Abstract (eng)
The present thesis examines, firstly, whether an EMU exit could be possible without an EU exit under existing EU Treaties and, secondly, the economic and financial consequences of a currency exit in the Gr-exit context of 2015. Both legal analysis on EU law as well as an assessment on economic elements especially focusing on the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas by Robert A. Mundell are utilized. In this respect, an EU amendment, an EU-exit with a simultaneous EMU exit, and a Council agreement represent the three options we analyze for the present purposes. Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each scenario, it seems that an amendment as well as a Council agreement would require high political efforts while an accession/re-accession case would entail massive procedural technicalities in terms of EU law. From a debt restructuring perspective, a debt repayable in the new drachma currency would be conceivable only through a Council agreement or an EU amendment. With regard to the consequences (‘viability’) of the initiative, the positive effects of devaluation are certainly a point for a Gr-exit; however, from an Optimum Currency Area perspective, an already integrated country concerning trade and labor factors would mean that Greece would ‘lose’, at least, in the field of its trade relations. From our part, we cannot neglect the argument that an exit scenario could result in, domestically, severe political repercussions, social distress, legal uncertainty, and ‘unknown economics’; but, nonetheless, these phenomena might refer to only a limited period of time. Moreover, the fact that the present assessment regards an EMU-exit rather than an EU-exit eventually uncovers the non-dramatic side of the initiative.