War II.

Figure 1: Immigration in the U.S.



**Note:** IRCA adjustments refer to the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, under which 2.7 million undocumented foreign U.S. residents obtained legal immigrant status.

**Source:** U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 2012).

While from 17<sup>th</sup> to the first half of the end of World War II, the country had received by far the highest number of immigrants from Western, Southern, and Eastern Europe, after World War


<sup>12</sup> Shaped by European immigrants mostly came between 17. and mid of 20. Century.

<sup>13</sup> As an umbrella term for citizens or immigrants with Latin-American background

<sup>14</sup> Includes Native Americans, Hawaiian/Alaska Natives.

II, the migration trends have changed toward Asian and Latin-American immigrants (Martin, 2014). Western, Southern, and Eastern Europeans made up the white population which has been the predominant race in the U.S. Just in between years 2000-2009, 7.5 Million legal immigrants immigrated to the U.S. Moreover, unauthorized immigrant numbers peaked in 2007 at 12.2 Million unauthorized.

Figure 2: Immigrants post-2000




Source: Pew Research Center, 2018

According to Pew Research Center (2018) and the official records in 2018, the highest number of immigrants came from Asia and Latin America after 2000. Moreover, the highest amount of first-generation immigrants are by far from Mexico, followed by China, India, the Philippines, and El Salvador.

Figure 3: 20 Metropolitan Areas with the Largest Number of Immigrants

#### Racial and ethnic composition of immigrant eligible voters varies across states

% of immigrant eligible voters, by race and ethnicity



Note: Eligible voters are adult U.S. citizens. Figures do not sum to 100% because other single-race and multiracial groups are not shown. Population totals are rounded to the nearest 1,000. Whites, blacks and Asians are of a single race and include only non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race.  
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2018 American Community Survey (IPUMS).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Pew Research, 2020

According to Pew Research Center (2020), 61% of the first generation -legal- immigrants living in the U.S. are eligible for voting since 2020 October or earlier and they predominantly live in

California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey. Moreover, these locations are also the states that receive the highest amount of immigrants. According to the data analysis results of Mayda, Peri & Steingress (2016), there is overall a highly significant correlation between immigrants and the act of voting for Democrat Party, especially among unemployed or low-income immigrants. This can mainly be explained by the immigrant-embracing policies of the Democrat Party and the anti-immigration-regulation policies of the Republican Party.

Moreover, beginning from the 2000's the highest amount of immigrants come to the U.S. from Mexico and Latin-American countries. Increase in the foreign-born population, estimated shrinkage on Non-Hispanic white population and estimated rapid increase among Hispanic population change politics and media. This also causes severe polarization dramatized and/or utilized by the politicians and media.

Like many other right-wing parties worldwide, politicians from the Republican Party focus on populism also (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). In the U.S., Republican Party targets the majority of the country: the non-Hispanic white population to create fear and hate by pointing out estimated near-future shrinkage within the non-Hispanic white population and rise in the Hispanic population (Finley & Esposito, 2019). Thus, they create an us-versus-them feeling. Moreover, according to the quantitative content analysis of Fernandes & De Moya (2021), Republican governmental officials and candidates mention immigrants 5.17 times more as a societal, cultural danger than their equivalent colleagues from Democrat Party.

Nonetheless, by far the most extreme anti-Hispanic-immigrants statements and anti-immigrant policies were shaped and adopted by former-elected President and candidate of the Republican Party in the 2020 Presidential Elections: Donald J. Trump. Former President Trump made some strong anti-immigrant statements and executed policies accordingly. During the 2016 Presidential Election, he claimed that he will build a wall on the Mexican border and make the Mexican government pay it. He also made populist statements on Muslims and portrayed them as a dangerous minority. Furthermore, once he was elected, he initiated the first surveillance on the Muslim population and later tried to establish a travel ban mainly to and from Muslim countries, resulting in a veto decision to this policy by the supreme court (Finley et. al., 2019). Nevertheless, according to the research results of Hooghe & Dassonneville (2018), these anti-immigrant and racist statements had a positive significant effect on the conservative voter to vote for Trump in 2016.

On the other hand, Democrat-Party approaches differently to the immigration issue since their voters have significantly more positive feelings towards immigrants (Hammer & Kafura, 2019).

Moreover, according to the findings of a public opinion survey by Hammer et. al., as of 2019, support for increased immigration is all-time high, especially among Democrats. Foreign-born first generation, second and third generation immigrants are likely to vote for Democrat Party (Hawley, 2019). Therefore, Democrat Party follows pro-immigrant statements, promises immigrant embracing policies during election campaigns. According to quantitative content analysis results by Facchini & Steinhardt (2011), more electoral and congress members from the Democrat party supported and/or voted for the policies that will liberate immigration, nonetheless, findings are not scientifically significant.

Immigrants, especially Hispanic and Muslim immigrants are portrayed as societal danger, criminals, incompetent in traditional cable news. According to quantitative survey results of Gil de Zuniga, Correa & Valenzuela (2014), consuming right-wing news channels, for instance Fox News, has a significant effect on perceiving immigration and immigrants negatively. Moreover, non-conservative Americans, who consume Fox News, are more likely to have negative feelings towards immigration and immigrants. The same research results show that CNN has no effect whether in positive nor negative perception of immigrants or immigration.


According to Pew Research (2016), the Hispanic population was receiving political information mainly on TV in 2006. Nevertheless, the situation has changed after a decade. As of 2016, news on the internet, including on social media, became so common it initiated a rivalry. Younger Hispanics choose now social media over Television for political information. Two of the possible causes of this phenomenon can be explained by the increasing use of social media among young people and the misrepresentation and underrepresentation of immigrants on traditional media (Ramasubramanian, Dashi & Saleem, 2017).

According to the comparative quantitative content analysis on immigration coverage by the U.S. cable news between the years 2003, 2008, 2012 (Dixon & Williams, 2014), the portrayal of non-Caucasian people and immigrants had changed. While in 2003 most news about the criminal activity of non-Caucasian people were connected to the African-American population, the trends had changed towards the Hispanic population. According to criminal news within 146 programs on ABC, CBC, NBC, PBS, CNN, FOX, MSNBC and Univision, the portrayal of the White population as perpetrators increased from 48% to 57% in 2012. Nevertheless, the percentage of White victims increased from 51% to 65% in 2012 also. Furthermore, according to the findings by Dixon (2014), 97% of the Hispanic perpetrators were portrayed as immigrants, despite the fact that only 47% of the Hispanic population in the U.S. are immigrants. Additionally, 82% of the Muslim perpetrators, regardless of the type of their crime, were portrayed as terrorists.

Even though, the portrayal of some minorities in traditional media improved, findings show that discrimination and racism towards some minorities still continues. Social media and especially, TV's new-age equivalent; YouTube, gives opportunity to everyone to establish a platform. Some of the American influential YouTubers from minority groups are The Young Turks (5.12M), VisualPolitik SP (2.26M), VisualPolitik EN (1.07M), VOA News (1.88M), Anthony Brian Logan (872K), . Moreover, there are ambivalent YouTube channels that aims to represent every minority group and their issues (Ottoni et. al., 2018), such as Vice (14.4M), VOX (9.68M), Inside Edition (9.24M), YouTube Spotlight U.S.A (31.4M), Tomo News U.S. (2.67M), etc.

Moreover, traditional mainstream media, including the TV Networks focus on the majority of the country and reflect aspects and issues of the vast population. Therefore, immigrants can find better representation on YouTube and other social media channels than traditional media such as TV.

*Figure 4: Cable TV Usage*



As the chart suggests, decreasing amount of people subscribe to cable tv, and cable news. Thus, more and more people are receiving political information on YouTube resulting in every major news network creating YouTube channel and actively upload videos to their channel. All these components and political environment made social media and TV's digital equivalent; YouTube more attractive not just for the viewers but also for research on political communication on YouTube.

### **2.3 Television in the U.S.**

Borah et. al. (2018) stated that televisions' central purpose of communication is persuasion. That means television channels build their strategies to convince people. Thus, there is a chance that people will act, think, buy in the desired way. Moreover, the research results of Dunaway (2008) show that the owner of a media organization's and its sponsors' influence over the news content is undeniably huge when it comes to TV and other traditional media. Therefore, they use various framing tactics for their own persuasive purposes.

Television in the U.S. broadcasts through three methods over the air, over the cable networks, and via satellite. These three broadcasting methods differentiate mainly regarding their financing model. On the one hand, channels that broadcast over the air are regional and do not require subscriptions or any monthly/annual payment since they are financed through ads. Nevertheless, these channels are obliged to be rated by a media surveillance community. On the other hand, cable TV and channels that broadcast via satellite are mainly financed on a subscription based and are not obligated to be monitored by the surveillance community. Moreover, contrary to European countries, there are no governmental TV Networks in the U.S. (Karikari, Brown & Abramowitz, 2003; Savage & Wirth, 2005). Most of the main cable news outlets in the U.S. broadcast over cable TV. Nevertheless, most of them offer free live streaming through the various channels of the internet.

Previous studies point out that most of the cable news in the U.S. is not neutral but biased (Bozell, 2004; Nie et. al., 2010; Stanley 2012). While CNN, NBC, MSNBC are targeting liberal news-consumers, and thus; making news for its audience, FOX TV is the most dominant conservative news channel regarding their content, and audience among main news networks (Brock, 2004; DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Kitty 2005; Nie et. al., 2010). Moreover, there are two conservative new cable news networks in the US; OANN<sup>15</sup> and Newsmax TV. These channels infamously supported Trump and his campaign fully during the election run in 2020 (Roose. 2020; Santis, 2020).

It is important to examine the political communication among TV channels in the U.S. and the different frames of various networks with diverse motivations and ideology use. Hence, the next sub-chapter focuses on political communication in the U.S. and the usage of frames during election time.

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<sup>15</sup> One America News Network

## **2.4 Political Communication and Framing among Cable News in the U.S.**

In 1960, the first Presidential debate was televised. Since then, TV is a major player regarding the election and campaign news. According to Strömbäck & Kaid “in the United States, television is significantly more important than newspapers, particularly concerning the influence over public opinion” (2008, p. 422).

According to a quantitative content analysis by Geer (2008), Presidential ads, and news on TV is getting more and more negative since 1960. While the amount of negative content on TV regarding the elections was around 40% in 1960, it rose above 50% in 2010 (Geer, 2008). It is essential to point out that according to Farmsworth & Lichter (2011), negative allegations and statements are a major part of framing among journalists since these types of frames create a “gotcha” moment for the journalists while these sorts of negative frames do not require elaborate investigation.

Capella & Jamieson (1997) point out that when TV Networks and newspapers cover the election news, they highlight the most who is winning and losing. Strömbäck & Dimitrova (2006) explain this phenomenon in their research with the horse-race framing strategy (see Chapter 4). A cross-cultural content analysis on news coverage during elections shows cable news in the U.S. approach the Presidential elections as if it is a horserace since they use often horserace framing (Strömbäck & Kaid, 2008).

Another study by DellaVigna et. al. (2007) showed that Fox News in comparison to CNN and mainstream ambivalent media such as ABC, CBS, etc. deliver dominantly biased news in favor of Republicans. Moreover, the research findings showed that due to the content of Fox News, a huge majority of African-Americans do not watch Fox News.

Hyun & Moon (2016) focus on a quantitative content analysis on partisan American cable news during the Presidential elections in 2012. They examined the attributes of the candidates<sup>16</sup> that were portrayed by the cable news. According to the research findings, Fox TV was dominantly addressing the positive attributes of Romney while they were pointing out more negative attributes of Obama. On the other hand, CNN was focusing appealing attributes of Obama and more repulsive attributes of Romney. NBC was talking about more positive attributes Obama. Nevertheless, in comparison to CNN and Fox News, NBC came across as more neutral.

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<sup>16</sup> Barack H. Obama (D) and Mitt Romney (R)



Famulari (2020) conducted a quantitative content analysis to determine different frames used by the U.S. cable news and newspapers about the zero-tolerance policy of former elected President Trump. In this study, he (2020) focuses on thematic and generic frames along with morality, human interest, attribution of responsibility, economy, legality, and security frames. Morality frame lacks among all cable news outlets, while Fox TV has the lowest amount of morality frame by 5.9%. CNN and MSNBC use the highest amounts of the human interest frame. On the other hand, Fox News applied the smallest amount of human interest frame by 3.9%. Moreover, Fox TV was the only cable news outlet on this research, that correlated crime and security frame with former elected President Trump's zero-tolerance policy.

Nassar (2020) researched with an experimental mixed-method strategy. Like Famulari (2020), Nassar (2020) analyzes the news of CNN, MSNBC, and Fox TV on the issue of Christian and Muslim refugees. He first examines framing by the cable news channels on the issue of Christian and Muslim refugees. Later, he compares the content analysis results to the survey results of these cable channels' viewers. According to the research results, Fox TV uses predominantly threat, criminality, and security frame when the topic comes to Muslim refugees. Moreover, Fox TV viewers showed statistically significant lower empathy and support for Muslim refugees. On the other hand, CNN and MSNBC did use a small amount of threat frames regarding Muslim refugees. The survey results show that there was no scientifically significant correlation between the viewers of these channels and lower support or empathy toward Muslim refugees (Nassar, 2020).

As evidence from various empirical research suggests, there is a difference in usage of frames among cable news networks regarding politics depending on their and their viewers' political ideologies.

## **2.5 Political Communication on YouTube in the U.S.**

Bucher (2018) points out that in less than two decades, YouTube has evolved from being a platform that depended on users' amateur videos to a major medium that built a new profession; influencers, and thus, micro-celebrities. Influencers of YouTube generate content not just concerning alternative topics to TV such as beauty, reaction, gaming, but also they imitate TV content and their setting through political channels, news channels, etc.

During the Presidential election in 2008, YouTube played first time a vital role in political communication through the help of YouTubers' political content and cable news collaborations, for example, the Presidential debate on YouTube. Thus, YouTube became an indispensable platform for political communication in a short period of time (Ricke, 2010). One of the main reasons why and how YouTube became such an important space for political communication was due to the lack of response to the expectations and desires of the viewers by the mainstream media in a problematic and polarized political climate.

According to Lewis (2019), a major change within the trust for the mainstream media occurred for political communication during the Presidential election in 2016. Both liberal and conservative mainstream media lost the trust of their viewers. However, the most significant decrease in trust appeared among conservative voters (Lewis, 2019). Resulting, higher usage of alternative media, including YouTube, for receiving political information.

May (2010) found that the viewership of cable news outlets and political news channels on YouTube are directly affected by the political trends among the audience. Because, regardless if a medium is an online or offline platform, every medium generates content to receive as high ratings or views as possible. Therefore, every medium takes the expectations of its viewers into consideration, especially a platform like YouTube, in which the desires, likes, dislikes of the viewers are immediate, transparent, and highly consequential. Due to this reason, it is critical to define the expectations, motives of users of YouTube to understand this new platform for political communication.

YouTube's audience awaits blunt, non-edited, sensational, content. For example, one early successful liberal political YouTuber was giving bold statements about mainstream cable networks by pointing out the similarities between Fox TV and Ku Klux Klan (May, 2010). Moreover, the audience wants to see real videos about brutal incidents that lacks or would have been censored on TV, such as ISIS beheading videos or the murder of George Floyd.

According to May (2010), all influential cable news outlets started to lose the majority of their audience on YouTube in 2010. Nevertheless, the liberal YouTube news channels; The Young Turks, and the conservative YouTube news channel; Alex Jones managed to grow by doubling their audience from 2009 to 2010. These channels offer more critical, edgy content in comparison to the TV channels that support the same ideology while imitating the cable news channels' sitting settings, program flow, interviewing styles, etc.

On the one hand, The Young Turks have a relatively big budget for a YouTube channel at that time and spread liberal statements and make the channel more attractive to especially younger people by creating TYT Army. On the other hand, far-right former<sup>17</sup> political YouTuber; Alex Jones talks about his conspiracy theories and attracts young people with his confident and alternative statements (May, 2010). Therefore, cable news outlets aim for the young audience on YouTube by creating YouTube channels and uploading videos regularly.

To understand the extent of the edgy content and marginal groups on YouTube, one needs to examine previous empirical research results. Askanius & Uldam (2011) designed a qualitative mix-method to analyze political communication on YouTube by Youtubers. Askanius et. al. (2011) initially analyzes a political YouTube video for climate change by a left-wing YouTuber, NTAC<sup>18</sup> and then interviews the main activists in the video. Askanius et. al. (2011) describes the video with the following words: the "activists are portrayed as soldiers in a war or, perhaps more incisively, as freedom fighters waging war on an occupational force. The construction of a series of discursive fields centers around the nodal points of the war, injustice and resistance" (p. 75).

Moreover, Lewis (2019) reasons the liberal culture on YouTube by emphasizing that new left and countercultural movements were initiated in 1960, nevertheless, they developed, gained acknowledgment, and much wider support through the internet.

According to Lewis (2019), YouTube is a platform that creates an intimate, authentic space, and thus, acceptance between the creator and the audience. Therefore, YouTube became the platform for the new left and it nourishes, creates countercultural movements. Moreover, YouTube gives people a chance for empathy regardless of their personal differences. Even though according to the research of Lewis (2019), YouTube contributes to democracy by increasing participation in various subjects including the political process, scholars (Marwick,

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<sup>17</sup> Due to this speculating statements during Capitol Unrest, along with many extreme-right-wing YouTuber, he did get banned from the platform.

<sup>18</sup> Youtube Channel. NTAC stands for „Never Trust A Cop“.

2013; Turner, 2010) argue that it also creates a more capitalist and materialist culture. Additionally, it is important to point out that YouTube offers a platform for marginal groups from every side of the political spectrum.

During the Presidential election in 2016, members of the alt-right movement created subcultures on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook such as “Internet trolls, anti-feminist gamers, conspiracy theorists, and ideologues [sic], such as men’s rights activists” (Lewis, 2019, p. 7). This alt-right movement identified with some white-supremacist YouTube channel owners or editors like Richard Spencer, David Duke, and they gained major political influence over the movement members. Another media actor Milo Yiannopoulos for his anti-feminist statements. Even though the movement was against mainstream media, they appeared in various shows on Fox TV to spread their ideology. Furthermore, Spencer and Duke, Yiannopoulos and other influential frontrunners of the alt-right movement were against progressive movements and rejected countercultural movements aiming for justice “such as feminism, LGBTQ, and Black Lives Matter” (Lewis, 2019, p. 8)

Ottoni et. al. (2018) conducted a lexicon analysis to investigate the hatred, violence, and discrimination produced and promoted by the right-wing YouTube channels in the U.S. According to their research results, the words used for discrimination were: “immigrant, migrant, Islamism, Muhammed, Muslim, Quran, bisexual, gay, homosexual, lesbian” (Ottoni et. al., 2018, p. 329) while other negative words were: “bad, burden, pirate, plague, taker, thief, assassin, attack, bomb, death, murder, radical, terrorist, immoral, outrageous, promiscuous, revolting, sinner” (Ottoni et. al., 2018, p. 329). Moreover, Lewis (2019) emphasizes that right-wing YouTube channels are highly opposed to popular movements for liberals, and liberal YouTube culture topics, such as Black Lives Matter, LGBTQAI, feminism, etc.

Another qualitative research focuses on framing analysis on Twitter and Facebook during the Presidential elections in 2012 in the U.S. (Groshek & Al-Rawi, 2013). They found that nominee of the Democrat Party; Obama, was strongly correlated to the words, such as “love”, “good”, “vote”, while the Republican Party nominee, Romney, was connected to “jobs”, “plan”. Moreover, the results show that supporters of Obama criticize Romney more repeatedly and explicitly, comparing the critics of Romney supporters toward Obama.

Lewis (2019) conducted a qualitative content analysis on three major political YouTube accounts with a high political influence and follower count. These YouTube influencers had distinct political views. While Dave Rubin is an influential member of alt-right movement, Tim Pool

is categorized as a classic liberal, and Blaire White was considered as left-leaning. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Blaire White stated in 2018 that she considers herself as a transgendered woman who is Republican and Trump-Voter (YouTube, 2018).

According to the research results of Lewis (2019), both Robin and Pool consider left and right-wing mainstream media as biased and inadequate. Pool and White criticize the mainstream media but especially conservative cable news channel FOX-TV. They describe these types of media as purposely sensationalist and they reason it by stating that mainstream media need to receive attention to be able to pay the costs of newsrooms.

Moreover, Pool criticizes the ambivalent, left-leaning, and liberal cable news by stating that these channels center social justice issues for receiving younger audiences and attention since the new generation is somewhat more left-leaning (Lewis, 2019). According to qualitative content analysis results by Lewis (2019) White points out that liberal traditional media focuses on “trendy sensationalism” (p. 11). By trendy sensationalism, White refers to creating sensationalism by centering the trendy social justice issues, such as putting transgender children into magazine covers, etc.

On the other hand, Robin criticizes the liberal mainstream media for supporting gender expression, transgender rights, etc. Furthermore, he claims that liberal mainstream media banned the usage of some words under the name of political correctness and thus, liberal media silence the American people.

Wiora et. al. (2021) conducted a mixed-method content analysis about American YouTube political channels to understand new digital counter journalism phenomenon during the Presidential election 2020. Wiora et. al. (2021) point out that regardless of their political view, YouTube channels criticize heavily the mainstream media by reasoning that mainstream media is institutionalized, has stakeholders and ad-givers, and therefore, they are biased. Moreover, according to Wiora et. al. (2021), right-wing YouTubers frame the left-wing mainstream media’s statements and/or titles by playing with their connotations. Additionally, YouTubers adopt emotion-infused eristic-based strategies by using relatable colloquial language with sarcasm and ridicule for creating a desired public opinion. On the other hand, right-wing YouTubers ask rhetorical and also sensational questions to solidify their presented opinion within the viewer and to create skepticism in viewers against mainstream media and their statement (Wiora, et. al., 2021).

## **2.6 Synopsis of the Literature Review**

In democracies, there are three official estates; judicial, executive, legislative, and one unofficial, media. These estates are separated and responsible for the protection and preservation of democracy under fair circumstances. The media's importance is based on its mission as a gatekeeper of knowledge (White, 1950). Cable news networks are the most used traditional media in the U.S. for political communication (Strömbäck et. al., 2009). During elections, the news media, such as cable news outlets, must be liable for supplying primary and balanced news to the public. However, the news media's, and thus, cable news outlets' objectivity is challenged, especially when it comes to political information in a polarized country, such as the U.S.

Strömbäck et. al. (2009) point out that the news by the cable networks in the U.S. is biased since every cable network has stakeholders, sponsors who are connected to the politics. Moreover, every cable news network has a political stand and/or cannot contradict political views or interests.

Due to this reason, previous research evidence confirms that there is a difference in highlighted, picked news, and presentation of the candidates between liberal and conservative cable news outlets, especially during Presidential elections. According to Nassar (2020), there is a significant distinction in used frames between the conservative and liberal cable news networks concerning political topics. While Fox TV presents Muslim refugees through negative connotations by using threat, crime, and security frames, CNN and MSNBC do not focus on these frames. Furthermore, the research results on Mexican immigrants by Famulari (2020) showed similar results. Fox TV uses a significantly lower percentage of morality and human interest frame. On the other hand, Fox TV applies crime and security frames to support the zero-tolerance policy. These results show that there are differences in usage of frames between news cable outlets from distinct ideologies.

Despite the rapid increase among the non-White population, cable news outlets remain incapable of addressing the issues of minorities and representing them. However, conservative voters criticize the majority of the mainstream media for being liberalists. Therefore, an increasing amount of politicians from the Republican Party utilize populist statements, such as the silent majority to create fear through us-against-them feeling. Due to all these reasons, a growing amount of people in the U.S. from minority groups and critics of the mainstream media prefer the media initiated by Web 2.0.

Web 2.0 brought various innovations, maybe the most important one being the two-way-communication-model which ensures the ideal circumstances for social media networks. Social media networks rely on active communication between multiple users, while some of them are dependent on the content created by their users.

YouTube offers its skeptical users, or its users from a minority or marginal group, and not represented by the traditional media, to create their political news channels. Since YouTube news is alternative news presented by cynics of mainstream media, their audience is also critics of cable news networks. Therefore, the expectation, desires of the viewers are different than cable news consumers. Nevertheless, cable news networks established their audience base on YouTube also by uploading regularly highlights of their content from TV to YouTube (Al Nashmi, North, Bloom, & Cleary, 2017; Twitter, 2021). Consequently, there is a distinction in types of content in cable news and YouTube news due to the different origins of the medium.

Through the election campaigns of former elected President Obama, YouTube became a space for political communication for the first time during the Presidential elections in 2008 (Ricke, 2010). It continued growing through the years. Due to the loss of trust towards mainstream media, YouTube reached its peak point as a platform for political communication in 2016 (Lewis, 2019). Even though both cable news networks and political news channels on YouTube are directly affected by the political trends, needs, and wishes of the viewer are more transparent on YouTube, and YouTubers have more active and open communication with their viewers (May 2010). Moreover, the YouTube audience expects video content that lacks in cable news networks, such as raw, non-edited, edgy, authentic videos, including brutality videos (May 2010). Additionally, it is essential to emphasize that videos by extremist groups from both sides of the political spectrum have a high count of views. While left-wing YouTubers see themselves as fighters of individual human rights, climate, environment, etc. (Askanius et. al., 2011), right-wing YouTubers from the alt-right movement consider themselves the defender of the American traditions. Therefore, they oppose feminism, LGBTQIA, the #BlackLivesMatter movement, and create conspiracy theories (Lewis, 2019). Moreover, right-wing news channels on YouTube discriminate against Muslims and immigrants. According to qualitative content analysis, some of the words they frequently utilize were: terrorist, death, bomb, burden, plague, sinner, etc. (Ottoni et. al., 2018).

Another evidence from framing research on YouTube and Facebook during the elections in 2012 shows that people from the Democrat Party criticize the candidate of the Republican

Party more (Groshek et. al., 2013). Moreover, all political YouTubers from all sides of the political spectrum claim that mainstream media failed to fulfill their purposes since they all utilize -trendy- sensationalism (Lewis, 2019). On the other hand, Wiora et. al., (2021) found that right-wing political news channels play with the connotations of the left-wing news media's news by using a sensationalism frame.

YouTube and TV are different platforms with distinct expectations from their viewers. Therefore, the content of political news channels on TV and YouTube varies. For instance, Borah (2018) et. al. conducted a quantitative content analysis to investigate differences in campaign ads during the Presidential election in 2012 on Television and YouTube. They found that TV ads have a highly more negative tone than Youtube Ads (2018). Moreover, according to the research results of Borah et. al. (2018), TV ads are more policy-focused, while YouTube ads are dominantly more concentrated on general issues and traits of the candidate. Moreover, the U.S. political news channels on YouTube imitate the presentation of the news and newsroom settings of the cable news network. Thus, regardless of the lack of empirical research on the topic, it is possible to claim that YouTube channels do apply frames and there will be a distinction between the frames used in between right and left-wing political news channels on YouTube and in between origin of the medium.



### **3. Theory**

The central theory of this paper is the framing theory. However, the research paper will draw on complementary theory to explain YouTube phenomena, medium theory to reason the content differences among different media, and finally, political discourse to explain distinct usage of framing in between ideologies.

#### **4.1 Framing Theory**

Framing theory conceptualizes different frames used in various sectors such as politics, economy, media, etc. However, this paper focuses on framing news media during the Presidential elections 2020. Therefore, this chapter first defines framing, explains framing in news media during elections, and reasons the framing analysis on video content.

“Frames repeatedly invokes the same objects and traits, using identical or synonymous words and symbols in a series of similar communications that are concentrated in time. These frames function to promote an interpretation of a problematic situation or actor and (implicit or explicit) support of a desirable response, often along with a moral judgment that provides an emotional charge.” (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2004, p. 177). Therefore, words and their connotations are primary sources in which frames can be analyzed.

Nevertheless, connotations are not just language-based but are very much history and culture related. Entman (1993) emphasizes that chosen expressions of communicators are the major clue for the determination process of framing. For instance, for a person, who is from the U.S., the word “nationalist” has negative connotations since it is linked to the enemy of U.S. during the World War II, thus, to fascism, yet its synonym patriot has positive connotations. Through framing, media present the desired message connected to desired person or event to the receiver. Thus, public opinion or reaction may be built by the communicator and their agenda. According to Schuefele (2000), “priming is the impact that agenda-setting can have on the way individuals evaluate public officials by influencing the thematic areas or issues that individuals use to form these evaluations. Framing can be considered an extension of agenda-setting...” (p. 297).

Entman (2004) points out that framing theory represents “selecting and highlighting some facets of events and issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” (p. 5). Tankard (2001) suggests a list of 11 framing mechanisms or focal points for identifying and measuring news frames: “1. headlines 2. sub-heads 3. photos 4. photo captions 5. leads [sic] 6. source selection 7. quotes selection 8. pull

quotes 9. logos 10. statistics and charts, and 11. concluding statements and paragraphs.” (p. 101).

According to Capella & Jamieson (1997), trying to analyze the frame within a text or a video without having guidelines is impossible. Therefore, they suggest, to find a frame, it must meet the linguistic standards and must be recognized in journalistic practice. In the discipline of communication science, framing analysis on news media, especially during elections is very common.

Moreover, Gan & Detenber (2005) conducted a quantitative content analysis to understand various frames applied by the media during the U.S Presidential elections in 2000. For this study, they research the conflict frame, human interest frame, issue/policy frame, regional perspective frame, horse-race frame, constitutional crisis frame. Furthermore, Strömbäck et. al. (2008) investigated the following frames: the game/metaframe, sensationalism frame, horse-race frame, political strategy frame, a news management frame, politicians-as-individuals frame, and conflict frame to understand how Swedish and American media cover news during an election. Although these are framing analyses on newspaper news and the vast majority of framing analyses during election time done on the written form of news, there are numerous framing analyses about news from broadcast channels.

Famulari (2020) and Nassar (2020) conducted content analyses on the issue of what kind of frames CNN, MSNBC, and Fox TV use about refugees and immigrants. Famulari (2020) searched for thematic and generic frames along with morality, human interest, attribution of responsibility, economy, legality, crime, and security frames, while Nassar (2020) focused more on the threat, crime, and security frames. Since searching frames in a video require somewhat complex standardization for quantitative content analysis, Nassar (2020), analyzed the transcripts of the news rather than examining the cable news directly.

This research examines frames that were researched in the same context by the previous scientific studies (see Chapters 4 & 5). Moreover, it will use a transcript add-on (see Chapter 6) to find frames within the political news on YouTube by YouTubers and cable news outlets. Therefore, it fits to framing analysis qualifications by Schluefe (2000) and Tankard (2001).

## **4.2 Medium Theory and Complementary Theory**

The medium theory was formed by Meyrowitz in 1985, partially based McLuhan's work in 1960s. In 1964, McLuhan stated that "the medium is the message" (2001, p. 107), he reasoned it by pointing out that "because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action" (2001, p. 108). According to McLuhan every new medium or technology will change human connection, communication and engagement. Therefore, content in each distinct medium will differ (McLuhan, 1967).

According to Meyrowitz,

"Medium theory studies the features of media that remain relatively fixed, regardless of media content selections and media grammar variables, just as one might study the differences between types of physical spaces (e.g., a long, narrow hallway vs. a ball-room), regardless of who is in them or how the furniture in them is arranged. Indeed, as with physical spaces, people tend to shift what they do and say within a medium to best match the medium's features" (2019, para. 4).

According to Riepl (1913), people are more prone to choose a medium that offers the most comfortable access. Once a new medium is perceived by people as beneficial, the medium will be immediately adopted. According to this theory, an adopted medium will never be entirely abandoned. However, when a medium fails to offer the -new- desired functions, then people will embrace another uncomplicated medium that grants the services the old medium failed to provide. Nevertheless, the old medium will not be replaced by the new medium but completed by it.

YouTube is a social media site that offers free access for everyone who has an internet connection. Moreover, on the contrary to TV, people can decide what to watch and when to watch by themselves on Youtube. Additionally, there is no official censor on Youtube, other than algorithmic censor. Thus, more and more people prefer YouTube over TV due to its easy access, variety of content, intimacy and the relatability of content creators, and fewer number ads that can be avoided by an Ad-blocker. Therefore, all major TV Cable news have a Youtube channel, and they are sharing the highlights and/or short clips on Youtube from their daily broadcast.

According to Borah et. al. (2018), the purpose of TV content lies in persuasion, while YouTube news aims to mobilize already partisan mass. Even though TV Cable news have YouTube channels, TV Cable news do not create content for their YouTube channels, rather they share

some parts of their daily broadcast. Moreover, while the tone of the language within TV has a long tradition, and thus; more formal, the tone of the language on YouTube is more authentic and similar to everyday conversation (Oh & Jung Ki, 2019). Moreover, Famulari (2020) compared frames used both in liberal and conservative newspapers to cable news. Famulari found that there is significant difference in the application of morality frame between left-wing newspapers and cable news outlets.

Due to all these reasons, it is possible to assume that there will be difference in usage of frames between cable news and YouTube news.

### **4.3 Political Discourse**

Askanius et. al. used political discourse theory in their case-study on Youtube activism channel. For discourse theory, hegemonic practices are an exemplary form of political activity that involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities..." (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 14). Furthermore, in political discourse the articulation of a political actor<sup>19</sup> will be determined by the actors' ideology, goals, etc. Chilton explained this phenomenon with an example: "(a) An Asian male was beaten up in the street. (b) A man was beaten up in the street. (c) Someone was beaten up in the street." (2004, p. 62). In this example, a political actor can give whether more or less information according to her/his strategy.

Some previous research show that political discourse exist also within voters', and the media's language based on the ideologies of American people. Sylwester & Purver (2015) conducted a content analysis about the different language used by Democrats and Republicans on Twitter. Therefore, they examined in a total of 923,758 tweets. The results show that there is a significant difference between Republicans and Democrats regarding their language. While Democrats used significantly more first-person pronoun, swear words, and words that indicate positive emotions but also anxiety, Republicans focused on the religious, tentative, words, and used first person plural. Moreover, top ten used words by Republicans were "Obama, tcot, will, god, obamacar, America liber, American, great, Benghazi, tax, conserve, run, state, country, govern, obam, vote, illeg, lie" (Sylwester et. al., 2015, para. 27). On the other hand, top ten most used words by Democrats were; "love, lol, just, feel, fuck, like, realli, watch, n't, got, happi, shit, worldcup, amay, work, women, day, they, know, much, life".

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<sup>19</sup> Political Candidate, Party Members, Politicians, News Organizations, etc.

Chen, Deb & Ferrara (2021) used public Twitter dataset and conducted a research about political discourse on Twitter during the Presidential elections 2021. For this research, Chen et. al. (2021) tracked politicians from the May 2019. The research results showed that there is a significant tendency of mentioning conspiracy theories by the Republicans. Moreover, some of the most frequently used hashtags and pattern of words for the candidates were “Sleepy Joe, sleepyjoe, HiddenBiden, CreepyJoeBiden, NeverBiden, BidenUkraineScandal, Dump-Trump, NeverTrump” (Chen et. al., 2021, para 16, tab 2). While both conservatives and liberals did mention their unfavored candidate and talked about their feelings towards the candidate of the other party, conservatives focused on more personal and insult-based context.

#### **4.4 Synopsis of the Theories**

Framing is a communication strategy that uses foremost the linguistic, then the visual tools. It is also a strategy used often by the political actors<sup>20</sup> during the election time. The main aim of framing is to connect a problematic issue to a person or an event. Hence, it is possible to create a public opinion while controlling the narrative of it (Entman, 1993). While application of framing is relatively more easy on a picture, framing through the language is more complex since the words will be chosen according to their subtle connotations. Therefore, it is crucial to operationalize each frame in detail and create an elaborate codebook.

Moreover, according to Pew Research (2021), the sociodemographic characteristics of the voters who receive political information via TV and YouTube are rapidly different. While people from age 18-39 used by far the most social media to be politically informed during the 2021 US Presidential elections, people from age 39-60 choose local and network TV to receive information regarding the elections. Additionally people who choose TV were more educated than the people who informed themselves on YouTube or any other social media (Pew Research, 2021). This shows the significant differences between the audiences of the cable news and social media. It is important to point out the fact that the ton of the language is decided mostly according to tradition of the medium, audience and their expectations, preferences. Moreover, framing is strongly connected to the language and its tone. Therefore, it is possible to expect differences within the used frames by cable news outlets and YouTubers.

According to political discourse theory, people tend to talk about events, facts, stories, based on their ideologies. Furthermore, some previous research showed that there is a undeniable difference within the political discourse by the liberals and conservatives (see Chapter 3.3). Many research results support the biases within the cable news and YouTube news based on

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<sup>20</sup> Politicians, journalist, media organizations, etc.

their ideology (Borah et. al., 2018; Famulari, 2020; Nassar 2020; Lewis, 2019; 2020). Additionally, YouTube is a similar platform to TV and one of the main differences of YouTube is the informal ton of language and required authenticity. Therefore, it is possible to expect differences within the applied frames by the liberal and conservative YouTube news and cable news.

This paper focuses on distinct frames used by right-wing and left-wing YouTubers in comparison to right-wing and left-wing TV Cable news' YouTube accounts. Additionally, it also compares different frames adopted between the same ideologies due to the difference of the original medium<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Even though TV channels have YouTube accounts, they produce the content originally for the TV and share some of the highlights on YouTube.

## **PART B) Empirical Research**

### **4. Research Questions and Hypotheses**

**RQ1:** What are the differences in application of various frames in videos of YouTube news channels and cable news networks' YouTube accounts during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.?

According to the study results of Borah (2018), TV news channels do not talk about issues during the election time. On the other hand, Lewis (2019) found that regardless of their political views, political news channels on YouTube criticize heavily the mainstream media for not addressing the real issues, being inadequate to fulfil their purposes. Furthermore, these YouTubers claim that they fulfil the media purposes which mainstream media fail to deliver. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this paper is:

**H1:** When YouTube news channels share a video during the Presidential elections of 2020, they utilize more issue frame than cable news networks on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

Strömbäck et. al. (2006; 2008) found that American news channels are using horse-race framing and meta framing during the election time almost excessively. On the other hand, Gorshek et. al., (2013) conducted a framing research about social media networks during the Presidential election in 2012. The findings show that words related to horse-race frame, such as "winning", "President", etc. are not among words frequently used (Groshek et. al., 2013). Even though the research did not focus on YouTube, YouTube is a social media channel that is depending on user-generated content just as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, etc. Moreover, vast majority of the users and influencers of YouTube have other social media accounts, such as Instagram, Twitter, etc. Therefore, it is possible to assume they will reflect same relationship. Thus, the second hypothesis is:

**H2:** When cable news channels on YouTube share a video during the Presidential elections of 2020, they use more horse-race frame than political news channels of YouTube.

**RQ2:** What are the differences in application of various frames by left-wing cable news videos on YouTube and right-wing cable news videos on YouTube during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.?

Famulari (2020) found a statistically high percentage of human interest frame among left-wing cable news outlets in comparison to right-wing cable news channels.

Thus third hypothesis of this paper is:

**H3:** When left-wing cable news outlets share a video on YouTube, they generate more human interest frame than right-wing cable news outlets during the Presidential elections 2020 in the U.S.

Nassar (2020) found that right-wing cable news outlets use excessively and significantly more threat, crime and security frame than left-wing cable news outlets. Thus, the fourth hypotheses of this paper is:

**H4:** When right-wing cable news outlets share videos on YouTube, they utilize more crime and security frame than left-wing cable news outlets on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential elections in 2020.

**RQ3:** What are the differences in application of various frames by right-wing and left-wing YouTubers?

Otoni et. al. (2018) found through their comparison right-wing YouTubers' channels to left-wing YouTubers' channels that right-wing YouTubers talk excessively talk about sensational topics, such as "bombing, nato, torture, terrorism, ebola, gamma, radiation, biological and chemical warfare" (p. 327). All of these topics create directly sensation through their connotations. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis of this research is:

**H5:** When right-wing YouTube news channels share videos on YouTube, they apply more sensationalism frame than left-wing YouTube news channels during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

Left-wing YouTubers center and support excessively social justice, individual rights, such as feminism, LGBTQAI rights, rights for minority groups, races. Thus, they apply human interest frame. On the other hand, right-wing YouTubers criticize openly these rights (Lewis, 2018). Therefore, the sixth hypothesis of this paper is:



**H6:** Left-wing YouTube news channels utilize more human-interest frame than right-wing YouTube news channels.

**RQ4:** What are the differences in application of various frames by right-wing YouTubers' channels and right-wing cable news' YouTube accounts?

Strömbäck et. al. (2006) found no significant amount of sensationalism frame among news channels in the U.S during an election time. Additionally, Wiora et. al. (2021) emphasize that cable news channels try to avoid extremely controversial topics. On the other hand, Ottoni et. al. (2018) found through their comparison right-wing YouTubers' channels to left-wing YouTubers' channels that right-wing YouTubers talk excessively about sensational topics, such as "bombing, nato, torture, terrorism, ebola, gamma, radiation, biological and chemical warfare" (p. 327). Therefore, the seventh hypothesis of this research is:

**H7:** When right-wing news channels on YouTube share videos they use more sensationalism

**RQ5:** What are the differences in application of various frames by left-wing YouTubers' channels and left-wing cable news' YouTube accounts?

According to the quantitative content analysis results of Famulari (2020) left-wing newspapers focus more on morality frame than left-wing cable news channels. However, Valenzuela, Piña, & Ramírez (2017) point out that morality frame is one of the at least used frames in professional journalism since it projects an open bias. Furthermore, Valenzuela et. al. (2017), found there was a significant increase of morality frame on other user-generated websites Facebook and Twitter in comparison to mainstream media. Since YouTube is based on a user-generated content (see Chapter 2.5) also, and share users with other social media networks (Pew Research, 2021), the eighth hypothesis of this paper suggests;

**H8:** When left-wing YouTube news channels share a video, they generate more morality frame than left-wing cable news outlets on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

**RQ6:** How do liberal and conservative YouTube news channels and cable news networks on YouTube use politicians-as-individuals frame?

No previous research exist that can suggest any hypothesis to this research question. Therefore, an explorative approach will be used to answer this question (see Chapter 6.3).

## 5. Operationalization

**Independent variables** of this research are shared videos by right and left-wing YouTube and Cable news channels on YouTube, while **dependent variables** are: issue, horse-race, human interest, morality, sensationalism, politicians-as-individuals, crime, and security frames. The independent variables of this paper do not require operationalization. Therefore, this chapter focuses on operationalizing these dependent variables.

Issue Frame: includes stories that focus on issues and issue positions.” (Strömbäck et. al., 2008, p. 138). Gan et. al. (2005) point out that issue framing is directly linked to the presentation of the *candidates’ statement about a specific issue* concerning the U.S. or world, in the general presentation of issues on a specific topic. For instance: irregular illegal immigrants, mishandling the Covid-19 crises, students loans, inequality between races, etc. Therefore, these definitions and concepts are used to determine the existence of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. For example, level 1 refers to denying existing issues, and level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

Horse frame: According to Strömbäck et. al., (2006) “the **horse-race frame** is when a “news story focused on winning or losing in the battle for votes”(p. 138). According to Gan et. al., horse-race framing is applied when the media covers the *campaign performance*, makes *predictions of the election results*, *mentions the party or individual strategy*, and mentions the *strengths of a candidate*, such as *financial, organizational, characteristic*, etc. (2005). These definitions and concepts define the existence of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. Level 1 refers to, for example, when the media talks about the insignificance of who wins the election and emphasizes the importance of voting. Level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

Human Interest Frame: refers to “generating feelings of empathy, concern, sympathy, compassion or outrage” (Gan et. al., 2005, p. 462). In addition to this definition, other relevant topics link to the human interest frame, such as racial injustice, discrimination towards minority groups, etc. These categories and concepts outline the presence of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. Level 1 refers to, for example, showing victims as predators or criminals. Level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

*Threat/Crime and Security Frame*: refers to showing minority groups as a threat and claiming that these groups will cause a malfunction in the security system (Nassar, 2020). It links certain groups to national or international threats and claiming that these groups will/do commit a crime and will create disorder (Nassar, 2020). Since this paper concentrates on the U.S., some of the sub-topics are: showing Hispanics, African Americans, immigrants, refugees, women, etc. as a threat.

These definitions and terms determine the existence of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. Level 1 refers to, for example, showing refugees or minority groups as victims. Level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

*Sensationalism Frame*: According to Strömbäck et. al. (2006), the sensationalism frame is “related to the “breathlessness” quality of a news story” (p. 138). Therefore the following types of words will be searched “*bombing, nato, torture, terrorism, ebola, gamma, radiation, biological and chemical warfare*” (Ottoni, et. al. 2018, p. 327). These definitions and concepts decide the existence of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. Level 1 refers to, for example, presenting a scandal as a part of normality. Level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

*Morality Frame*: is a frame that contains instances and topics related to normative messages, religious and cultural principles. This frame emphasizes events and issues related to normative context, religious and cultural beliefs (Semetko & Walkenburg, 2000). Moreover, Famulari (2020) added American values to its operational definition. Some examples to this frame would be; being American and protecting freedom, democracy, or being Christian and accepting refugees, etc. These definitions and concepts determine the presence of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. Level 1 refers to, for example, questioning religious and cultural principles. Level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

*Politicians-as-individuals Frame*: is applied when a “news story focused on politicians as persons with different attributes, characters, and behaviors rather than as spokespersons for certain policies” (Strömbäck et. al., 2006 p. 138). Some examples of these frames would be; emphasizing the characteristics of candidates such as Kamala Harris being an African/Asian-American woman, Biden is an old politician, etc. These definitions and concepts discover the appearance of the frame. The frame is measured through a 5 level Likert scale. Level 1 refers

to, for example, talking about politicians as institutional figures. Level 5 indicates frequent use of the frame and its concepts (see Appendix A).

## 6. Method

This study focuses on a quantitative content analysis to determine and compare the various frames applied within right-wing and left-wing cable news' videos on YouTube and videos of YouTube news channels. Moreover, with an explorative approach, it analyzes politicians-as-individuals frame and its relationship to these media and ideologies which were not researched by the previous studies. This chapter addresses the reasoning of the chosen method, sampling information, methodology, and its process.

Content analysis is one of the most common and essential methods within social sciences (Krippendorff, 2004). Moreover, Rössler (2020) stated that standardized content analysis is one of the most principal methods when it comes to analyzing political communication. According to Allen (2017), a quantitative "content analysis is a systematic, quantitative process of analyzing communication messages by determining the frequency of message characteristics" (p. 239). Rössler (2020) emphasizes the fact that standardized content analysis offers many perks, such as being able to analyze the message through an intersubjective and logical point of view. In this paper, the communication message that needs to be examined is the usage of various frames and their frequency (see Chapter 4). Allen (2017) points out that researchers can analyze the messages directly by their communicator and "researchers can examine the manifest (the actual communicative message characteristics) and latent (what can be inferred from the message) content of a message." (p. 240).

Rössler (2020) emphasizes that standardized quantitative content analysis is mostly used within political communication to study TV news, newspaper reportages, political debates, Tweets, social media comments, etc. This study centers on the different frames used by different types of communicators: cable news videos on Youtube and Youtubers. Moreover, many previous scientific research papers on a similar topic did choose quantitative content analysis as their main research method (Borah et. al. 2018; Famulari, 2020; Gan et. al., 2005; Nassar, 2020; Strömbäck et. al, 2006; Strömbäck et. al. 2008; Valenzuela et. al., 2017). Due to all these reasons, standardized quantitative content analysis is the best fitting method to answer the hypotheses of this paper.

On the other hand, Krippendorff (2004) points out that content analysis can be used for examining a text, picture, or video. However, it is important to point out that in communication studies, quantitative content analysis is commonly used to analyze the written form of communication rather than examining an image or a motion picture such as video (Crawley, 2007; Gan et. al., 2005; Rixon et. al., 2014). Therefore, Nassar (2020), investigated the content of political

frames used in cable news through transcriptions of the videos. Due to these reasons, this paper uses transcriptions of videos on YouTube to analyze frames.

Additionally, exploratory quantitative content analysis is used when there are not enough scientific findings on one of the research's issues. In this paper, the issue requires an explorative approach is the politicians-as-individuals frame on political YouTube channels. According to Mayring (2007), exploratory quantitative research brought in the past many essential approaches. Moreover, "Nicht vergessen werden darf dabei, dass auch quantitative Forschung explorative Ansätze hervorgebracht hat: Explorative Datenanalyse ist ein Ansatz, der durch nicht hypothesengeleitete erste offene Analysen den Datensatz näher erfassen will, vor allem um mit graphischer Veranschaulichung der Datenverteilung zu Hypothesen zu gelangen." Auch Faktorenanalysen können explorativ eingesetzt werden, führen zu Dimensionen (wenn die Faktoren interpretiert werden), die vorher nicht bekannt waren."<sup>22</sup> (Mayring, 2007, p.6)

According to Krein (2012) „Ein explorativer Forschungsansatz, der dem Ziel dient, ein empirisches Phänomen innerhalb eines komplexen Beziehungsgefüges aus ganzheitlicher Sicht zu beschreiben und einer detaillierten Analyse zu unterziehen, um so zu einem besseren Verständnis der Zusammenhänge beizutragen...“<sup>23</sup> (p .64).

For the explorative approach, and for extending the sub-categories of the codebook suggested by the previous research, this study use an inductive text-mining strategy based on its main standardized deductive codebook. Inductive text-mining offers efficient and reliable solutions for explorative quantitative content analysis since frequency analysis of texts can be done through a computer-automated system and key words can be placed into pre-existing categories manually. Thus, a deductive-inductive codebook can be built for quantitative content analyses (Waldherr, Wehden, Stoltenberg, Miltner, Ostner & Pfetsch, 2019). Waldherr et. al. (2019), suggest that main and sub categories of a content analysis can be generated by computer-automated software. Nevertheless, this paper does not focus on a mere inductive codebook strategy rather on a deductive-inductive one, since previous research on the topic offer relevant data on framing strategies during Presidential elections in the U.S. Therefore, most frequently used key words are manually interpreted and categorized (see Chapter 6.2).

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<sup>22</sup> It should not be forgotten that quantitative research has also produced exploratory approaches: Exploratory data analysis is an approach that aims to capture the data set in greater detail through first open analyzes that are not guided by hypotheses, especially to arrive at hypotheses with a graphical illustration of the data distribution. Factor analyzes can also be used for exploratory purposes, leading to dimensions (if the factors are interpreted) that were not previously known.

<sup>23</sup> An exploratory research approach aims to describe an empirical phenomenon within a complex relationship structure from a holistic aspect and subject it to a detailed analysis. Thus, it can contribute to a better understanding of the relationships.... (Kerin, 2012, p. 64).

## 6.1 Sampling

The population of this research is every YouTube video shared by active political news channels of YouTube and cable news channels on YouTube<sup>24</sup>, which identify themselves whether as right-wing/conservative or left-wing/liberal and have more than 1 Million subscribers on YouTube. However, it is not possible to examine every political video shared by popular YouTube channels. Therefore, this study will focus on an example group. Hence, the necessity of a sampling method for the selection an active left-wing cable news accounts on YouTube, active right-wing cable news on YouTube, active popular left-wing YouTubers, and active popular right-wing YouTubers.

“Probability sampling methods are better suited to research where population inference is the goal. Probability sampling procedures are those where the determination of who or what provides data to the researcher is determined by a random process. In a probability sample, the only influence the investigator has in determining who is included in a sample is in the determination of the population to be sampled. Once the population is identified, the researcher (or his or her assistants or associates) has no say in who ends up in the sample.” (Hayes, 2005, p. 38).

Moreover, probability sampling methods have a higher chance of representation of the population. On the other hand, some relevant previous studies used a non-probability-sampling method to examine and compare most conservative and liberal channels (Nassar, 2020; Zuniga et. al., 2012). Nevertheless, this option is not applicable to this study (see Chapter 6.5). Therefore, this study chooses the simple random sampling method of probability sampling methods. To apply a simple random sampling method, all members of the research topic, population, must be within the selection process (Hayes, 2005).

This paper follows more of an unconventional way to sample its example group. YouTube has a video suggestion system mainly based on the videos a user previously watched. It suggests

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<sup>24</sup> With the rise of the social media, all types of TV-Networks initiated their social media projects. Nowadays, almost every TV-Network has at least one social media account. While newspapers and journalists, who work at a newspaper, focus mostly on Twitter, cable news networks are extremely active on their YouTube accounts (Al Nashmi, North, Bloom, & Cleary, 2017; Twitter, 2021). As of 2021, American cable news, such as MSNBC, NBC, Fox News upload 30-38 videos to their YouTube accounts per day. The length of the videos are mostly between 3 Minutes to 10 Minutes. Nevertheless, there are videos over 10 Minutes, and seldomly videos around one hour (YouTube, 2021). According to Al Nashmi et. al. (2017), CNN and CNN international's YouTube accounts seek one of the highest interaction with their audience on YouTube among Cable news' YouTube accounts. Hence, they receive the highest number of comments, likes and subscription (Al Nashimi et. al., 2017; YouTube, 2021).

videos in different ways to its users based on three qualifications: personalization, performance of the video<sup>25</sup>, external factors<sup>26</sup> and recently the duration of the video<sup>27</sup> (YouTube, 2021). There is a specific algorithm that is responsible for each of these qualifications. At the end of the analysis phase conducted by the algorithms, algorithms communicate to each other to determine the video(s) most likely to be liked by an individual viewer (Celis et. al., 2019). Thus, videos will be suggested by these algorithms to maximize the time spent on the website or app. Moreover, previous research found these personalization algorithms of social media networks cause a higher amount of polarization since people only see the content they are interested in (Celis et. al., 2019; Spohr, 2017). Since this research examines frames used in the right and left-wing channels on YouTube, it becomes intriguing to use the personalization of YouTube as a part of the sampling method. Due to these reasons, YouTube personalization and search results are used for the selection of the channels (see Chapters 6.1 & 6.2).

After the selection process of the channels, systematic random sampling will be used for the selection of the videos. In systematic random sampling, “the researcher selects a random start point in the list of the population and then includes every kth member of the population from that point” (Hayes, 2005, p. 38). The population size<sup>28</sup> will be divided by 150, which is the desired sample size per channel. All collected data will be evaluated by the statistics program for social sciences: SPSS.

## **6.2 Machine Training: Personalization and Sampling the YouTube Accounts**

Personalization on YouTube is specific for each user since the algorithms are trained according to the videos watched by a specific user. To avoid any possible manipulation to sampling results, two completely different YouTube accounts were created on the 3rd of February and are used on two different devices<sup>29</sup>. Both devices are connected to a premium VPN<sup>30</sup> service and are using distinct IP<sup>31</sup> addresses located in the United States. Moreover, similar information was given about account owners. For instance, both of the users are from the same generation and female. On one device, only right-wing/republican content had been watched and right-wing news on Google had been searched on a regular basis, while on the other

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<sup>25</sup> The number of subscribers, views, likes, dislikes, comments.

<sup>26</sup> Market, trends, megatrends, etc.

<sup>27</sup> Recently, YouTube started encouraging videos more than 20 minutes by increasing the chances of those videos to be shown in the search results.

<sup>28</sup> The number of videos within the sampled channel from August 11, 2020, to November 3, 2020.

<sup>29</sup> Tablet, and Smartphone

<sup>30</sup> Virtual Private Network. Allows users to hide their IP address, other information and connects users the internet over other countries.

<sup>31</sup> An unique address of a network. Can be saved by websites through cookies, and used for advertising or personalization purposes.



device, only left-wing/liberal content is had been consumed both on YouTube and worldwide-web on daily basis.

*Figure 5: Right-Wing Persona*

Joanna Davis, born on 01.02.1990 (31 years old), female, based in Salt Lake City <sup>32</sup>
<b>Device:</b> Samsung Tablet
<b>Personalization Settings on Google and YouTube:</b> Express personalization
<b>Allowed:</b> Data storage for 18 months, YouTube history (for better YouTube search results- data storage for 36 months), personalized ads.
<b>Some of the searched keywords:</b> Trump's speech on election results, outcome of election fraud in Pennsylvania, Nevada. New York Daily News, why does Biden want to ban guns?, etc.*

\* All searched themes and words are based on contemporary topics and found mostly in conservative Newspaper: New York Daily News. Since newspapers and their YouTube channels are not within the population of this research, they do not cause manipulation on search results.

*Figure 6: Left-wing Persona*

Melanie McLennan, born on 05.04.1996 (25 years old), female, based in New York City <sup>33</sup>
<b>Device:</b> iPhone 6s
<b>Personalization Settings on Google and YouTube:</b> Express personalization
<b>Allowed:</b> Data storage for 18 months, YouTube history (for better YouTube search results- data storage for 36 months), personalized ads.
<b>Some of the searched keywords:</b> Trump's speech before riots in Capitol, Biden's acceptance speech, Biden's stand on gun violence, etc.**

\*\* All searched themes and words are based on contemporary topics and found mostly on liberal traditional media sources: New York Times or John Oliver. Since newspapers, late-night shows, and their YouTube channels are not within the population of this research, they do not cause manipulation on search results.

<sup>32</sup> Salt Lake City gave its electoral votes to Republican candidate Donald J. Trump during the election 2020. Therefore, this city is selected for the conservative profile.

<sup>33</sup> New York City gave its electoral votes to Democrat candidate Joe Biden during the election 2020. Therefore, this city is selected for the conservative profile.

After training the algorithm on both accounts for approximately four months, on the 10th of June, the following search entry “Presidential election 2020 Trump vs. Biden” was written in both accounts to sample the channels. The reason for search entry choice is because the entry includes the main topic of the research and does not show any bias. Moreover, it connects to the channels that were covering the elections. The first channel which is in the population of this study and appears first in the search result will be selected.

According to Joanna Davis's search results, **Fox News** was the number seven search result. The first six search results were not in the population of this research since they were late-night shows, newspapers' channels, or did not have the sufficient subscriber number. Therefore, Fox News is used as a sample for the right-wing cable news channels on YouTube. Fox News, with its 7.09 million subscribers, has the highest subscriber number among conservative cable news networks on YouTube. Moreover, it shared approximately 2155 videos between August 11, 2020, and November 3, 2020. The cable news network was researched by various relevant studies (Nassar, 2020).

On the other hand, the first political news channel appeared at the end of the second page of the search result, and it was **The Daily Wire**. Thus, The Daily Wire is a sample of the right-wing YouTube news channel. The Daily Wire has 2.52 Million subscribers, and it is currently one of the right-wing YouTube news channels, with the closest program format to traditional cable news networks. The channel shared around 205 Videos during the relevant research time frame.

In the search results of Melanie McLennan, **CNN** was in 5th place. The videos before CNN were light night shows, podcasts, and newspaper channels. Due to this reason, CNN is the sampled channel for liberal cable news networks on YouTube. CNN has over 12.3 subscribers, and previous framing analysis analyzed this channel as well. CNN shared roughly 440 videos between the end of caucuses and election day.

**The Young Turks** were the first YouTube news channel and it was located in the middle of the second page of the search results. TYT is one of the earliest and most established liberal YouTube news channels. The channel was examined by the previous research. It mimics the program format, flow, and settings of a traditional cable news outlet. It currently has over 5.11 Million subscribers. It shared approximately 560 videos during the election campaign time.

### **6.3 Deductive-Inductive Codebook through the Text-Mining Strategy**

This paper adopts the empirical method of quantitative content analysis with an explorative approach. Therefore, it obtains pre-existing categories gathered through previous empirical research on framing analysis since the media framing analysis during Presidential elections in the U.S. is a considerably common research topic among scholars (Famulari, 2020; Nassar, 2020; Gan, 2005; Strömbäck, 2006; 2008). However, there is a limited amount of framing research concerning YouTube. Therefore an additional explorative approach has a scientific significance. Due to all these reasons, this research uses a mixed deductive-inductive strategy to create its standardized codebook.

The main categories and subcategories of frames are pre-determined by the previous relevant studies (Famulari, 2020; Nassar, 2020; Gan, 2005; Strömbäck, 2006; 2008, also see Figure 11). The inductive data is gathered through a text mining strategy. Text mining is a strategy used for harvesting text through an automated or semi-automated approach. Even though in usage for codebook creation, the keywords and their context are examined within the text and decided by the researcher(s) if the keywords are employable, it minimizes the interpretational mistakes (Waldherr et. al., 2019).

For these purposes, an additional frame concept; politicians-as-individuals are added to the codebook and four different documents are created. Each document represents one of the four groups of this research: right, and left-wing political news channels on YouTube, left and right-wing cable news networks on YouTube. Each document obtains transcriptions of 50 randomly chosen videos within their group. Once the collection process of the transcriptions is finished, every groups' transcriptions are uploaded to Voyant Tools. Voyant Tools is an open-source web-based software that automates text analysis and offers crucial analyses such as correlation, co-occurrence analyses (Waldherr et. al., 2019). Voyant Tools exclude some unwarranted redundant words automatically. Nevertheless, it does not recognize slang words or unnecessary verbs. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary data, some words are excluded from the analysis, such as: like, going, gonna, we're, i'm, there's, that's, etc. The frequency analysis was done by the website automatically.

As Waldherr et. al. (2019) & Wettstein (2012) suggest, the keywords and their connections to the categories are determined through various analyses: such as frequency and co-occurrence and smallest space analysis. After finding the most frequently used words, the researcher examined the transcription to avoid misinterpretations. For example, one of the most used words within right-wing YouTube news channels was LGBTQ. Nevertheless, they used the word not because they support LGBTQ rights, but they found it immoral. Therefore, the frequency, co-

occurrence, play significant roles. The most frequently used words are placed under the pre-existing categories.

Figure 7: Right-wing YouTube news channels

Frequency Rank	Term	Number of Usage
1	Trump	402
3	Biden	244
6	Police	202
7	Black	201
15	Racist	116
16	Law	114
61	Death	63
62	Riot	63

Moreover, correlation of some co-occurred words were found scientifically significant, such as black-bad ( $p=0.0012$ ), justify-police ( $p=0.0031$ ), trump-President ( $p=0.0008$ ), services-trump ( $p=0.0014$ ), incidents-police ( $p=0.00097$ ), justifying-police ( $p=0.0038$ ), suffering-trump, biden's-biased ( $p=0.0000$ ), biden-accused ( $p=0.002$ ), riot-burning ( $p=0.0034$ ), etc.

Figure 8: Right-wing Cable News Networks on YouTube

Frequency Rank	Term	Number of Usage
1	Trump	304
2	Biden	271
4	Police	190
7	Kamala	154
10	Black	97
11	Riots	90
17	Election	54

Scientifically significant correlation was found in following co-occurred words: kamala-african ( $p=0.002$ ), riots-burning ( $p=0.0035$ ), trump-win ( $p=0.0009$ ), ballots-fraud, sleepy-joe ( $p=0.0029$ ).

Figure 9: Left-wing YouTube news channels

Frequency Rank	Term	Number of Usage
1	Rights	273
4	Trump	186
5	Biden	161
7	Black	184
9	Love	96
14	LGBTQ	72
-	Covid-19/Corona	52

Moreover, correlation of some co-occurred words were found scientifically significant, such as women-rights ( $p=.0000$ ), trump-dumb ( $p=.0037$ ), black-asylum ( $p=.0041$ ) world-protesters ( $p=.0001$ ), gay-rights ( $p=.0013$ ), police-murdered ( $p=.0018$ ), abortion-equality ( $p=.0023$ ), etc.

Figure 10: Left-wing Cable News Networks on YouTube

Frequency Rank	Term	Number of Usage
1	Trump	246
2	Biden	235
5	Kamala	183
6	Black	177
7	Rights	149
8	Protests	132
11	Covid-19/Corona	87

Following co-occurred words showed scientifically significant correlation: Kamala-woman ( $p=.0026$ ), black-injustice ( $p=.0007$ ), corona-bad ( $p=.0031$ ).

Figure 11: Categories, Subcategories, and Keywords

Category	Conceptional Definition	Keywords and Concepts
Threat/Crime and Security Frame	linking certain groups to national or international threats and claiming that these groups will/does commit crime and they will create disorder (Nassar, 2020)	Illegal, immigrants, refugees, Hispanic, Black, crime, <i>burning, looting</i>
Horse-Race Frame	media coverage on the campaign performance, makes predictions of the election results, mentions the party or individual strategy, and mentions the strengths of a candidate, such as financial, organizational, characteristic	<i>Winning, Covid-19, Corona, economy</i>
Human Interest Frame	“generating feelings of empathy, concern, sympathy, compassion or outrage” (Gan et. al., 2005, p. 462).	Racial injustice, inequality, <i>women, African-American, Asian, police brutality, women rights, gay rights, abortion rights, equality</i>
Issue Frame	specific issue concerning the US or world, in the general presentation of issues on a specific topic.	irregular illegal immigrants, mishandling the Covid-19 crises, students loans, inequality between races, <i>ballots, absentee votes, mail votes</i>
Morality Frame	normative messages, religious and cultural principles, American values (Famulari, 2020; Semetko, 2000). protecting the freedom, democracy, or being Christian and accepting refugees, etc.	<i>Sexualizing children, Christian moms, leading to election fraud, immorality of LGBTQ,</i>
Sensationalism Frame	is “related to the “breathlessness” quality of a news story” (Strömbäck, 2006, p. 138).	“bombing, nato, torture, terrorism, ebola, gamma, radiation, biological and chemical warfare” (Ottoni, et. al. 2018, p. 327). <i>Election fraud, riot.</i>

Politicians-as-individuals	Strömbäck et. al. (2006) point out that the politicians-as-individuals frame is applied when a “news story focused on politicians as persons with different attributes, characters, and behaviors rather than as spokespersons for certain policies” (p. 138).	<i>Kamala Harris as a first black and woman nominee for the vice presidency, Donald Trump as an incompetent politician, Donald Trump as a relatively young and dynamic leader, Joe Biden as the oldest nominee for presidency, Joe Biden as a supporter of minorities, etc.</i>
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\*\*\* Keywords written in italics are the words generated through text-mining.

The final codebook of this study was built by 17 nominal-scaled, five ordinal-scaled, and seven five-point-Likert-scaled questions regarding the frames in hypotheses. All of these questions are closed and standardized. Nominal-scaled questions determine the name, type, ideology, time frame of the channels, and the existence of the frames. After the pre-test, an additional nominal question is added to the horse-race frame and politicians-as-individuals frame to understand the positivity or negativity within the context (see Chapter 6.4). Ordinal-scaled questions measure the duration, views, likes, dislikes, and comments of each video.

Even though in most of the content analysis researchers search for the existence of certain patterns and therefore use mostly nominal scales, it is crucial to add interval scaled questions to be able to measure the scientific significance for answering the hypotheses. On the other hand, the Likert scale is an ordinal concept treated as an interval scale in social sciences. Moreover, the major perk of using five-point Likert scales is that they work well with quantitative research and these scales offer an easy path for reasoning the outcomes. However, most content analyses use Likert scales to measure the satisfactory level or opinion on a subject. Therefore, the most common ranges are "strongly agree" and "strongly disagree" (Joshi, Kale, Chandel & Pal, 2015). These ranges do not have the means to serve the research questions and their hypotheses. Thus, the points are specifically standardized for this study.

For instance, for the question of the extent of the human-interest-frame, 1 does not stand for the absence of the frame but the opposite of the frame. For example, if the news does not show any empathy to the victims of an incident, it is coded as 1. If there is no human interest frame, then the code codes it as 2. If the news used the frame for a single time then the coder will code it as 3. If the news utilized the frame two to three times then the coder codes it as 4. If the report mentions the frame and its keywords more than three times then the coder codes

it as 5. The aim here is to eliminate or minimize the bias of the researcher by standardizing the codebook as strictly as possible (see Appendix).

#### **6.4 Pre-Test**

A pre-test is an essential tool for correcting and updating the designed research process to the particular case of the study. Therefore, aim here is to obtain further knowledge about the exact population of the study to adapt circumstances shaped around the population better. Pre-testing is an even more crucial concept for quantitative studies since quantitative studies often work with a standardized research design, and therefore any changes must be done before initiating the empirical study (Hayes, 2009). Due to these reasons, a pre-test was designed for this study. In the scope of the pre-test, the researcher picked a random channel for each group of this research.

In the first step, the researcher examined the videos uploaded between August and November. Even though the primaries and caucuses ended on the 27th of August, Biden won the primaries before the last primary took place. On the 11th of August, Biden nominated Kamala Harris for his running mate and nominee for the vice-presidency. Therefore, it is found that all channels started talking about the election excessively on the 11th of August. Thus, the starting point of the research had been changed from the 27th of August to the 11th of August.

During the second step, the researcher watched 10 random videos for each group between the 11th of August and the 3rd of November. This step showed the necessity for modifying the codebook. For example, this paper focuses on the horse-race frame concept. However, the videos showed some videos generate positive and other negative horse-race and politicians-as-individuals frames. Therefore, a nominal-scaled question was added to the codebook to detect if these frames were used in a positive or negative context.

To measure reliability, the researcher found the same 40 videos through the history of Safari internet explorer approximately two months later than the initial pre-test. She watched the same videos in the same order and coded them into the same SPSS document. The aim is to determine the consistency of the coding procedure through test re-test reliability. Therefore, related scales are duplicated and divided into two time frame T1<sup>34</sup> and T2<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> Time 1. First analysis (28.05.2021).

<sup>35</sup> Time 2. Second analysis (24.08.2021).



Table 1: Reliability Test

<b>Frames</b>	<b>r*</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>p</b>
T1 Crime and Security Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Crime and Security Frame	.983**	40	.000
T1 Horse-Race Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Horse-Race Frame	.981**	40	.000
T1 Human Interest Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Human Interest Frame	1.000**	40	.000
T1 Issue Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Issue Frame	.965**	40	.000
T1 Morality Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Morality Frame	.984**	40	.000
T1 Politicians-as-individuals Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Politicians-as-individuals Frame	.971**	40	.000
T1 Sensationalism Frame	1	40	.000
T2 Sensationalism Frame	.973**	40	.000

\*Correlation according to Pearson

\*\*Die correlation is on the level of .01 (2 tailed) significant

According to Darren & Paul (2003), the closer r-value to 1 the higher the correlation is. The variables from T1 and T2 are positively correlated and their r-value is very close to 1. Moreover, they have a high significance value. Therefore, it is possible to say that the data has consistency and thus, it is reliable.

### 6.5 Limitations and Possible Solutions

One of the significant limitations of this research is the delicacy of the algorithms and personalization systems of YouTube since this study uses the personalization of YouTube for sampling channels. YouTube algorithms for personalization are sensitive. Therefore, every video watched by a new account has a meaningful effect on the personalization of YouTube (Banet-Weiser, 2017). Moreover, videos related to politics have an even more significant impact on personalization. Previous studies (Banks et. al., 2020; Celis et. al., 2019; Guerra et. al. 2013; Levy, 2020) suggested that personalization algorithms lead to polarization since the aim of these algorithms is to suggest new videos based on watched videos. Due to these reasons,

two different YouTube accounts were created in February the third and used on separate devices with different IP addresses.

Another notable issue is the geographical limitations. Even though the research topic centers entirely on the U.S., the research takes place in Vienna/Austria. Therefore, in case of any geographical limitations to the content on YouTube, devices are connected to the U.S. servers via a VPN.

Moreover, there are some limitations to exploratory quantitative content analysis since exploratory research is used regularly with qualitative studies. According to Krein (2012), exploratory research works better with qualitative methods because qualitative methods can focus on exceptions better. Therefore, both inductive and deductive strategies were adopted in the creation process of the codebook. Since the vast majority of framing analyses focus on written media (Crawley, 2007; Gan et. al., 2005; Rixon et. al., 2014) this study uses transcriptions<sup>36</sup> of the videos in addition to the audiovisual video content. Although Nassar (2020) analyzed cable news channels through the transcripts, examining the audiovisual content is essential also. Because exploring the full content enables an understanding of the concepts such as sarcasm.

Some previous studies focused whether on most popular media or most conservative and most liberal media (Famulari, 2020; Nassar, 2020; Ottoni et. al., 2018). However, after the contribution of the most popular right-wing political news channels on YouTube to Capitol unrest on January 6, 2021, these accounts were banned from all social media platforms, including YouTube. Therefore, a sampling method based on these qualifications would have created an unbalance within the samples. Due to this reason and due to the time limitation of this research, a random -systematic- sampling method was adopted.

## **6.6 Time Frame and Descriptive Data of the Research**

In the scope of the research four channels were sampled. In every channel 150 videos, in a total of 600 videos were watched and coded into the SPSS based on the codebook. Most of the videos were between 3 minutes to 15 minutes (65%). The number of published videos within every channel from the 11th of August until the 3rd of November was divided into 150. Thus, the researcher can perform a systematic random sampling model. The researcher focused on every third video in CNN, every 20th video in Fox News, every second video in daily

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<sup>36</sup> Automated transcription on YouTube and Google Doc

wire, and every fourth video in TYT. Thus, the researcher watched the videos from the 12th of July 2021 to the 10th of August 2021 every day approximately 3-5 hours. Moreover, non-election-related political events, such as the Presidential speech about Covid-19 was not within the analysis topics since this paper focus on frames used by various media and ideologies.

In the scope of the research, horse-race, human interest, issue, morality, sensationalism, politicians-as-individuals, crime, and security frames were searched through 600 YouTube videos (N=600). The sample of this data consisted of 25% right-wing YouTube news channel, 25% left wing YouTube news channel 25% right-wing cable news channel, and 25% left-wing cable news channel on YouTube (N=600).

Table 2: Exploring the Dataset

<b>Frames</b>	<b>N</b>	<b><math>\mu</math></b>	<b><math>\sigma</math></b>
Crime and Security Frame	600	2.29	1.203
Horse-Race Frame	600	2.92	1.528
Human Interest Frame	600	2.37	1.086
Issue Frame	600	2.91	1.038
Morality Frame	600	2.26	.708
Politicians-as-individuals Frame	600	2.57	1.417
Sensationalism Frame	600	2.67	1.332

Table 3: Frequency Analysis

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>N</b>
Crime and Security Frame	146	454	600
Horse-Race Frame	315	285	600
Human Interest Frame	176	424	600
Issue Frame	326	274	600
Morality Frame	120	480	600
Politicians-as-individuals Frame	319	281	600
Sensationalism Frame	262	328	600

## 7. Results

It is crucial to explore if the data set has a normal distribution, in other words, if it is representative of the population, before starting testing the hypotheses since the result of the distribution will determine the type of the hypotheses testing tests. For understanding, if the data set has a normal distribution or not, one looks at a couple of different qualifications. First of all, one should look at the histogram and detrended-normal plot to see random patterns, coefficient of the variations, values of skewness, kurtosis, and normal distribution values.

Table 4: Skewness and Kurtosis

Frames	Skewness	Kurtosis	$\mu$	$\sigma$	CV*
Crime and Security Frame	1.100	.275	2.29	1.203	.525
Horse-Race Frame	-1.488	2.67	2.92	1.528	.523
Human Interest Frame	.917	.118	2.37	1.086	.373
Issue Frame	.525	-.818	2.91	1.038	.388
Morality Frame	1.810	3.515	2.26	.708	.313
Politicians-as-individuals Frame	.199	-1.385	2.57	1.417	.551
Sensationalism Frame	-1.070	2.36	2.67	1.332	.498

\*CV= $\sigma/\mu$

According to Darren et. al. (2003), for a normal distribution in social sciences, skewness and kurtosis must be in the range of +1.5 and -1.5. Moreover, a CV must be >0.3. None of the frames does fit to normality standards of CV, Skewness, and Kurtosis.

Table 5: Normality of Distribution

Kolmogorov-Smirnov			
Frames	W	df	p
Crime and Security Frame	.347	600	.000
Horse-Race Frame	.189	600	.000
Human Interest Frame	.336	600	.000
Issue Frame	.389	600	.000
Morality Frame	.447	600	.000
Politicians-as-individuals Frame	.242	600	.000
Sensationalism Frame	.258	600	.000

If the  $n > 60$ , it is suggested to look at the values of Kolmogorov and Smirnov (Darren et. al., 2003). Since the  $n = 600$ , this paper considers the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test values. The requirement for a normal distribution within the data set is that the significance value must be higher than .05 ( $p > .05$ ). Thus,  $H_0$  can be rejected and normality can be found. Nevertheless,  $p < .05$  within every variable. Due to all these reasons, the dataset of this paper does not show normal distribution. Hence, the necessity of continuation with non-parametric tests.

## 7.1 Hypothesis 1

**H1:** When YouTube news channels share a video during the Presidential elections of 2020, they utilize more issue frame than cable news networks on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by YouTube news channels and cable news networks on YouTube.

Table 6: Mann-Whitney U Test for H1

Issue Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Cable news channels	2	300	28447.500	-8.257	.000	.337
YouTube news channels	3	300	73597.500	-8.257	.000	.337

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

Mann-Whitney U test was used to measure the difference between usage of issue frames by cable news networks on YouTube and YouTube news channels. The significance value shows ( $p < .0005$ ) that there is a scientifically significant difference. Thus, the  $H_0$  is rejected. According to Cohen (1988),  $r$  determines the effect size of the difference between the variables. While .1 shows a small effect size, .3 stands for medium effect size, and .5 refers to large effect size. The  $r$ -value ( $r > .3$ ) is higher than 3. Due to all these reasons, YouTube news channels apply moderately more issue frames than cable news channels during the Presidential election campaign in 2020. Thus, the **H1 is supported**.

## 7.2 Hypothesis 2

**H2:** When cable news channels on YouTube share a video during the Presidential elections of 2020, they use more horse-race frame than political news channels of YouTube.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by YouTube news channels and cable news networks on YouTube.

Table 7: Mann-Whitney U Test for H2

Horse-race Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Cable news outlets	4	300	17552.000	-13.238	.000	.540
YouTube news channels	2	300	62702.000	-13.238	.000	.540

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

Mann-Whitney U test shows a high significance with a large effect range ( $r < .5$ ) on a higher amount of usage of horse-race frames by cable news outlets during the Presidential election in 2020. Therefore, **H0 is rejected**, and **H2 is supported**.

## 7.3 Hypothesis 3

**H3:** When left-wing cable news outlets share a video on YouTube, they generate more human interest frame than right-wing cable news outlets during the Presidential elections 2020 in the U.S.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by left-wing cable news outlets and right-wing cable news outlets.

Table 8: Mann-Whitney U Test for H3

Human interest Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Left-wing cable news outlets	2	150	7975.000	-5.074	.000	.292
Right-wing cable news outlets	2	150	7975.000	-5.074	.000	.292

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

Mann-Whitney U test shows significance ( $p = < .0005$ ). Thus, the  $H_0$  is rejected. However, the  $r$ -value shows only a limited range of effect ( $r = < .1$ ). Therefore, left-wing cable news outlets use more human interest frames than right-wing cable news outlets during the election time 2020, nevertheless with a narrow difference range. Thus, the **H3 is supported**.

#### 7.4 Hypothesis 4

**H4:** When right-wing cable news outlets share videos on YouTube, they utilize more crime and security frame than left-wing cable news outlets on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential elections in 2020.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by left-wing cable news outlets and right-wing cable news outlets.

Table 9: Mann-Whitney U Test for H4

Crime and Security Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Left-wing cable news outlets	2	150	7032.500	-7.223	.000	.417
Right-wing cable news outlets	2	150	7032.500	-7.223	.000	.417

\* $r = z / \sqrt{N}$

Mann-Whitney U test found significance ( $p = < .0005$ ). Therefore, the  $H_0$  is rejected. Moreover, the  $r$ -value shows a medium range of effect ( $r = < .3$ ). Therefore, right-wing cable news outlets use more crime and security frames than right-wing cable news outlets during the election time 2020, nevertheless with a medium difference range. Thus, the **H4 is supported**.

#### 7.5 Hypothesis 5

**H5:** When right-wing YouTube news channels share videos on YouTube, they apply more sensationalism frame than left-wing YouTube news channels during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by left-wing YouTube news channels and right-wing YouTube news channels.

Table 10: Mann-Whitney U Test for H5

Sensationalism Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Left-wing YouTube news channels	2	150	1743.000	-12.979	.000	.749
Right-wing YouTube news channels	4	150	1743.000	-12.979	.000	.749

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

Mann-Whitney U test shows a high significance value with a high effect range ( $r < .5$ ). Thus, it is possible to say that right-wing YouTube news channels use significantly more sensationalism-frame during the Presidential election in 2020. Therefore, **H0 is rejected**, and **H5 is supported**.

### 7.6 Hypothesis 6

**H6:** Left-wing YouTube news channels utilize more human-interest frame than right-wing YouTube news channels.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by left-wing YouTube news channels and right-wing YouTube news channels.

Table 11: Mann-Whitney U Test for H6

Human interest Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Left-wing YouTube news channels	3	150	3353.500	-11.069	.000	.639
Right-wing YouTube news channels	1.5	150	3353.500	-11.069	.000	.639

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

Mann-Whitney U test results show that there is a significant difference ( $r > .0005$ ). Therefore, the **H0 is rejected**. Since the r-value is  $> 3$ , left-wing YouTube news channels utilize significantly more human interest frames than right-wing Youtube new channels. Thus, **H6 is supported**.



### 7.7 Hypothesis 7

**H7:** When right-wing news channels on YouTube share videos they use more sensationalism frame than news by right-wing cable outlets during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by right-wing YouTube news channels and right-wing cable news outlets.

Table 12: Mann-Whitney U Test for H7

Sensationalism Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Right-wing YouTube news channels	4	150	4926.500	-8.710	.000	.502
Right-wing cable news outlets	2	150	4926.500	-8.710	.000	.502

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

According to the result of the Mann-Whitney U test, right-wing YouTube news channels use significantly ( $p < .0005$ ) more sensationalism-frame in comparison to right-wing cable news outlets during the Presidential election 2020. Thus, **H6 is supported**.

### 7.8 Hypothesis 8

**H8:** When left-wing YouTube news channels share a video, they generate more morality frame than left-wing cable news outlets on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.

**H0:** There will be no difference among the frames used by left-wing YouTube news channels and left-wing cable news outlets.

Table 13: Mann-Whitney U Test for H8

Morality Frame						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Left-wing YouTube news channels	2	150	10569.500	-1.299	.194	.609
Left-wing cable news outlets	2	150	10569.500	-1.299	.194	.609

$$*r = z / \sqrt{N}$$

According to the Mann-Whitney U test results, there is no scientifically significant difference ( $p < .05$ ) between left-wing YouTube news channels and left-wing cable news outlets when it

comes to usage of morality frame during the Presidential election in 2020. Thus, **H0 is supported**, and **H8 is not supported**.

### 7.9 Research Question 6

Politicians-as-individuals frame is not a framing concept suggested by hypotheses of this research but it is added to explore the frame within the context of various ideologies and origin of media during the Presidential election 2020 of the U.S.

Table 14: Descriptive Results of Politicians-as-individuals Frame

Name of the channel	Mdn	none	negative	positive	both	N
CNN (L)	4	29.3%	40%	9.3%	20.7%	150
Fox News (R)	2	58%	13.3%	9.3%	19.3%	150
The Daily Wire (R)	1	58.7%	32%	3.3%	8%	150
The Young Turks (L)	3	39.3%	30%	16%	14.7%	150

According to this table, CNN used the highest range of politicians-as-individuals frame followed by another left-wing media organization TYT. Moreover, CNN utilize the frame the most within a negative context. On the other hand, right-wing organizations did not use the politicians-as-individuals frames as heavy as left-wing media.

Table 15: Mann-Whitney U Test for RQ6

Politicians-as-individuals						
Type of the channel	Mdn	n	U	z	p	r*
Left-wing channels	3.5	300	28256.000	-8.205	.000	.335
Right-wing channels	1.5	300	28256.000	-8.205	.000	.335

\* $r = z / \sqrt{N}$

According to Mann-Whitney U test results and its significance value ( $p = >.0005$ ), it is possible to say that left-wing news channels regardless of their origin of media utilize more -negative-politicians-as-individuals frame than right-wing news channels during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S. This situation can be explained by the dislike, disproof toward the former elected President and the candidate of the Republican Party: Donald J. Trump.

## 8. Conclusion

Web 2.0 allowed a two-way communication model, which formed the necessary conditions for two-way communication based networks such as social media. Social media is today a megatrend that has changed every aspect of our lives. These two-way communication-based new media encourage their users to generate content since social media networks depend mainly on user-generated content. As previous studies (Dixon et. al., 2014; Gil de Zuniga et. al., 2017; Pew Research, 2021; Ramasubramanian et. al., 2017) emphasize that despite the changing demographics of the U.S., there has been a significant lack of representation or misrepresentation of minority groups and their issues in the mainstream media.

Moreover, regardless of their race, extremist and marginal groups are excluded from the mainstream media (Askanius et. al., 2011; Lewis, 2019). Therefore, members of these groups started to create medial content for social media. Within a short period of time, social media became an alternative to traditional media. YouTube is one of the first social media platforms that rely on content generated by its users. The platform evolved from a space of unprofessional, short videos to a network that competes and complements Television.

Furthermore, the platform evolved into a space for political communication in 2008 during the Presidential election (Bimber, 2014; May, 2010). Since then, a growing number of mainstream media critics have started to create political news channels on YouTube, which have similar program formats and flows as cable news networks, and increasing numbers of people have begun informing themselves on YouTube. Although YouTube news channels essentially criticize the content but mimic the program format, flow, and setting of cable news networks (May, 2010), and framing analysis is a common research concept during the Presidential elections on TV (DellaVigna et. al., 2007; Famulari, 2020; Hyun et. al., 2016; Nassar, 2020 Strömbäck et. al., 2008), no research investigates and compares frames used by liberal and conservative YouTube news channels and cable news networks during the Presidential election 2020.

Therefore, this study focused on differences in usage of frames by liberal and conservative YouTube news channels and cable news networks. Furthermore, it drew on framing, complementary, medium, and political discourse theories to explain why liberals and conservatives might use different sets of frames and the medium of origin might affect the content. This paper's main research question is " what are the differences in application of various frames

in videos of YouTube news channels and cable news outlets' YouTube accounts during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.?

The main aim of this study was to find different usage of frames between various ideology and media. Furthermore, the hypotheses were based on previous research results. Therefore, the principal method of this paper was quantitative content analysis. Nevertheless, due to the lack of previous research on this specific topic, an explorative approach was adopted as an addition to quantitative content analysis. First, the researcher created the categories and subcategories of the frames based on previous research. Then, she used a semi-automated text-mining strategy to explore the frames in-depth within the research population. Through this method, the categories, their key concepts, and words were expanded.

After training the YouTube algorithms for four months, personalization of YouTube is used to sample channels randomly. A liberal cable news channel: CNN, a liberal YouTube news channel: TYT, a conservative cable news channel: Fox News, and a conservative YouTube news channel: TDW were selected. Through systematic random sampling, the researcher watched 150 videos of each channel for approximately a month and coded them into SPSS.

The most essential finding of this research is that there is a statistically significant difference between the usage of frames by liberal and conservative YouTube news channels and cable news channels. The central hypothesis of this research is "when YouTube news channels share a video during the Presidential elections of 2020, they utilize more issue frames than cable news networks on YouTube during the U.S. Presidential election in 2020.". As Borah et. al. (2018) and Lewis (2019) suggested, cable news channels do not talk about issues often and YouTube news channels highlighted the issues statistically significantly more than cable news channels. Thus, the H1 is supported.

As Groshek et al. (2013) and Strömbäck et. al. (2006; 2008) proposed, cable news channels focus on horse-race framing while YouTubers use significantly less horse-race framing. Therefore, the H2 is supported. Moreover, as Famulari f(2020) found, the left-wing cable news channels use a statistically more human-interest frame than right-wing cable news outlets. Hence, the H3 is supported. The findings of this research for the H4 support the research findings of Nassar (2020). Right-wing cable news outlets use significantly more crime and security frames than left-wing cable news networks. Therefore, H4 is supported.

Findings for the H5 reflect the research results of Ottoni et. al. (2018). Right-wing YouTube news channels utilize a more sensationalism-frame than left-wing YouTube news channels. Consequently, H5 is supported. Furthermore, as Lewis (2019) suggested, left-wing YouTube news channels use predominantly human interest frames. Additionally, they utilize a statistically more human interest frame than right-wing YouTube news channels. Thus, the H6 is supported. Findings for the H7 show a linkage to the research results by Strömbäck et. al. (2008) and Ottoni et. al. (2018). Right-wing YouTube news channels use a more sensationalism-frame than right-wing cable news channels. Therefore, H7 is supported.

On the other hand, no statistically significant difference within the morality frame was found between the left-wing YouTube news channels and left-wing cable news channels. Moreover, right-wing YouTube channels used significantly more morality frames than any other channel. The main reason for this is that left-wing channels highlighted the human aspect of the issues more than the moral aspect. Moreover, the morality frame included cultural and religious values. Right-wing YouTube news channels focus on cultural and religious aspects of the issues to emphasize the importance of American tradition. Politicians-as-individuals frame was added to the codebook for explorative reasons since no previous study had enough evidence to formulate a theory and research-based hypothesis. Findings have shown that left-wing channels utilize statistically significantly more politicians-as-individuals frame than right-wing channels, regardless of their origin of media. Moreover, they use this dominantly more in a negative context since the former President and nominee of the Republican Party; Trump is frequently criticized for his character and action.

There were some limitations to this research. This research use personalization of YouTube for sampling its example group. Therefore, one liberal and one conservative account were created. However, YouTube algorithms use various information of its user to personalize content, including the IP address, and therefore the location of the user. Since the researcher of this paper does not locate in the U.S., she uses a premium VPN service to sign different locations to two accounts in the U.S. Another essential limitation was that most popular right-wing YouTube news channels are banned from the platform after the Capitol unrest in January 2021. Therefore, unlike the previous studies, the random sampling strategy was adopted.

Even though with one exception, all hypotheses of this research are supported, it is crucial to emphasize that the dataset of this study does not have a normal distribution, and therefore, the hypotheses were tested through non-parametric tests. Hunter & May (1993) point out that non-parametric tests have less likelihood to reject the H0. Moreover, due to the limitation of the number of researchers, this study could only examine one channel from each group. In

empirical studies, a larger example group offers a higher chance for the normal distribution. Thus, parametric tests can be run. Therefore, future studies can focus on the same topic with a larger example group. Thus, the hypotheses can be tested through parametric tests and results can be representative of the whole population. Moreover, future studies can focus on the same topic for the next U.S. elections to understand to which extent the media's way of using frames was affected by the extreme dislike, disapproval by liberals, and love and affection by conservatives for Donald J. Trump.

This study is one of the first studies that use the personalization of YouTube for sampling strategy. Moreover, it is the first study that compared frames used in liberal and conservative YouTube news channels to cable news channels during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.

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## Appendix

### A. Codebook

Question	Concepts		Scale	Scale Ranges
What is the name of the channel?		Illegal, immigrants, refugees, Hispanic, Black, crime, <i>burning</i> , <i>looting</i>	Nominal	1. CNN 2. Fox News 3. The Daily Wire 4. The Young Turks
What is the type of the channel?			Nominal	1. Cable news 2. YouTube news
What is the ideology of the channel?			Nominal	1. Left-wing 2. Right-wing
What is the ideology of the cable news network?			Nominal	1. Left-wing 2. Right-wing
What is the ideology of the YouTube news channel?			Nominal	1. Left-wing 2. Right-wing
What is the type of the left-wing channel?			Nominal	1. Cable news 2. YouTube news
What is the type of the right-wing channel?			Nominal	1. Cable news 2. YouTube news
When did the video get published?			Nominal	1. August 2. September 3. October 4. November
What is the duration of the video?			Ordinal	1. Less than five minutes 2. 5-10 minutes 3. 10.1-15 minutes 4. 15.1-20 minutes 5. More than 20 minutes
How many views did the video receive?			Ordinal	1. 1-149.999 2. 150.000-299.999 3. 300.000-449.999 4. 450.000-600.000 5. More than 500.000
How many likes did the video receive?			Ordinal	0. No information 1. 1-1499 2. 1500-2999 3. 3000-4499 4. 4500-6000 5. More than 6000

How many dislikes did the video receive?			Ordinal	0.No information 1. 1-1499 2. 1500-2999 3. 3000-4499 4. 4500-6000 5. More than 6000
How many comments did the video receive?			Ordinal	0.No information 1. 1-1499 2. 1500-2999 3. 3000-4499 4. 4500-6000 5. More than 6000
Is there a crime and security frame?	linking certain groups to national or international threats and claiming that these groups will/does commit crime and they will create disorder (Nassar, 2020)	Illegal, immigrants, refugees, Hispanic, Black, crime, burning, looting	Nominal	1.No 2. Yes
To which extent is there a crime and security frame?			Likert-scale	1.opposite 2. None 3. One time mentioned 4. Two-three times mentioned 5. More than three times**
Is there a horse-race frame?	media coverage on the campaign performance, makes predictions of the election results, mentions the party or individual strategy, and mentions the strengths of a candidate, such as financial, organizational, characteristic	Winning, Covid-19, Corona, economy	Nominal	1.No 2. Yes
What is the context of the horse-race frame?			Nominal	1.None 2. Negative 3. Positive 4. Both negative and positive

Is there a politicians-as-individuals frame?			Nominal	1.No 2. Yes
What is the context of the politicians-as-individuals frame?	Strömbäck et. al. (2006) point out that the politicians-as-individuals frame is applied when a “news story focused on politicians as persons with different attributes, characters, and behaviors rather than as spokespersons for certain policies” (p. 138).	Kamala Harris as a first black and woman nominee for the vice presidency, Donald Trump as an incompetent politician, Donald Trump as a relatively young and dynamic leader, Joe Biden as the oldest nominee for presidency, Joe Biden as a supporter of minorities, etc.	Nominal	1.None 2. Negative 3. Positive 4. Both negative and positive
To which extent is there a politicians-as-individuals frame?			Likert-scale	1.opposite 2. None 3. One time mentioned 4. Two-three times mentioned 5. More than three times
Is there a human interest frame?	“generating feelings of empathy, concern, sympathy, compassion or outrage” (Gan et. al., 2005, p. 462).	Racial injustice, inequality, women, African-American, Asian, police brutality, women rights, gay rights, abortion rights, equality	Nominal	1.No 2. Yes
To which extent is there a human interest frame?			Likert-scale	1.opposite 2. None 3. One time mentioned 4. Two-three times mentioned 5. More than three times

Is there an issue frame?	specific issue concerning the US or world, in the general presentation of issues on a specific topic.	irregular illegal immigrants, mis-handling the Covid-19 crises, students loans, inequality between races, ballots, absentee votes, mail votes	Nominal	1.No 2. Yes
To which extent is there an issue frame?*			Likert-scale	1.opposite 2. None 3. One time mentioned 4. Two-three times mentioned 5. More than three times
Is there a morality frame?	normative messages, religious and cultural principles, American values (Famulari, 2020; Semetko, 2000). protecting the freedom, democracy, or being Christian and accepting refugees, etc.	Sexualizing children, Christian moms, leading to election fraud, immorality of LGBTQ,	Nominal	1.No 2. Yes
To which extent is there a morality frame?			Likert-scale	1.opposite 2. None 3. One time mentioned 4. Two-three times mentioned 5. More than three times
Is there a sensationalism frame?	is "related to the "breathlessness" quality of a news story" (Strömbäck, 2006, p. 138).	"bombing, nato, torture, terrorism, ebola, gamma, radiation, biological and chemical warfare" (Ottoni, et. al. 2018, p. 327). Election fraud, riot.	Nominal	1.No 2. Yes

To which extent is there a sensationalism frame?			Likert-scale	1.opposite 2. None 3. One time mentioned 4. Two-three times mentioned 5. More than three times
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*\*Extents of the frames are coded based on the fully watched video rather than sequences of it.*

**\*\*All scales are categorized and standardized for the consistency of the coding procedure.**

## B. SPSS Outputs

### Crosstabs: Frequency Analyses

Anzahl

		Existence of the politicians as individuals frame		Gesamt
		No	Yes	
Name of the channel	CNN	46	104	150
	Fox_News	87	63	150
	The_Daily_Wire	88	62	150
	TYT	60	90	150
Gesamt		281	319	600

### Name of the channel \* Existence of the sensationalism frame Kreuztabelle

Anzahl

		Existence of the sensationalism frame		Gesamt
		No	Yes	
Name of the channel	CNN	123	27	150
	Fox_News	78	72	150
	The_Daily_Wire	16	134	150
	TYT	121	29	150
Gesamt		338	262	600



**Name of the channel \* Existence of the human interest frame  
Kreuztabelle**

Anzahl

		Existence of the human interest frame		Gesamt
		No	Yes	
Name of the channel	CNN	98	52	150
	Fox_News	123	27	150
	The_Daily_Wire	135	15	150
	TYT	68	82	150
Gesamt		424	176	600

**Name of the channel \* Existence of the horse-race frame  
Kreuztabelle**

Anzahl

		Existence of the horse-race frame		Gesamt
		No	Yes	
Name of the channel	CNN	43	107	150
	Fox_News	36	114	150
	The_Daily_Wire	107	43	150
	TYT	99	51	150
Gesamt		285	315	600

**Name of the channel \* Existence of the issue frame Kreuztabelle**

Anzahl

		Existence of the issue frame		Gesamt
		No	Yes	
Name of the channel	CNN	79	71	150
	Fox_News	101	49	150
	The_Daily_Wire	74	76	150
	TYT	20	130	150
Gesamt		274	326	600

		Existence of the crime and security frame		Gesamt
		No	Yes	
Name of the channel	CNN	144	6	150
	Fox_News	93	57	150
	The_Daily_Wire	77	73	150
	TYT	140	10	150
Gesamt		454	146	600

## Reliability Test for Crime and Security Frame

### Korrelationen

Korrelationen		T1 Crime	T2 Crime
T1 Crime	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	,983**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T2 Crime	Korrelation nach Pearson	,983**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Reliability Test for Horse-Race Frame

### Korrelationen

Korrelationen		T1 Horse-race	T2 Horse-Race
T1 Horse-race	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	,981**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T2 Horse-Race	Korrelation nach Pearson	,981**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Reliability Test for Human-Interest Frame

### Korrelationen

Korrelationen		T1_Human	T2_Human
T1_Human	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	1,000**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T2_Human	Korrelation nach Pearson	1,000**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Reliability Test for Issue Frame

### Korrelationen

Korrelationen		T1 Issue	T2 Issue
T1 Issue	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	,965**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T2 Issue	Korrelation nach Pearson	,965**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Reliability Test for Politicians-as-individuals Frame

## Korrelationen

Korrelationen			
		T2_Politicians	T1_Politicians
T2_Politicians	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	,971**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T1_Politicians	Korrelation nach Pearson	,971**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Reliability Test for Morality Frame

### Korrelationen

Korrelationen			
		T1 Morality	T2 Morality
T1 Morality	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	,984**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T2 Morality	Korrelation nach Pearson	,984**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Reliability Test for Sensationalism Frame

### Korrelationen

Korrelationen			
		T2 Sensationalism	T1 Sensationalism
T2 Sensationalism	Korrelation nach Pearson	1	,973**
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)		,000
	N	40	40
T1 Sensationalism	Korrelation nach Pearson	,973**	1
	Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000	
	N	40	40

\*\* Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.

## Normality Test

### Deskriptive Statistik

			Statistik	Standard Fehler
Extent of the horse-race frame	Mittelwert		2,92	,062
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,79	
		Obergrenze	3,04	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,91	
	Median		3,00	
	Varianz		2,335	
	Standard Abweichung		1,528	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		3	
	Schiefe		,082	,100
	Kurtosis		-1,498	,199
Extent of the sensationalism frame	Mittelwert		2,67	,054
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,57	
		Obergrenze	2,78	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,64	
	Median		2,00	
	Varianz		1,773	
	Standard Abweichung		1,332	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		2	
	Schiefe		,427	,100
	Kurtosis		-1,070	,199
Extent of the morality frame	Mittelwert		2,26	,029
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,21	
		Obergrenze	2,32	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,21	
	Median		2,00	
	Varianz		,501	
	Standard Abweichung		,708	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		0	
	Schiefe		1,810	,100
	Kurtosis		3,515	,199
Extent of the issue frame	Mittelwert		2,91	,042
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,83	
		Obergrenze	2,99	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,87	
	Median		3,00	
	Varianz		1,078	
	Standard Abweichung		1,038	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		2	
	Schiefe		,525	,100
	Kurtosis		-,818	,199

Extent of the politicians as individuals frame	Mittelwert		2,57	,058
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,45	
		Obergrenze	2,68	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,52	
	Median		3,00	
	Varianz		2,009	
	Standard Abweichung		1,417	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		3	
	Schiefte		,199	,100
	Kurtosis		-1,385	,199
Extent of the human interest frame	Mittelwert		2,37	,044
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,28	
		Obergrenze	2,46	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,30	
	Median		2,00	
	Varianz		1,179	
	Standard Abweichung		1,086	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		1	
	Schiefte		,917	,100
	Kurtosis		,118	,199
Extent of the crime and security frame	Mittelwert		2,29	,049
	95% Konfidenzintervall des Mittelwerts	Untergrenze	2,19	
		Obergrenze	2,39	
	5% getrimmtes Mittel		2,21	
	Median		2,00	
	Varianz		1,448	
	Standard Abweichung		1,203	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		5	
	Spannweite		4	
	Interquartilbereich		0	
	Schiefte		1,100	,100
	Kurtosis		,275	,199

#### Tests auf Normalverteilung

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov <sup>a</sup>			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistik	df	Signifikanz	Statistik	df	Signifikanz
Extent of the horse-race frame	,189	600	,000	,856	600	,000
Extent of the sensationalism frame	,258	600	,000	,871	600	,000
Extent of the morality frame	,447	600	,000	,614	600	,000
Extent of the issue frame	,269	600	,000	,846	600	,000
Extent of the politicians as individuals frame	,242	600	,000	,843	600	,000
Extent of the human interest frame	,336	600	,000	,821	600	,000
Extent of the crime and security frame	,347	600	,000	,784	600	,000

a. Signifikanzkorrektur nach Lilliefors

#### Mann-Whitney U Test for H1

## Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Type of the channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the issue frame	Cable_News_Network	300	245,33	73597,50
	YouTube_News	300	355,68	106702,50
	Gesamt	600		

### Statistik für Test<sup>a</sup>

	Extent of the issue frame
Mann-Whitney-U	28447,500
Wilcoxon-W	73597,500
Z	-8,257
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable: Type of the channel

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H2

### Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Type of the channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the horse-race frame	Cable_News_Network	300	391,99	117598,00
	YouTube_News	300	209,01	62702,00
	Gesamt	600		

### Statistik für Test<sup>a</sup>

	Extent of the horse-race frame
Mann-Whitney-U	17552,000
Wilcoxon-W	62702,000
Z	-13,238
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable: Type of the channel

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H3

### Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Ideology_of_the_cable_news_network	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the human interest frame	Left-wing	150	172,33	25850,00
	Right-wing	150	128,67	19300,00
	Gesamt	300		

### Statistik für Test<sup>a</sup>

	Extent of the human interest frame
Mann-Whitney-U	7975,000
Wilcoxon-W	19300,000
Z	-5,074
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable: Ideology\_of\_the\_cable\_news\_network

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H4

## Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Ideology_of_the_cable_news_network	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the crime and security frame	Left-wing	150	122,38	18357,50
	Right-wing	150	178,62	26792,50
	Gesamt	300		

Statistik für Test <sup>a</sup>	
	Extent of the crime and security frame
Mann-Whitney-U	7032,500
Wilcoxon-W	18357,500
Z	-7,223
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable:  
Ideology\_of\_the\_cable\_news\_network

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H5

## Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Ideology_of_the_YouTube_channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the sensationalism frame	Left-wing	150	87,12	13068,00
	Right-wing	151	214,46	32383,00
	Gesamt	301		

Statistik für Test <sup>a</sup>	
	Extent of the sensationalism frame
Mann-Whitney-U	1743,000
Wilcoxon-W	13068,000
Z	-12,979
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable:  
Ideology\_of\_the\_YouTube\_channel

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H6

## Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Ideology_of_the_YouTube_channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the human interest frame	Left-wing	150	203,14	30471,50
	Right-wing	150	97,86	14678,50
	Gesamt	300		

Statistik für Test <sup>a</sup>	
	Extent of the human interest frame
Mann-Whitney-U	3353,500
Wilcoxon-W	14678,500
Z	-11,069
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable:  
Ideology\_of\_the\_YouTube\_channel

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H7

### Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Type_of_the_right_wing_channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the sensationalism frame	Cable News	150	108,34	16251,50
	YouTube	150	192,66	28898,50
	Gesamt	300		

#### Statistik für Test<sup>a</sup>

	Extent of the sensationalism frame
Mann-Whitney-U	4926,500
Wilcoxon-W	16251,500
Z	-8,710
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable:  
Type\_of\_the\_right\_wing\_channel

## Mann-Whitney U Test for H8

### Mann-Whitney-Test

Ränge				
	Type_of_the_left_wing_channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the morality frame	Cable News	150	145,96	21894,50
	YouTube	150	155,04	23255,50
	Gesamt	300		

#### Statistik für Test<sup>a</sup>

	Extent of the morality frame
Mann-Whitney-U	10569,500
Wilcoxon-W	21894,500
Z	-1,299
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,194

a. Gruppenvariable:  
Type\_of\_the\_left\_wing\_channel



## Exploring the politicians-as-individuals frame

### Kruskal-Wallis-Test

Ränge			
	Name of the channel	N	Mittlerer Rang
Extent of the politicians as individuals frame	CNN	150	379,91
	Fox_News	150	250,86
	The_Daily_Wire	150	238,52
	TYT	150	332,72
	Gesamt	600	

### Statistik für Test<sup>a,b</sup>

	Extent of the politicians as individuals frame
Kruskal-Wallis H	73,748
df	3
Asymptotische Signifikanz	,000

a. Kruskal-Wallis-Test

b. Gruppenvariable: Name of the channel

### Häufigkeiten

Statistiken			
	Name of the channel	Type of the politicians as individuals frame	
N	Gültig	600	600
	Fehlend	0	0
Mittelwert		2,50	1,94

### Häufigkeitstabelle

Name of the channel					
		Häufigkeit	Prozent	Gültige Prozente	Kumulierte Prozente
Gültig	CNN	150	25,0	25,0	25,0
	Fox_News	150	25,0	25,0	50,0
	The_Daily_Wire	150	25,0	25,0	75,0
	TYT	150	25,0	25,0	100,0
	Gesamt	600	100,0	100,0	

Type of the politicians as individuals frame					
		Häufigkeit	Prozent	Gültige Prozente	Kumulierte Prozente
Gültig	None	278	46,3	46,3	46,3
	Negative	173	28,8	28,8	75,2
	Positive	58	9,7	9,7	84,8
	Both	91	15,2	15,2	100,0
	Gesamt	600	100,0	100,0	

Name of the channel			Type of the politicians as individuals frame				Gesamt
			None	Negative	Positive	Both	
CNN	CNN	Anzahl	44	60	15	31	150
		% innerhalb von Name of the channel	29,3%	40,0%	10,0%	20,7%	100,0%
		% innerhalb von Type of the politicians as individuals frame	15,8%	34,7%	25,9%	34,1%	25,0%
		% der Gesamtzahl	7,3%	10,0%	2,5%	5,2%	25,0%
	Fox_News	Anzahl	87	20	14	29	150
		% innerhalb von Name of the channel	58,0%	13,3%	9,3%	19,3%	100,0%
		% innerhalb von Type of the politicians as individuals frame	31,3%	11,6%	24,1%	31,9%	25,0%
		% der Gesamtzahl	14,5%	3,3%	2,3%	4,8%	25,0%
	The_Daily_Wire	Anzahl	88	48	5	9	150
		% innerhalb von Name of the channel	58,7%	32,0%	3,3%	6,0%	100,0%
		% innerhalb von Type of the politicians as individuals frame	31,7%	27,7%	8,6%	9,9%	25,0%
		% der Gesamtzahl	14,7%	8,0%	0,8%	1,5%	25,0%
	TYT	Anzahl	59	45	24	22	150
		% innerhalb von Name of the channel	39,3%	30,0%	16,0%	14,7%	100,0%
		% innerhalb von Type of the politicians as individuals frame	21,2%	26,0%	41,4%	24,2%	25,0%
		% der Gesamtzahl	9,8%	7,5%	4,0%	3,7%	25,0%
Gesamt		Anzahl	278	173	58	91	600
		% innerhalb von Name of the channel	46,3%	28,8%	9,7%	15,2%	100,0%
		% innerhalb von Type of the politicians as individuals frame	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% der Gesamtzahl	46,3%	28,8%	9,7%	15,2%	100,0%

### Chi-Quadrat-Tests

	Wert	df	Asymptotisch e Signifikanz (zweiseitig)
Chi-Quadrat nach Pearson	65,378 <sup>a</sup>	9	,000
Likelihood-Quotient	71,734	9	,000
Zusammenhang linear- mit-linear	4,260	1	,039
Anzahl der gültigen Fälle	600		

a. 0 Zellen (,0%) haben eine erwartete Häufigkeit kleiner 5. Die minimale erwartete Häufigkeit ist 14,50.

### Mann-Whitney-Test

#### Ränge

	Ideology of the channel	N	Mittlerer Rang	Rangsumme
Extent of the politicians as individuals frame	Liberal	300	356,31	106894,00
	Conservative	300	244,69	73406,00
	Gesamt	600		

#### Statistik für Test<sup>a</sup>

	Extent of the politicians as individuals frame
Mann-Whitney-U	28256,000
Wilcoxon-W	73406,000
Z	-8,205
Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig)	,000

a. Gruppenvariable: Ideology of the channel

### C. Abstract in English and German

#### *English*

Cable news networks are traditionally used media for political communication in the U.S. Nevertheless, due to the lack of representation of certain minority groups, and with the help of Web 2.0, the trends for the medium of political communication are switching from Television to YouTube news. Therefore, besides YouTube news, every major cable news network in the U.S. has an active YouTube account. Previous research shows that framing is one of the most utilized communication strategies during election time. Nonetheless, there is a research gap about frames used by YouTube and cable news. Therefore, this study analyzes the used frames by right and left-wing YouTube and cable news videos on YouTube during the Presidential election 2020 in the U.S.

Additionally, it draws on framing, complementary, medium, and political discourse theory for explaining the different usage of frames within distinct ideologies and the origin of the medium. This study examines the issue, horse race, morality, sensationalism, human interest, politicians-as-individuals, crime, and security frames on YouTube and cable news channels on YouTube. It adopts quantitative content analysis to test its hypotheses while using an inductive explorative approach for politicians-as-individuals frame since no study examined this frame within the same context. The simple random sampling method is used with the help of the personalization of YouTube. For this process, two YouTube accounts were created to stage two personas from two distinct ideologies. The findings of this paper support this paper's first seven hypotheses. YouTube news channels use more issue framing than cable news networks, cable news network utilize more horse-race frame than Youtuber news. Moreover, left-wing YouTube news applies the highest number of human interest frames followed by left-wing cable news channels, while right-wing YouTube news utilizes the highest amount of sensationalism, crime, and security frames followed by right-wing cable news outlets.

#### *German*

Kabelnachrichtennetzwerke sind in den USA traditionell das meistgenutzte Medium für die politische Kommunikation. Aufgrund der fehlenden Vertretung bestimmter Minderheitengruppen und mit Hilfe des Web 2.0 wandeln sich die Trends für das Medium der politischen Kommunikation jedoch vom Fernsehen zu YouTube-Nachrichten. Daher haben neben YouTube News alle großen Kabelnachrichtensender in den USA ein aktives YouTube-Konto. Frühere Forschungen haben gezeigt, dass Framing eine der am häufigsten verwendeten Kommuni-

kationsstrategien während der Wahlzeit ist. Dennoch gibt es eine Forschungslücke zu Frames, die von YouTube und Kabelnachrichten verwendet werden. Daher analysiert diese Studie die verwendeten Frames von rechten und linken YouTube- und Kabelnachrichtenvideos auf YouTube während der Präsidentschaftswahl 2020 in den USA.

Darüber hinaus stützt es sich auf die Framing-, Komplementaritäts-, Medien- und politische Diskurstheorie, um die unterschiedliche Verwendung von Frames innerhalb verschiedener Ideologien und den Ursprung des Mediums zu erklären. Diese Studie untersucht das Thema, Issue, Horse-race, Moralitäts-, Sensationsgier, menschliches Interesse, Politiker-als-Individuen, Kriminalität und Sicherheitsframes auf YouTube und Kabelnachrichtenkanälen auf YouTube. Dieses Papier verwendet quantitative Inhaltsanalyse, um die Hypothesen zu testen, während es einen induktiv explorativen Ansatz für Politiker-als-individuellen Frame verwendet, da keine Studie dieses Frame im selben Kontext untersucht hat. Mit Hilfe der Personalisierung von YouTube wird das einfache Stichprobenverfahren verwendet. Für diesen Prozess wurden zwei YouTube-Konten erstellt, um zwei Personas aus zwei unterschiedlichen Ideologien zu inszenieren. Die Ergebnisse dieses Papiers stützen die ersten sieben Hypothesen dieses Papiers. YouTube Nachrichtenkanäle verwenden mehr Issue-Framing als Kabel-Nachrichtennetzwerke, Kabel-Nachrichtennetzwerke verwenden mehr Horse-race-Frames als Youtube Nachrichtenkanäle. Darüber hinaus verwenden linke YouTube-Nachrichten die meisten Frames mit menschlichem Interesse, gefolgt von linken Kabelnachrichtenkanälen, während rechte YouTube-Nachrichten die höchste Menge an Sensations-, Kriminalitäts- und Sicherheitsframes verwenden, gefolgt von rechten Kabelnachrichten Nachrichtenagenturen.