Abstract (eng)
The Husserlian „Turn“ of the Transcendental Deduction follows the way how Husserl elaborates the monistic method of reduction vis-à-vis to The Deduction of Pure Concepts of The Understanding in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and at the same time in connection to the Brentanoian idea of intentionality.
Kant can separate categories and intuitions (Anschauung) only at the price of a formalistic, non evident, subjectivistic charactered a priori, not being capable to grasp what Kant himself called the synthesis of categories and intuitions as a transcendental foundation of knowledge which leads to a dualism not being capable to answer the wrong question of how to bring together the separate.
Husserl answers to this problem with the method of reduction, first as a Cartesian, that is dualistic one, later on, after his transcendental turn, as an intentional-psychological and last but not least as an ontological one, which goes through the universal ontology of what Husserl called “life-world”. What the late Husserlian notion of life-world first makes clear, is that the world is in opposition to the objective and Cartesian notion of the natural world not to deny, not to bracket, but the unavoidable presupposition of life. Life-world includes a system of categories on the basis of which anything appearing to the subject is present as meaningful. Only on the way of the ontological reduction Husserl succeeds to come to the undeniable life-world, which we live in and through which he comes to the universal correlation (a priori) of (inter)subjectivity as such. Only on the way of the ontological reduction can phenomenology show its monism of the correlation a priori between the constituted objects in the world, the constituted (inter)subjectivity and the constituting, absolute (inter)subjectivity.