Abstract (eng)
Over the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) existence, judges have had three opportunities to make a pronouncement on nuclear weapons. In each pronouncement (two judgments and one advisory opinion), they showed caution and judicial self- restraint. This thesis discusses the potential reasons for this restrictive approach. Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are of high political relevance. However, this is only one possible explanation for judicial self-restraint. First, the thesis presents useful theoretical concepts that could explain judicial self- restraint, including the system of optional jurisdiction in the international sphere and the Court’s composition. As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the ICJ no longer primarily rules on technical disputes; instead, it has confronted an increasing number of disputes with various degrees of political involvement. However, many legal scholars have argued that the ICJ does not have legitimate authority to decide highly political matters and that such cases should be considered non-justiciable and dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction. However, the thesis argues that all contentious cases contain political elements to a certain extent and that no valid distinctions can be drawn in practice. It also discusses the Court’s judicial responsibility as an institution that contributes to the development of international law. When the applicable legal rules are ambiguous and obscure, the ICJ is empowered to fill legal lacunae. In addition, the ICJ’s three pronouncements on nuclear weapons are critically examined based on previously established concepts established. Lastly, some attempts to respond to the Court’s judicial self-restraint towards nuclear weapons are presented, highlighting the role of States in the international sphere and joint efforts to achieve global nuclear disarmament.