Abstract (eng)
The aim of this paper is to understand to what extent the ideal of freedom as non-interference can be clearly distinguished from the ideal of freedom as non-domination in Philip Pettit's theory of neo-republicanism. For this purpose, the two basic theses “domination but no interference: bad only under the non-domination ideal” and “interference but no domination: bad only under the non-interference ideal” are tested on the basis of four underlying conditions. The result will be that those conditions are not sufficient to confirm the two theses, since, on the one hand, the ideal of freedom as non-domination could be interpreted as individual freedom of choice, and on the other hand, Pettit's reductionist reading of the ideal of freedom as noninterference can be rejected. It is therefore argued that a substantial understanding of arbitrariness is necessary in order to confirm the two theses. Subsequently, a new focus will be placed on the ideal of “equal status society” and the ideal of “contestatory democracy”. It will be concluded that the neo-republican concept of freedom should be interpreted as “arbitrary but non-worsening power” and that stronger participatory rights for “vulnerability classes” are necessary. The last part points out the relevance of such a reorientation of the ideal of freedom as non-domination for a critical approach on the French integration model. To this end, the neorepublican concept of the “républicanisme critique” by Cécile Laborde and the concept of the “républicanisme multicultural” by Guérard de Latour will be presented. Hereby, further strong tensions of the political implications of the ideal of freedom as non-domination become visible.