Title (eng)
Counterinsurgency - reasons for success and failure
U.S. counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2001-present)
Author
Naurah Khurshid
Advisor
Markus Kornprobst
Assessor
Markus Kornprobst
Abstract (deu)
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Faktoren, die den Erfolg oder das Scheitern einer Aufstandsbekämpfung durch eine Intervention bestimmen, zu identifizieren. Es wird argumentiert, dass politische und kulturelle Faktoren in Zusammenhang mit externer Unterstützung der Rebellen den Erfolg oder das Scheitern der Aufstandsbekämpfung erheblich beeinflussen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird der Bedeutung externer Akteure gewidmet, wobei argumentiert wird, dass diese zwar einflussreich sind, aber nicht allein den Erfolg oder das Scheitern einer Aufstandsbekämpfung bestimmen. Die Arbeit basiert auf zwei akademischen Disziplinen: Internationale Beziehungen und Geschichte. Es werden eine chronologische Analyse der Ereignisse des US-Afghanistan Krieges, sowie als Fallstudie, die daraus resultierende US-geführte Aufstandsbekämpfung in Afghanistan präsentiert.
Abstract (eng)
This thesis identifies the factors behind a successful or a failed counterinsurgency (COIN) by assessing the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the U.S.-led counterinsurgency there. This paper posits that political, cultural, and external factors play a decisive role in determining the successes or failures of counterinsurgency while putting specific emphasis on the external actor aspect. Two academic disciplines, International Relations and History, are incorporated in the research methodology to conduct a chronological analysis of the Afghan war and U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The thesis contends that while external actors’ support to insurgents can be detrimental, other factors such as internal politics, history, the host country’s culture, and regional geography also have a significant influence on counterinsurgency. The United States’ complex dynamics with Pakistan will also be focussed on, in order to assess the effect that U.S.-Pakistan relationship has on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The nature of conflict and war has evolved from regular aggression between states to irregular or unconventional warfare. These wars are characterised by an asymmetry in the military and economic prowess of the forces involved in the conflict. Though one is clearly superior to the other, the weaker party still poses a threat and persists in waging a war through unconventional means. Although there has been extensive research into unconventional war tactics and counterinsurgency strategies, and the U.S. army is well aware of these tactics, the United States finds itself engaged in a protracted conflict in Afghanistan. Authors who have contributed to theories of counterinsurgency include those who have served in the armed forces or have advised countries involved in counterinsurgencies. While there has been significant research on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, most of the analysis is based on military strategies and solutions. This thesis discusses political factors in greater detail, and emphasises the role of external actors.
Keywords (eng)
counterinsurgencywarAfghanistanU.S. historyInternational Relations
Keywords (deu)
AufstandsbekämpfungAfghanistanU.S.GeschichteInternationale Beziehungen
Subject (deu)
Type (deu)
Persistent identifier
Extent (deu)
86 Seiten
Number of pages
92
Study plan
Universitätslehrgang für Internationale Studien (M.A.I.S.-Lg)
[UA]
[992]
[940]
Association (deu)
Title (eng)
Counterinsurgency - reasons for success and failure
U.S. counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2001-present)
Author
Naurah Khurshid
Abstract (deu)
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Faktoren, die den Erfolg oder das Scheitern einer Aufstandsbekämpfung durch eine Intervention bestimmen, zu identifizieren. Es wird argumentiert, dass politische und kulturelle Faktoren in Zusammenhang mit externer Unterstützung der Rebellen den Erfolg oder das Scheitern der Aufstandsbekämpfung erheblich beeinflussen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird der Bedeutung externer Akteure gewidmet, wobei argumentiert wird, dass diese zwar einflussreich sind, aber nicht allein den Erfolg oder das Scheitern einer Aufstandsbekämpfung bestimmen. Die Arbeit basiert auf zwei akademischen Disziplinen: Internationale Beziehungen und Geschichte. Es werden eine chronologische Analyse der Ereignisse des US-Afghanistan Krieges, sowie als Fallstudie, die daraus resultierende US-geführte Aufstandsbekämpfung in Afghanistan präsentiert.
Abstract (eng)
This thesis identifies the factors behind a successful or a failed counterinsurgency (COIN) by assessing the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the U.S.-led counterinsurgency there. This paper posits that political, cultural, and external factors play a decisive role in determining the successes or failures of counterinsurgency while putting specific emphasis on the external actor aspect. Two academic disciplines, International Relations and History, are incorporated in the research methodology to conduct a chronological analysis of the Afghan war and U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The thesis contends that while external actors’ support to insurgents can be detrimental, other factors such as internal politics, history, the host country’s culture, and regional geography also have a significant influence on counterinsurgency. The United States’ complex dynamics with Pakistan will also be focussed on, in order to assess the effect that U.S.-Pakistan relationship has on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The nature of conflict and war has evolved from regular aggression between states to irregular or unconventional warfare. These wars are characterised by an asymmetry in the military and economic prowess of the forces involved in the conflict. Though one is clearly superior to the other, the weaker party still poses a threat and persists in waging a war through unconventional means. Although there has been extensive research into unconventional war tactics and counterinsurgency strategies, and the U.S. army is well aware of these tactics, the United States finds itself engaged in a protracted conflict in Afghanistan. Authors who have contributed to theories of counterinsurgency include those who have served in the armed forces or have advised countries involved in counterinsurgencies. While there has been significant research on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, most of the analysis is based on military strategies and solutions. This thesis discusses political factors in greater detail, and emphasises the role of external actors.
Keywords (eng)
counterinsurgencywarAfghanistanU.S. historyInternational Relations
Keywords (deu)
AufstandsbekämpfungAfghanistanU.S.GeschichteInternationale Beziehungen
Subject (deu)
Type (deu)
Persistent identifier
Number of pages
92
Association (deu)
License
- Citable links
- Other links
- Managed by
- Details
- Metadata
- Export formats