Abstract (eng)
One of the most heated debates of recent years in modern international law has been the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, which has been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and the Sixth Committee since 2009, after a group of African States voiced complaints that it was being used selectively and politically abused. However, Africa’s grave concern regarding the applicability of the principle of universal jurisdiction does not pertain to what is actually being done by the international community. Universal jurisdiction began as a modest and rather narrow doctrine, which was applicable only to the crime of piracy, but has developed along with the international legal order and as new challenges arose in international law.
Under the principle of universality, any State may exercise jurisdiction without the criminal conduct having any nexus to the prosecuting State. Doctrinally the rationale for universal jurisdiction is based on the idea that certain crimes are so serious that they affect the international community as a whole, are universally condemned and harmful to international interests, with the result that States can take appropriate action against the perpetrators. The practical application of the universality principle came a long way from the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in London to the most recent initiation of the proceedings against Hisséne Habré in Senegal.
Although a great amount of work has been undertaken in recent years to clarify universal jurisdiction, there is neither a consensus on what universal jurisdiction is or should be, nor regarding the crimes covered by the concept, either in doctrine or State practice. This Thesis identifies the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction in criminal law, distinguishes it from other related concepts, and shows that it offers a basis for ensuring accountability, addressing impunity gaps and providing justice to victims.