Abstract (eng)
This paper addresses the growing threat of cyberattacks on nation-states, the current lack of extensive literature which applies international relations theory to cyberattack cases, and an attempt to apply such theory to some of the available cases in hopes of analyzing how states respond when confronted with cyberattacks. Cyberattacks against states are on the rise, and the true threat level is not known. This paper begins with an explanation of the state of cybersecurity literature, and then proposes that a theory for explaining the responses of states after cyberattacks must be developed and tested. Following this, the IR schools of Liberalism, Constructivism and Realism are assessed for their potential explanatory power in regards to currently available cyberattack cases. A form of Defensive Realism is selected as the basis for developing a theory of cyberconflict, which will seek to explain the response behavior of states after cyberattacks. The theory predicts that, due to the inherent instability and anonymity of the cyber-sphere, states will tend toward defensive behavior when it comes to cyberconflict. The four cases which the theory will be applied to are: the Estonian attacks in 2007, the Stuxnet attack in 2010, the Shamoon Attacks, starting in 2012, and the Ukrainian Power Grid Hacks in 2015 and 2016. The conclusion of the analysis is that Defensive Relist application to cyberattack cases is mostly helpful in predicting and explaining state response behavior, but falls short in some areas, due to lack of access to information, inability to incorporate other possible variables such as national culture or history, and other factors. In the conclusion, shortcomings are discussed, and suggestions for further research in IR applied to cyber are proposed.